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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH OUTLINE 
1.1 Prologue 
In 2000, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), in cooperation with 
the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), issued a new proposal to change 
the current accounting regulation with respect to leasing to an alternative approach 
(IASB (2000) and Lennard and Nailor (2000)). This new lease-accounting approach, 
called the “asset and liability approach”, capitalises all leases on the balance sheet. 
This contrasts with the current lease-accounting approach, called the “risk and 
reward approach”, which discriminates between the recognition of financial leases 
on the balance sheet and the disclosure of operating leases off the balance sheet. 
Although also the new approach has many opponents, both the IASB and the FASB 
voted in July 20062 to add to its agenda again the project on leasing. This project is 
expected to result in a discussion paper in 2008 that will fundamentally change the 
way lease contracts are recognised in the financial statement of lessees and lessors 
(IASB (2006)). 
 
In 2003, the former chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
Arthur Levitt argues that since the collapse of Enron3 the SEC needs to grapple 
with several issues. One of these issues is that investors should ask the following 
questions: ‘Should companies still be allowed to leave billions of off-balance-sheet 
debt, such as lease financing, out of a company's reported liabilities? Off-balance-
sheet debt persists, distorting the financial picture investors have been given in 
companies in many sectors. Markets will discipline themselves and their 
participants, but only if they have accurate information.’ (Levitt (2003)). In other 
words, he questions whether the current lease-accounting standards that allow 
operating leases to be disclosed in the footnotes to the financial statements should 
remain in place. At the other hand, the Dutch Accounting Standards Board 
(DASB)4, argues that the elimination of the off-balance sheet character of operating 
leases will ‘place an undue requirement on a lessee to recognise assets used, but not 
controlled, by the enterprise5’. And although the DASB supports the initiative to 
review the current manner of accounting for leases, they suggest to maintain the 
current lease accounting standard with additional prescriptive guidance that may 
address the problems with the existing standard. In short, the above is the subject 
of this thesis; Does lease financing indeed distort the financial picture? Do market 
participants have sufficiently accurate information? Moreover, could additional 
requirements address (some of-) the problems with the existing standard? 
 
The remaining of this introduction is set up as follows; section 1.2 describes the aim 
and the relevance of this study. This section also presents the main research 
questions of this study. Section 1.3 presents the position and contribution of this 
study to previous research, by first, defining accounting theory and accounting 
                                                          
2 The introduction of a new lease-accounting standard did not have the highest priority in 2000 and probably 
suffered from the attention given to the introduction of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
3  In short: on December 2nd 2001, Enron Corporation, one of the largest corporations in the world, filed for 
bankruptcy. This was mainly caused by its hundreds of Special Purpose Entities (SPEs), which under the US GAAP 
did not have to be consolidated in the Enron annual accounts, which were afterwards said to be misleading. 
4 Until July 15th, 2005, the Dutch Accounting Standards Board (DASB) was known as the Council for Annual 
Reporting (CAR). 
5 Chairman of the DASB, Johan van Helleman, in a comment letter of August 3rd, 2000, to the G4+1 Position Paper 
on Leasing IASB (2000) 
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research approaches (1.3.1), and subsequently, places this study within this 
accounting research spectrum (1.3.2). Section 1.3.2 also shows the outline of this 
study.  
1.2 Aim and relevance of the study 
In 1976, Miller and Upton began one of their articles with the statement that, ‘ the 
contrast between the economist's approach and the accountant's approach to 
problems of corporate decision-making is nowhere better illustrated than in the 
lease-or-buy decision’ (Miller and Upton (1976, p.1)). The neoclassical economist’s 
choice between leasing and buying depends on non-financial advantages (such as 
maintenance, disposal, etc.), assuming that the purely financial costs of both choices 
are equivalent. The accountant, however, takes the non-financial advantages as 
equal, and his choice depends on presumed (financial) advantages of one method 
over the other. Although the article of Miller and Upton focused on the tax 
implications of the choice, the contrast between the two professions today with 
respect to leasing is still relevant. Brealey and Myers (2003) distinguish between 
sensible economic reasons for leases (offering convenience, tax advantages) and non-
sensible accounting reasons for leases (bringing operating leases off the balance 
sheet to show a better financial performance), (Monson (2001) and Brealey and 
Myers (2003)). 
 
This study focuses on operating leases and not on financial leases. First of all, this 
is because the off-balance-sheet character of operating leases is the main issue 
behind the discussion on the lease-accounting standard. The off-balance-sheet 
character allows a lease to be structured in such a way that it is less transparent; 
this has caused many authors to question whether this does not distort the financial 
picture of a company (see, for example, Levitt (2003) and SEC (2005)). Second, 
operating leases are by far the dominant lease type, compared to financial leases. 
This was established, for example, by the SEC in the US6 (SEC (2005)), and by 
Beattie, Goodacre and Thomson (2006) in the UK. 
 
The relevance of the disclosure instead of capitalisation of operating leases can be 
seen in the intensified research and interest from both the IASB and FASB (IASB 
(2006)) on their proposals that urge capitalisation of all leases on the balance sheet 
(IASB (2000) and Lennard and Nailor (2000)). The disclosure of important 
accounting information has been a hot topic ever since the Enron debacle. The 
Enron case boiled down to the abuse of accounting standards to show a better 
financial performance; in the end, such manipulation only harms the users of the 
financial statements. One of the reactions following the bankruptcy of Enron was 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act7. This act has as its objective (p.1 of the act) to ‘protect 
investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made 
pursuant to the securities laws’. In 2005, the SEC released a report on off-balance-
sheet activity as required by section 401 (c) of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SEC (2005)). 
This report is clear in its opinion of the current lease accounting standards and 
                                                          
6 The SEC report showed that for their sample of 200 companies approximately 77% of all companies report 
operating leases as opposed to 30% reporting financial leases; the future commitments under operating leases were 
USD 205 billion as opposed to USD 16 billion financial leases. Beattie et al. (2006) showed that of the companies in 
the FTSE100, 65% had financial leases and 92 had operating leases; the median ratio of operating leases to financial 
leases was 6.2. 
7 An act issued by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress 
assembled on January 23, 2002. 
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what it enables; the SEC (p.63) argues that ‘many issuers involved in leasing, 
structure their lease agreements to achieve whatever accounting objective is 
desired. This structuring of leases in order to meet various accounting, tax and 
other goals has become an industry in itself during the last 30 years’.  
 
The study aims to contribute to the discussion of whether the current 
(international) lease-accounting standards best serve the users of the financial 
statements. This will be evaluated from two perspectives: first, the perspective of 
the individual user of the financial statements, and second, the perspective of a 
company’s management who decide to become (heavily) involved in operating 
leases. The study will evaluate whether the disclosed information on operating 
leases is useful from the perspective of the individual user of the financial 
statements. If the information required on operating leases is neither transparent, 
nor sufficiently complete nor reliable, and subsequently does not allow a fair 
comparison between high- and low-leasing companies, then adjustments to the 
accounting standard on operating leases might be appropriate. Second, a change in 
the accounting standard with respect to operating leases is also desirable if 
companies deliberately use the current off-balance possibilities to influence the 
accounting information. This is separately investigated for companies facing 
bankruptcy. Therefore, the study is divided in three main parts, first, the decision 
usefulness of operating lease disclosure for individual users of the financial 
statements; second, the determinants of the operating-lease decisions by company’s 
management; and third, whether operating leases have predictive power in 
financial distress prediction models.  
 
Therefore, the study’s relevance lies in the improvement of the lease-accounting 
standard. The results of this study might assist standard setters in adjusting the 
accounting standards with respect to operating leases in such a way that it benefits 
the users of the financial statements and maintains the sensible economic 
advantages of leasing for companies. Bowen (1999) analysed the economic 
determinants of accounting method choices, and he argued that the results should 
be useful for standard setters. ‘Standard setters must understand the economic 
motives underlying accounting choices in order to determine how the flexibility 
allowed in financial reporting is being utilised’, (Bowen, 1999, p.30.) 
 
The descriptive research in this study will be supported by empirical studies using 
Dutch data. The Netherlands is interesting for this study for three reasons: first, 
virtually no research has been done with Dutch leasing data; second, operating 
leasing seems to be a significant source of financing in the Netherlands; and third, 
comparable studies have been done for the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Belgium, Australia and New Zealand, which makes international comparison 
possible.  
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The main research question of this thesis builds upon the opinions of both the SEC 
and the DASB as described in the prologue and is formulated as follows: 
 
Main research question: 
 
“While the on-balance treatment of operating leases has both many 
opponents as proponents, an intermediate solution might be acceptable 
for both sides: How can the current lease-accounting standard be 
improved? 
 
The purpose of this thesis is twofold, first to investigate whether the current lease-
accounting standard provides sufficient transparent information to the user of the 
financial statement and second whether the current-lease accounting standard 
drives the decision to choose operating leases instead of sensible business reasons 
arising from company characteristics. Because the latter is separately investigated 
for companies facing bankruptcy or financial-distress, three sub questions are 
deducted from the central research question: 
 
1. Do the requirements of the current lease accounting standards regarding 
operating lease disclosures, result in useful information to individual users 
of the financial statements? 
 
2. What company characteristics determine whether a company has a high- 
or low- operating lease intensity? 
 
3. Do financial distressed companies have a higher operating-lease intensity 
than healthy companies? 
 
These questions each relate to a different area of accounting research. This is shown 
in the next section. 
1.3 Position and contribution of this study to prior research  
As described above, a difference exists between the evaluation of (operating) leases 
based on the financial advantages and based on the accounting implications of 
(operating) leases (the economist approach versus the accountant approach, as 
described by Miller and Upton (1976)). However, finance and accounting research 
can be very closely related. For example, as Watts and Zimmerman (1986) describe, 
the efficient-market hypothesis, which found its base in the economics and finance 
literature, eventually had a major impact in accounting research. In order to 
understand where this study fits within the accounting research spectrum and what 
the contribution of this research will be, the next subsection compares the prior 
literature on leasing with the existing accounting theories. 
 
1.3.1 Accounting theories 
In 1977, the Committee on Concepts and Standards for External Financial Reports 
(the “Committee”) of the American Accounting Association (“AAA”) published the 
Statement on Accounting Theory and Theory Acceptance (American Accounting 
Association (1977)). This statement explored certain theoretical approaches to 
accounting. According to the Committee (p.1), ‘there has been a persistent, widely 
held belief among accountants that the accumulation of accounting theory would 
  INTRODUCTION 
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eventually lead to a compelling basis for specifying the content of external financial 
reports’. In the view of the Committee, ‘a single universally accepted basic 
accounting theory does not exist at this time. Instead, a multiplicity of theories has 
been proposed’ and ‘it is unrealistic to expect accounting theory to provide 
unequivocal policy guidance’ (p.51). More recently, this was confirmed by Riahi-
Belkaoui (2000, p.65), who states that ‘it must be recognised that no comprehensive 
theory of accounting exists at the present time’. Riahi-Belkaoui maintains that the 
primary objective of accounting theory is to provide a basis for the prediction and 
explanation of accounting behaviour and events.  
 
The AAA identified three basic theoretical approaches: (1) classical models, (2) 
decision usefulness and (3) information economics. The three approaches 
(“paradigms”) defined by AAA were discussed extensively by Riahi-Belkaoui (2000). 
Appendix 1.I summarises the findings of both publications. In short, these three 
approaches can be described as follows: 
(1)  Classical models 
Within the classical models, a distinction can be made between normative 
(measuring true income) and positive theories. Whereas normative theories 
are concerned with prescription (what ought to happen), positive theories 
are concerned with explanation and prediction (what does/will happen) 
(Ryan, Scapens and Theobold (2002)). Watts and Zimmerman (1986) 
describe the positive accounting theory extensively.  
(2)  Decision usefulness 
While for the normative theories the primary goal was to determine a 
measure of true income, researchers in the 1970s became aware of the fact 
that financial reporting is concerned with providing information to various 
decision makers. Various income-determination models might be used for 
different purposes. This led to decision-usefulness research (see Beattie in 
Ryan et al. (2002).) Although the decision-usefulness approach did not 
succeed in providing the logical basis for accounting choices, it did stimulate 
two principal types of empirical study: behavioural accounting research 
(focused on the decision outcome of the individual user) and market-based 
accounting research (focused on the decision outcome and market security 
prices).  
(3)  Information economics 
Information economics treats information as a conventional economic 
commodity, the acquisition of which constitutes a problem of economic 
choice (American Accounting Association (1977, p.21)). This approach is 
concerned with the costs and prices of information. Rationality is the major 
assumption underlying this approach.  
 
Although the accounting research approaches in as shown in Appendix 1.I can be 
useful in defining the research spectrum of a study (such as this study), it is not 
possible to pinpoint each study in exactly one specific theoretical approach. First, 
when looking at the main research question of this study, it can be argued that the 
decision-usefulness approach is the basis for further research on operating-lease 
disclosure, since transparency and reliability of the disclosed information is the 
subject of this study. However, this study also seeks to investigate why some 
companies use more leases than other companies, and whether these companies 
deliberately choose an accounting method that is less useful in decision-making. As 
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mentioned before, the decision-usefulness approach did not succeed in providing a 
logical explanation for accounting choices. Research on accounting choice (see, for 
example, Fields, Lys and Vincent (2001) and El-Gazzar, Lilien and Pastena (1986) 
on the decision to lease) found its base in the positive accounting research. For 
example, the debt hypothesis, as first described by Watts and Zimmerman (1986), is 
connected with the decision to lease, described by El-Gazzar et al.(1986). 
 
Another example of the overlap is the effect of corporate disclosure on the efficiency 
of capital markets. This has been investigated in general (as disclosure is critical to 
efficient capital markets, according to Healy and Palepu (2001)), but also 
specifically, with respect to lease capitalisation. Efficient capital market research 
has been classified in the decision-usefulness approach (see Appendix 1.I). But 
again, efficient capital markets are also the subject of positive accounting theory 
and accounting choices as described by Fields et al. (2001), which classified the 
accounting choice literature in three groups based on the capital market 
imperfections that makes accounting important in a given setting: agency costs, 
information asymmetries and externalities affecting non-contracting parties. The 
first two were described extensively in the positive accounting theory of Watts and 
Zimmerman in 1986.  
 
Finally, Beattie (in: Ryan et al. (2002)), states that positive accounting research 
relies to a considerable extent on finance theories such as the capital asset pricing 
models and the efficient-market hypothesis. Holthausen and Leftwich (1983) also 
explicitly mention in a footnote (p.77) that most theories explaining the link 
between firms, cash flow and reported accounting numbers are commonly referred 
to as positive theories. This classification of ‘positive theory’, however, is not their 
distinguishing feature, since most research in accounting is positive, according to 
Holthausen et al. (1983).  
 
A more precise classification was therefore needed. Competition between the three 
abovementioned paradigms led to new streams in accounting research, whereby 
each new approach acquired the attributes of a distinct paradigm, causing 
accounting to become a multi-paradigmatic discipline (Riahi-Belkaoui (2000)). 
These new approaches found their base in the paradigms described above, but are 
more refined, are summarised in Table 1.1. 
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Table 1.1 Accounting Research Approaches (Riahi-Belkaoui (2000)) 
APPROACH OBJECTIVE RELATED STUDIES 
Events approach To maximise forecasting 
accuracy of accounting reports 
Studies focusing on real events that are 
transformed by the user to accounting 
information 
Behavioural approach To explain and predict human 
behaviour 
Five general classes of studies: 
1. Adequacy of disclosure  
2. Usefulness of financial statement data 
3. Attitudes about corporate reporting 
practices 
4. Materiality judgements 
5. Decision effects of alternative accounting 
procedures 
Human Information 
Processing approach 
To improve both the information 
set presented to users of financial 
data and the ability of the user to 
use the information 
Studies related to: 
1. Input of variables that affect the way 
people process information 
2. Processing of information 
3. Judgement, prediction or decisions that 
affect how  information is processed. 
Predictive approach To solve the problem of 
evaluating alternative methods of 
accounting measurements; 
predictive ability is related to one 
purpose of gathering accounting 
data: facilitation of decision-
making 
Studies related to: 
1. Prediction of an economic event 
(including time-series analysis, distress 
prediction and bond ratings) 
2. Prediction of market reactions: market-
based research in accounting, such as 
capital market models, efficient market 
hypothesis 
Positive approach To understand, explain and 
predict existing accounting 
practices 
Studies on what factors are likely to affect the 
optimum choice, guided by the assumption of 
agency and contracting cost theories. 
 
In the next sub-section the three research questions of this study will be placed in 
these accounting research approaches. Appendix 1.II summarises previous studies 
with respect to (operating-leasing) and their placement within the (accounting-) 
research areas. 
 
1.3.2 This study within the accounting research spectrum 
This study (see section 1.2) aims to contribute to the discussion on whether 
operating leases should be capitalised on the balance sheet instead of disclosed in 
the footnote of the financial statements. First under investigation will be the 
usefulness of the information provided in the footnotes to the financial statement 
for the users of these financial statements (decision usefulness). Integral to this 
question is whether the operating-lease commitments are of a material amount, 
because only then does the entire study make sense. Second, it is questioned what 
determines the choice of a company’s management of operating leases, with an 
emphasis on the determinants following from the lease-accounting standard 
(accounting choice)? Third, the study will investigate whether bankruptcy-
prediction models would improve if they would include operating leases as an 
explanatory variable.  
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This study contains five parts, including an introductorily part and a concluding 
part. The three parts in-between, as shown below, have, due to the particular 
research questions addressed, their own prior research- and literature section, their 
own hypotheses or research questions, and methods used for empirical testing.  
 
Figure 1.1 Outline of this study and related accounting research approaches (as described in Table 1.1) 
Chapter 1:
Objective of the study
Chapter 2: 
Leasing in general
Introduction Summary, 
conclusions 
recommendations
Chapter 10
Required operating 
lease disclosures:
useful information?
Chapter 3: 
Criteria of useful information
Chapter 4: 
Review and refinement of 
operating lease capitalisation 
approaches
Chapter 5: 
Empirical study on the impact 
of capitalisation on financial 
ratios
Behavioural approach:
Adequacy of disclosure and
usefulness of accounting data
Operating lease 
intensity 
in financial-distress
prediction models
Chapter 8:
Literature review
Chapter 9: 
Empirical investigation of 
the predictive ability of 
operating lease intensity
Predictive approach:
Predictive ability of 
accounting data
Determinants 
of the 
operating lease 
decision
Chapter 6: 
Literature review
Chapter 7: 
Empirical investigation of 
the determinants of the 
operating lease decision
Positive approach:
What factors are likely to 
affect accounting choices
Part I Part III Part IV Part VPart II 
 
 
Chapters 1 and 2 describe the objective of this study and leasing in general.  
Whereas this chapter is an introductorily chapter on the research subject and 
research outline, chapter 2 will especially show the specific circumstances with 
respect to operating leases, with an emphasis on the Netherlands. These particular 
circumstances, such as the legal aspects, operating leases as opposed to financial 
leases in volume- and in accounting treatment, and the growth of the leasing 
industry, will once more underline the relevance of this study.  
 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 address the first research question: Do the requirements of the 
current lease accounting standards regarding the disclosure of operating leases 
result in useful information to the individual user of the financial statements? The 
off-balance sheet character of operating leases has an impact on the financial ratios 
derived from on-balance number. These financial ratios are used in many ways to 
measure performance— for example, by rating agencies, in financial databases, in 
management compensation contracts, and in debt contracts. As described by Bowen, 
DuCharme and Shores (1999), even when neither explicit nor implicit agreements 
exist, stakeholders may rely on reported accounting numbers in order to make 
decisions. The impact of operating lease capitalisation on key financial ratios has 
been investigated using different capitalisation procedures (see Appendix 1.II). The 
impact that lease capitalisation has on key financial ratios might influence the 
perceived financial performance of the analysed company and the decisions 
following from the financial analysis. The first research question investigates 
whether the disclosed information on operating lease is sufficiently complete and 
reliable to enable users of the financial statements to capitalise the operating lease 
commitments. This is will only be relevant when the operating lease commitments 
are of a material amount.  
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Therefore, answering the first research question will address the following sub-
questions: 
• When is accounting information useful for decision-making? 
• Does the accounting standard on operating leases fulfil the requirements of decision 
usefulness? 
• How can operating-lease commitments be capitalised? 
• Are the operating-lease commitments of a material amount? 
• How sensitive is the capitalisation of operating leases to assumptions made by the individual 
user? 
• What is the impact on financial ratios if operating leases are capitalised?  
• Do the different capitalisation approaches arrive at consistent and comparable results? 
 
This study improves on the existing capitalisation approaches and investigates 
whether the available capitalisation methods arrive at significantly different 
outcomes. Significant different outcomes imply different evaluations of the financial 
performance of a company or its managers, and therefore different decisions taken, 
merely by choosing one method over another. This research first describes in 
chapter 3 the criteria of decision usefulness, as defined by accounting-standard 
setters such as the IASB and the DASB. Chapter 4 describes the capitalisation 
approaches that have been previously been developed by different researchers. 
Chapter 5 then empirically tests the criteria of decision usefulness using the 
financial statements of 119 Dutch listed companies during the period 2000-2004. 
The chapter also tests the sensitivity of the results to the assumptions and 
capitalisation approaches.  
 
Chapters 5 and 6 address the second research question: What company 
characteristics determine whether a company is a high- or low-leasing company?, or 
in other words, what are the determinants of the operating lease decision? 
 
These chapters investigate whether companies with substantial operating-lease 
commitments have specific characteristics. This provides greater insight into the 
determinants of the leasing decision. Since an important question is whether the 
accounting reason to lease instead of the economic reasons to lease is an important 
driver in the leasing decision, prior research on accounting choice will be described. 
In 2001, Fields et al. described accounting choice, including also a classification of 
the choice between operating and financial leases (see p.262). They also describe in 
depth the debt hypothesis (managers select or change accounting methods to avoid 
covenant violations). Several researchers have investigated especially the 
accounting choice for leasing. Many researchers, however, investigate the choice for 
financial leases instead of operating leases. Also the studies that do investigate the 
determinants of operating leasing choice do not take into account the capitalised 
value of the leases. This study investigates the determinants of only operating 
leasing choice. Additionally, this study will take into account the impact on the 
some of the determinants of the capitalisation of operating leases (as described in 
chapters 4 and 5) as opposed to the approach of previous studies in using only the 
unadjusted variables. This might add valuable new information on the leasing 
decision8.  
                                                          
8 For example, the before-capitalisation leverage ratio might not show any statistical explanatory power because the 
company’s goal was to lower leverage, and they might have succeeded in this goal. Thus, taking the after-
capitalisation debt-ratios of the company may have more explanatory power to uncover the true reason for this 
particular accounting choice. 
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Questions addressed in part III: 
• What determines the choice of a company’s management regarding operating leases? 
• What are the characteristics of high-leasing companies as opposed to low-leasing companies? 
• Do these characteristics conform to what might be expected according to the accounting-
choice literature? 
 
Chapters 8 and 9 address the third, and last, research question of this study: Do 
financial distressed companies have a higher operating-lease intensity than healthy 
companies? These chapters will investigate the use of operating leases as 
explanatory variable in financial-distress prediction. Financial distress is a 
characteristic that is not present in the dataset of the Dutch listed, healthy, 
companies used in the chapters 6 and 7. In addition, financial-distress or 
bankruptcy-prediction is often based on financial ratios, which ratios will change 
when operating leases instead of financial leases are chosen (the impact of 
operating-lease capitalisation as described in chapters 4 and 5). Therefore, the use 
of operating leases by companies in financial distress, compared to their use among 
healthy firms, is investigated. Operating leases have been incorporated in 
bankruptcy prediction by Elam (1975), Altman, Haldeman and Narayanan (1977) 
and Lawrence and Bear (1986). This study contributes at least two items to this 
prior research. First, the previous studies are rather outdated. Twenty years ago, 
leasing was still innovative, and not transparent; nowadays, it is a substantial form 
of financing, and more information on operating leases has become available during 
the last ten years. Second, the statistical approach used in the previous studies 
(multiple discriminant analysis) is updated since; nowadays, logistic regression is 
preferred in financial-distress prediction. Both arguments provide a call for a more 
reliable study, regardless of the outcome of the investigation. Questions addressed 
in this part are: 
• What are the previously dominant accounting variables used in financial-distress prediction? 
• Are these accounting variables affected by the capitalisation of operating leases? 
• Do financial distressed companies use relatively more operating leases? 
• Does the inclusion of operating-lease commitments in financial-distress prediction models 
improve their classification accuracy? 
 
Limitations of the study 
This study does not pretend to be the first study addressing (parts of-) these 
research questions (see also Appendix 1.II). However, this study extends previous 
research on several aspects. These aspects will especially become clear in each of 
the following chapters addressing the specific research questions. This study 
extends previous studies especially on 1) the impact of operating lease capitalisation 
on financial ratios (including the capitalisation approach, 2) whether the 
information is sufficiently complete to enable the capitalisation, and 3) on the 
determinants of the lease-decision (including the non-financial advantages as 
preserving debt capacity but excluding the lease-or buy-decision as an optimal 
investment decision).  
 
Furthermore, this study does not answer the question what ultimately serves best 
the user of the financial statements: all leases on the balance sheet or maintaining 
the distinction between financial- and operating leases. In my opinion, that 
discussion is more extensive than only limited to leases. It contains the underlying 
question whether all kinds of (long-term-) rights and obligations should be 
capitalised on the balance sheet, regardless of legal- and/or economic-ownership. 
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This is also acknowledged by for example the IASB who suggest to exclude 
executory contracts from the proposed lease-accounting standard, based on the idea 
that the ‘both parties are still to perform to an equal degree the actions promised by 
and required of them under the contract’ (IASB (2000, p.11)). This is subject to 
discussion while the distinction between leases and executory contracts will again 
bring a degree of artificiality and arbitrariness again in the lease-accounting 
standard (comment letters to the IASB (2000) proposal). This study does contribute 
to the knowledge how important the accounting reason to lease is and how the 
distinction between financial- and operating leases determines the choice for 
operating leases. 
 
Finally, part II addresses the decision usefulness of information in the financial 
statements and especially with respect to operating leases. This is done by 
connecting the qualitative criteria of useful information, with previous research on 
the use of financial ratios by users of the financial statements and the possible 
impact operating leases might have on these financial ratios. However, no research 
has been undertaken amongst users of financial statements in order to directly 
investigate their attitude towards the decisions usefulness of information disclosed 
on operating leases. Such a study might be worthwhile to carry out in the future. 
 
This introductorily part will now continue with a general description of the specific 
aspect concerning operating leases (in the Netherlands) in the next chapter 2. 
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Appendix 1.I : Accounting research approaches 
 OBJECTIVE BASIC SUBJECT THEORIES METHODS 
CLASSICAL APPROACH    
* Inductive school To understand, explain and predict 
existing accounting practices 
 existing accounting practices 
 management attitudes towards 
those practices 
 information economics 
 analytical/agency models 
 income smoothing/earnings management 
hypotheses 
 positive theory of accounting 
 techniques used in income smoothing 
research, earnings-management research and 
positive theory research 
 
* Normative Deductive 
school  
To present an alternative to the 
historical cost model 
 constructing theory based on 
logical and normative reasoning 
and conceptual rigor 
 a concept of ideal income based on 
another method than the historical 
cost method 
 price level adjusted accounting 
 replacement cost accounting 
 deprival-value accounting 
 continuously contemporary (net realisable 
value) accounting 
 present-value accounting 
 general analytic reasoning 
DECISION-USEFULNESS APPROACH    
* Decision-usefulness / decision model   
 Information relevant to a decision 
model is determined and then 
implemented by choosing the best 
accounting alternative. 
 the usefulness of accounting 
information to decision model 
 theories that deal with different kinds of 
business decision-making including buy-
versus-lease decision 
 theories that deal with different economic 
events that may affect a going concern 
(including bankruptcy, bond ratings, 
takeovers) 
 empirical techniques to determine the 
predictive ability of selected items of 
information. General approach has been 
discriminant analysis to classify into several 
a priori groupings 
* Decision-usefulness / decision maker    
aggregate market 
behaviour 
The decision usefulness of accounting 
information can be derived from 
aggregate market behaviour 
  the aggregate-market response to 
accounting variables 
 based on the theory of capital market 
efficiency. A change in information will 
automatically result in new equilibrium. 
Theories include: 
 Efficient market model 
 Efficient market hypothesis 
 Capital asset pricing model 
 Arbitrage pricing theory 
 Equilibrium theory of option pricing 
 market model 
 beta-estimation models 
 event study methodology 
 Ohlson’s evaluation model 
 Price-level balance-sheet evaluation models 
 Information content of earning models 
 Models of the relation between earnings and 
return 
   
Individual user Behavioural accounting research is the 
study of how accounting functions, and 
reports the influence the behaviour of 
accountants and non-accountants 
 the individual user response to 
accounting variable. Accounting is 
viewed as a behavioural process. 
 Behavioural accounting theories borrowed 
from other disciplines to explain and predict 
human behaviour in an accounting context. 
 interviews 
 questionnaires 
 experiments 
INFORMATION / ECONOMICS APPROACH  
 Accounting information is evaluated in 
terms of its ability to improve the 
quality of the optimal choice. 
 information is an economic 
commodity 
 acquisition of information amounts 
to a problem of economic choice 
 theory of teams 
 statistical decision theory 
 economic theory of choice 
 analytical reasoning 
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Appendix 1.II : Objectives of previous studies with respect to leasing and their 
accounting research approach 
Leasing has been the subject of many finance and accounting studies. Leasing as a 
research subject can be divided into three main discussions areas; first, the lease 
decision; second, the substitutability of leasing and debt, and third, the impact of 
lease capitalisation on key financial ratios. These areas are summarised in the 
following table. 
 
OBJECTIVE ACCOUNTING RESEARCH APPROACH STUDIES 
I. The leasing decision, focussing on either:  
1) Measurable financial 
variables  
Theories of optimal investment decisions, 
lease-or buy, highest net present value 
Myers, Dill and Bautista (1976), 
Miller and Upton (1976), Smith 
and Wakeman (1985), Lewellen, 
Long and McConnell (1976; 
Franks and Hodges (1987; 
Grenadier (1995), Sharpe and 
Nguyen (1995), Trigeorgis 
(1996),Herst (1983)  
 
2)  Non (-direct) financial 
advantages 
Positive approach (accounting choices, 
financial contracting theory) 
Lasfer and Levis (1998), Monson 
(2001), Mehran, Taggart and 
Yermack (1999), El-Gazzar et al. 
(1986), Sharpe and Nguyen 
(1995), Smith and Wakeman 
(1985) 
 
II. The lease-debt-substitutability  
  
Positive approach, as well as theories of 
optimal investment decisions (see the lease-
or-buy decisions) 
 
Lewellen and Emery (1980; Slovin, 
Sushka and Polonchek (1990; 
Lewis and Schalheim (1992), Ang 
and Peterson (1984), Beattie, 
Goodacre and Thomson (2000b), 
Bowman (1980), Deloof and 
Verschueren (1999) 
III. Operating lease capitalisation, either  
1) Impact on financial 
ratios 
Behavioural approach, usefulness  and 
materiality of accounting data 
Beattie, Edwards and Goodacre 
(1998), Goodacre (2001), Imhoff, 
Lipe and Wright (1991), Imhoff, 
Lipe and Wright (1997), Bennet 
and Bradbury (2003), Elam (1975), 
Wilkins and Zimmer (1983), 
Monson (2001) 
 
2) Relation with equity 
risk 
Predictive and behavioural approach, 
testing market efficiency 
Slovin et al. (1990; Ely (1995), 
Beattie, Goodacre and Thomson 
(2000a), Lipe (2001) 
 
I. The leasing decision can be split into research relating to either financial 
advantages or to non-financial drivers. 
 
Financial advantages, the “lease-or-buy” decision, concerns research based on 
the financial and/or tax differences between leasing an asset and buying the 
asset. The lease-or-buy decision is more a finance research subject than an 
accounting research subject (which also can be seen by the number of times 
that the Journal of Finance is the publishing journal). It is very much focused 
on the direct financial advantages of leasing, particularly on the tax 
differential between lessee and lessor. The information analysed for the 
purpose of these studies is mainly financial data (differential tax rates, cash-
flow implications of leasing) rather than accounting data. Often assumptions 
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are made of perfectly competitive capital markets with no transaction costs or 
information asymmetries (see also Sharpe and Nguyen (1995)), and most of 
the analyses involve analytical reasoning (choosing leasing instead of buying 
if leasing has a higher net present value). Most research is based on the 
Myers, Dill and Bautista model, which does not consider the determinants of 
optimal capital structure and assumes that the firm has excess debt capacity 
(Myers et al. (1976))9. In the Netherlands an extensive study in this area has 
been undertaken by Herst (1983). Riahi-Belkaoui (2000) explicitly places the 
lease-buy decision within the decision-usefulness/decision model approach 
(see Appendix 1.I). In addition, Riahi-Belkaoui places all finance theory-
related research (concerning efficient markets, capital asset pricing model, 
etc.) within the predictive approach (market-based research). Although this is 
true when using accounting data, this finance research, as described, focuses 
on the decision to lease based on NPV-calculation using financial data; this 
research should therefore be classified within the theories of optimal 
investment decisions. 
 
Non-financial drivers, or non-direct financial advantages, concern research 
focused on aspects other than choosing the alternative with the highest net 
present value. Aspects considered include maximizing convenience, 
preserving debt capacity, avoiding agency costs, and avoiding breach-of-debt 
covenants. As described before, Brealy and Myers (1998) define some of these 
non-financial drivers as sensible business decisions (together with the 
financial drivers), but the decisions are based on keeping the debt off the 
balance sheet (preserving debt capacity) as a non-sensible accounting reason. 
The accounting reason to lease is the subject of a specific part of the positive 
accounting research namely research on accounting choice. The accounting-
choice literature describes whether accounting matters. Accounting choice is 
defined by Fields et al. (2001) as any decision whose primary purpose is to 
influence the output of the accounting system in a particular way. El-Gazzar 
et al. (1986) argue that the differences in accounting choice with respect to 
leasing result from debt covenant constraints, compensation plans based on 
income and political costs. Accounting choice research is part of the positive 
approach. 
 
II.  Lease-debt substitutability studies have close link to the lease-buy decision 
based on financial drivers. Most researchers of lease-buy decisions also address 
lease-debt equivalence. However, the discussion of whether leases are 
substitutes of, or complements to, debt is also based on capital structure 
theories, accounting choice and the related financial contracting theory. This 
theory suggests that a firm’s characteristics affect its contracting costs, and 
these costs impact the choice between alternative forms of finance, debt or 
equity, or classes of fixed-claim finance, such as debt and leasing (Beattie et al. 
(2000b). Furthermore, the accounting part of this type of research (in contrast 
                                                          
9 The Myers, Dill and Bautista model takes the following form: 
∑
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, 
where NPV is the net present value of the lease (to the lessee), I0 is the initial investment at time 0, Lt is the lease 
payment at time t, cτ is the corporate tax rate, tΔ is the amount of depreciation at time t, and r* is the after-tax cost of 
debt. This model will be discussed in chapter 4. 
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to the finance lease-buy research) on the lease-debt substitutability does use 
accounting data instead of financial data. For example, Beattie et al. (2000b) 
conducted empirical research on lease-debt substitutability and used variables 
as debt ratio, expected growth, liquidity and profitability. These ratios are not 
used in finance research or in the above-described model of Myers, Dill and 
Bautista. 
 
III. Operating lease capitalisation split into either the impact on key financial 
ratios or the relation with the stock market. 
• The impact on key financial ratios is often investigated by researchers who 
mention the use of these ratios in decision-making by users of the financial 
statements Monson (2001) argues that users (equity investors) analyse the 
performance of companies based on certain ratios, which are compared with 
ratios of prior periods or with those of other companies or industries. The 
extent to which such analyses lead to different conclusions about the 
creditworthiness or performance of a lessee, due to data differences that 
result entirely from selecting one accounting convention over another, affects 
directly the relevance of the data being analysed.  
• The relation with equity risk concerns studies that investigate stock-market 
response and uses capital market theories. This refers to the decision-
usefulness/decision-maker/market aggregate approach (see Appendix 1.I) or 
the predictive approach in (Table 1.1).  
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CHAPTER 2 LEASING IN THE NETHERLANDS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a general description of leasing, with a specific look at the 
situation in the Netherlands. The purpose is to give an overview of the area in 
which this study takes place, and to illustrate the timely nature and relevance of 
this study. This will be done by addressing certain questions: What are the reasons 
that companies choose leasing instead of non-leasing debt alternatives? What 
differentiates leasing from other corporate claims? What are the legal, accounting 
and tax aspects of (operating-) leases, and what distinguishes an operating lease 
from a financial lease? How are operating leases and financial leases related in 
terms of disclosure and volume in the financial statements? How important are 
leases in terms of volume? 
  
This chapter is set up as follows; section 2.2 describes the basic concept of leasing, 
including the reasons to choose leasing and the differences between (operating) 
leases and other financial contracts. Section 2.3 describes the legal aspects with 
respect to leasing and the legal status of Dutch accounting standards. Section 2.4 
describes leasing as defined and regulated by the Dutch accounting guidelines, 
including the differences between financial and operating leases. A comparison is 
made between the Dutch lease-accounting standard, the International Financial 
Reporting Standards10 (IFRS), and the lease-accounting standards in the US and 
the UK. A comparison is also made between the lease classification in the 
accounting standard and the tax lease classification. Section 2.5 evaluates the 
proposal to change the lease-accounting standard, including the comments on the 
lease-accounting reform. Section 2.6 describes how leasing is used worldwide and in 
the Netherlands; section 2.7 concludes.  
 
2.2 Concept of leasing 
Although leasing is often referred to as a relatively new way of financing, leasing 
has ancient roots. Clay tablets were discovered in 1984 that show that leasing 
occurred already in the year 2010 B.C., when the priests who governed the ancient 
Samarian city of Ur rented agricultural tools and land to farmers. Also the Romans, 
the Greeks and the ancient Egyptians engaged in leasing. The ‘hell-or-high-water’ 
clause in many lease contracts11 originates from these days; ships were often the 
subjects of a lease. From 1900, leases were used more often, especially in the 
railroad industry. The real growth in the leasing industry came only after the 
1950s, however, when different companies were established that specialised as 
intermediaries in leasing transactions. The first of these was established in 1954: 
U.S. Leasing Corporation. Many others followed, and the economic advantages 
                                                          
10 International Accounting Standards (IASs) are developed by the International Accounting Standards Committee 
(IASC), whose purpose is to develop a single set of global accounting standards. With regard to the restructuring of 
the IASC, the new Board on 1 April 2001, as one of its first decisions renamed the IASC as the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB); with regard to future international accounting standards, the Board renamed 
IAS as International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). The International Financial Reporting Standards are the 
current International Accounting Standards (IAS) and the interpretations thereto (SICs). The International 
Accounting Standards will remain known as IAS (like IAS 17 for Leasing), but new, yet-to-be-issued accounting 
standards by the IASB will be indicated as IFRS. 
11 Hell-or-high-water clauses bind the purchaser or lessee to the terms of the contract until the contract's expiration. 
A contract containing such a clause is also known as ‘a promise to pay contract’. 
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arising from tax laws and accounting standards in particular led to continuous 
growth from the 1960s until now12 (Equipment Leasing Association (2005)). 
Although Europe and the Netherlands followed somewhat later, new capital tax 
allowances enhanced the attractiveness of leasing from the 1970s. In the UK, for 
example, a new capital tax allowance (an accelerated depreciation scheme) was 
introduced in 1970; in the Netherlands, an investment deduction scheme (WIR) was 
introduced in 1978. Each is said to have provided an important stimulus to leasing 
in these countries (Thomson (2003), Bruins Slot (1994), Vereniging voor 
Belastingwetenschap (2001)).  
 
The growth in the leasing business has lead to more regulation. Not surprisingly, in 
1976 the US Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) was the first to 
establish a lease-accounting standard: the Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards No. 13, “Accounting for leases” (FAS13). FAS13 was subsequently 
adopted by other countries, and also by the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB) in 198213, as International Accounting Standard No. 17, “Operating 
Leases” (IAS17). In the Netherlands, the first accounting standard regarding 
leasing was introduced in 1984 (Guideline 1.05.1 (www.rjnet.nl)).  
 
The word “Leasing” is a generic term covering several different kinds of contractual 
relations between a lessee and a lessor. Graham et al. (1998) define leasing as a 
financial transaction that separates the costs and benefits of asset use. Smith and 
Wakeman (1985, p.895) distinguish between buying and leasing an asset: “When a 
firm buys an asset, it obtains both the right of the services of that asset over the 
period it is owned plus the right to sell the asset at any future date. With a lease, 
the firm acquires only the right to the asset’s services for a period specified in the 
contract.’ The contractual relationship is always of the type that the lessor is the 
legal owner of an asset, who grants the right of utilisation of the asset to a lessee. 
The exact formulation in the lease contract should realise the economic 
consequences that both parties have in mind, taking into consideration the fiscal 
consequences. The economic intentions of the lease will ultimately determine the 
(legal) type of the lease contract as either a way of financing, a rental agreement or 
a credit granting (relating to hire purchase agreements and provision of 
services);(Beckman and Joosen (1988) and Hees (1997)). 
 
As Beckman (1988, p.9) states: “the acquirement of the right of utilisation of an 
asset by means of a lease instead of by means of legal ownership, will be a rational 
decision by the lessee: he will choose leasing instead of buying an asset if he expects 
that certain advantages are related with the lease agreement, which advantages he 
would miss without leasing”. This implies a business decision based on the 
measurable and non-measurable advantages and disadvantages of leasing, 
according to the objectives of the respective parties.  
 
                                                          
12 The history of leasing is described in a number of studies, many of which refer to the discovery of the clay tablets 
and the establishment of the first lease corporation; see, for example, Equipment Leasing Association (2005).  
13 In 1980 the exposure draft E19 ‘Accounting for leases’ was published and this resulted in 1982 in the publication 
of the final standard, IAS17 (www.iasplus.com) 
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2.2.1 Leasing as opposed to other corporate liabilities  
As will become clear in subsequent sections, a difference exists between operating 
leases and financial leases. Chapters 6 and 7 will describe and test extensively the 
determinants of the (operating) lease decision. This section has the task of 
summarising the specific attributes of operating leases as opposed to other 
corporate liabilities and the reasons a company might choose leasing. Figure 2.1 is 
an extension of Table 1 of Barclay and Smith (1995, p.900), in which they 
illustrated the different dimensions of six types of corporate liabilities, from 
financial leases through debt contracts to common stock. Barclay and Smith, 
however, did not include operating leases. Figure 2.1 adds operating leases to the 
table of Barclay and Smith, and includes three new characteristics: first, who (the 
company or the claimholder) has the legal title; second, who is considered to be the 
economic owner; and third, who is entitled to the tax incentives related to the 
financed assets and economic ownership. 
Figure 2.1 Characteristics of corporate liabilities  
Table 1, page 900, from Barclay and Smith (1995), extended with operating leases. All information in italics is added to 
the original table.  
Types of 
Corporate 
Liabilities 
Operating 
Lease 
Financial 
Lease 
Secured 
debt 
Ordinary 
debt 
Subordinated 
debt 
Preferred 
stock 
Common 
stock 
Priority of 
claim 
Highest  Lowest 
Can default 
trigger 
bankruptcy 
Yes No 
 
Control 
rights 
 
 
Right to use the asset 
 
 
Rights limited to covenants in contract 
Rights limited 
to covenants 
and voting 
rights of 
stockholder 
 
Rights 
limited to 
voting rights 
Legal 
ownership  
No Yes 
Economic 
ownership 
No Yes 
Tax shields: 
Cash flows 
Full lease 
payment 
deductible 
Interest part 
lease payment 
deductible 
Interest payment deductible Dividend not deductible 
Depreciation No depreciation Asset financed by financial lease, debt or equity is depreciated by economic owner 
Additional tax 
incentives 
Not entitled Entitled to tax incentives attached to the financed asset 
 
The differences between operating leases and other corporate liabilities in Figure 
2.1 will now be described briefly (see also Barclay and Smith (1995)). Sections 2.3 
and 2.4 will elaborate more on, respectively, the legal-, accounting- and fiscal 
differences between operating and financial leases. 
 
Priority of claim 
The priority of the claim, from the point of view of the claimholder, is the 
highest for leases. The lessor retains the legal ownership of the asset, and 
default gives (in general) the lessor the right to repossess the leased assets. 
Bankruptcy law in some countries may prevent repossession of the asset by 
the lessor, in the event that the asset is essential for an ongoing business. 
However, this does not alter the fact that the priority of the claim is higher 
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for the lessor than for other debt-holders. The priority of the other 
claimholders is such that first the debt-holders will be repaid, with a 
preferred position for the secured debt-holders, and the last position for the 
subordinated debt-holders. The stockholders are the residual claimants, 
whereas the preferred stockholders may be in a better position.  
 
Trigger bankruptcy 
Default under a debt- or lease contract generally gives the claimholder the 
right to force the company into bankruptcy. The stockholders are not 
creditors and cannot trigger bankruptcy.  
 
Control rights 
All financial liabilities give some control rights to the claimholder. For 
example, the common stock holders have voting rights imposed on the 
company by law, preferred stockholders might have additional rights as laid 
down in the specific preferred-stock issue. Debt contracts may contain all 
kinds of different covenants that restrict the company in, for example, 
extension in financings, preserving financial ratios above a certain level, 
investment possibilities or payout approvals. Lease contracts may also 
contain such debt covenants, particularly when the lease is set up as a 
financing contract comparable with debt financing. Restrictions with respect 
to the use of the asset will also be incorporated, as well as any obligations the 
company has in maintaining the asset (in the event that the contract is 
directly related to certain assets). 
 
Ownership 
The differences between the financial contracts often arise from differences in 
the legal ownership of the assets financed. Liabilities arising from either a 
debt contract or through equity enable a company to invest the acquired 
financings by purchasing the assets. With a lease contract, the company 
obtains the right to use the assets and is obliged to fulfil regular payments 
during the period of usage. The contractual relationship is always of the type 
that the lessor is the legal owner of an asset, who grants the right of 
utilisation of the asset to a lessee. The differentiation between financial and 
operating leases lies within the distinction of who has the economic 
ownership, as opposed to the legal ownership. Since this is the fundamental 
difference between the accounting treatment of operating- versus financial 
leases, this will be extensively described in section 2.4 
 
Tax shields 
The stockholders will receive (if available) dividends that are not tax 
deductible by the company. Debt-holders receive interest and repayment of 
the financing provided, of which only the interest payments are deductible. 
With a financial lease, the lease payment is split in an interest- and 
repayment part (comparable with) normal debt, and the interest part is 
deductible. Under an operational lease the entire lease payment is deductible.  
 
Depreciation 
The economic owner of the asset is entitled to depreciate the financed asset. 
Since only with an operating lease the company is neither the legal nor the 
economic owner of the asset, it is only with operating leases that the lessee 
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company does not depreciate the asset. Although it might seem that this is a 
disadvantage of operating leases from a fiscal point of view, this is offset by 
the preceding characteristic that only in case of an operating lease is the 
entire lease payment deductible, instead of only the interest part of the lease 
payment. 
 
Additional tax incentives 
The economic owner of the asset is also entitled to tax incentives related to 
the financed assets. Again, this implies that for all financial contracts the 
company, and not the claimholder, is entitled to these tax incentives. Only for 
operating leases is it the lessor (claimholder) and not the company who is 
entitled to eligible tax incentives schemes related to the assets. In the event 
that the lessor has a higher corporate tax rate than the company, it might be 
worthwhile for the company to shift the tax incentives to the lessor. This will 
be described in section 2.4.5 and in chapter 6. 
 
The differences between operating leases, financial leases and other corporate 
liabilities result in advantages that can only be obtained trough operating leases. 
Therefore, the reason to choose operating leases relate to the above described 
characteristics. Thomson (2003) grouped the reasons to choose leasing instead of 
non-leasing debt alternatives into four categories: tax savings, borrowing-related 
aspects, risk sharing and other financial/transactional reasons. Figure 2.2 
summarises the reasons to choose leasing instead of a non-leasing debt alternative. 
A description for these reasons appears below the figure.  
Figure 2.2 Reasons to choose leasing over non-leasing debt alternatives 
(based on figure 3.3 of Thomson (2003, p.100)) 
Risk-sharing reasons
• Flexibility through options and in 
production process
• Operating lease reduces risk of 
obsolescence
• Lessor characteristics
• Reduce costs/risk of ownership transfer
Tax-savings reasons
• Transfer of capital allowances to higher 
tax paying lessor, in exchange for lower 
rentals or in order to bring tax savings 
forward
Other financial/transactional reasons
• Convenience, also in maintenance and 
services
• Off-balance character improves 
financial ratios
• Management’s own interest
Borrowing-related reasons
• Preserves debt capacity
• Generally less restrictive covenants
• 100% finance provided, no additional 
collateral
Reasons for leasing over non-
leasing debt alternatives
 
 
Some of the reasons to lease relate only to operating leases. The following list of the 
advantages of leasing to the lessee mentions whether the advantages relate only to 
operating leases or only to financial leases. When it is not explicitly mentioned, the 
advantages relate to both types of leasing. 
 
Risk-sharing reasons 
Provides flexibility through incorporated options 
Lease agreements often incorporate renewal-, purchase- or cancellation 
options. When the economic life of equipment is uncertain, a lease can 
provide protection against the risk of obsolescence. These options allow 
the risk of obsolescence to be borne by the lessor (purchase option will 
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not be exercised when the asset has deteriorated to a greater extent 
than foreseen); companies that are uncertain of their future demand 
thereby keep some flexibility in their production process (by exercising 
their cancellation or renewal option). These options often define who 
bears the economic risk related to the ownership of the asset, and 
therefore often determine the qualification as operating or financial 
lease.  
 
Related to characteristics of the lessor  
Incentives to lease might be related to characteristics of the lessor— 
for example, when the lessor is in a better position to acquire or to 
dispose the assets (Smith and Wakeman (1985)). 
 
Reduces costs of transferring ownership 
Leasing may reduce some the costs of the transfer of ownership, such 
as legal fees and transfer taxes. Especially when the useful life of an 
asset is significantly longer than the period the company expects to use 
the asset, and if the costs of transfer of ownership are substantial, this 
may be a reason to lease rather than buy an asset (Smith and 
Wakeman (1985)) 
 
Tax-savings reasons 
Distributing tax shields 
When two parties have different tax rates, they might find it 
worthwhile to shift possible tax advantages through an operating lease 
from the lower taxpaying entity (lessee) to the higher taxpaying entity 
(lessor). The lessor thus benefits from the tax incentives and may share 
these advantages with the lessee by means of lower lease rentals. 
Section 2.4.5 describes the tax aspects of leasing. 
  
Borrowing-related reasons 
Preserving debt capacity 
The debt capacity of a company is the amount that it might be able to 
borrow. This debt capacity may sometimes be limited, due to 
constraints (debt covenants) or to certain practical rules of lenders (for 
example, a bank requires a company to maintain at least 30% equity). 
With an operating lease, the financed amount is not shown on the 
balance sheet, and this might improve debt capacity. Chapter 3 
documents how some lenders indeed do not consider the operating 
leases when they examine the lending possibilities of a company. 
 
Providing 100% financing  
By means of a lease an asset is 100%-financed; while the legal 
ownership remains with the lessor, the lessee does not have to put up 
additional collateral for the financing.  
 
Containing less restrictive covenants 
Lease contracts may not only contain less restrictive covenants, but 
may also circumvent covenants in other debt contracts such as 
maximum debt levels permitted. 
Different aspects of operating leases  
35 
 
Other financial/transactional reasons 
Convenience 
With a lease agreement, the lessee may wish to use the asset without 
the responsibility and trouble of maintaining it, insuring it or disposing 
of it at the end of the lease term. The lease agreement may be set up in 
such a way that this is the responsibility of the lessor. Convenience is 
probably one of the most important reasons for leasing in, for example, 
the car leasing industry, where many companies do not want the 
bother of having an own-car park, involving insurance, service and 
obsolescence of the cars.  
 
Off-balance character 
Related to the previous advantage, the off-balance-sheet character of 
operating leases also improves financial ratios such as leverage- and 
solvency ratios. Although sophisticated financial analysts often will use 
a capitalisation technique to improve the meaningfulness of ratios, 
previous evidence has shown that this is not always the case. The 
impact of operating leases on financial ratios is described and 
empirically tested in part II. 
 
Management’s own intentions 
The off-balance-sheet character of operating leases and the possible 
improvement of financial ratios might be a reason for the management of a 
company to choose operating leases, if management compensation is based on 
these financial ratios. 
 
Chapters 6 and 7 will describe extensively most of the abovementioned reasons to 
lease. 
2.3 Legal aspects 
2.3.1 Leasing in the Dutch Civil Code 
In the Netherlands, no legislation (neither civil nor commercial) exists that 
explicitly mentions the word leasing. This is similar to other European countries 
and to the US (Vereniging voor Belastingwetenschap (2001)). Most European 
countries do not have specific lease legislation, except for Belgium, Greece and 
Turkey14 (Leaseurope (2005)). The distinction between operating- and financial 
leases, as widely accepted in practice from an accounting or tax perspective (see the 
next sections), is not recognised everywhere by the legislator. As in the 
Netherlands, other classifications do occur in the legislation of other countries to 
distinguish between different types of leasing. For example, in France a distinction 
is made between ‘location simple’ (rental), ‘credit bail’ (hire purchase) and ‘location 
avec option d’achat’ (lease with purchase option); (Leaseurope (2005) and 
Vereniging voor Belastingwetenschap (2001)).  
 
According to Hees (1997), the fact that leasing is not defined legally as a specific 
agreement and that it does not occur in legal terminology, is historically explainable 
                                                          
14 In Belgium ‘lease-financing-agreement of movable assets’ are defined by law. In Greece a lease agreement is 
defined as  the right of use of movable assets with a purchase or renewal option at maturity, (Vereniging voor 
Belastingwetenschap (2001) 
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as follows: since leasing was not ‘invented’ by lawyers, it was generally accepted as 
expression for agreements with the same characteristics. These characteristics are 
that one party (the lessor) undertakes to provide the other party with the use of an 
asset, in return for a series of payments, for an agreed period of time. Lease 
agreements are drafted between a lessee and a lessor, and the content determines 
the legal status of the contract. The legal status of a lease in the Netherlands can be 
either a rental agreement, a leasehold agreement (pachtovereenkomst,), or a hire 
purchase (huurkoop), which are legal contracts recognised in Dutch Law. 
 
Therefore, the most important legal provisions in Dutch Civil Law are those articles 
that refer to the abovementioned legal agreements. 
 
Rental; Civil Code Book 7, Title 4, Article 201  
1. Rental is a contract whereby one party, the lessor, undertakes to 
provide the other party, the lessee, with the use of a thing or a 
part thereof and the lessee undertakes to render a 
counterprestation (counter-obligation). 
2.  Rental may also relate to patrimonial rights (property, rights and 
interests), in which case the provisions of this Section and 
Sections 2 - 4 shall apply to the extent that this is not contrary to 
the necessary implication of such provisions or the nature of the 
right. 
3.  Leasehold of land is not considered to be a rental. 
 
Hire purchase; Civil Code Book 7A, Article 1576h  
1. Hire purchase is the sale and purchase on redemption, whereby 
the parties agree that the transfer of ownership will not switch to 
the purchaser on delivery of the assets, but only after the 
fulfilment of all obligated payments.  
2. All agreements with the same intention, either rental, or other 
forms or naming, will be considered as hire purchase. 
3. Under hire purchase is also considered the agreement where for 
the sale and purchase, a third party, who obtains the ownership, 
grants credit to the purchaser as these actions together have the 
same intention as hire purchase. 
 
Law on leasehold (“Pachtwet”), Article 1.1, Leasehold 
d. Each agreement, in whatever form or naming, where one party 
undertakes to provide to the other party, with the use of a farm 
or land for agriculture purposes, and the other party undertakes 
to render a counterprestation. 
 
As will be shown in section 2.4 The accounting standards in the Netherlands follow 
the same definitions as the Dutch Civil Law, where leasing is also a generic term 
that is refers to rental-, hire purchase, or leasehold-agreements. 
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2.3.2 The legal status of Dutch accounting standards 
Since 1970, the Act on the Annual Financial Statements of Enterprises (hereafter 
the Act) is effective in the Netherlands (and was incorporated in 1976 in the Dutch 
Civil Code, Part 9, Book 2 (Burgerlijk Wetboek, Titel 9, Boek 2)). The Act has been 
adapted several times since then, due to the fourth and seventh Directives on 
Company Law of the Council of the European Communities (Bouma and Feenstra 
(1997), Nobes and Parker (2000) and DASB (2002). 
 
The Act was ratified in 1970; in 1971, the Dutch Accounting Standards Board 
(DASB) was established at the suggestion of the Dutch Government; (Raad voor de 
Jaarverslaggeving; until 2005 known as the Council for Annual Reporting and from 
1971 till 1981 known as the Tripartite Consultative Body). The DASB comprises 
representatives of the preparers, users and auditors of annual accounts of 
companies. Boardmembers (each of the three groups has four members) are 
appointed by the executive board, after nomination by the founding organisations15 
or by other organisations (for example, one of the ‘user’ members is a nominee of the 
Dutch Association of Investment Analysts).  
 
The sections of the Act provide the basis for the Guidelines of Annual Reporting as 
defined by the DASB (2002, p.24). However, in contrast to the legal compliance 
required by the Act (which is part of Dutch law), Dutch companies are not legally 
obliged to follow the guidelines (this is no longer true for Dutch listed companies, 
which will be described shortly). The legal binding of the guidelines is not the 
presumption of the DASB (although the more authoritative statements are printed 
in bold): each company bears individual responsibility for its own financial accounts 
(DASB (2002)). Therefore, Vergoossen (1992,p.247) argues that ‘the guidelines can 
be best described as authoritative opinions of an influential private group’. This is 
in line with a recent (February 10th 2006) decision of the Dutch Supreme Court16 on 
the standing of the guidelines in an appeal between Dutch Royal KPN and Stichting 
Onderzoek Bedrijfsinformatie (“SOBI”). In their judgement of the appeal (6.10 of the 
decision), the Supreme Court agrees with of the Deputy Procureur-General17 on his 
advice on the standing of the guidelines. The Deputy Procureur-General argues that 
the guidelines are considered by experts to represent a system of generally accepted 
principles of financial reporting, which is required in article 2:362 of the Dutch Civil 
Code. The guidelines are therefore authoritative guidelines and form a useful tool to 
the Enterprise Chamber (Ondernemingkamer). 
 
The Dutch financial reporting system is classified by Nobes and Parker (2000) as 
unique. They state (p.509), “classifiers of financial reporting systems usually 
consider the Netherlands to be a country by itself. Unlike other continental 
European countries, its tax rules have little effect on financial accounting, there is 
no national accounting plan and as much choice as the European Directives permit 
is allowed in financial statement presentation. The Netherlands differs in 
important ways from the United Kingdom and the United States.” According to 
Nobes et al. (2000, p.21-22), “Standard Dutch” is unique insofar as it has no family 
resemblance to other systems of accounting standards, but belongs to a class of 
                                                          
15 Employers organisations: Federation of Netherlands Industry (VNO), Netherlands Christian Employers’ 
Federation (NCW); Trade Unions: Federation of Netherlands Trade Unions (FNV), Christian National Federation of 
Trade Unions in the Netherlands (CNV); and the Dutch Institute of Registered Accountants (NIVRA). 
16 Dutch Supreme Court, February 10th, 2006, LJN:AU7473, C04/305HR.  
17 Advice of the Deputy Procureur-General Mr. Timmerman of October 7th, 2005, paragraph 3.3. 
CHAPTER 2 
38 
systems suited to strong equity markets, just as UK, IAS and US GAAP (generally 
accepted accounting principles). The class in which the Dutch accounting standards 
are placed, Class A, is in particular focused on the ‘key cause of international 
differences in financial reporting’, the differentiation between credit/insiders and 
equity/outsiders. Countries in Class A are countries with a widespread ownership of 
companies with shareholders who do not have access to internal information, and 
there will be more pressure for disclosure, audit and fair information. This is in 
contrast with countries in Class B, where ownership is kept to a greater extent 
within banks, families or governments; in these countries the need for published 
information is less clear.  
 
The non-legal binding of guidelines does not mean that Dutch companies are not 
legally obliged to disclose their lease commitments (or the commitments arising 
from the legal agreements, as described in the previous section). The Dutch Civil 
Code explicitly requires the disclosure of certain items in the notes to the financial 
statements as specified in the Dutch Civil Code; Book 2, Part 5, Articles 378 - 383. 
Article 381 is also applicable for lease commitments that are not shown on the 
balance sheet.  
The translation of Article 381 is as follows: 
 
Civil Code Book 2, Title 9, Part 5, Art. 381 
Any major financial commitments entered into by the legal person for a 
number of years in the future and which are not disclosed in the balance 
sheet, such as those arising out of long-term contracts, shall be stated with 
separate mention of commitments towards group companies. Article 375, 
paragraph 3, shall apply mutatis mutandis. 
 
This article 381 builds upon the Fourth Council Directive of the EC: 
 
Fourth Council Directive of 25 July 1978 (78/660/EEC), Section 8, Art. 43 
In addition to the information required under other provisions of this 
Directive, the notes on the accounts must set out information in respect of the 
following matters at least: sub (7) the total amount of any financial 
commitments that are not included in the balance sheet, insofar as this 
information is of assistance in assessing the financial position. Any 
commitments concerning pensions and affiliated undertakings must be 
disclosed separately. 
 
For listed companies, the non-legal binding of the accounting guidelines in the 
Netherlands has ended. As from 2005, all listed companies in the European Union 
are obliged to formulate their annual accounts in compliance with IFRS (see 
footnote 10 and (EC (2002))18. This has led to several proposals of amendments of 
law with respect to the Dutch Civil Code, amongst them a proposal that annual 
accounts should conform to IFRS19. The Dutch amendment proposal requires that if 
the IFRS are not applied, this should be declared (either comply or explain). The 
amendment proposal to the Dutch Civil Code also allows companies to have only 
one annual account, even if a company is listed in several countries. The application 
                                                          
18 Reference is made to the Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and the Council of the 
European Union of 19 July 2002 on the application of international accounting standards. 
19 Dutch House of Commons, Publication 28220, Nr. 1, 2, B and Memorie van Toelichting, February 5th 2002, 
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of US GAAP is especially excluded. According to Ernst&Young (2003, p. 55), this 
will have a number of implications in the near future for Dutch Listed companies: 
- Less freedom in the choice of valuation and income approaches  
- More information has to be provided 
- Deviation from the IFRS will be almost impossible 
 
This will also have implications for the auditing profession in the Netherlands: 
there will be less professional judgement, but a rise in more specific supervision on 
the application of the IFRS. For non-listed companies, the IFRS is not obligatory, 
and the (non-legal binding) guidelines of the DASB are still applicable.  
 
Since the guidelines had no legal status in the Netherlands, there was no legislation 
on the supervision of these guidelines. This will also end for the Dutch companies 
that are now legally obliged to disclose according to IFRS. In the Netherlands, 
recently two new laws became effective: the law on the supervision of auditor firms 
(“Wet toezicht accountantorganisaties20”) and the law on the supervisions of 
financial reporting, (“Wet toezicht financiele verslaggeving21”). The supervisor 
under both laws is the Dutch Autoriteit Financiele Markten (“AFM”).  
 
Especially the law on the supervision of financial reporting will enhance the 
enforceability by law of compliance with the accounting standards by Dutch listed 
companies. Indirectly, the law on the supervision of auditor firms will also 
contribute. In section 2.4 the accounting standard with respect to leases will be 
described, and section 2.4.4 will show that different (alternative) formats for 
disclosing operating leases are in use in the Netherlands. Chapter 5 will empirically 
investigate how many companies actually use these alternative formats, of which 
not all formats comply with the accounting standard. These results might indicate 
whether the proposals of law to enforce compliance with the accounting standards 
are indeed necessary (see also Lückerath (2006)). 
 
2.4 Current lease-accounting standards: the risk/reward approach 
2.4.1 Comparison of lease-accounting standards 
Most lease-accounting standards throughout the world are referred to as ‘risk and 
reward approaches’. For example, the Dutch RJ292, the International IAS17, the 
US FAS13 and the UK Statements of Standard Accounting Practice No. 21 
(hereafter “SSAP21”) are all risk and reward approaches. The name applies on the 
basis of a distinction made between operating and financial leases based on who 
bears substantially all risks and rewards related to the ownership of the underlying 
asset. Financial leases are those leases for which substantially all risks and 
rewards are transferred to the lessee. Thus, although the legal ownership remains 
with the lessor, the economic ownership is transferred to the lessee. RJ292 and 
IAS17 give a number of examples that ‘would normally’ (RJ292.107, IAS17.8) or 
‘could’ (RJ292.108, IAS17.9) lead to a classification as financial lease: 
                                                          
20 Dutch Congress (House of Commons) official publication, year 2003/2004, 29 658, Nr. 1-2, effective since 
October 1st, 2006. 
21 Dutch Congress (House of Commons) official publication, year 2005/2006, 30 336, Nr. 1-4, effective since 
December 31st, 2006. 
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RJ292.107, IAS17.8 
(a) the lease transfers ownership of the asset to the lessee by the end of the 
lease term; 
(b) the lessee has the option to purchase the asset at a price sufficiently lower 
than the fair value at the date of the option (very likely to be exercised); 
(c) the lease term is for the major part of the economic life of the asset 
(d) at the inception of the lease the present value of the minimum lease 
payments amount to at least substantially all of the fair value of the leased 
asset; and 
(e) the leased assets are of a specialised nature such that only the lessee can use 
them without major modifications. 
RJ292.108, IAS17.9  
(a) if the lessee can cancel the leases, then the lessors’ losses associated with the 
cancellation are borne by the lessee; 
(b) gains or losses in the fair value of the residual value of the assets fall to the 
lessee; and 
(c) the lessee has the ability to continue the lease for a secondary period at a 
rent that is substantially lower than the market rent. 
 
Subsequently, operating leases are those leases that are not financial leases. 
Financial leases are accounted for on the balance sheet, comparable to normal debt 
financing. Operating leases are disclosed in the notes in the financial statement, 
and are therefore off-balance. Although the Dutch RJ292.107 follows the same 
criteria as IAS17.8 to classify a lease as either a financial- or an operating lease, 
there are some differences. In RJ292, as well as in the United States (FAS13), a 
quantitative indication is given for the words ‘major part’ (IAS17.8c) and 
'substantially' (IAS17.8d). Figure 2.3 shows the lease-classification according to 
IAS17, and the related quantitative indications of RJ292.  
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Figure 2.3 Financial vs. operating leases according to IAS17 and RJ292 
Substantially
fair value test met?
Lease  is for 
major part of the
economic life of asset?
Bargain purchase option or
renewal option?
Transfer of ownership?
Operating leaseFinancial lease
Is present value of lease
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No
No
No
No
No
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A major part of of the
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IAS17
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Whether a lease is cancellable, or not, is not a distinguishing feature between 
financial- and operating leases. The classification as financial- or operating lease 
only takes into account the non-cancellable part of the lease. For example the lease-
term is defined by IASB as ‘the non-cancellable period’ and the minimum lease 
payments are the ‘non-cancellable lease rents’. Therefore leases that are cancellable 
without restrictions are predominantly operating leases, while both criteria on 
lease-term and present value of the lease payments direct to an operating lease. 
However, operating leases disclosed in the financial statements classify as 
operating leases by their non-cancellable part. Table 2.1 compares four lease-
accounting standards (RJ292, IAS17, FAS13 and SSAP21) with respect to the 
following: the definition of a lease, the qualification as an operating- or a financial 
lease, the required disclosures and the definition of minimum lease payments. 
Although all four lease-accounting standards are based on the risk/reward 
approach, some differences are apparent. 
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Table 2.1 Comparison of operating-lease accounting of RJ292, IAS17, FAS13 and SSAP21 
 DUTCH RJ 292 INTERNATIONAL IAS 17 (revised) US FAS13 UK SSAP 21 
 
 
LEASE DEFINITION 
RJ 292.102 
As IAS17.3, but explicitly adds 
that lease agreements comprise 
rental agreements, leasehold 
agreements and hire-purchase 
agreements. 
IAS 17.3 
A lease is an agreement whereby the lessor conveys to 
the lessee in return for a payment or series of payments 
the right to use an asset for an agreed period of time. 
FAS13.1 
A lease is an agreement conveying the right to use 
property, plant, or equipment (land and/or depreciable 
assets) usually for a stated period of time. It includes 
agreements that, although not nominally identified as 
leases, meet the above definition. 
SSAP 21 
A lease is a contract between the lessor and 
the lessee for the hire of a specific asset. 
The lessor retains ownership of the assets, 
but conveys to the lessee the right to use the 
asset for an agreed period of time in return 
for paying specific rents. 
 
 
 
 
LEASE 
QUALIFICATION 
RJ292.104 
As IAS17.6 
 
RJ292.107 
As IAS 17.8, with an 
indication of ‘major part’ 
under c) meaning 75% or 
more, and ‘substantially all” 
under d) meaning 90% or more 
IAS 17.6 
A lease is classified as a financial lease if it transfers 
substantially all risks and rewards incident to 
ownership. A lease is classified as an operating lease if 
it does not transfer substantially all the risks and 
rewards incident to ownership. 
IAS 17.8 
Examples of situations that would normally lead to a 
lease being classified as a financial lease: 
a) transfer of ownership 
b) bargain purchase option 
c) lease term is major part of the economic life of the 
asset 
d) at inception, the present value of the minimum 
lease payments amount to at least substantially all 
of the fair value of the asset, 
e) Specialised nature of the lease assets 
FAS13.6 
a. classification from the standpoint of the lessee: 
i) capital lease, leases that meet one of the criteria of par.7, 
ii) operating leases, all other leases 
FAS13.7 
If at its inception a lease meets one or more of the 
following four criteria, the lease shall be classified as a 
capital lease by the lessee: 
a) transfer of ownership 
b) lease contains bargain purchase option 
c) lease term is equal to 75 percent or more of the 
estimated economic life 
d) the present value at the beginning of the lease term of 
the minimum lease payment equals or exceeds 90 
percent of the excess of the fair value of the lease 
property over any related investment tax credit retained 
by the lessor. 
SSAP 21.15 
A lease is classified as a financial lease if it 
transfers substantially all the risks and 
rewards of ownership of an asset to the 
lessee.  
SSAP21.17 
An operating lease is a lease other than a 
financial lease. 
SSAP 21.15 
It should be presumed that such a transfer of 
risk and rewards occurs if at the inception of 
the leases the present value of the minimum 
lease payments amounts to substantially all 
(normally 90 percent or more) of the fair 
value of the leased assets. 
 
 
 
OPERATING-LEASE 
DISCLOSURE 
RJ 292.118 
As IAS17.27, excluding d) 
(although d) is recommended) 
 
IAS 17.27 
a. Minimum future lease payments for each of the 
following periods: period less than one year, period 
between one and five years, periods over five years. 
b. Minimum sublease payments receivable in future 
periods under non-cancellable subleases. 
c. Current lease and sublease payments recognised in 
income for the period, with separate amounts for 
minimum lease payments, contingent rents and sublease 
payments. 
d. General description of lessee’s significant leasing 
arrangements 
FAS 13.16 
b. for operating leases having initial or remaining non-
cancellable lease terms in excess of one year: 
i) Future minimum rental payments, in the aggregate 
and for each of the five succeeding fiscal years. 
ii) Minimum rentals to be received in the future under 
non-cancellable subleases 
c. rental expenses for each period for which an income 
statement is presented, with separate amounts for 
minimum rentals, contingent rentals and sublease rentals. 
d. General description of lessee’s leasing arrangements 
SSAP21.56 
The payment that the lessee is committed to 
make during the next year, analysed 
between those  
- expired within the year,   
- expired between the second & fifth years, 
and  
- expiring after five years.  
The analysis should show the commitments 
with respect to land and buildings separately 
from those of other operating leases.  
 
 
MINIMUM LEASE 
PAYMENTS 
RJ292.102 
As IAS17.3 
IAS 17.3 
Non-cancellable lease rents,  
excluding: contingent rentals, service costs and taxes 
payable or reimbursable to the lessor, 
including: any guarantee of payments by lessee or 
lessee-affiliated parties 
Plus, if applicable, the purchase option price if the 
option is very likely to be exercised due to the relatively 
low price. 
FAS13.5 
The payments that the lessee is obligated to make or can 
be required to make in connection with the leased 
property, excluding guarantees by the lessee of the lessor’s 
debt and the lessee’s obligations to pay executory costs 
(insurance, maintenance) and taxes in connection with the 
leased property.  
The payments that the lessee is committed 
to make during the lease tem, including 
initial payments the lessee makes, minimum 
rentals over the lease term, and any amount 
guaranteed by the lessee or by a party 
related to him. 
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Differences in lease definition 
The lease definition is similar between the four lease-accounting standards 
described in Table 2.2. It is striking, however, in contrary to the other 
standards, that the Dutch RJ292 explicitly stipulates that rental-, leasehold-, 
and hire-purchase agreements also are part of leasing agreements, the other 
standards only describe leasing. This is probably caused by the fact that 
leasing is not a Dutch word and in the Netherlands, the term ‘leasing’ may be 
assumed to be something different from rental. By incorporating the 
mentioned agreements that fall within the guideline, the DASB made it clear 
that leasing includes these agreements too. As mentioned before, leasing is 
also not defined in Dutch civil law and from a legal point of view is a generic 
term for the abovementioned agreements, which are defined agreements in 
Dutch civil law. The reference to these contracts by FASB is less explicit, but 
also the FASB mention that FAS13 also applies to other agreements that 
‘although not nominally identified as lease, meet the above criteria’. 
 
Differences in lease qualification 
All lease-accounting standards here described make a distinction between 
operating and financial leases. However, RJ292 and FAS13 formulate 
quantitative criteria to define how the words ‘major’ and ‘substantial’ should 
be explained. These quantitative criteria are interpreted differently in RJ292 
and FAS13, while for RJ292.107 these quantitative criteria are defined as 
‘indicative’, whereas for FAS13.7 the percentages are included as a bright-line 
test in de the classification criteria. IAS17 refrains from including these 
quantitative criteria in the standard. SSAP21 does give a quantitative 
indication of the word ‘substantially’.  
 
There is, however, a major difference between the quantitative criteria of 
FAS13 and RJ292. Although both apply quantitative criteria to classify a lease 
as an operating or as a financial lease (the 75% of economic life and 90% of 
present-value rules), there seems to be a major difference in the 90% rule. 
With FAS13.7d, the 90% is calculated of the excess of the fair value of the 
leased property over any related investment tax credit, whereas conforming to 
RJ292.107d, the 90% is calculated over the fair value of the leased property. 
According to FAS13, the investment tax credit should be deducted from the 
fair value of the leased property before the 90% rule is applicable. Although 
the rules look identical, this difference may have major consequences for the 
lease qualification from both perspectives22.  
 
                                                          
22 For example, assume a tax investment credit that allows an additional deduction of 55% of the 
property in the first year (the Dutch IB2001, art 3.40). If the corporate tax rate is 40%, then the 
after-tax benefit is 0.4*55% = 22% of the invested amount. If the fair value of the lease property is 
100,000 Euro, then the present value of the lease payments, according to RJ292, may not exceed 
90,000 Euro (90% of 100,000). However, according to FAS13, the present value of the lease payments 
may not exceed 70,200 Euro; 90% of 100,000 minus 22,000 value of investment credit. Thus, the 90% 
of the RJ292 relates in this example to 70.2% according to FAS13. Depending on the nature of the 
investment tax credit, this difference will vary. 
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Differences in operating-lease disclosure 
The disclosure requirements are almost identical for RJ292, IAS17 and FAS13. 
The requirements of SSAP21 differ meaningfully, however, from the other 
three lease-accounting standards. According to RJ292.118, lessees should 
make the following disclosures for operating leases: 
(a) The total of future minimum lease payments under non-cancellable 
operating leases for each of the following periods: 
(i) not later than one year; 
(ii) later than one year and not later than five years; 
(iii) later than five years; 
(b) the total of future minimum sublease payments expected to be received 
under non-cancellable subleases at the balance-sheet date; 
(c) lease and sublease payments recognised in the income statement for the 
period. 
 
This is in line with IAS17 and FAS13, although the latter requires the total 
commitment for each of the years one ‘til five, and one lump sum for the 
commitments expiring after the fifth year (see Table 2.1). Under UK SSAP21, 
next year’s lease commitment has to be disclosed, split into three lease-expiry 
periods, whereas the other three require the disclosure of the total future lease 
commitment split into three (IAS17 and RJ292) or five (FAS13) lease-expiry 
periods. According to PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2005), the requirements of UK 
SSAP21 are sometimes misunderstood; the intention is to show only the 
annual commitment and not the total amount that will be payable until the 
end of the lease. This, however, is certainly the intention of IAS17, RJ292 and 
FAS13. This difference might be the reason that the UK SSAP21 is 
misunderstood, since users might assume the standards to be equal on this 
matter. Table 2.2 illustrates the differences between the disclosures of IAS17 
and RJ292, FAS13 and SSAP21 using the operating lease commitments of 
Ahold as disclosed in their 2003-financial statements23.  
 
Table 2.2 Difference between total commitment  disclosed (FAS13, IAS17 and RJ292) and annual 
commitment disclosed (SSAP21)  
Operating-lease commitments (Euro millions) of Ahold in 2003. Ahold discloses according to 
FAS13. This enables to construct also the disclosure according to IAS17 and RJ292 while these 
standards require less detailed information. SSAP21 requires the disclosure of next year’s 
lease-payments, split into three expiry periods. The total commitment cannot be derived from 
SSAP21. 
FAS13 IAS17/RJ292 SSAP21 
Expiry in:   Expiry in:   Expiry in:   
One year 747 One year 747 One year 58 
Two years 689 
Three years 663 
Between two and 
five years 2,487
Between two and 
five years 137 
Four years 583 After five years 5,552 After five years 552 
Five years 552    
After five years 5,552    
Total 8,786 Total 8,786 Total 747 
 
The different disclosure rules have consequences for the method to capitalise 
operating leases. This will become clear in chapter 4, which discusses the 
different capitalisation methods, with data originating from either the US or 
                                                          
23 Ahold discloses the operating lease commitments as required by FAS13. 
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New Zealand (i.e. Imhoff et al. (1991), Bennet and Bradbury (2003)), or from 
the UK (Beattie et al. (1998)). 
 
Differences in minimum lease payments 
 The lease-accounting standards all consider the minimum lease payments to 
be the non-cancellable lease payments or payments that the lessee is obligated 
to make in connection with the lease property, excluding tax payable. Some 
differences exist between the standards as to whether guarantees from the 
lessee to the lessor should or should not be included. 
 
The above shows that although the intention of the lease-accounting standards is 
the same, harmonisation between the standards is not yet complete. Especially the 
disclosure requirements in the UK differ from those of the Netherlands, the US and 
the IASB. Another important difference is the quantitative criteria of FAS13 and 
RJ292 (although indicative), versus the more qualitative criteria of IAS17 and 
SSAP21. And finally, the 90% fair-value rule applied by both RJ292 and FAS13 
may lead to different outcomes between these two standards, since they use a 
different measure of the fair value of the leased asset.  
 
2.4.2 Capitalisation of financial leases versus disclosure of operating leases  
The qualification of a lease as a financial- or operating lease has consequences for 
the disclosure of the commitments. Financial leases are recognised as assets and 
liabilities on the balance sheet of the lessee at amounts equal to the fair value of the 
leased property at inception, or if lower, at the present value of the minimum lease 
payments (IAS17.12, RJ292.112). The lease payments should be apportioned 
between the interest part and the reduction of the outstanding liability, calculated 
on an annuity basis (IAS17.17, RJ292.113). A financial lease thereby gives rise to a 
depreciation expense as well as a finance expense for each accounting period 
(IAS17.19, RJ292.114). 
  
Operating leases, on the other hand, never give rise to recognition of the leased 
asset in the balance sheet of the lessee (RJ292.116). The Dutch guideline in this 
respect refers to guideline 310 (‘Commitments not recognised in the balance sheet’), 
(hereafter RJ310). RJ310.101 subsequently refers to the Dutch Civil Code Book 2, 
article 281, which article requires the disclosure of major financial commitments in 
the notes (see section 2.3.2). Operating-lease payments should be recognised as an 
expense in the income statement on a straight-line basis (IAS17.25, RJ292.117). 
 
Table 2.3 shows the difference between the requirements for the capitalisation or 
disclosure of financial- versus operating leases for, respectively, the balance sheet, 
the income statement and the notes.  
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Table 2.3 Operating and financial leases in the financial statements of lessee  
OPERATING LEASE FINANCIAL LEASE 
BALANCE SHEET 
No information 292.112 
Fair value of the assets or (if lower) the present value of 
minimum lease payments 
INCOME STATEMENT 
RJ292.117 
Lease payments should be recognised as an expense in 
the income statement on a straight-line basis. 
RJ292.113 
Lease payments split into interest part and repayment part 
RJ292.114 
Financial lease gives rise to a depreciation expense as 
well as a finance expense. It is in general inappropriate to 
equate the two kinds of expenses. (IAS17.21 adds: 
Accordingly, the asset and the related liability are 
unlikely to be equal after the inception of the lease.) 
NOTES 
292.118 
a. total minimum future lease payments for each of the 
following periods, expiring: 1) within one year, 2) 
between one and five years, and 3) after five years 
b. total of future minimum sublease payments 
expected to be received under non-cancellable 
subleases 
c. current lease- and sublease payments recognised in 
income for the period, with separate amounts for 
minimum lease payments, contingent rents and 
sublease payments 
PLUS: Recommended: general description of lessee’s 
significant lease arrangements 
292.115 
a. for each class of assets, the net carrying amount at 
balance-sheet date 
b. the total minimum lease payments and their present 
value for each of the following periods, expiring:  1) 
within one year, 2) between one and five years and 3) 
after five years 
c. total of future minimum sublease payments expected 
to be received under non-cancellable subleases 
 
 
PLUS: Recommended: general description of lessee’s 
significant lease arrangements  
 
Appendix 2.I illustrates the consequences of the differences between these 
requirements. Appendix 2.II shows the differences as found in the financial 
statements of Royal KPN N.V. for 2004.  
 
The major difference is of course the recognition on the balance sheet of the leased 
asset and the lease liability for financial leases versus solely the disclosure in the 
notes for operating leases. This results logically in the depreciation requirement of 
the asset under a financial lease. Consequently, under a financial lease the lessee 
needs to distinguish between the repayment of the liability (not recognised in the 
income statement) and the depreciation of the assets (recognised in the income 
statement). Under an operating lease, it does not really matter which part is 
interest and which part is repayment in the lease payment, since the entire lease 
payment is recognised in the income statement.  
 
Furthermore, for financial leases disclosure is required of both the nominal (total) 
lease commitments as well as the present value of the lease commitments. 
Moreover, the amount of the asset on the balance sheet per class of assets must also 
be disclosed. For operating leases only the nominal commitments are required, 
which forces the user of the financial statements to calculate the present value of 
the operating lease himself if he wishes to estimate an on-balance equivalent. Since 
for operating leases the information provided in the notes is the only information 
available, it is remarkable that also the disclosure requirements for financial leases 
in the notes are more extensive than the disclosure requirements of operating 
leases. The purpose of capitalisation and the available procedures to do so will be 
described in chapter 5.  
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However, assuming that companies are capable of calculating a present value for 
both operating leases and financial leases, and since the present value is also 
necessary in determining whether the lease is an operating- or a financial lease, the 
disclosure requirements of operating- and financial leases could be harmonised on 
this aspect.  
 
2.4.3 Previous discussions on the difference between operating- and financial leases 
The difference between the disclosure of operating leases and the capitalisation of 
financial leases has been the subject of many discussions. The risk/reward approach 
has been described as unsatisfactory for the users of the annual accounts due to the 
arbitrary way of lease qualification and accounting. For example, a lease that 
differs only in a small way from another lease24 may be accounted for in a 
completely different way. McGregor (1996) argues, “the attractiveness of an 
operating lease lies within the off-balance-sheet character, since the same rights 
can be obtained as with debt financing. The leverage-effect of the operating lease 
increases the measures of return on assets and protects existing debt covenants or 
allows for the issuances of new debt”. When the purpose of the lease is driven by the 
desire to show a better financial performance, lease accounting can be seen as a 
form of creative accounting, which is defined by Shah (1998, p.83) as follows: 
“Creative accounting can be understood as the process by which management take 
advantage of gaps or ambiguities in accounting standards to present a biased 
picture of financial performance. It does not breach the letter of the law or rules, but 
may breach its spirits.” Wilkins and Zimmer (1983, pp. 749-750) state in their 
article that lease financing is a controversial topic amongst financial communities of 
the US, Canada and the UK, and that the two (related) issues of concern are 
i. that the alternative reporting methods, which reflect different debt- and equity 
structures, may influence creditor evaluations and affect the ability of a lessee 
firm to raise capital; and 
ii. that financing by a term loan instead of an ‘equivalent’ financial lease affects 
the ability of a firm to raise capital. 
 
Reither (1998) summarised the results of a survey on the five best and the five 
worst accounting standards amongst 75 participants25 of the 1996 FASB conference 
on financial reporting issues. Approximately 50% of the participants voted for 
FAS13 (Leases) as one of the five worst accounting standards, by far the winner of 
the election. Respondents gave the following reasons for rating FAS13 as one of the 
worst accounting standards: 
• It fails to achieve objectives because many obligations that in 
substance are financial, such as sales-type or direct-financing leases, 
are recognised as operating leases; 
• It is conceptually and operationally a nightmare; 
• The bright-line rules for lease capitalisation cause abuse of the 
standard; 
• It is a complicated strand (evidenced by many amendments and 
interpretations); 
                                                          
24 For example, a lease with a maturity of 73% of the remaining useful life of the asset is qualified as an operating 
lease, while a lease with the same characteristics but with a maturity of 75% of the remaining useful life is qualified 
as a financial lease. 
25 These 75 individuals include 40 academics, 16 standard setters, four regulators, nine public accountants and six 
financial analysts. 
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• It relies too heavily on disclosure to assess lease obligations; 
• It does not significantly improve accounting for lease transactions. 
 
According to Mason and Gibbins (1991), standard setters should facilitate auditors 
in the application of the standards by: “reviewing new and existing standards to 
reduce the large number of ambiguities and other difficulties that detract from the 
thrust of the standard by requiring interpretive and clarifying judgements rather 
than judgements on substantive matters”. The same is stated by Hronsky and 
Houghton (2001): “clearly worded standards provide guidance for auditors in 
auditor-client situations, and reduce the justifiability of aggressive reporting 
decisions”.  
 
Before section 2.5 describes the proposed alternative for the beleaguered 
risk/reward approach, the asset/liability approach, section 2.4.4 first describes the 
different formats of operating-lease disclosures that can be found in the financial 
statement of Dutch companies. As will become clear, these formats do not all 
comply with current lease-accounting standards. 
 
2.4.4 Compliance with accounting standards 
As shown in Table 2.1, the required disclosure of the future minimum lease 
payments under operating leases leaves no room for different interpretations by the 
lessee. However, a perusal of the annual accounts of 119 Dutch companies in the 
period 2000-2004 reveals several forms of disclosure (an extensive description of the 
sample is given in the empirical chapters 5 and 7). Some of these forms do not 
comply with RJ292 or IAS17. Table 2.4 shows the eight different formats that were 
found during the investigation of the annual accounts of Dutch listed firms. The 
eight are ranked based on how informative they are; the most informative is at the 
top and the least is at the bottom.  
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Table 2.4 Different formats of operating-lease disclosure used by Dutch listed firms 
# Description Example: 
1 FAS 13 
The future operating lease commitments are disclosed 
separately for a) each of the next five years and b) 
cumulative for the period beyond year five. This is in 
accordance with FAS 13. 
Ahold, Annual Report 2003, page 159 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 FAS 13 < > RJ292/IAS17 
The future operating lease commitments are disclosed 
separately for a) the period up to one year, b) the 
aggregate of the years two and three, c) the aggregate 
of the years four and five and d) the cumulative for the 
period beyond year five. This is less then FAS 13, but 
more then RJ292/IAS17. 
SNT, Annual Report 2003, page 29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 RJ292/IAS17 
The future operating lease commitments are disclosed 
separately for a) the period up to one year, b) the 
aggregate of the years two till five and b) the 
cumulative amount for the period after year five. This is 
according to RJ292 and IAS17. 
Buhrmann, Annual Report 2003, page 85 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 Present Value (PV) 
The total present value of the future operating lease 
commitments is disclosed with the discount rate. 
Macintosh, Annual Report 2003, page 61 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 Total nominal commitments (TC) 
The total nominal value of the future operating lease 
commitments is disclosed. 
Grontmij, Annual Report 2003, page 44 
 
 
 
6 Annual payment plus remaining life (AP+RL) 
The annual operating lease commitments are disclosed 
together with the (average) remaining life of the total 
lease portfolio. 
Wolters Kluwer, Annual Report 2003, page 91 
 
 
 
 
7 Annual payment (AP) 
The annual operating lease commitments are disclosed 
without the applicable (average) remaining life of the 
lease portfolio. 
Amstelland, Annual Report 2003, page 58 
 
 
 
8 Other 
Combinations of methods. 
Ten Cate, Annual Report 2003, page 58 
The commitments given  by  the group companies can be specified as
follows:
2003
Amount (x  € 1,000) Total 1 year 1-3 year 3-5 year >5year
Rental agreements 124,688 24,411 44,868 35,867 19,542
Operational lease 21,474 7,516 11,811 2,147 --
The present value of existing rental and lease commitments relating  to
immovable property can be broken down by  terms as follows:
Rental Lease
Due within 1 year 6,556 50,789
1 to 5 years 22,170 132,888
Due after 5 years 20,454 32,500
49,180 216,177
The aggregate amounts of minimum rental commitments to third parties
as of December 28, 2003, under non-cancelable operating lease contracts
for the next five years and thereafter were as follows:
2004 747
2005 689
2006 663
2007 583
2008 552
Thereafter 5,552
Total 8,786
* million Euro
The long-term financial commitments relating to rents and operating leases
amount to € 84,584,000 (2002: € 61,838,000).
As at December 31, 2003 annual commitments under rental and operational
lease agreements amounted to EUR 83 million (2002: EUR 79 million). The
average term of these commitments is approximately 5.8 years (2002: 6.0 years).
The instalments on lease contracts due in 2004 total € 3.7 million  (in 2003:
€ 3.6 million). The rent commitments for 2004 total € 4.5 million (in 2003:
€ 4.3 million).
RENTAL AND OPERATIONAL  LEASE COMMITMENTS
These are due as follows;
Within 1 year 85
After 1 year but within 5 years 216
After 5 years 135
436
* million Euro
 
 
The most informative are those firms that disclose the information as required by 
FAS13. FAS13 (the first disclosure format) requires lessees to disclose the total 
lease commitments split into five expiry periods, whereas RJ292 (the third format) 
requires only three expiry periods. The second disclosure format is a combination of 
FAS13 and RJ292. Formats four through eight do not comply with RJ292. The 
fourth discloses the present value of the operating leases instead of the nominal 
value as required, either split into the three expiry categories or just the total 
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present value without additional information. Although it can be argued that this is 
useful information, it is more in line with the disclosure of financial leases and it is 
a progressive disclosure type (since the user of the financial statements does not 
have to estimate the present value of the commitments, this format is not as 
required by the accounting standard). The fifth through eighth disclosure formats 
do not comply with the standard, and the information disclosed is insufficient to 
estimate the (present value of) total commitments of the company. This will be 
described in more detail in chapters 4 and 5. The fifth disclosure format discloses 
the total nominal leases commitments without dividing these into expiry periods. 
The sixth disclosure format discloses the annual payment including the (average) 
remaining life. Because the total commitment can be roughly estimated, this format 
provides more information than the seventh does. The seventh disclosure format 
discloses only next year’s annual payment without the maturity. The estimation of 
the total commitment of such a company is a complete guess, and is the least-
informative disclosure type. The eighth disclosure format is a combination of the 
formats described above.  
 
As can be seen from Table 2.4 compliance with the accounting standards may not 
have priority in at least some companies. This may be a result of the non-legal 
binding of the accounting standards in the Netherlands, or it is possible that the 
companies involved might be of the opinion that their lease commitments are of 
non-material amounts. Chapter 5 presents the results of the analysis of the 
compliance of all Dutch listed firms during the period 2000-2004. 
 
2.4.5 Accounting lease qualification versus fiscal lease qualification 
From a fiscal point of view, by separating the ownership from the use of the asset, a 
lease can create value for both lessee and lessor. Most of the research on the lease-
or-buy decision (see Appendix 1.II) focuses on the tax differential between lessee 
and lessors and the possibility of shifting the tax shield for low-tax-rated lessees to 
high-tax-rated lessors. However, to be entitled to depreciate an asset (and to be 
entitled to the tax incentives schemes), the lessor must be the economic owner of 
the asset and the lease will qualify as an operating lease. The increase in operating-
lease transactions during the ‘70s and ‘80s is supposedly related to the tax-incentive 
investment programs of the Dutch government. The WIR-premie (“Wet 
investeringsrekening, available from 1978 until 1988) was an important stimulus 
for investments and the growth of the leasing business (Bruins Slot (1994, p.1303)26, 
Vereniging voor Belastingwetenschap (2001, p.15)). Nowadays, the government also 
has tax incentives schemes27 promoting in particular investments in sustainable 
energy (like wind farms, co-generation plants, biomass installations).  
                                                          
26 Bruins Slot was formerly the tax inspector with the Amsterdam Inland Revenue Service for large companies and 
was involved in both the tax guidelines (resulting eventually in the Lease guideline 2000) and was a member of 
“Commission Leasing” of the Dutch Association of Tax Science that published in 2001 the Fiscal aspects of leasing. 
Bruins Slot withdrew from that commission, however, because of a possible conflict of interest that might have 
arisen between his dissertation and the commission’s report. Bruins Slot defended his PhD-thesis ‘ Leasing in de 
vennootschapsbelasting. Een nieuwe kijk op 'economische eigendom'  on June 7th 2006 at the University of Tilburg 
Bruins Slot (2006). 
27 In the Netherlands, tax incentives schemes include the following: accelerated depreciation (WET IB 2001, art. 
3.31-3.38), small-scale investment deduction (Wet IB 3.41), energy investment deduction (Wet IB 3.42), 
environmental investment deduction (Wet IB 3.42a) and the movie investment deduction27 (Wet IB 3.42b). These 
allow early depreciation or additional deductions that make it advantageous to enter into a lease agreement when the 
investor has limited or no tax capacity.  
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To distinguish between the legal and the fiscal owners of the asset, the Dutch tax 
authorities therefore also distinguish between operating and financial leases for 
fiscal purposes. (In the US, the distinction between the two types from a fiscal 
perspective refers to ‘true leases’ (tax transfer allowed) and ‘conditional-sales 
contracts’ (non-true leases); (Graham, Lemmon and Schallheim (1998)).  
 
As with accounting standards, in order for the lease to qualify as an operating lease, 
the lessor must bear economic risk in the transaction; otherwise, the tax authorities 
will consider the lease to be a financial lease, which implies that the lessor will not 
be allowed to depreciate. Although the principle between the fiscal requirement and 
the accounting requirements is the same (transfer of economic ownership), the exact 
qualifications are not, and the same lease can be a financial lease for accounting 
purposes and an operating lease for tax purposes. Since 1985, several lease 
guidelines have been issued, meant to give some certainty to the lease industry 
regarding the boundaries of operating-lease qualification (Vereniging voor 
Belastingwetenschap (2001)). Until 2000, the guidelines were agreements between 
the Dutch Association of Leasingcompanies (“NVL”) and the Amsterdam Inland 
Revenue Service for large companies. Since 2000, the lease guideline is a resolution 
of the Dutch Undersecretary of Finance (“staatssecretaris van Financiën) . On 
November 15th 1999, the undersecretary issued the latest lease regulation28. Also 
within the tax regulations, the Dutch government found it desirable that lease 
agreements are treated equally to the greatest extent possible, as it is mentioned as 
the objective of the new lease regulation. The investment facilities as incorporated 
in the Dutch law appear to be one of motives for making the boundaries clear of a 
distinction between finance and operating leases, since the undersecretary explicitly 
refers to this matter. The lease guideline 2000 contains the criteria for which the 
lessor is assumed to be the fiscal owner of the asset, which results in the 
qualification of an operating lease. Appendix 2.III presents these criteria. 
 
Although the qualifications as operating lease from a fiscal perspective as opposed 
to the accounting standard are quite similar (no bargain purchase option, asset not 
too specific for only lessee’s use), some differences exist. Table 2.5 summarises the 
major differences between the Dutch fiscal and accounting requirements. 
 
Table 2.5 Operating-lease qualification conditions 
 PV of lease payments less than Economic useful life less than 
Tax 92.5%1 85% 
RJ-292 90% 75% 
IAS 17 ‘substantially all’ ‘major part’ 
1 Minimum residual value is 7.5% and will be increased by 0.5% for lease contracts with a maturity longer than five 
years. 
 
The differences might lead to a qualification as an operating lease for tax purposes 
but as a financial lease for the financial statement, as illustrated by Figure 2.4. 
 
                                                          
28 Leaseregeling 2000, act of November 15th 1999, nr. AFZ 99/3262M, Stcrt.225) which replaced the existing lease 
regulation of December 4th, 1992, and became effective on January 1st, 2000. On June 20th 2001 the last 
amendments were made to this lease regulation (RTB 2001/2423M), but these amendments are not material.  
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Figure 2.4 Qualification as operating lease based on lease term as % useful economic life 
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The equivalent treatment of fiscal- and accounting-lease qualification is not a 
necessity, according to the Dutch Minister of Justice29. However, the Commission of 
Justice argues that although the equivalence of the two areas may not be an end in 
itself, harmonisation of the guidelines might lead to a simplification of the leasing 
matter (Vereniging voor Belastingwetenschap (2001). The difference between the 
tax and accounting qualifications of leases is also apparent in the US30 but as 
Graham et al. (1998) state: “the tax and accounting guidelines suggest that 
operating leases (accounting) are predominantly true leases (tax)”. Although in the 
Netherlands and the US the fiscal accounts do not necessarily follow the financial 
statements, this is not applicable to most continental European countries. This was 
also shown in the classification of Nobes et al. (2000), who argued that in Class-B 
countries the tax rules dominate the accounting rules. This applies to Germany, 
Italy, France and Belgium, for example. In Class-A countries, including the 
Netherlands, the US and the UK, tax rules are separated from accounting rules.  
 
Although the difference between the accounting and tax qualification31 in the 
Netherlands is not that large, it may have an influence on the tax reasons to choose 
operating leases (as investigated in chapters 6 and 7). For example, a tax-driven 
lease might be structured in a way that it qualifies as an operating lease from a tax 
perspective. If the accounting treatment is of no interest to the lessee or lessor, the 
lease might not qualify as an operating lease in the financial statements. This 
might affect the results in chapter 7. 
 
To finalise this section, Table 2.6 summarises the definition of a lease, the 
qualification as operating lease and the consequences thereof from a legal, 
accounting and fiscal point of view. 
 
                                                          
29 He said this in answer to the questions of the Commissions of Justice on draft regulations with respect to the 
financial statements of banks (see Vereniging voor Belastingwetenschap, 2001, p.29) 
30 In the US, the IRS set forth six guidelines to define the difference between true and non-true leases. These are in 
short: 1) minimum at-risk (20%) requirement for lessor, 2) minimum estimated residual value of 20%, 3) minimum 
remaining life (20% of originally estimated life), 4) no bargain purchase option, 5) no loan from lessee to lessor, and 
6) lessor must demonstrate expectation of profits. 
31 This section focussed on the tax incentives and qualifications of operating leases, since this is often described as 
an important reason for choosing operating leases instead of buying an asset.  However, the fiscal environment of 
leasing contains in general much more than the Leaseregeling 2000 or tax incentives attached to the fiscal owner of 
an asset. Other aspects are, for example, transfer taxes on immovable assets, sales taxes or seizure in case of 
bankruptcy. For an extensive description of these aspects, refer to “De fiscale aspecten van leasing “ (The fiscal 
aspects of leasing) by the Dutch Association of Tax Science (Vereniging voor Belastingwetenschap (2001)), and to 
the dissertation of Bruins Slot (2006)Bruins Slot. 
Different aspects of operating leases  
53 
Table 2.6 Summary of definition and qualification as operating leases from a legal, accounting and fiscal 
point of view 
 
LEGAL ACCOUNTING RJ292 
TAX 
LEASE GUIDELINE 
2000 
 
 
LEASE DEFINITION 
Not legally defined, either rental, 
or hire purchase, or leasehold. 
Separation of legal ownership 
and use of an asset 
An agreement whereby the lessor 
conveys to the lessee in return for 
a payment or series of payments 
the right to use an asset for an 
agreed period of time, including 
rental- leasehold and hire-
purchase agreements. 
 
 
 
Not defined 
Lease not legally defined, so 
neither a distinction between 
operating and finance leases 
 
Operating- versus financial leases 
based on who bears substantially 
all the risks and rewards incident 
to ownership 
Operating- versus financial leases 
based on who is the fiscal owner 
of the asset 
 
OPERATING VS. 
FINANCIAL LEASE 
 Fiscal lease qualification differs slightly from accounting qualification. 
(see Table 2.5) 
CONSEQUENCES OF 
DIFFERENCE 
BETWEEN 
OPERATING AND 
FINANCIAL LEASES 
Any major financial commitment 
not disclosed on the balance sheet 
shall be disclosed in the notes. 
(Civil Code 2:381) 
 
Operating lease total future 
nominal commitments are 
disclosed in the notes; financial 
leases are capitalised for their fair 
value on the balance sheet. 
With operating leases, the lessor 
is the fiscal owner, and he 
depreciates and uses possible tax 
incentives. 
 
2.5 Proposed lease-accounting approach: asset/liability approach 
In 2000, a position paper was published by a working group consisting of members 
of the standard-setting bodies of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK and the 
US, and the staff of the IASB (the “G4+1 working group”); (IASB (2000) and 
Lennard and Nailor (2000)). This paper described a relatively new approach32, the 
asset/liability approach, which would overcome the shortfalls of the risk/reward 
approach. The asset and liability approach is a way to account for all leases, 
irrespective of a qualification of different types, based on the same principle: the 
lease is assumed to have assets and liabilities for both lessee and lessor, and is 
accounted for by valuing these assets and liabilities and incorporating these in some 
way on the balance sheet. The difficulty inherent in judging and assessing some 
lease transactions is mentioned by McGregor (1996, p.9) and IASB (2000) as one of 
the shortfalls of the risk/reward approach, which is said to be improved under the 
asset/liability approach. If the asset/liability approach has indeed less ambiguity 
than the risk/reward approach, and the standards are easier to interpret and to 
apply, then the endorsements above suggest that it would be an improvement.  
 
The proposal of the new accounting approach has surprising number of parallels 
with studies in the ’60s and ‘70s, before FAS13 was established. For example, the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants published a study in 1962 in 
which they conclude that leases should be reflected in the balance sheet by 
capitalising the value of the lessee’s rights as an asset and recording the lessee’s 
obligations as a liability. Consequently, this study led to many articles commenting 
on the lease capitalisation approach. Rappaport (1965) starts his article with, ‘the 
current controversy over accounting for leases highlights once again the necessity 
for accelerated research in basic accounting theory’. Cook (1963) strongly opposed 
lease capitalisation, providing six reasons why capitalisation is a misconception of 
the authors of the G4+1 study. It was also during this period that the first study 
analysing the impact of capitalisation on financial ratios was performed by Nelson 
                                                          
32 In 1996, this approach was introduced by another paper of the G4+1, ‘Accounting for Leases: a new approach.’ 
(McGregor (1996)). 
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(1963). The impact of capitalisation of leases is therefore the subject of chapters 4 
and 5, which will discuss the issue in more depth. However, based on the above one 
might conclude that the current new attention for lease accounting has similarities 
to the earlier flow of lease-capitalisation discussions. Furthermore, the above-
mentioned articles showed that the lease-accounting regulation as laid down in 
FAS13 was probably not received with an overwhelming agreement of all parties. 
The division between operating- and financial leases is evidently a compromise 
between proponents and opponents of lease capitalisation. The recently proposed 
asset/liability approach is then an attempt to undo this compromise. 
 
The conceptual frameworks adopted by the different (national) accounting 
standards boards provide definitions of assets and liabilities. Table 2.7 gives an 
overview of the definitions used by FASB and by IASB (IASB (2000)). 
 
Table 2.7 Overview of definitions of assets and liabilities by FASB and IASB 
ASSETS 
FASB IASB 
Assets are probable future economic benefits obtained 
or controlled by a particular entity as a result of past 
transactions or events. 
An asset is a resource controlled by the enterprise as a 
result of past events and from which future economic 
benefits are expected to flow to the enterprise. 
 
LIABILITIES 
FASB IASB 
Liabilities are probable future sacrifices of economic 
benefits arising from present commitments of a 
particular entity to transfer assets or provide services 
to other entities in the future as a result of past 
transactions or events. 
A liability is a present obligation of the enterprise 
arising from past events, the settlement of which is 
expected to result in an outflow from the enterprise of 
resources embodying economic benefits. 
 
 
Furthermore, the frameworks determine whenever the assets and liabilities should 
be recognized in the financial statements. In short, recognition is obliged whenever  
- it is probable that any future economic benefit associated with the item 
will flow to or from the enterprise, 
- the item has a cost or value that can be valued with reliability. 
 
The originator of the asset and liability approach, Warren McGregor, finds it clear 
that application of the framework definitions and recognition criteria leads to the 
conclusion that all financial leases and most, if not all, operating leases qualify for 
recognition as assets and liabilities in the financial statements (McGregor (1996, 
p.16-17)). The proposed capitalisation, according to the reports of IASB and FASB, 
is to capitalise only the fair value of the rights and obligations to the extent these 
are passed on to the lessee. This is called the ‘financial components approach’ by 
Monson (2001) or the ‘rights of use approach’ by UBSWarburg (2004). This is in 
contrast to capitalisation of the full value of the equipment with the obligation to 
return it at the end of the lease. The G4+1 working group discussed this alternative, 
and proponents argued that the lessee has full control over the entire equipment 
during the term of the lease. In addition, this alternative approach would make the 
balance sheet more comparable to companies that own the assets instead of leasing 
them (IASB, 2000, p.25). This alternative approach is called the “whole-asset 
approach” by Monson (2001) and UBSWarburg (2004). This alternative was rejected 
by the G4+1 working group, because of the following reasons: first, lessee rights 
relate only to that part of the equipment’s economic life and not the whole of it;  
second, the economic benefits beyond the end of the lease are not transferred to the 
Different aspects of operating leases  
55 
lessee in the first place, and the obligation to return the asset at the end of the lease 
therefore does not represent economic reality.  
 
Appendix 2.IV illustrates the differences between the risk/reward approach and the 
asset/liability approach, using both the whole-asset approach and the financial-
components approach. For illustrative purposes, the purchase of the assets with 
100% debt financing is also included. 
 
As described before, the G4+1 working group has rejected the whole-asset approach. 
Although both Monson (2001) and UBSWarburg (2004) agree with the principle of 
capitalising all leases, they both prefer the whole-asset approach because it makes 
the balance sheet comparable with the purchase and debt financing of the asset. 
Monson (2001) argues that when comparing the approaches to the criteria of useful 
information by the frameworks, the whole-asset approach is overwhelmingly 
superior to the financial-components approach. Monson (p.284) states that “any new 
lease-accounting standard that does not reduce the volume of lease contracts 
transacted solely because of their perceived off-balance-sheet advantages is 
producing information that is neither relevant nor reliable”. He is of the opinion 
that this approach will lead to further possibilities to structure leases in a way that 
is convenient to the lessee’s balance sheet.  
 
In July 2006, the board members of both the IASB and the FASB voted to add to the 
agenda the project on lease accounting. The project will be conducted jointly and is 
expected to result in the publication of another discussion paper in 2008 (IASB 
(2006)). New rules are not expected to be issued until 2009. FASB member Leslie 
Seidman mentioned during the board meeting that ‘reworking FAS13 ranks second 
behind pension accounting as one of FASB’s top priorities33’ The next sub-section 
summarises a study analysing the comments written in response to the previous 
IASB- and FASB proposal to change the lease-accounting standard. 
 
2.5.1 Comments on lease reform by different users 
Different parties have an interest in lease accounting, either as insiders (lessors, 
lessees or auditors), or as outsiders (regulators, users of the financial statements or 
academics). An unpublished paper on the economic interest of lease accounting 
analysed the comment letters sent to the IASB by 29 parties involved in lease 
accounting, on the proposed asset/liability approach (Lückerath (2002)). The results 
of this study are summarised below and will be discussed hereafter. 
 
Attitude towards current and proposed lease-accounting standard 
The two central research questions of the study are the following: first, is the 
current risk/reward approach perceived to be unsatisfactory, and second, will the 
asset/liability approach be an improvement? The IASB received 29 letters, which 
were posted on the IASB website. An overview of these letters is shown in Appendix 
2.V. Of the 29 letters, 27 were useful for analysis (one remained undisclosed and 
one was a delay notice). Table 2.8shows the division of the letters over the five 
categories of interested parties. Table 2.8 also shows whether a negative or positive 
attitude toward the two lease-accounting approaches was expressed in the comment 
letter. 
                                                          
33 Citation from Marie Leone, July 19th, 2006, www.CFO.com 
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Table 2.8 Attitude towards lease-accounting approach 
  RISK/REWARD APPROACH ASSET/LIABILITY APPROACH 
Respondent: Total Letters Positive 
attitude 
Negative 
attitude 
Positive 
attitude 
Negative 
attitude 
Lessor 10 5 2 1 7 
Lessee 2 2 0 0 2 
Auditor 10 0 6 8 0 
Regulator 3 0 1 0 2 
Academic 2 0 2 1 0 
Total  27 7 11 10 11 
 
Of the total sample of 27 respondents, for eighteen respondents34 the opinion 
towards the risk/reward approach was obvious: seven were positive and eleven 
negative. With respect to the asset/liability approach, for 21 respondents their 
attitude was clear: eleven were negative and ten positive. However, the division of 
these attitudes over the interested parties attracts attention. Most striking are the 
auditors; the auditors for which the attitude could be observed from the letter were 
all six negative, with respect to the risk/reward approach, and all eight positive, 
with respect to the asset/liability approach. The two lessees in the sample reacted in 
an opposite manner, both positive towards the risk/reward approach and both 
negative toward asset/liability approach. The lessors had mainly the same 
outcome— although for both approaches there were two (one) exceptions. The two 
academics in the sample were both negative towards the risk/reward approach, but 
only one expressed a positive attitude towards the asset/liability approach. 
 
Reactions on current and proposed lease-accounting standard 
Table 2.9 shows the reactions of the respondents on three specific items mentioned 
in the letters: the method was arbitrary, the information was either unsatisfactory 
(for risk/reward approach) or incorrect (asset/liability approach), and the 
risk/reward approach  should be maintained, or they agreed with the asset/liability-
principle.  
Table 2.9 Specific comments on lease-accounting approaches 
 RISK/REWARD APPROACH 
  Arbitrary Unsatisfactory Maintain Risk/Reward 
Respondent: Total letters Agree Disagree Agree Disagree Agree Disagree 
Lessor 10 4 3 0 4 6 1 
Lessee 2 1 0 1 0 2 0 
Auditor 10 7 0 6 1 1 8 
Regulator 3 2 0 1 0 1 1 
Academic 2 1 0 2 0 0 2 
Total  27 15 3 10 5 10 12 
  ASSET/LIABILITY APPROACH 
  Arbitrary Confusing/wrong 
information 
Agree with A/L 
principle 
Respondent: Total letters Agree Disagree Agree Disagree Agree Disagree 
Lessor 10 7 0 3 0 2 7 
Lessee 2 1 0 1 0 0 2 
Auditor 10 2 1 3 0 9 1 
Regulator 3 2 0 2 0 0 3 
Academic 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Total  27 12 1 9 0 12 13 
                                                          
34 Five respondents did not express their attitude, and the attitude of four respondents was mixed. 
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Of the 27 respondents, eighteen reacted to the arbitrariness of the risk/reward 
approach; three of these (all lessors) disagreed with the qualification of 
arbitrariness. Both lessees were in favour of maintaining the risk/reward approach, 
as were six out of seven lessors that reacted on this matter. The major part of the 
auditors found the risk/reward approach arbitrary and unsatisfactory, and 
disagreed with keeping this approach. The arbitrariness is presumably not 
improved by the asset/liability approach, since still twelve respondents found it 
arbitrary (of these, seven were lessors). The asset/liability principle is not supported 
by a small majority of the respondents. Striking is the disagreement of the three 
regulators with the asset/liability-principle. Not surprisingly, these letters did not 
come from countries directly involved in the IASB paper (letters came from the EU, 
the Netherlands and Germany). 
 
Comments by lessors 
Arguments used by the lessors do not seem to centre on the fear of losing 
business, but are more related to the usefulness of each approach to the 
public, the costs of implementation and the possibility of structuring lease 
transactions to suit off-balance transactions. 
 
Comments by lessees 
Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, only two letters came from lessees. This 
is indeed unfortunate, because of the impact that the change of the lease-
accounting approach will have on especially the lessee’s balance sheet. It is 
not surprising because lessees do not participate in leasing as a core business 
but as a way of purchasing or hiring assets, and they therefore have no 
interest in leasing itself. This probably explains why the only two comment 
letters coming from lessees were associations representing groups of lessees 
(i.e. the International Air Transport Association, IATA, and the Australian 
Institute of Company Directors, AICD). Both lessees were in favour of 
maintaining the risk/reward approach. The IATA (p.1) was very clear in the 
reasons why it favoured the risk/reward approach: ‘the manner in which 
leases are accounted for has a major bearing on the financial statements of 
most if not all airlines’, and ‘strong support for the existing R/R approach’. 
The arguments of the IATA are driven purely by their own commercial 
interests in maintaining the current approach, which is also mentioned as a 
shortcoming of the proposed approach because it overlooks the commercial 
reasons for companies to lease, according to the IATA. The AICD suggests 
maintaining the Risk/Reward approach and expanding only the disclosure 
rules.  
 
Comments by auditors 
Eight out of the ten auditors that reacted to the IASB proposal disagreed 
with the risk/reward approach. Arthur Andersen, for example, (p.1) ‘has been 
concerned for many years that the approach to accounting for leases has been 
based on a mass of rules and sub-rules designed to support relatively 
arbitrary conclusions’, or the Accountant Association of Canada ‘the current 
treatment requires subjective judgement and is open to abuse, transactions 
that are essentially the same should be accounted for in the same manner.’ 
The South African Institute of Chartered Accountants finds that the 
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asset/liability approach increases the comparability and convergence of 
accounting requirements but adds, “our main concern is that it will remain 
relatively easy to structure leases so that a lessee can report immaterial 
amounts on its balance sheet even though the economics of the arrangement 
are that the lessee has acquired significant property interests”. Moreover, 
since most of the auditors find the risk/reward approach arbitrary (seven 
agree, none disagree) and unsatisfactory (six agree, one disagree), the 
approach seems indeed to be an improvement on this matter, since only two 
auditors agree with the arbitrariness of the approach (one disagree). Thus, 
although the auditors also find some shortcomings in the asset/liability 
approach, the majority favours it. 
 
Comments by regulators 
Three regulatory bodies reacted to the proposal of the IASB: the European 
Commission and the Dutch and German regulators. Two responded 
negatively towards the proposed asset/liability approach (Dutch and German 
regulators). The European Commission showed some hesitance because they 
do not agree with the asset/liability approach principle but do agree, “lease 
accounting would be brought in line with more recent standards and the 
various conceptual frameworks of the G4+1-members, because the 
pronouncements clearly have a different underlying basis”. Also, the DASB 
does acknowledge that the risk/reward approach operates unsatisfactorily, 
but does not agree with the proposed asset/liability approach; they argue, 
however, that only those assets that an enterprise can control should be 
reflected on the balance sheet. Situations might occur when the asset/liability 
approach “will place an undue requirement on a lessee” (p.1). Although the 
asset/liability approach is not preferred, neither is the risk/reward approach. 
Only the Dutch regulator favours an amended risk/reward approach to 
address the problems of the existing standard. The other two did not really 
react to the risk/reward approach and could therefore not be classified. 
 
Comments by academics 
Both of the academics that responded oppose the risk/reward approach, citing 
this rejection based on economic theory. Michael Bradbury, University of 
Auckland, said, (p.2) ‘it is clear that the existing operating/financial lease 
distinction does not work. It is based on arbitrary criteria, which do not 
reflect fundamental economic characteristics’; Beattie and Goodacre, 
University of Stirling, stated, (p 1.) ‘current lease accounting standards fail to 
capture the economic reality and flexibility of lease contracts. As a result, 
company-operating ratios based on reported financial statements are 
significantly distorted’. Furthermore, Beattie and Goodacre do not comment 
in depth on the asset/liability approach, although they do favour 
capitalisation of all leases. The lease-capitalisation approach as suggested by 
Beattie and Goodacre (1998) and Beattie et al. (1998) will be extensively 
described in chapter 4 of this thesis. Bradbury does believe that ‘the 
asset/liability approach is a useful alternative to the risk/reward approach, 
since it is consistent with current economic theory’.  
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The above discussion allows us to conclude that although the risk/reward approach 
is often called unsatisfactory, there is also no overwhelming support for the 
asset/liability approach. Also, different parties have different interests in lease 
accounting. Lanfranconi and Wiedman (2000) argue that if users of the financial 
statements truly believe that two types of leases exist (based on the division of the 
risks and rewards of ownership), then the asset/liability approach appears 
somewhat draconian. They suggest that in that case a modification of the current 
criteria seems more appropriate. On the other hand, if all leases are considered to 
fall within a continuum where the lessor and the lessee share the rights, the risks 
and rewards to varying degrees, then the asset/liability approach might be a better 
reflection of this reality. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 investigate the decision usefulness of 
the current operating-lease disclosure requirements. The empirical analysis of 
chapter 5 will test whether the information required is sufficiently complete to 
allow companies to be compared on a fair basis, regardless of whether or not a 
company has material lease commitments. Insufficient information may lead us to 
one of two conclusions: either the asset/liability approach is unavoidable, or a 
compromise between the current and proposed lease-accounting approaches might 
be worth consideration.  
 
2.6 Leasing volume in the Netherlands 
Just how important leasing has become worldwide and in the Netherlands will be 
illustrated in this section. However, as will also become clear, leasing activity in the 
Netherlands is hard to analyse, and it seems impossible to come up with 
indisputable numbers of how big the market is. For example, the upcoming analysis 
of the volume of leasing for only 87 listed companies shows already higher numbers 
than are disclosed in the World Leasing Yearbook 2006 for the Netherlands as a 
whole. This section does show, however, how leasing has become relatively more 
important in the world, in Europe and in the Netherlands. 
 
Figure 2.5 shows the development during the years 1996-2004 of the nominal 
commitments disclosed in the financial statement for a stable group of 87 Dutch 
listed companies. The financial statements of the companies in this sample were 
available for the entire eight-year period. Also these companies disclose information 
on operating leases (this includes companies disclosing that there are no operating-
lease commitments). The disclosed nominal commitments are taken into account as 
they are disclosed, so that no estimation has been conducted. Thus, for a company 
that discloses only the annual payment (see Table 2.4), only this payment is taken 
into account (whereas the total commitment will be larger). The development of the 
sample is shown in two lines, one including all 87 companies, and one excluding 
Shell and Ahold, due to the impact they have on the total commitments.  
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Figure 2.5 Development of nominal operating-lease commitments disclosed in financial statements of 87 
Dutch listed companies  
The increase of nominal lease commitments during the period 1996-2004 for a sample of 87 Dutch listed companies, 
which had operating-lease disclosures available during the entire period. The top line shows the total disclosed 
nominal amount of operating leases. The bottom line shows the total disclosed, excluding Ahold and Shell, since 
they account for a major part of the total. 
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Figure 2.5 shows a continuous growth in disclosed nominal operating-lease 
commitments as from 1996. The total disclosed commitments in 1996 of 6.6 billion 
Euro (excluding Ahold and Shell) is attributable to 62 companies, since in 1996 23 
companies did not disclose operating leases. This is on average 107 million Euros 
per company. In 2004, only six of the 85 companies did not disclose operating leases, 
and the remaining 79 companies disclosed 15.4 billion Euros. This is on average 195 
million Euros per company. The increase of the disclosed operating-lease 
commitments in Figure 2.5 may be caused by several aspects: the increase of 
companies using operating leases, the increase in total commitments of individual 
companies, and also the increase in the disclosure of total commitments instead of 
only next year’s annual payment.  
 
Figure 2.6 shows the relative importance of operating leases as opposed to financial 
leases. The period analysed is 2000-4004 and the number of companies is a stable 
group of 109 Dutch listed companies35. The commitments of the operating leases are 
the nominal commitments as disclosed in the footnotes to the financial statements. 
The commitments of the financial leases are the commitments as capitalised on the 
balance sheet, and are therefore the present value of the future commitments (see 
section 2.4 for the differences). The present value of the future operating-lease 
commitments is probably higher than the nominal commitments, due to the number 
of companies that disclose only the annual payment. The present value of their total 
commitments will be (much) higher. Therefore, the difference between the volumes 
of financial and operating leases for these 109 companies is probably even larger. 
The increased usage of operating leases as opposed to financial leases can also be 
                                                          
35 The financial lease data was not gathered before the year 2000. This enlarges the stable group of companies used 
in Figure 2.6 as opposed to Figure 2.5, since for the year 1996-2000 the information availability limited the group to 
87 companies for the entire period 1996-2004. The empirical studies of parts II, III and IV analyse the period to the 
years 2000-2004 because of better data availability during that period. However, to show the relative growth of the 
nominal operating-lease commitments, Figure 2.5 covers the period 1996-2004 with a limited number of companies. 
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deduced from the number of companies that disclosed in any form operating leases, 
as opposed to financial leases. For example, in 2004, of the 109 companies, 103 
disclose operating leases. Of these 109 companies, however, only 36 report financial 
leases. The nominal operating-lease commitments add up to 29.5 billion Euros, as 
opposed to the capitalised financial leases of 3.9 billion Euros. 
 
Figure 2.6 Relative importance of operating leases compared to financial leases 
Nominal commitments of operating leases disclosed in the footnotes to the financial statements of 109 companies 
during the period 2000-2004, and the on-balance capitalised financial leases for the same group of 109 companies 
during the same period. 
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Figure 2.6 shows that the operating leases are a multiple of the financial-lease 
commitments, and as a financing source are more important. This is in line with 
studies conducted in the US by the SEC (2005), Mehran et al. (1999) and Graham et 
al. (1998), for example, or in the UK by Beattie, Goodacre; and Thomson (2004). 
However, in the following analyses of annual leasing volume in the Netherlands 
and internationally, the two types of leasing are not mentioned separately by the 
different sources.  
 
Figure 2.5 showed the increase of disclosed operating-lease commitments for a 
small sample of 87 Dutch listed companies. Also other sources prove the growing 
use of leasing in general (financial and operating). Leasing has become a growing 
source of financing for companies over the last decades. Beginning in the 1950s, 
different countries established specialised leasing intermediates, starting with the 
US Leasing Corp. in 1954. The US has since then been the fastest growing market 
in annual leasing volume. From the 1980s, the European leasing industry has also 
grown each year due to newly established tax and accounting rules. Euromoney 
Institutional Investor Plc. publishes every year the World Leasing Yearbook, which 
is the only source of aggregate information on the world leasing industry. Although 
their information is a useful tool for estimating the size of the market, their results 
should be interpreted carefully. For example, lease information is gathered through 
leasing associations. Information from Europe is provided by Leaseurope (the 
European Federation of Leasing Company Associations), which in turn receives 
information from national associations such as the Dutch Leasing Association 
(NVL). Finally the national leasing associations receive information from their 
associated leasing companies. Thus, information on leases contracted without the 
involvement of a leasing company is not included.  
 
CHAPTER 2 
62 
However, as with Figure 2.5, the information provided by the Leasing yearbook is 
valuable in illustrating the growing relative importance of leasing. Figure 2.7 shows 
the annual leasing volume of the three major leasing markets in the world; North 
America, Europe and Asia. It shows that since 1978 indeed most new leasing 
volume was attributable to North America. However, in 2004 the market share of 
Europe (39.6%) approached North America’s market share (41.6%). This might 
indicate that the leasing market in North America has become a mature market 
Euromoney (2006). 
Figure 2.7 Annual leasing volume of North-America, Europe and Asia, 1978-2004 
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Euromoney World Leasing Yearbook 2006 
 
The annual lease volume in Europe and the outstanding lease commitments during 
the period 2000-2004 are shown in Figure 2.8. Of the annual volume in 2004, 83% 
was attributable to equipment leasing and hire purchase, and 17% to real estate 
leasing. This also indicates, however, that the numbers are being processed by 
national leasing associations, which are mainly involved in equipment leasing. 
Especially real estate leasing will often be contracted without the involvement of a 
leasing company. Nevertheless, as concluded by Mills in: Euromoney (2006, p.38), ‘it 
does demonstrate the increasing importance of leasing as a means of financing 
throughout Europe’.  
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Figure 2.8 Annual leasing volume and outstanding lease commitments in Europe from 2000-2004 
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Subsequent to the breakdown of world leasing volume, Figure 2.9 shows the share 
of the Netherlands in Europe’s annual leasing volume and outstanding lease 
commitments in 2004. For Leaseurope, the Netherlands is too small with regard to 
its contribution to the total leasing volume in Europe that the Netherlands is 
combined either with Belgium, Luxemburg and Switzerland or into the category 
‘Other’ in tables and figures included in Leaseurope’s reports (Euromoney (2006), 
Leaseurope (2005)). This study has distracted the Netherlands from the rough data 
to reconstruct Figure 2.9. This does not mean that countries combined in the ‘Other’ 
category are less significant leasing countries than the Netherlands. 
 
Figure 2.9 Share of the Netherlands in annual volume (left) and outstanding lease commitments (right) in 
2004  
source: www.leaseurope.org 
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In new volume, the Netherlands accounted for 4.4 billion Euros (1.9% of Europe’s 
new volume) and with respect to the total outstanding, the Netherlands also has a 
1.8% share of 603 billion Euros (11 billion Euros). Again, when we compare these 
numbers to the total nominal commitment disclosed in 2004 for 85 Dutch listed 
companies (see Figure 2.5), we see that these companies already have a total 
nominal commitment of 15 billion Euro of exclusively operating leases (even 27 
billion Euro including Ahold and Shell). How this number relates to the 11 billion 
Euro of all leases in the Netherlands as estimated by Leaseurope is hard to 
discover. The absolute figure for leasing volume in the Netherlands is definitely 
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underestimated by Leaseurope. Since this might also be the case for other countries, 
we cannot conclude that the Netherlands’ market share lies above 2%.  
 
Of course, the absolute numbers are dependent on the size of each country and the 
number of investments in that country. Leaseurope therefore also calculates a 
relative measure of leasing per country: the ‘penetration rate’. The penetration rate 
is calculated by dividing the total lease- and hire purchase new production by the 
total mount of investments in a country. It should show the relative importance of 
leasing in the particular country. However, the penetration rate in the Netherlands 
estimated by Leaseurope is also one of the lowest in Europe. Leaseurope estimates 
that the penetration rate is 6.56%36 in the Netherlands (as opposed to, for example, 
Belgium (8.83%), France (10.86%), Germany (17.14%), Italy (19.35%) or the UK 
(24.49%)). The penetration rate in the Netherlands is more in line with countries 
such as Morocco (6.07%), Romania (6.34%) or Greece (6.81%).  
 
An explanation may be that the leasing companies in the Netherlands are 
specialised in movable assets (equipment leasing), whereas in other countries 
leasing companies are more involved in real estate as well. This seems true when 
analysing Leaseurope’s division between ‘equipment’ and ‘real estate’ leasing. 
Figure 2.10 shows this division for Italy, France, Germany, the UK, Belgium and 
the Netherlands. In the Netherlands, 25% of the outstanding consists of real estate, 
whereas this is 56% for Italy. This implies that real estate leasing in the 
Netherlands is outside the scope of the leasing companies and is therefore not 
accounted for in the World Leasing Yearbook 2006 and by Leaseurope. 
Figure 2.10 Division of total outstanding in equipment and real-estate leasing 
source: www. leaseurope.org 
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This section demonstrates that (in the Netherlands) the leasing business is rather 
difficult to unravel, and many leasing activities are executed outside the sight of 
organised leasing associations. Although the analysis of Leaseurope might indicate 
that the Netherlands is not a country in which leasing plays a major role, the 
difference between Figure 2.5 and the explanation provided above regarding that 
difference, indicates the opposite. Chapter 5 presents the results of how important 
operating leases are as a financing form for Dutch listed companies. 
 
                                                          
36 Leaseurope adds in a footnote that the penetration in the Netherlands would increase to 13.55% if data from the 
Dutch Car leasing Association would be included. It is not explained why this data is not included in the first place.  
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2.7 Summary/Conclusions 
This chapter described different aspects of leasing in general. Section 2.2 introduced 
the concept of leasing and the reasons to choose leasing. Subsequently, sections 2.3, 
2.4 and 2.5 respectively described the legal aspect of leasing and its accounting 
standard, the current lease-accounting standard and the proposed lease-accounting 
standard. Section 2.6 showed the growing importance of leasing worldwide and the 
dominance of operating leases as opposed to financial leases. This chapter has made 
it clear that operating leases are a major financing source, of which the accounting 
treatment is probably an important stimulus. Although a new accounting standard 
might bring this to an end, consensus on a new lease-accounting standard seems 
just out of reach. This stresses the importance and the timely nature of the 
underlying study, and upcoming chapters investigate whether the lease-accounting 
standard provides useful information and whether the limitations of the standard 
provide the incentives to choose unusual numbers of operating leases.  
 
Section 2.3.1 showed that the Dutch Civil Law has no specific laws with respect to 
leasing, and that leasing is not known as a separate legal agreement. It is the 
substance of the contracts that defines which articles of the Dutch Civil Law are 
applicable. The legal status of a lease can be a rental agreement, a leasehold 
agreement, or a hire purchase, which are legal contracts recognised in the Dutch 
Civil Law. The most important legal provisions in Dutch Civil Law are therefore 
those articles that refer to the abovementioned legal agreements. Furthermore, 
section 2.3.2 described the legal status of the accounting standards. The conclusion: 
that in the Netherlands the accounting standards are not legally binding, which has 
changed for the listed companies; the financial statements as from January 1st, 
2005 have a legal obligation to comply with IFRS. However, companies are legally 
obligated (Civil Code 2:381) to disclose any major financial commitments that are 
not disclosed on the balance sheet. This therefore also applies to major operating-
lease commitments.  
 
Section 2.4 described the current lease-accounting standard. Section 2.4.1 compared 
the Dutch RJ292, the international IAS17, the US FAS13 and the UK SSAP21. 
Although the intentions and basic principles are the same, still some not-to-be-
neglected differences exist between these lease-accounting standards. Section 2.4.2 
described the differences in the recognition of financial leases versus the disclosure 
of operating leases. The major difference lies of course within the on- and off-
balance character of both types. Also striking, however, is the difference in what 
should be disclosed. With a financial lease, the present value has to be disclosed 
(excluding the interest part), whereas for an operating lease the total future lease 
commitment (including the interest part) must be disclosed. Subsequently, section 
2.4.4 provided an overview of the formats used for the disclosure of operating leases 
in the Netherlands. Not all companies comply with the required disclosure of 
operating leases in the notes. Companies disclosing according to FAS13 provide the 
most information; companies disclosing only next year’s annual payment, without 
an indication of the remaining life, provide the least. Chapter 5 will empirically 
analyse how many companies do not comply. Section 2.4.5 described the difference 
in the lease qualification between the accounting standards and the Dutch Lease 
guideline 2000. Also between these two fields no harmonisation exists. 
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Section 2.5 describes the proposal to change the lease-accounting standard from the 
risk/reward approach to the asset/liability approach. The latter is a proposal to 
eliminate the differences between financial- and operating leases, and to recognise 
all leases on the balance sheet. The proposed asset/liability approach is not as clear-
cut as the G4+1-working group suggests, since the two alternatives (either the 
financial-components approach or the whole-asset approach) differ substantially, 
each with their own disadvantages. The analysis of the letters written in response 
to the IASB- and FASB proposals shows that the current risk/reward approach has 
many opponents, indeed; this is also the case, however, for the proposed 
asset/liability approach. Standard setters might find a compromise worthy of 
consideration. Recently, the lease project has been put high on the agenda of both 
IASB and FASB. However, a new discussion paper is expected to be published in 
2008, and IAS17 and FAS13 are not expected to be amended until 2009. 
 
Finally section 2.6 showed the increasing importance of (operating) leases 
throughout the world, in Europe and in the Netherlands. It was shown that from 
1978, leasing has shown continuous exponential growth. The World Leasing 
Yearbook 2006 concluded that in 2004 Europe approached the US in terms of 
annual production, and that the US is assumed to be a mature market, whereas 
Europe has still opportunities to grow. However, these figures from the World 
leasing Yearbook and Euromoney compared to an analysis of 109 Dutch listed 
companies revealed that the statistics from these institutions are far from complete. 
To the extent that this information is provided solely by the Dutch leasing 
association, and no other association has access to more complete information, the 
total leasing volume in the Netherlands will remain undisclosed. Section 2.6 also 
showed that, based on a sample of 109 Dutch listed companies, operating leases are 
by far the dominant leasing type, compared with financial leases. 
 
The main conclusions of this chapter are therefore as follows: 
• operating leases have in particular become an increasing source of financing,  
• from a legal, fiscal and accounting point of view, differences still exist 
(internationally) on what leasing is, and how operating and financial leases 
can be distinguished,  
• current lease accounting as well as the prospect of future lease-accounting 
reform have both convinced proponents and opponents that consensus will 
not be easy to reach. 
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Appendix 2.I Example of operating- and financial leases in the financial statements of lessee  
The lease payment is calculated as a ten-year annuity of 13.6 per annum (amount of 100, interest 6% and a maturity of ten years). The leased asset has a value of 100 and will be 
linearly depreciated over the maturity (10 per annum). The interest part in the first year’s lease payment is 6% *100= 6.0; the repayment part is consequently 13.6-6.0= 7.6. Tax 
rate is 40%. 
OPERATING LEASES FINANCIAL LEASES 
                BALANCE SHEET     
 t=0 t=1  t=0 t=1  t=0 t=1  t=0 t=1 
Assets 0 0 Liability 0 0 Assets 100 90 Liability 100.0 92.4 
Cash 0 -13.6 tax 0 -5.4 Cash 0 -13.6 tax 0.0 -6.4 
   Retained earnings 0 -8.2    Retained earnings 0.0 -9.6 
Total assets 0 -13.6 
Total equity 
and liabilities 0 -13.6 Total assets 100 76.4 
Total equity 
 and liabilities 100.0 76.4 
               INCOME STATEMENT     
    t=1   t=1     
   Lease payment -13.6  Depreciation -10.0     
   EBIT -13.6  EBIT -10.0     
   Interest 0.0  Interest -6.0     
   EBT -13.6  EBT -16.0     
   Tax 5.4  tax 6.4     
   Net Income -8.2  Net Income -9.6     
     NOTES    
Operational lease commitments t=0 t=1  Financial lease commitments t=0 t=1  
 < 1 year 13.6 13.6  < 1 year 13.6 13.6  
1 year < > 5 years 54.4 54.4  1 year < > 5 years 54.4 54.4  
 > 5 years 68.0 54.4   > 5 years 68.0 54.4  
   136.0 122.4     136.0 122.4  
      Lease assets 100.0 90.0  
            Present-value lease payments  100.0 92.5  
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Appendix 2.II Financial and operating leases in the financial statements of KPN in 
2004 
KPN includes the financial leases in the balance sheet for a total amount of 125 million Euros: 67 million Euros 
under long-term debt and 58 million Euros as short-term debt. These are their outstanding commitments. 
Furthermore, they include in their notes the net present value of the total of these commitments: 145 million Euro. 
KPN does not disclose the interest rate used to discount the commitments, but because the present value is higher 
than the outstanding amount, it can be assumed that the discount rate used is lower than the interest rate applicable 
in the leases. Finally, KPN discloses in the notes a total nominal commitment of 2,224 million Euro of operating 
leases, which amount includes the interest portion applicable to the lease.  
 
Financial lease as captalised on the balance sheet:
Total = EUR 125 million
Financial lease in the notes:
Operating lease in the notes:
Total operating lease commitments
disclosed were EUR 2,224 million, thus
expiring as follows:
-Within one year 324 
-Between two and five years 1,231
-After five years 969
 
 
Appendix 2.III Fiscal lease guideline 2000 requirements to qualify as fiscal 
owner 
The lessor will be considered to be the fiscal owner of the asset if, 
a. the lessor acts as fiscal owner; 
b. the lessor has legal title to the asset (legal owner); 
c. bears residual value risk (positive and negative), which implies: 
i)  for contracts with a purchase option or extension option, 
- the option price is a fair value at inception of the lease 
- the option price has a minimum value of 7.5% of the fiscal cost price 
ii) for contracts without an option it is expected that the fair value of the asset will not be above 
7.5% at maturity of the asset. If the lessee obtains the asset at maturity for an amount below 
this 7.5%, it is assumed that the lessor had no residual value risk. 
iii) for the contracts mentioned under A. and B., it is furthermore required that 
- the lease period is not longer than 85% of the economic life of the asset 
- the residual value risk has not been mitigated through the lessee or a therewith related party 
- the residual value risk has not been mitigated by a third party for more than 7.5% 
- the lessee in fact has the full economic ownership of the asset (through other agreements) 
- if both lessee and lessor apply for tax investment facilities, the lessor is assumed to have 
given up this claim 
iv) for contracts with a maturity beyond five years the minimum required residual value will be 
increased by 0.5% for each additional year. 
v) Finally, the above is not applicable for specific assets, which are defined as assets that have no 
value after maturity of the lease except for the lessee or cannot be used after maturity by any 
party but the lessee. 
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Appendix 2.IV Difference between risk/reward- and asset/liability approaches in lease accounting 
Example of a lease of an asset worth 100,000 Euro, with a maturity of two years: The economic life of the asset is ten years, with no residual value after ten years. The annual 
lease payment is 10,291 Euro (which is an annuity using 6% interest and 80,000 Euro residual value after year two). With the risk/reward approach, the operating leases are 
disclosed in the notes to the financial statements. The nominal commitment is disclosed divided over the three lease-expiry periods (within one year/between one and five 
years/beyond five years). The impact of the capitalisation of the asset and liability approach on the balance sheet is approximately five times higher when using the whole-asset 
approach than for the financial-components approach. This demonstrates the difference between the use of the asset during a two-year period, and the economic life of the asset 
which covers a ten-year period. The financial-components approach capitalises only the rights obtained for these two years, while the whole-asset approach capitalises the 
whole asset with the obligation to return it after two years. The purchase of the asset results in a lower net leased asset amount than with the whole-asset approach, due to the 
linear depreciation with the purchase as opposed to the annuity-based depreciation with the whole-asset approach. 
Balance sheet 31-12-00 31-12-01 31-12-02 31-12-00 31-12-01 31-12-02 31-12-00 31-12-01 31-12-02 31-12-00 31-12-01 31-12-02
Assets
Cash 0 -10,291 -20,583 0 -10,291 -20,583 0 -10,291 -20,583 0 -12,818 -25,635
Leased Asset 0 0 0 100,000 100,000 100,000 18,868      18,868        18,868      100,000 100,000 100,000
Accumulated depreciation 0 0 0 0 4,420 8,840 0 9,434          18,868      0 10,000           20,000           
Net Leased asset 0 0 0 100,000 95,580 91,160 18,868 9,434 0 100,000 90,000 80,000
Total Assets 0 -10,291 -20,583 100,000 85,289 70,577 18,868 -857 -20,583 100,000 77,182 54,365
Liabilities and equity 31-12-00 31-12-01 31-12-02 31-12-00 31-12-01 31-12-02 31-12-00 31-12-01 31-12-02 31-12-00 31-12-01 31-12-02
Long term debt, due in one year 0 0 0 4,291 4,549 91,160 9,159        9,709          0 6,818        7,227             7,660             
Long-term debt, due after one year 0 0 0 95,709 91,160 0 9,709        0 0 93,182      85,955           78,295           
Lease liability 0 0 0 100,000 95,709 91,160 18,868 9,709          0 100,000 93,182           85,955           
Tax liability -4,117 -8,233 -4,168 -8,233 -4,226 -8,233 -6,400 -12,636
Retained earnings -6,175 -12,350 -6,252 -12,350 -6,340 -12,350 -9,600 -18,955
Total Liabilities and equity 0 -10,291 -20,583 100,000 85,289 70,577 18,868 -857 -20,583 0 77,182 54,365
Income statement 31-12-01 31-12-02 31-12-01 31-12-02 31-12-01 31-12-02 31-12-01 31-12-02
Leasepayment -10,291 -10,291 Depreciation -4,420 -4,420 -9,434 -9,434 -10,000 -10,000
Operating Income -10,291 -10,291 -4,420 -4,420 -9,434 -9,434 -10,000 -10,000
Interest expense 0 0 -6,000 -5,743 -1,132 -583 -6,000 -5,591
Gross income -10,291 -10,291 -10,420 -10,163 -10,566 -10,016 -16,000 -15,591
Tax @40% 4,117 4,117 4,168 4,065 4,226 4,007 6,400 6,236
Net Income -6,175 -6,175 -6,252 -6,098 -6,340 -6,010 -9,600 -9,355
Notes: operational lease commitments
due in one year 10,291 10,291 0
due between one and five years 10,291 0 0
due after five years 0 0 0
Total 20,583 10,291 0
Purchase of assetRisk Reward Asset/Liability
Whole asset Financial Components
 
Note: as for the whole-asset approach, the obligation to return the asset is still shown on the balance sheet. However, when the asset is returned to the lessor (and thus this obligation 
has been fulfilled), the balance sheet will be the same as the other two approaches. 
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Appendix 2.V 29 Comment letters received by the IASB on lease-accounting proposal 
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Comment Letter: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
Country G S UK UK I J UK UK G I C SA NZ I E E N C UK - N E A G - ANZ F A I
Position L A L O A A A A A Le L A O L R A R L L - L L A R - L L Le A
Risk/Reward Approach
-arbitrary 0 0 y 0 y 0 y y y y y 0 y 0 y y y n y y n y 0 0 n 0 y
-unsatisfactory 0 y 0 y y 0 y n 0 0 0 0 y 0 0 y y n 0 n n y 0 0 n y y
-maintain risk/reward y n y n n n n y n y n 0 n 0 n n y y 0 y y n 0 0 y y n
-attitude towards approach 5 2 3 1 1 0 1 3 1 4 1 0 2 2 2 0 3 5 0 4 4 1 3 0 4 4 2
-consistent with framework 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 n 0 0 0 0 y 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
-in favour of amending risk/reward 0 0 0 0 0 0 n y 0 y 0 0 0 0 0 0 y n 0 y y 0 0 y y y 0
Asset Liability approach
-agreement with asset and liabilities in lease n y n 0 y y y n y n y y y n n y n n 0 n n y n y n n y
-attitude towards approach 1 3 2 0 4 4 4 3 4 1 4 5 4 2 3 4 1 2 0 2 2 4 2 3 1 2 4
-information difficulty 0 y 0 0 y y 0 0 0 0 0 0 y 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 y 0 0 0 0
-capitalisation problems 0 0 y n 0 0 0 y 0 y 0 0 0 y y y 0 y y 0 0 0 0 y 0 y 0
-consistent with framework 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 y 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
-arbitrary y y y 0 y 0 0 0 0 y 0 n 0 0 0 0 y y y y y 0 y 0 y 0 0
-confusing y y 0 0 0 0 0 y 0 y 0 0 0 0 y y y y 0 0 0 0 0 0 y 0 0
-wrong info y y 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 y y y 0 0 0 0 0 0 y 0 0
-financial engeneering possible 0 y y 0 y 0 y 0 y y 0 0 0 0 0 y y 0 0 y 0 y 0 y y 0 0
-variation through input 0 y y 0 y 0 0 0 0 y 0 0 0 0 0 y 0 y y 0 y 0 y y y 0 0
-inconsistent with other standards y y y 0 0 0 n y 0 0 0 n 0 0 y y 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
-in favour of amending asset/liability 0 y y 0 y 0 0 0 y 0 0 0 y 0 0 y 0 0 0 0 n 0 0 0 0 0 0
y = yes, agree
n = no. disagree
0 = not mentioned
or
0 = not mentioned
1 = very negative
2 = negative
3 = doubtful
4 = positive
5 = very positive
Lo=lessor
Le=lessee
A = auditor
R=regulator
O=other
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PART II:  THE USEFULNESS OF OPERATING LEASE DISCLOSURES 
AND THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF CAPITALISATION ON 
FINANCIAL RATIOS  
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Part I Part III Part IV Part VPart II 
 
 
 
Part II of this thesis concerns the usefulness of operating-lease disclosures. It will 
try to find an answer to the first part of the research question, whether the current 
lease-accounting standard provides useful information to the user of the financial 
statements. This is done by addressing the following research questions: When is 
accounting information useful for decision-making? Does the accounting standard 
on operating leases fulfil the requirements of decision usefulness? How can 
operating-lease commitments be capitalised? Are the operating-lease commitments 
of a material amount? How sensitive is the capitalisation of operating leases to 
assumptions made by the individual user? What is the impact on financial ratios if 
operating leases are capitalised? Do the different capitalisation approaches arrive 
at consistent and comparable results? 
 
Part II consists of the chapters 3, 4 and 5. Chapter 3 will describe the qualitative 
criteria of useful information as described by the IASB conceptual framework. 
Chapter 4 is an extensive comparison of the methodology and the assumptions of 
seven different capitalisation approaches. Among these seven capitalisation 
approaches is a suggested ameliorated version of the capitalisation approaches 
previously used in comparable studies. Chapter 5 will empirically test: —the 
compliance with the criteria of decision usefulness of operating-lease disclosures, —
the impact on the financial ratios of operating-lease capitalisation, and, —the 
sensitivity of these results to the underlying assumptions and methodology of the 
seven different capitalisation approaches. 
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CHAPTER 3 CRITERIA OF USEFUL INFORMATION IN FINANCIAL 
STATEMENTS  
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the decision usefulness of accounting information in general, 
and the disclosure of operating leases, more specifically. Decision usefulness of 
accounting information is defined by several accounting regulators such as the 
IASB, FASB and also by the DASB. The chapter is organised as follows. Qualitative 
criteria are described in section 3.2. Section 3.3 consequently describes these 
characteristics from the perspective of operating leases. Since the off-balance 
character of operating leases has especially an impact on financial ratios, special 
attention is given in section 3.3 to the importance of financial ratios by users of the 
financial statements. Previous research on the capitalisation of operating leases has 
focussed on the impact on these financial ratios (Imhoff et al. (1991), (1997); Beattie 
et al. (1998)). This study expands the focus from the comparability criteria of 
decision usefulness (impact on financial ratios) to also the other criteria of decision 
usefulness. For example, when the impact on financial ratios is material, this 
makes the information on operating leases relevant in decision-making, and this 
information is therefore classified as useful. Section 3.4 formulates five research 
questions that will be empirically investigated in the chapters 4 and 5. These 
research questions should ultimately answer the main question whether the 
disclosed operating-lease information is useful in decision-making. It will also show 
the weaknesses of the current lease-accounting standards. Answering these 
questions might assist standard setters in improving accounting regulations.  
 
As mentioned in chapter 1, the main concern of this part is the decision usefulness 
of operating-lease information for the individual user (individual decision 
usefulness approach), and not for the market as a whole (aggregate-market decision 
usefulness approach). Decision usefulness is also questioned by the FASB special 
report on operating leases (Lennard and Nailor (2000)). They explicitly mention 
that their proposal to capitalise all leases on the balance sheet (see section 2.5) is 
guided by the objectives of financial statements to provide information that is useful 
to investors and to others who use financial statements as an input to economic 
decisions. This study will therefore be limited to the information available from the 
financial statements.  
 
3.2 The usefulness of information disclosed in the financial statements 
3.2.1 Characteristics of useful information according to the IASB Framework 
The objectives of financial statements have been defined by several accounting 
standard boards (i.e. IASB, FASB) and laid down in their respective conceptual 
frameworks (IASB (2003), FASB (1976)). The DASB has included in their 
Guidelines the so-called “Stramien”, which is a translation of the Framework of the 
IASB (the “Framework”). The DASB endorses the Framework, since it is an 
important basis for the further development of the Dutch Accounting Guidelines. 
Furthermore, the Framework is a useful tool in the day-to-day accounting practice 
dealing with situations that are not yet or only summarily regulated in the 
Guidelines. References in this section will be made to certain paragraphs of the 
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IASB Framework (FW + paragraph number), since the Dutch Stramien is a 
translation of this Framework.  
The Framework has four major objectives: 
1) To describe the objective of financial statements; 
2) To define the qualitative characteristics that determine the usefulness of 
information in the financial statements; 
3) To describe the definition, recognition and measurement of the elements 
from which the financial statements are constructed; and, 
4) To define the concepts of capital and capital maintenance. 
 
Figure 3.1 illustrates parts one and two of the Framework (paragraphs 1 through 
46). Parts three and four (paragraphs 47 through 101) are not the subject of this 
section and therefore are not described in depth here. The IASB is of the opinion 
(paragraph 46) that the application of the qualitative characteristics (and of 
appropriate accounting standards) would normally result in financial statements 
that are generally understood to be a true and fair view of the position and 
performance of a company. The definition of the financial statements (‘de 
jaarrekening’) includes the balance sheet, the income statement, the statement of 
cash flows and also the notes and other explanatory materials that are an integral 
part of these financial statements (FW7). The financial statements exclude items 
such as reports by directors, statements by the chairman, management discussions 
and similar items that may be included in the full annual report (‘jaarverslag’). This 
thesis will use the same terminology.  
 
Figure 3.1 Illustration of paragraphs 1 through 46 of the IASB Framework 
IASB Framework for the Preparation and 
Presentation of Financial Statements (FW)
Purpose and Status
FW1-4
Users and their need
FW9-11
Scope
FW5-8
Objective of Financial Statements
FW12-21
Provide information that is useful to users in making economic 
decisions about the financial position and performance  and 
change therein of an enterprise.
Underlying assumptions
FW22-23
Useful Information
FW24-46
Relevant
FW26-30
Reliable
FW31-38
Understandable
FW25
Comparable
FW39-42
-Material -Faithful
-Substance over form
-Neutral
-Prudence
-Complete
-Consistent
Constraints on relevance and 
reliability (FW-43-45)
True and Fair view of (changes in) the financial position and 
performance of a company (FW46)  
 
The objective of financial statements (FW12) is to provide information about the 
financial position, performance and changes in the financial position of an 
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enterprise that is useful to a wide range of users in making economic decisions. The 
Framework also defines a) the wide range of users (FW9) and b) when information 
is useful. The qualitative criteria of information usefulness are described below.  
 
3.2.2 Qualitative criteria of information usefulness 
According to the Framework (FW24), the qualitative characteristics are the 
attributes that make the information provided in financial statements useful to the 
defined users. The four principal qualitative characteristics are 
i) Understandability  
ii) Relevance   
iii) Reliability   
iv) Comparability   
Section 3.3 discusses the qualitative criteria of information usefulness. Each of the 
criteria will also be related to the information disclosed for operating leases.  
 
 Understandability 
Information provided in the financial statements should be readily 
understandable by users, who are assumed to have a reasonable knowledge 
of business, economics and accounting.  
 
 Relevance 
Information in the financial statements should be relevant to the decision-
making needs of users. Information is relevant when it influences the 
economic decisions of users. Information about the financial position and 
past performance is frequently used as the basis for predicting future 
financial position and performance, as well as other matters, such as the 
ability of the enterprise to meet its commitments as they fall due (FW28). 
The relevance of information is affected by its nature and materiality. The 
nature of information might be sufficient to determine the relevance. For 
example, a new segment the company is entering may result in additional 
risks and opportunities, which must be understood. Also information on 
committed fraud may be relevant information, irrespective of its materiality 
(FW29). Information is material when its omission or misstatement could 
influence the economic decisions of users taken on the basis of the financial 
statements. Materiality depends on the size of the item or of the size of the 
error caused by the omissions or misstatement. 
 
 Reliability 
According to the Framework, the information in the financial statements 
should be reliable. Information is reliable when it is free from material error 
and bias and can be depended upon by the users. To be reliable, information 
should be  
- faithful (FW35). Therefore, the IASB is of the opinion that transactions 
and events should be accounted for and presented in accordance with 
their substance and economic reality, and not merely on their legal form.  
- neutral (FW36). Financial statements are not neutral if, by the selection 
or presentation of information, they influence how a decision or 
judgement is made.  
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- prudent (FW37). Prudence is the inclusion of a certain degree of caution 
when making estimates under conditions of uncertainty (such that assets 
or income are not overstated, or liabilities and expenses are not 
understated).  
- complete (FW38). Information in the financial statements should be 
complete, within the bounds of materiality and cost.  
 
 Comparability 
Users of the financial statements should be able to compare (FW39) the 
financial statements of an enterprise through time and with different 
enterprises in order to evaluate their relative position, performance and 
changes therein. Therefore, the measurement and display of the financial 
effects of transactions and events must be carried out in a consistent way 
throughout an enterprise and over time for that enterprise, and in a 
consistent way for different companies.  
 
How these qualitative criteria apply to the information disclosed on operating leases 
in the financial statements will be discussed in section 3.3. 
 
3.3 Usefulness of operating-lease disclosures 
Contrary to financial leases, operating leases have, through their off-balance-sheet 
character, an influence on items disclosed on the balance sheet and in the income 
statement (not on the cash-flow statement) (see also section 2.4.2). Consequently, 
the operating leases have an impact on the financial ratios derived thereof. 
Therefore, an on-balance equivalent of the operating-lease liability can be estimated 
to adjust the relevant financial ratios (‘constructive capitalisation’). The purpose 
and procedures of capitalisation are described in chapter 4. This section has two 
aims. First, it will use previous research to demonstrate that financial ratios are 
still an important source in decision-making in different disciplines. Second, it will 
describe the issues between the information disclosed on operating leases and the 
qualitative criteria of information usefulness as described in the previous section.  
 
3.3.1 Understandability of operating-lease information 
The specific characteristics of operating leases lead to three issues with respect to 
the understandability of operating-lease information37. Are users of the financial 
statements aware of the following? 
• the difference between on-balance financial commitments (including financial 
leases) and off-balance operating leases (which are not included on the 
balance sheet and of which the information is available only in the footnotes); 
• the difference between the off-balance disclosed total commitments of 
operating leases (including future interest) and limitation to only the 
outstanding amount (excluding future interest) capitalised on balance for 
other financings alternatives, including financial leases; 
• the difference in the priority of the claims and in the legal and economic 
ownership of the financed assets, which are different for operating-, financial- 
and non-leasing alternatives (see Figure 2.1). 
                                                          
37 Section 2.4 describes in more detail the current accounting standards, including the differences 
described here between operating leases and other corporate liabilities, including financial leases. 
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First, do users of the financial statements realise that besides the commitments 
included in the balance sheet, a company may have other commitments not shown 
in the balance sheet? Operating leases are non-cancellable (long-term) 
commitments that are disclosed only in the notes. This is contrary to the notes on 
other long-term liabilities: these notes serve as additional information on an 
amount that is already capitalised on the balance sheet. In other words, the notes 
on operating leases are new information, since the notes on, for example, long-term 
debt and also for financial leases, are more detailed information on already 
disclosed numbers. As described in section 2.4.2, the difference between financial 
leases and operating leases can be rather small and arbitrary; this has caused  
many authors to object to allowing this major difference in accounting treatment.  
 
Second, is the information as provided in the footnotes understandable? Section 2.4 
described the current disclosure requirements. The information that required 
disclosure in the financial statements (RJ292, IAS17) is straightforward: the sum of 
the nominal non-cancellable long-term lease commitments divided over three expiry 
periods (expiring within one year, expiring between two and five years and expiring 
after five years). The user should be aware that these lease commitments are 
nominal commitments, including an interest and repayment part, and that these 
cannot be compared directly to other long-term commitments, including financial 
leases. Long-term commitments disclosed on the balance sheet incorporate only the 
outstanding amount and not the related interest payments. The operating-lease 
commitments consist of the total commitments in the future: the outstanding 
amount including interest. To compare the off-balance operating-lease 
commitments with on-balance commitments, the user should eliminate the interest 
part of the lease commitments by means of a capitalisation approach. This stresses 
the importance of a solid capitalisation approach. These approaches are described in 
chapter 4. 
 
Third, is the difference between the nature of the financial commitments that can 
be used to finance assets by either operating leases, financial leases or other 
commitments common knowledge to all users? Figure 2.1 illustrated the differences 
between corporate liabilities. In general, the difference between the three forms of 
(debt) financing is that with normal debt, the company is both the legal- and 
economic owner of the assets; with a financial lease, the company is not the legal 
owner, although he is assumed to be the economic owner due to the fact he bears 
most of the risks and rewards attributable to the assets; with an operating lease, 
the company is neither the legal owner, nor is assumed to be the economic owner of 
the asset. The above has several consequences for both the claimholder and the 
company (see Figure 2.1).  
 
Previous studies (Kamp (2001), Wilkins and Zimmer (1983), Abdel-Khalik (1981)) 
have shown that it is still not commonplace that users do make adjustments to the 
financial statements for the off-balance lease commitments. Kamp (2001) questions 
whether other users (aside from rating agencies or banks) of the financial 
statements have sufficient information to notice the off-balance-sheet effects on 
credit evaluations and to make the necessary corrections. Wilkins and Zimmer 
(1983) investigated credit decisions of loan officers. They indicate that loan officers 
respond differently to different levels of financial leverage, but not to different 
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methods of fixed-asset financing or reporting of leases. Therefore, it appears that 
the concern of comparability of companies with or without leases may be misplaced. 
Wilkins and Zimmer mention that this conclusion relates, of course, to credit 
decisions: lenders understand the leverage implication of alternative methods of 
lease accounting, and their evaluations and decisions are not affected by the 
alternative accounting method (p.761). The findings of Wilkins and Zimmer (1983), 
that loan officers are indifferent between operating leases disclosed in the footnotes 
or capitalised on the balance sheet, contradicts the findings of Abdel-Khalik (1981). 
Abdel-Khalik found that the majority of financial analysts and loan officers in their 
sample evaluated more favourably a company that kept the leases off the balance 
sheet than they did an identical company that capitalised leases. This is also found 
by Thornton and Bryant (1986)38, who determined that over half of a sample of 
leasing companies with public debt, the ratio tests in debt covenants referred to 
financial statement numbers with no adjustments made. 
 
Furthermore, despite the fact that not all users make adjustments for off-balance-
sheet leases, many studies use financial ratios as input for analysis on credit 
scoring (Wilkins and Zimmer (1983) and Danos, Holt and Imhoff (1996)), 
bankruptcy prediction (Altman (1968) and Dimitras, Zanakis and Zopounidis 
(1996)), company rating studies (Moody's Investor Services (1999), Standard and 
Poor's (2001) and Peavy and Edgar (1984)), and other purposes, and only a few take 
into account the impact of operating leases (Elam (1975), Lawrence and Bear (1986) 
and Altman et al. (1977)). Very few articles explicitly explain the ignorance of 
operating leases and show that it is a deliberate choice (Dambolena and Khoury 
(1980)).  
 
Finally, also users who extract accounting data from databases will most likely 
ignore the operating-lease data. The study of Danos et al. (1996) provided evidence 
that lenders use independent services (in their study: Dun and Bradstreet) as a 
primary source of initial information about a client. The financial analysis of these 
independent services might therefore influence lending decisions. However, most 
databases do not include the operating-lease data in their financial analyses of 
companies. For example, the international databases Thomson Financial, 
Datastream, and Worldscope, and the Dutch database Reach, provide 
approximately twenty ratios derived from financial statements— and none of these 
ratios is adjusted for operating-lease data. Of these databases, only Worldscope has 
operating-lease data available if the user would like to adjust the ratios. However, 
they present only the commitments when the company discloses according to the 
requirements of IAS17, FAS13 or RJ292. The understanding of the existence of 
operating-lease data is therefore not improved by experienced financial services 
that also ignore the operating-lease data. 
 
With respect to the understandability of the operating-lease information, the above 
suggests that the off-balance-sheet character of operating leases causes some 
confusion between users of the financial statements; some users make adjustments 
for operating leases, some do not. Ignorance regarding operating leases is often not 
explained, and it might be caused either by misunderstanding the provided 
information or by the expectation that the operating leases are not material. 
Termination of the off-balance treatment of operating leases, as the asset/liability 
                                                          
38 Cross reference Lanfranconi and Wiedman (2000, p.65) 
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approach suggests, would eliminate this confusion. The accounting difference 
between operating- and financial leases, which follows from the division of risk 
between lessee and lessor, would also disappear. The asset/liability approach would 
probably make it easier for at least the user of the financial statements. The issues 
with respect to understanding the capitalisation procedure that has to be conducted 
to eliminate the interest part from the operating-lease commitments will be 
discussed in chapter 4. 
 
3.3.2 Relevance of operating-lease information 
For operating-lease commitments to be relevant, they should be either material or 
relevant by nature. It can be argued that when the operating leases are not 
material, they have no specific features that make them relevant by nature. The 
risks involved are not disproportionately higher than those of other financial 
commitments. This study therefore assumes that the relevance of operating-lease 
commitments is determined by the materiality of these commitments. 
 
Operating leases are material when they cross a certain threshold value, indicating 
that the lease liability is of a material amount. Scant literature exists on what this 
materiality threshold value should be. However, before 1990, a materiality 
threshold for off-balance-sheet commitments was included in the Dutch accounting 
Guideline 2.65.2 “off-balance-sheet commitments”. Commitments were assumed to 
be material when they exceeded the threshold of 5% of total assets (De Bos 
(1996)).This Guideline was applicable since January 1984; before this date, the 
threshold of 5% was included in the ‘Considerations V.12’ of the Tripartite 
Consultative Body (succeeded in 1981 by the DASB, see also section 2.3.2). After 
1990, this threshold was removed from the Dutch accounting guidelines. 
 
Based on case studies and experiments, De Bos (1996) recommends in his study 
(p.291) the re-inclusion of a materiality threshold for operating leases in the 
guidelines. According to the De Bos, these thresholds should be divided into two 
materiality criteria: one measuring the materiality of the annual lease payments 
and one measuring the materiality of the total lease commitments. The 
corresponding threshold values that De Bos suggests are, respectively, annual lease 
payments exceeding 10% of net income and present value of the total lease 
commitments exceeding 25% of long-term commitments (the second materiality test 
of this study). However, since net income is subject to variability and when net 
income approaches zero or becomes negative, this materiality test is less reliable.  
 
An alternative measure for testing the materiality of the operating-lease 
commitments might be the lease-intensity measure of Sharpe and Nguyen (1995). 
In a study concerning the determinants of the lease decision (the subject of part III 
of this thesis), they measure the lease intensity by dividing the annual lease 
payments by the total capital costs of a company. The total capital costs39 are the 
costs associated with the use of fixed assets (Sharpe and Nguyen (1995, p.278)), and 
are calculated as the sum of rental commitments, depreciation expense and the 
opportunity costs of fixed assets (interest times net-property, plant and equipment). 
This measure of lease intensity is also adopted by Adams and Hardwick (1998) and 
                                                          
39 With total capital costs Sharpe and Nguyen do not mean the capital costs as normally defined in finance as the 
opportunity costs of capital, or the weighted average costs of debt and equity costs (see for example Brealey and 
Myers (2003), but as the costs associated with the use of fixed assets. 
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Mehran et al. (1999). The determinants of leases intensity are the subject of part III 
of this thesis and therefore, lease intensity will be described in depth in chapter 6. 
In this chapter, and in the empirical chapter 5, the analysis is restricted to the 
materiality-test of operating leases. A threshold of 20% for the lease-intensity 
measure of Sharpe and Nguyen will be used, since this seems to be in line with the 
other materiality tests.  
 
Table 3.1 summarises the above-described materiality thresholds that will be used 
in chapter 5 to investigate the materiality of the operating-lease commitments for 
the sample of Dutch listed companies. 
Table 3.1 Materiality threshold  
 MATERIALITY THRESHOLD SOURCE 
1 Present value of total operating-lease commitments exceeds 5% of total assets Guideline 2.65.2 (1984) 
2 Present value of total operating-lease commitments exceeds 25% of (on-balance) long-term commitments DeBos (1996) 
3 Annual lease payment exceed 20% of total capital costs Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) 
 
If the operating-lease commitments are material, and the balance sheet is adjusted 
for these commitments, this will affect the capital structure of a company and the 
financial ratios derived thereof.  
 
3.3.3 Reliability of operating-lease information 
Users of the financial statements rely on the company to provide reliable 
information (FW31). To a great extent, the reliability of information provided in the 
financial statements can only be investigated when there is access to the data and 
to the decisions underlying the financial statements (internal company data). With 
respect to operating leases, the internal relevant information relates mostly to the 
lease-classification decision (classification as either a financial- or an operating 
lease). The formal lease classification criteria of RJ292 (and also IAS17 or FAS13; 
see chapter 2) make it possible to structure leases in such a way that the 
commitments are off-balance, and therefore might pose a threat to the ‘substance-
over-form’ principle (‘faithfully’). On the other hand, neutrality is enhanced by the 
formal classification criteria, which makes it relatively easy to classify a lease 
contract as either a financial- or an operating lease (Vergoossen (1992)).  
 
The reliability of operating-lease data based on externally available information 
therefore has to do with two aspects of reliability: neutrality and completeness. 
Information is neutral if all companies present the information in a similar way. 
The requirements of RJ292 or IAS17 are straightforward and leave no room for 
different ways of presentation. Chapter 2 showed that in the financial statements of 
Dutch listed companies used eight different formats for disclosing operating leases, 
of which four formats are not in line with RJ292. Chapter 5 investigates how often 
Dutch listed companies use these formats. Non-compliance, although not 
attributable to the accounting standard, result in information which is not neutral, 
nor complete. 
 
Furthermore, the completeness of the information disclosed goes beyond the 
willingness of a company to provide sufficient information, but also relates to 
whether the information required is indeed complete. Section 2.4.2 showed how the 
required operating-lease information is less complete than the information provided 
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on financial leases. The operating-lease commitments are disclosed in nominal 
amounts, whereas for the financial lease commitments, both the nominal 
commitments as well as the present value of these commitments have to be 
disclosed, including the discount rate (RJ292.115). Appendix 2.II presented these 
differences for KPN’s 2004 financial statement. 
  
As has been mentioned already several times, these differences can be rather small, 
and a lease can be structured in such a way that it qualifies as an operating lease, 
to make it off-balance. Again, this is one of the major objections to the current 
risk/reward lease-accounting approach while the accounting treatment determines 
the choice for operating leases. 
 
Furthermore, with respect to the completeness criteria, if a user wishes to capitalise 
the operating-lease commitments, he has to make several assumptions on, for 
example, discount rates and the remaining life of the lease portfolio, because these 
are not included in the disclosure requirements. These assumptions and 
estimations that must be made by users explain in part why the G4+1 proposed an 
alternative lease-accounting approach. Lennard and Nailor (2000): ‘capitalisation by 
financial statements preparers should be preferred to constructive capitalisation by 
financial statements users. This is because users can only estimate (with limited 
accuracy) information held by preparers in calculating the balance-sheet- and profit 
and loss- effect of operating leases’. In other words: information required is not 
sufficiently complete because the individual financial statement user is not able to 
estimate the fair value of lease commitments. The constructive capitalisation by 
financial statement users (as defined by Lennard and Nailor) is the subject of the 
next chapter. Several capitalisation approaches will be compared on the basis of 
their calculations and assumptions. If the capitalisation of the operating leases is 
also sensitive to the choice of capitalisation approach, this will also compromise the 
completeness of the operating-lease disclosures.  
 
The above discussion allows us to conclude that operating-lease information is 
reliable if all companies disclose their operating-lease commitments in the same 
way (neutrality) and if the capitalisation of the operating-lease commitments is not 
sensitive to assumptions or to the capitalisation approach used (completeness).  
 
3.3.4 Comparability of operating-lease information: financial ratios in decision making 
The disclosed operating-lease information should be consistent, since that would 
make the information between companies comparable. Again, the disclosure 
requirements in RJ292 are unambiguous, which emphasises the consistency. The 
comparability criteria for operating-lease data address two issues: first, if operating 
leases are not capitalised and financial ratios are not adjusted, would that make 
comparison between high- and low-leasing companies unfair; second, if operating 
leases are capitalised and financial ratios are adjusted, would that make the 
comparison of companies consistent? Chapter 5 describes the impact of the 
capitalisation of operating leases on financial ratios; chapter 6 investigates the 
impact empirically. This section now goes on to describe the way in which different 
disciplines use financial ratios in order to illustrate the consequences that 
inaccurate financial ratios might have on decision-making. 
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Financial ratios as a performance measure of companies are used by different 
disciplines. Standard and Poor’s (2003) define financial ratios as helpful in broadly 
defining a company’s position relative to rating categories. They are not intended to 
be hurdles or prerequisites that should be achieved by a company in order to attain 
a specific debt rating assigned by Standard and Poor’s. Financial ratios are used to 
standardise financial statements across firms and over time, facilitating 
comprehensive analysis. A primary advantage of ratios is that they can be used to 
compare the risk-and-return relationship of firms of different sizes (White, Sondhi 
and Fried (2003) and Brealey and Myers (2003)). Standard and Poor’s adjust the 
ratios for operating leases, and do this for all companies. The reason for doing this 
is that companies that buy plants and equipment are put on a more comparable 
basis with firms that lease part or all of their operating ratios. According to 
Standard and Poor’s, the lease adjustment impacts all of the ratios. Financial ratios 
are thus also important variables of the comparison criterion of decision usefulness. 
 
In their financial analyses, investment analysts use not only accounting data but 
also financial ratios (Hoogendoorn and Mertens (2001) and Bouwman, Frishkoff and 
Frishkoff (1995)). Hoogendoorn and Mertens (2001), for example, investigated in 
their survey of 21 Dutch investment analysts i) the importance of different 
information sources (including the financial statements and ii) the importance of 
information elements in the financial statements. Their findings showed that the 
annual report was the second most important source of information (the first was 
direct contact with management). They also studied which sections of the annual 
report were indicated as most important; they established that the notes to the 
financial statements were the most important part of the annual report, followed by 
the income statement and the balance sheet. Finally, they reported on which 
criteria financial analysts found most important when evaluating financial 
statements. Analysts reviewing a total of 1,812 information elements that could be 
included in a financial analysis ranked 487 elements as most important. These 
include information on long-term borrowing (score 93.75%), net income (100%), 
leverage (score 28.33%) and profit per share (score 83.33%). Criteria related to lease 
contracts were also evaluated. Of all of the 32 criteria related to lease contracts 
(financial and operating), only three were evaluated as important by the analysts: 
the value of assets under financial lease contracts (23.08%), the present value of 
operating-lease contracts (13.73%) and a description of sale- and lease-back 
transactions (100%). 
 
Bouwman et al. (1995) observed 22 financial analysts while they were formulating 
decisions (either pursuing or rejecting a stock). They analysed not only accounting 
information (such as sales, net income, financial ratios) in the five categories 
mentioned above, but also non-accounting information (such as general company- 
and segment information, management, stock price etc.). The results of their study 
affirmed the relevance of accounting information. Ranked at, or near, the top of 
every analysis activity was income and performance information. The major focus of 
ratio analysis was performance, with the emphasis on earnings per share, return on 
investment and income statement components as a percentage of sales. 
 
Financial ratios are also used by rating agencies when analysing a company’s 
performance (Moody's (2000) and Peavy and Edgar (1984)). Moody's (2000)): 
‘Financial ratios are related to firm failure the way that the speed of a car is related 
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to the probability of crashing: there is a correlation, it is non-linear, but there is no 
point at which failure is certain’. Peavy and Edgar (1984) concluded from their 
research on commercial paper rating that all of the studies they examined assume 
that a very large portion of the differences among differently rated bonds can be 
explained by only a few basic corporate statistics. After examining four major bond-
rating studies, Peavy and Edgar found six final explanatory (accounting) variables 
in bond rating that measure the long-term viability of the issuing company.  
 
The creditability of companies is analysed by both lenders and researchers using 
financial ratios in studies on lending decisions (i.e. Dietrich and Kaplan (1982), 
Wilkins and Zimmer (1983) and Danos et al. (1996)) and in financial distress 
prediction (i.e. Altman (1968), Ohlson (1980), Zmijewski (1984) and Dimitras et al. 
(1996)).  
 
Dietrich and Kaplan (1982) analysed the risk classification of commercial bank 
loans by loan officers, bank controllers, auditors and bank examiners. According to 
Dietrich and Kaplan, the loan classification decision can be viewed as an attempt to 
predict the financial distress or bankruptcy of a firm. The higher the classification a 
loan gets (“higher” meaning less loan quality), the higher the likelihood that the 
borrowing firm will go bankrupt. Wilkins and Zimmer (1983) analysed the effect of 
leasing on credit decisions by loan officers. They quote several studies on the use of 
leverage ratios in credit assessments and on the deterioration of these ratios when 
capitalising leases. Wilkins and Zimmer argue that loan officers’ credit assessments 
and decisions would be affected if they ignore operating leases in calculating these 
ratios. This possible advantage may even lead lending institutions to promote off-
balance-sheet financing over alternative debt financing. Because of my own 
experience as a lending officer at a large Dutch bank, I agree with this conclusion; 
the off-balance character of operating leases is a ‘unique selling point’ of these 
transactions, and is promoted as such (see also Lückerath (1998)). Also Danos et al. 
(1996) examined the impact of accounting information on judgements of experienced 
bank loan officers. Their study confirmed the overall importance of historical and 
forward-looking accounting information in the lending decision process.  
 
Research on the predictability of financial distress or bankruptcy has been done by 
many researchers (including Altman (1968), Beaver (1966), Deakin (1972), Ohlson 
(1980), Elam (1975), Altman et al. (1977), Dambolena and Khoury (1980),  
Zmijewski (1984) and Lawrence and Bear (1986)). Of these researchers, only Elam 
(1975), Altman et al. (1977) and Lawrence and Bear (1986) addressed operating-
lease commitments. Elam did not adjust the ratios, but incorporated operating-lease 
data as an input variable, Altman et al. adjusted two ratios with the present value 
of the operating-lease commitments and Lawrence and Bear both adjusted the 
financial ratios and incorporated operating-lease data as an input variable.  
Dimitras et al. (1996) reviewed 47 studies published on bankruptcy prediction in 12 
different countries. Their review of bankruptcy-prediction studies provided a 
summary of the ratios used. The most frequently used financial ratios were as 
follows: working capital to total assets (16 times), total debt to total assets (15 
times), current assets to current liabilities (12 times), EBIT to total assets (12 
times) and net income to total assets (11 times).  
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The above shows that financial ratios have long been, and still are, an important 
source used in the financial analysis of a company. The off-balance-sheet character 
of operating leases, of which the alternative is to capitalise the (long-term) 
liabilities on the balance sheet, has, at the least, an effect on the total commitments 
as shown on the balance sheet.  
 
3.4 Summary and research questions on the decision usefulness of operating 
leases 
This chapter has described the criteria of decision usefulness of accounting 
information. These criteria (as defined by the IASB and endorsed by the DASB) are 
understandability, relevance, reliability and comparability. Each of these criteria 
also applies to the disclosure of operating leases. However, due to the off-balance 
character of operating leases, the commitments are often neglected in practice, 
although they affect the financial ratios that are derived from the balance sheet. 
This impact is only meaningful when the disclosed commitments are of a material 
amount and when these financial ratios are used in decision-making. Using the 
results of previous studies, the study has shown that financial ratios are still an 
important input in decision-making for different users of the financial statements. 
Credit analysts, rating agencies, lenders and researchers use financial ratios as an 
information source. This implies that operating-lease information should not be 
neglected.  
 
Monson (2001) asserted that it is not possible for a radically different (numerical) 
representation of the same event (leasing) in the basic financial statement to 
produce information with equally useful predictive value and feedback value. He 
also argues (p. 284) that any new lease-accounting standard that does not reduce 
the volume of lease contracts transacted solely or primarily to take advantage of the 
perceived off-balance-sheet financing must be producing information that is neither 
relevant nor reliable. However, as mentioned in chapter 2, the reason a firm chooses 
operating leases cannot be attributable solely to the off-balance-sheet character. 
That chapter also questions whether a lease-accounting approach that capitalises 
all leases on the balance sheets solves all disadvantages of the current lease-
accounting standard. 
 
Therefore, the question underlying part II of this thesis is whether the required 
information provided in the footnotes of financial reports is useful information. 
Since requiring additional information might solve some of the disadvantages, 
thereby negating the need for a rigorously different lease-accounting approach. 
Chapter 5 empirically tests IASB’s three criteria of decision usefulness: relevance, 
reliability and comparability. By not examining the fourth criteria, 
understandability, the study does not say that understandability is not an issue for 
the decision usefulness of operating-lease disclosures. On the contrary, to question 
whether all users are aware of the fact that the footnotes contain important 
information on the commitments of the company might be interesting. This study, 
however, focuses on the unambiguous information available from the financial 
statements, which does not tell us anything about the knowledge level of the user of 
the financial statement. 
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In order to come to a conclusion on the decision usefulness of operating-lease 
disclosures, the study has formulated five research questions that investigate 
whether the current operating-lease disclosure fulfils the qualitative criteria of 
decision usefulness as defined by the IASB and other regulators. Most questions can 
be attached to more than one of the qualitative criteria. For example, one could 
argue that the question whether the information is sufficiently complete (reliability) 
to estimate the capitalised value of operating leases (question 3 below), is only 
interesting when the capitalised value of operating leases is relevant in decision-
making. However, the questions one till five below are categorised by the 
qualitative criterion to which it is mostly related. 
 
Relevance 
RQ1 Are the operating-lease commitments material?  
 
A company is obliged to provide information on operating-lease commitments in the 
footnotes in its financial statements. Users of the financial statements might adjust 
their financial analysis based on the balance sheet or income statement with the 
capitalised value of the operating-lease commitments. If they do not make 
adjustments for the operating-lease commitments, the information is omitted from 
financial analysis, although the information might be relevant in decision-making. 
The information is therefore relevant if it is material (and when omitted, it may 
change the decision). Materiality will be tested by analysing and capitalising the 
operating-lease commitments, and comparing these with the three threshold values 
as described in section 3.3.  
 
Reliability 
RQ2 Do companies with operating leases comply with the footnote 
disclosure rules? (neutrality) 
 
RQ3 Is the information required by the lease-accounting standard 
sufficient to permit informed users to estimate the consequences of 
operating leases? (completeness) 
 
Information in the financial statements is reliable if it is faithfully represented, 
neutral, prudent and complete. Two of these criteria, faithfulness and prudence, can 
only be tested by investigating information that is not provided in the financial 
statements but is available only at the lessee company. Faithful representation (the 
substance-over-form principle) and prudence depend on the contractual structure of 
each lease contract in the entire lease portfolio. The other two criteria can be tested 
with the information provided in the financial statements. Neutrality is at stake 
when the information is presented in different forms. Although IAS17 and RJ 292 
allow only one way of presentation, companies may not comply with these rules. 
Although this is not shortcoming attributable to the accounting standard is does 
harm the reliability criterion of useful information while the information is not 
neutral between companies. The last criterion of reliability, completeness, is at 
stake when users who want to capitalise the operating-lease commitments have 
insufficient information to do so. If the capitalised value of operating leases and its 
related impact on financial ratios ratio and decisions are sensitive to the 
assumptions made or the capitalisation method chosen by the users, then the 
information provided is not complete. 
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This study will investigate the following: first, whether all companies disclose the 
information as required by the accounting standard; second, whether the 
capitalisation results are sensitive to the assumptions on discount rates, remaining 
lives; and finally, whether the capitalisation results are sensitive to the 
capitalisation method used. 
 
Comparability 
RQ4 Are key financial ratios significantly affected?  
 
RQ5 Does the capitalisation of operating leases change the ranking 
between companies (comparability)? 
 
Finally, the study will investigate the impact on the financial ratios used in 
decision-making. A significant impact on the financial ratios indicates that the off-
balance character of operating leases indeed affects decision-making, which 
compromises the comparability criterion.  
 
Information in the financial statements is comparable when it allows users to 
consistently compare companies. Users who do not capitalise operating leases 
cannot consistently compare companies because the true financial commitments of 
especially high-leasing companies are ignored. Unfairly, these companies will be 
preferred above companies with no operating-lease commitments but similar 
commitments on the balance sheet. The comparability of companies is at stake 
when the financial ratios used for analysis are changed significantly and when the 
ranking of companies (as compared to each other based on these ratios) is different 
for users who do capitalise operating leases as opposed to users who do not. 
Furthermore, the information provided on operating leases in the footnotes to the 
annual statements account does not allow a consistent comparison between 
companies, when the capitalised value of the operating-lease commitments is 
sensitive to the assumptions made and the capitalisation method chosen.  
 
The research questions follow the same order as the qualitative criteria in the 
Framework (relevance, reliability and comparability); the answers, however, do not 
necessarily follow this order. For example, whether the operating leases 
commitments are neutral (RQ2) will be answered as soon as the disclosures are 
collected. Subsequently, two of the materiality tests (using PVOL) can be executed 
only when capitalisation has been conducted. Figure 3.2 shows the relationship 
between the five research questions and the different stages of answering these 
questions.  
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Figure 3.2 Overview of decision usefulness of disclosed operating-lease information 
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The study now goes on to describe the available capitalisation approaches (chapter 
4) and empirically test the research question using a sample of 119 Dutch listed 
companies (chapter 5).  
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CHAPTER 4 COMPARISON OF LEASE-CAPITALISATION 
APPROACHES 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter described the criteria of decision usefulness. Based on these 
criteria, also applicable for operating leases, five research questions were 
formulated. The major issue behind all these questions is whether it would matter if 
the operating-lease commitments had been capitalised on the balance sheet. 
Therefore, before the research questions can be empirically tested in the next 
chapter, first the purpose of capitalisation and the capitalisation approach should 
be chosen. This choice is, however, not straightforward. In previous literature and 
also in financial practice, several approaches are in use, with different assumptions 
and calculations. Therefore, this chapter addresses the capitalisation of operating 
leases.  
 
Section 4.2 describes the purpose of capitalisation. Section 4.3 then describes a 
theoretical valuation approach of operating leases, as found in the finance 
literature. Unfortunately, however, the accounting practice is not a theoretical 
environment where the necessary information is freely available. Therefore, section 
4.4 introduces seven capitalisation approaches. Six of these come from previous 
studies; the seventh is the approach developed in this thesis. This study builds upon 
the two approaches of Imhoff et al. (1991) and Beattie et al. (1998), but adjusts 
these approaches by taking into account the expiry pattern of the lease portfolio of 
each company. This has especially an impact on the capitalised value of the leased 
asset, and the depreciation charge derived thereof. The assumptions made by the 
seven capitalisation approaches are described in section 4.5. Appendix 4.I 
illustrates the differences between the seven approaches with an example, using the 
operating-lease commitments as disclosed in the 2004- annual report of KPN. 
Section 4.6 concludes. 
 
4.2 Purpose of capitalisation and previous evidence 
Constructive capitalisation requires the estimation of the amount of debt and assets 
that would be reported on the balance sheet if the operating leases had been treated 
as capital leases from their inception (Imhoff et al. (1991), UBSWarburg (2001), 
Standard and Poor's (2001)). Comparability should thus improve for highly leased 
companies with companies having limited or no leases. One of the first attempts to 
investigate the effects of lease capitalisation on financial ratios was Nelson (1963). 
Nelson suggested two purposes for investigating the effect on financial ratios: first, 
to determine whether capitalisation would make these ratios more meaningful and 
second, to analyse whether decision-making would be improved. Nelson argued that 
the usefulness of many important financial ratios is limited by reporting practices. 
His argumentation is similar to the more recent argumentation of the opponents of 
the current accounting regulation with respect to leasing (for example, McGregor 
(1996) and Lennard and Nailor (2000)). According to Nelson, the limitations do not 
come from weaknesses in the ratios, but from faulty procedures for reporting leases 
that are primarily financial in nature. Capitalisation is therefore meant to 
overcome this weakness in lease reporting, as it reflects the financial impact of 
leasing in the financial statements. Because capitalisation recognises leasing for 
what it really is (a means of financing), the financial ratios, which are computed 
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from statements containing capitalised lease, are meaningful. Nelson argues that 
operating-lease information is relevant, and that reliability improves when the 
operating-lease obligations are capitalised.  
 
Ashton (1985) conducted comparable research based on similar motives: namely, 
testing whether lease capitalisation had a significant impact on the main indicators 
of financial performance, and whether the decisions of the companies in the sample 
to voluntarily capitalise leases were dictated by the economic consequences. Ashton 
(1985) found that only the leverage ratios changed significantly. Imhoff et al. (1991) 
analysed 14 pairs of US companies, each pair of which consisted of a high- and low-
leasing company. The impact on return-on-assets and the debt-equity ratio were 
analysed; on average, these ratios changed -22% and 119%, respectively. Their 
conclusion: the results suggest that constructive capitalisation of long-term 
operating-lease commitments that are material may be necessary before an 
accurate evaluation of financial results within or across firms and industries can be 
performed. Beattie et al. (1998) found in their analysis of 232 UK companies that 
capitalisation had a major impact on the profit margin, return on assets, asset 
turnover and three leverage ratios. Bennet and Bradbury (2003) found evidence 
that the capitalisation of operating leases not only negatively affects leverage ratios, 
but also decreases liquidity and profitability for the 38 companies in their sample. 
 
Lennard and Nailor (2000) argued that constructive operating-lease capitalisation 
by investment analysts and other users (such as credit-rating agencies) appears to 
be commonplace, suggesting that the present accounting treatment of operating 
leases is not the most relevant of the choices available. If operating-lease 
capitalisation is warranted for financial analysis, then capitalisation by financial 
statement preparers should be preferred to constructive capitalisation by financial 
statement users; after all, only users can estimate (with limited accuracy) 
information held by preparers in calculating the balance-sheet effects and profit- 
and loss effects of operating leases. Lennard and Nailor therefore doubt the 
completeness of the disclosed operating-lease information. 
 
Users of financial statements should be able to compare the financial statements of 
an enterprise through time and with different enterprises in order to evaluate their 
relative position and performance, and the changes therein. The measurement and 
display of the financial effects of transactions and events must therefore be carried 
out in a consistent way, over time, throughout an enterprise, and in a consistent 
way for different companies. The disclosed operating-lease information should be 
consistent, which would make the information between companies comparable. 
Again, the disclosure requirements in IAS17 are unambiguous, which enhances 
consistency. However, previous studies (Kamp (2001), Wilkins and Zimmer (1983), 
Abdel-Khalik (1981)) have proved that it is still not commonplace for users to make 
adjustments to the financial statements for off-balance-sheet lease obligations.  
 
The comparability criterion for operating-lease data addresses two issues. The first: 
if operating leases were not capitalised and financial ratios were not adjusted, 
would comparison between high- and low-leased companies be unfair? The second: if 
operating leases were capitalised and financial ratios were adjusted, would 
comparison of companies be consistent? Different procedures might lead to 
divergent outcomes, also caused by the unavoidable assumptions a user has to 
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make to capitalise the leases; this would also pose a threat to the comparability and 
completeness criterion. 
 
4.3 Theoretical value of operating leases 
The theoretical value of an (operating) lease has been debated extensively in the 
finance literature by authors discussing the lease-or-buy/borrow decision at 
inception of the lease (for example, Myers et al. (1976), Franks and Hodges (1978), 
Ang and Peterson (1984), Lewellen and Emery (1980), Trigeorgis (1996)). Myers, 
Dill and Bautista (1976) initiated the discussion on the valuation and they 
presented a lease-valuation formula. Although this formula has since been clarified 
and extended by several authors, it has in essence remained the same. Myers et al. 
(1976) define the value of lease contracts as the advantage of leasing vs. debt 
financing. In theory, a lessee decides to lease at t=0, when the present value of a 
lease compared to normal debt financing is positive. Myers et al. therefore calculate 
the present value of a lease by considering all changes in cash flows due to the 
decision to lease. Although many agree with the basics of this equation, some argue 
that the equation is not complete. For example, Trigeorgis (1996) added to the 
equation the valuation of the incorporated options in the lease that can be valued 
using theoretical option-valuation models. Here the focus is on the Myers et al. 
equation, which relates closely to the hereafter-described capitalisation approaches. 
 
The Myers et al. equation takes the following form: 
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whereas,  
V0  = the value of the lease at inception 
TL = the total term of the lease, which is most or all of the asset’s economic life,  
I  = the original investment in the leased asset,  
CFt = the lease payment during year t,  
T  = the marginal corporate income tax rate,  
i   = the firm’s marginal borrowing rate,  
deprt  = the depreciation in year t,  
Dt-1  = the debt displaced by the asset leased. 
 
The value of the lease at inception (V0) is the difference between the present value 
of the financial advantages and disadvantages of the lease as compared to normal 
debt. Equation (1) calculates this value by distinguishing three parts from the 
original investment in the asset: a) the cash outflow related to the lease, after-tax, 
b) the fiscal disadvantage of losing the ability to deduct the depreciation of the 
assets and c) the after-tax financial advantage of not paying interest on normal 
debt. The first part (a) of equation 1 is the present value of the after-tax lease 
payments. Lease payments are fully deductible from gross income, which is an 
advantage to debt financing, where only the interest part is deductible. The second 
part (b) shows the lower deductible amount for leases caused by depreciation 
differences between leasing and debt. The lessee cannot depreciate the asset (this 
will be done by the lessor), since with normal debt financing the asset will be 
depreciated. This results in a lower deductible amount for the lessee. The last part 
(c) of Equation (1) expresses the interest costs of debt-financing that are saved by 
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the lease decision. The interest paid by the lessee is incorporated in the annual 
lease payments (CFt). 
 
Unfortunately, there are at least four reasons why external users of annual reports 
cannot use the theoretical Myers et al. equation for the capitalisation of operating-
lease commitments. First, the equation is designed such that a choice must be made 
between leasing and borrowing at the inception of the lease (the investment/finance 
decision). This is not the case for the capitalisation of operating leases, whereas the 
capitalisation of operating leases is necessary during the entire period of the lease 
contract. Second, the equation is an accumulation of all the cash-flow effects of 
leasing instead of borrowing. This also relates to the investment/financing decision. 
The capitalisation of operating leases is an accounting issue, however, which begs 
the question of what the liability of an operating lease should be when it is shown 
on the balance sheet. Comparable with debt, the capitalisation of leases should 
therefore not incorporate tax-deductible items such as depreciation and interest on 
the alternative debt. Third, Myers et al. calculate the value of one single lease, since 
external users need to capitalise the entire lease portfolio of a company because no 
individual information is available. This also relates to the difference between the 
investment/financing decisions of one lease as compared to the accounting 
treatment of all leases. Fourth, the information necessary to calculate the 
theoretical value of the operating-lease commitments is not available in the annual 
report used in the Myers et al. study.  
 
Table 4.1 shows the connection between the finance perspective and the accounting 
treatment using the elements of the Myers et al.-equation (Eq.1). The theoretical 
value of operating leases is a useful handle to develop awareness of which 
information or variables are needed to calculate the value of an operating lease. The 
required information might be available internally in the company; this information 
is not available to external users. Table 4.1 shows the necessary information for the 
theoretical capitalisation of an operating lease during the lease period and the 
available information according to RJ292 and IAS17.  
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Table 4.1 Comparison of necessary information (finance theory) and available information (accounting 
practice) for lease valuation 
FINANCE THEORY ACCOUNTING PRACTICE 
Information necessary 
(for each separate lease 
contract) 
Information available in annual 
report (for entire lease portfolio) 
 
Assumptions to be made 
i, 
implicit interest rate/or 
alternative costs of debt 
 
Not disclosed 
 
Estimation 
TL, 
Total Lease Life Not disclosed 
RL, 
Remaining Life 
 
Not disclosed 
While the Myers-equation is at inception of 
the lease, and the accounting implications 
have to be calculated on an annual basis, 
assumptions have to be made on what the 
original lease period was (TL) and how far 
this lease period has passed already (RL).  
CFt 
Lease payments for year t 
Lease payments are disclosed into three 
lease expiring categories CFe, e=1, 2 
or 3. e=1: lease commitments expiring 
within next year, e=2: expiring 
between one and five years, and e=3: 
expiring after year five. 
The lease commitments in the three lease-
expiry categories, CFe=1, CFe=2 and CFe=3 
have to be divided over the years (t) to come 
to annual lease payments, CFt, until the end 
of the lease term. 
V0 
Initial value of the lease Not disclosed 
Capitalisation approach to calculate the 
present value of the lease liability (PVOL) 
I 
Initial value of leased asset 
 
Not disclosed 
Assume how the value of the lease asset 
(PVA) relates to lease liability (PVOL): the 
asset proportion (AP). 
T 
company’s marginal tax 
rate 
 
Not disclosed 
 
Estimation 
Depr 
annual depreciation of 
asset 
 
Not disclosed 
The depreciation of the assets (PVA) 
depends on the remaining life and/or the 
expiry pattern of the lease portfolio 
 
Since the different capitalisation approaches differ in the assumptions made on the 
required variables, they subsequently differ in the refinements of the approach. The 
next sections therefore build upon the information required and the assumptions 
made. This enhances the comparability of the approaches and shows where the 
approaches agree and where they do not.  
4.4 Capitalisation approaches 
This section introduces seven different capitalisation approaches, which can be 
divided into two major distinctions: first, the multiple methods (see Moody's 
Investor Service (1999), UBSWarburg (2001), Ely (1995), Unilever Annual Report 
(2002, p.129)), and second, the present-value methods (see Imhoff et al. (1991), 
Imhoff et al. (1997), Beattie et al. (1998) and Ely (1995)). Figure 4.1 shows the seven 
capitalisation approaches described in this chapter; the empirical results in relation 
to these approaches will be compared in chapter five.  
Figure 4.1 Seven capitalisation approaches  
 
CAPITALISATION OF
OPERATING LEASES
MULTIPLE METHODS PRESENT VALUE METHODS
8-times rent UBSWarburg Multiple Ely Imhoff et al. Beattie et al. PV Ely This study  
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Multiple methods 
The multiple methods calculate the capitalised value of an operating lease by 
multiplying a company’s next-year lease obligations with a fixed multiple. The 
multiple methods can be classified as simple methods or as ‘rules-of-thumb’ 
methods. Both Moody's Investor Service (1999) and UBSWarburg (2001) mention in 
their reports that multiple methods are still used by analysts to capitalise operating 
leases. The major distinction between the multiple methods and the present-value 
methods (described in the next section) is the usage of the next-year lease payment, 
instead of all future lease payments, to determine the lease liability. The multiple 
methods can also be divided in two different approaches: First, those using a 
constant (for example 6- or 8-times rent) and second, those using a formula 
(UBSWarburg (2001) and Ely (1995)).  
 
• Multiple methods using a constant use a fixed number for all companies to 
multiply the next-year operating-lease payment. For example, the 8-times-
rent method (Moody's Investor Service (1999)) multiplies the annual lease 
payment by eight. Although the most important advantage is its simplicity,  
Moody’s asserts that an important advantage is also, to some degree, the 
incorporation of borrower creditworthiness. Thus, the annual lease payments 
will change with the borrower’s credit risk, and by applying a constant 
multiple, an analyst will be able to differentiate between different classes of 
borrowers. Use of a constant multiple, however, prevents distinctions from 
being made between interest rates or underlying assets (and their related 
useful life). The multiple method using a constant may be simple, but 
professionals also use it in practice, as shown in Unilever’s 2004 annual 
report, where on page 151 net debt is adjusted for lease obligations by adding 
five times the next year’s lease expenses to (non-adjusted) net debt. Unilever 
uses a constant (five) to calculate the capitalised value of operating-lease 
obligations. 
 
• Multiple methods using a formula (UBSWarburg (2001) and Ely (1995)) 
incorporate different interest rates and operating-lease terms, compared with 
the multiple methods using a constant. First, the multiple methods using a 
formula assume lease payments based on annuities that will be equal during 
the remaining lease term. Second, the present values of these annuities can 
be calculated using the relevant discount rate. Finally, this present value will 
be a multiple of the first annual lease payment. This multiple will be the 
same for all leases with the same remaining lease term and applicable 
discount rate. Ely (1995) uses a multiple method to see whether her present-
value method is robust to the assumptions made on lease term (25 years), 
interest rate (10%) and yearly payments (constant amount each year). The 
multiple method described by Ely is different to that of UBSWarburg, and 
therefore both methods will be described in the next sections. 
 
Present-value methods 
Present-value methods calculate the capitalised value of an operating lease by 
discounting all future lease obligations. Discounting the future lease obligation 
aims to eliminate the interest part that is incorporated in the future lease 
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obligations40. The present-value methods are most in line with the theoretical model 
of Myers et al. (1976) (see section 4.3). To understand the development of these 
methods, this study now describes the three different capitalisation approaches of 
Imhoff, Lipe and Wright (1991, 1997), Ely (1995) and Beattie et al. (1998).  
 
• Imhoff, Lipe and Wright (1991) were the first to develop a method for 
capitalising operating-lease obligations based on present values. In 1991, 
they estimated the effect on return on assets and debt to equity. After their 
study, several other studies presented an alternative for this approach, 
including Imhoff, Lipe and Wright themselves in 1997, when they estimated 
of the impact on income. The method of Imhoff, Lipe and Wright is most used 
in practice, by Standard and Poor's (2001), Moody's Investor Services (1999) 
and White et al. (2003), for example. 
 
• Beattie et al. (1998) built upon the procedure as developed by Imhoff, Lipe 
and Wright in 1991, and therefore start the description of their procedure 
with Imhoff et al.’s assumptions. Beattie et al. use a very similar approach, 
but their major contribution is the differentiation between the remaining- 
and total life of the lease portfolio using the weights of each lease-expiry 
category (e=1, 2 or 3; see Table 4.1). Furthermore, they differentiate between 
two asset categories (land and buildings and other) because they have 
different maturities. However, their data is substantially different from that 
used in the other methods described, since Beattie et al. use UK companies 
disclosing according to UK SSAP21. As shown in Table 2.1 in section 2.4.1 , 
SSAP21 companies disclose only next year’s operating-lease payment split in 
three expiry periods. This is substantially different from the disclosure of the 
total commitments according to RJ292, IAS17 or FAS13. The data available 
of UK companies does not provide information on the total future lease 
commitments, and shows only next year’s lease commitments categorised into 
the three lease-expiry categories. This imposed some additional requirements 
on Beattie et al.’s approach to be able to estimate the present value of the 
total future commitments. 
 
• Ely (1995) investigated whether investors view operating leases as property 
rights. According to Ely, the user’s perspective toward a lease is instrumental 
in determining its accounting treatment (balance-sheet recognition or 
footnote disclosure). Ely explains that the current risk/reward approach with 
respect to operating leases assumes that users focus on who bears the risk of 
ownership. This means that lessees with operating leases bear insufficient 
risk to treat the leased asset as an asset or the obligation as a liability. The 
main goal of Ely’s study was not to investigate the impact on financial ratios 
but to link the operating leases to equity risk. She therefore only adjusts the 
debt-equity ratio in her research. Ely is of the opinion (page 403) that the 
present value collapses to a constant times the first minimum lease payment 
(the multiple method). She adds in a comment between parentheses that this 
is true when leases are entered into regularly and when the payment per 
lease is constant. In her research, she therefore assumes that a firm enters 
into new leases every year and that the value of these leases is always the 
                                                          
40 Contingent rentals, service costs and taxes should already be excluded from the minimum future lease-payments 
disclosed in the financial statements (see Table 2.1). 
CHAPTER 4  
96 
same. Therefore, PVOL each year can be characterised as a constant times 
the first minimum lease payment. The model used by Ely is developed by 
Bowman in 1997 and relates equity risk to two ratios that are often adjusted 
by investors to include operating leases: the debt-equity ratio and the return 
on assets. 
 
• The approach developed in this study is also a present-value approach, since 
such an approach represents best an on-balance equivalent of the operating 
leases (thus comparable with financial leases and non-leasing debt). 
Discounting the total future lease commitments eliminates the interest part. 
The approach in this study is therefore based on the present-value 
calculations as first initialised by Imhoff et al. (1991). However, as described 
by Beattie et al. (1998), companies differ in their lease portfolios, since some 
companies have more short-term leases and others more long-term leases. As 
will become clear in the next sections, this has an impact on the assumed 
remaining- and total life of the lease. This study’s approach uses the weights 
of the three different lease-expiry categories to a greater extent than Beattie 
et al. do. In this study, the (average) remaining life and total life are adjusted 
using the payment pattern within the lease portfolio. The consequences of the 
difference between this study’s approach and the other approaches will 
become evident in the following sections. 
4.5 Assumptions 
This section describes the different underlying assumptions of each method and the 
subsequent difference in capitalisation results. These methods have been analysed 
and compared on the following items: 
 
Implicit interest rate   (i)   4.5.1 
Remaining Life and Total Life  (RL and TL)  4.5.2 
Division of future lease payments  (CFe and CFt)  4.5.3 
Capitalised lease liability  (PVOL)   4.5.4 
Capitalised lease asset and asset proportion (PVA and AP)  4.5.5 
(Indirect) impact on other accounting variables 4.5.6 
 
4.5.1 Implicit interest rate (i) 
The major purpose of the capitalisation approaches is to extract the interest 
component from the disclosed operating-lease commitments. The capitalised 
amount should be a fair indication of what should have been the amount on the 
balance sheet if the operating leases would have been treated as financial lease 
from the beginning. Each lease will have its own implicit interest rate41, which 
should be used, for example, when defining whether the operating lease is a 
finance- or operating lease (RJ292.107; IAS 17.8, 17.12). The implicit interest rate 
should be the most accurate discount rate (Moody's Investor Services (1999), White 
et al. (2003)). However, firms are not required to disclose the (implicit) interest rate, 
which might not even be known by the company itself when the lessor is not 
transparent in the lease-payment calculations. The user therefore needs to choose 
an alternative. 
 
                                                          
41 The lessee pays to the lessor a lease payment that includes both a repayment part and an interest part; these parts, 
however, are not separately invoiced, as is the case with normal debt. Therefore, the interest rate should be deducted 
from the lease payment, by calculating what percentage implicitly was used when determining the lease payment.  
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Table 4.2 summarises the assumptions in interest rate for the different 
capitalisation approaches. 
Table 4.2 Assumption on interest rate  
CAPITALISATION 
APPROACH INTEREST RATE 
Multiple methods  
8-times rent No interest rate required 
UBSWarburg Estimated current borrowing rate of each company 
Multiple Ely 10% derived from footnotes representative for entire sample 
Present-Value methods  
Imhoff, Lipe and Wright Interest rate implicit in financial lease, fixed at 10% for entire sample 
Beattie, Edwards and Goodacre Short-term borrowing rate, fixed at 10% for entire sample 
PV Ely 10% derived from footnotes representative for entire sample 
This study Alternative cost of debt, fixed for entire sample 
 
Multiple methods 
The multiple methods using a constant do not take the interest rate into account. 
However, the constant of eight in the 8-times-rent method was originally conceived 
by assuming a fixed interest and remaining life for all leases. This will become clear 
when the multiple methods using a formula are described.  
 
For the multiple methods using a formula the interest rate is relevant, since the 
implicit interest rate together with the remaining- or total life of the lease defines 
the multiple. The formula to calculate the multiple used by UBSWarburg (2001) is 
shown in Equation (2). 
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The multiple calculation of Ely is shown in Equation (3) 
 
TL
))(1(
11
Multiple 1
∑
=
−+−
=
TL
t
tTL
Ely
i
i
  (3) 
 
UBSWarburg and Ely argue that the estimated current borrowing rate of the 
company should be used to calculate the multiple. However, Ely uses a fixed 
interest rate for all companies of 10%. She analysed the footnotes of the annual 
reports of the companies in her sample, and found 10% to be representative for the 
entire sample. She therefore does not distinguish between companies.  
 
Present-value methods 
Coincidentally, the three articles using present-value approaches used a 10%42 
interest rate to calculate these present values. All three use different arguments for 
choosing 10%. According to Imhoff, Lipe and Wright (1991) the appropriate 
incremental borrowing rate should be the weighted average historical borrowing 
rates of each lease in comparison to all operating leases. Since both the historical 
                                                          
42 Nowadays, a discount rate of 10% would be inappropriate, since interest rates have decreased since the ‘90s. In 
the Netherlands, for example, the average interest rate charged on a ten-year loan in 1991 was 8.74%; in 2003, this 
was 4.12% (source:www.statistics.dnb.nl). Another example is the decrease in the mean of the Finance House Base 
rate as used by Beattie et al. For the six-year period 1998-20004, the mean was 5.4% instead of the 10% used in 
their study (source: www.fla.org.uk) 
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rates and the composition of each lease to all operating leases are not known, they 
assumed in 1991 that this rate is similar to the average historical interest rate for 
reported secured long-term debt. This rate can be estimated by examining the debt 
footnote. Imhoff et al. found for its example (MacDonald’s) a historic rate of nine 
percent; they used 10% to produce a conservative measure that avoids overstating 
the liability. In 1997, they suggested taking the implicit rate in companies’ financial 
leases. Even if this rate is not disclosed, it is possible to calculate it using the 
footnotes on financial leases. 
 
Also Beattie et al. use an interest rate of 10% in their study; this was based, 
however, on other arguments. They selected a short-term borrowing rate, the three-
month London deposit rate, as a suitable discount rate for the entire sample. 
According to Beattie et al. this rate is similar to the Finance House Base Rate, used 
by members of the Finance and Leasing Association. This rate varied during the 
period of their research (1981-1994), with a mean of 10.8% for the entire period and 
10.3% for the period 1988-1994. Beattie et al. found the latter the most suitable rate 
and rounded it off to 10%. Beattie et al. therefore do not use the interest rates of 
individual companies. 
 
Ely uses a 10% interest rate, since she assumes that a lease term of 25 years is 
representative for her sample of 212 firms, and the long-term debt footnotes suggest 
that an interest rate of 10% is also representative. The assumptions about the lease 
term, the interest rate and the yearly payments embedded in the lump-sum amount 
of leases expiring after year 5 are not tailored to the specific firms in the sample. 
Ely argues that PVOL is not sensitive to these assumptions, since the correlations 
all exceed 0.9 between PVOL and alternative measures of lease lives, interest and 
yearly payments.  
 
In their study concerning the relation between tax, debt and leases, Graham et al. 
(1998) describe the calculation of the present value of operating-lease commitments 
(p.139). They use a 10% discount rate to calculate the present value, acknowledging 
that this calculation may be biased when different companies have different costs of 
(lease) capital. Therefore, they also used as alternative each company’s short-term 
borrowing rate. This led to many missing observations and reduced their sample. 
Moreover, the use of the alternative did not change the qualitative results of their 
study. 
 
The above discussion allows formulation of the following conclusions on the interest 
rate used in the capitalisation procedures:  
• Ideally, each lease should be capitalised using the implicit interest rate in 
each contract; this rate, however, is practically unavailable for both the 
(lessee) company and the user of the financial statements; 
• Alternatively, a lease (or a lease portfolio) should be capitalised using the 
interest a company pays on similar debt (the alternative cost of debt), which 
is also recommended by the IAS17 and RJ29. Although this rate will be 
known to the company, it is often unavailable to the user of the financial 
statements,  
• Finally, as done by most previous studies, a fixed interest rate for all 
companies will be used.  
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4.5.2 Remaining life and total life (RL and TL) 
Whereas the theoretical value of a lease as described in section 4.3 is calculated at 
the inception of the lease, this is not the case for the capitalisation of operating 
leases as disclosed in the annual report. The operating leases in the annual report 
consist of a portfolio of different leases with different maturities, and will differ also 
in their remaining lives. For example, a lease of a computer will have a different 
original maturity than a lease of a building. However, a complicating factor of 
estimating the remaining life of the operating leases is the fact that the entire lease 
portfolio is disclosed at once, instead of per leased asset. The remaining life of the 
‘land and buildings’ in this portfolio will be different from the remaining life of the 
computer. The total life is relevant, as will be shortly described, to estimate the 
already depreciated part of the leased asset. This cannot be estimated from the 
future lease commitments, and additional assumptions have to be made. 
 
How the different capitalisation approaches estimate the remaining- and total life 
of the lease portfolio will now be described. Table 4.3 summarises the assumptions 
and calculations used. 
 
Table 4.3 Assumptions on remaining- and total lives  
CAPITALISATION 
APPROACH REMAINING LIFE (RL) TOTAL LIFE (TL) 
Multiple methods   
8-times rent Irrelevant Irrelevant 
 
 
UBSWarburg 
Ideally the weighted average remaining life,  
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Multiple methods 
In the 8-times-rent method, the remaining life and total life of the operating lease is 
not required to calculate the capitalised operating-lease liability. As can be seen in 
the previous sub-section, the formulas of UBSWarburg (equation (2)) and Ely 
(equation (3)) use either the remaining life or the total life.  
 
Although the remaining life (RL) suggested by UBSWarburg is ideally a weighted 
average using annual lease payments, a simple estimate may be sufficient (p.3). 
The weighted average remaining life of the total lease portfolio can be based on the 
division of future lease payments in the lease portfolio (see next sub-section). A 
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multiple calculated this way does take into account the future lease obligations. 
Equation (4) shows how this weighted average is calculated. 
 Weighted Average RL = 
∑
∑
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 5
3
CF
CF5RL =+= eUBS
, rounded up to the next full year,  (5) 
 
The formula of Ely is based on the assumption that the operating leases in the 
portfolio of a company all have different remaining lives equally divided over the 
total (assumed) lease term. Ely ignores future lease payments and assumes that 
yearly lease payments are constant; further, she uses a fixed total life of 25-years. 
Whereas part of the multiple formula is equal to the present value of an annuity, 
Ely (1995) argues that the multiple method is basically the same as present-value 
methods, under the assumptions that leases are entered into regularly and the 
payment per lease is constant. This simplification might be acceptable for 
equipment leasing, like cars and computers, since these may remain constant over 
time in a company, but is not very realistic for fixed assets as machinery, or land 
and buildings. 
 
Present-value methods 
Imhoff, Lipe and Wright (1991) assume that the useful life of the leased assets 
(equipment, offices, vehicles) is 30 years. Furthermore, they argue that if they 
assume that the remaining life is 14 years, and they divide the lump sum after year 
five by nine (14 years minus five years), the annual lease payment after year 5 is 
higher than the annual payment for the next year. Since this is not logical (lease 
payments are more likely to decrease over time), they assume a remaining life of 15 
years instead of 14 years.  
 
Although their reasoning is not described in depth (see the reasoning of the 
remaining life of 14 years for MacDonald’s), Imhoff et al. suggested a procedure 
whereby the fifth future year’s minimum lease payment, together with the lump-
sum payment of the third lease-expiry category (expiring beyond year five), is used 
to approximate how many years the payment would continue after year five. This 
procedure is also adopted and described in greater detail in their 1997 article. 
 
5
3
CF
CF5RL =+= eILW , rounded up to the next full year43,  (6) 
Standard and Poor's (2001) also uses this method to calculate the remaining life and 
consequently the divisions of annual lease payments after year five. Since the 
actual pattern of annual payments after year five cannot be observed, Imhoff et al. 
(1997) expeced some decay in the cash payments beyond year five, as they do for the 
first five years. Therefore, they round up the outcome of equation (6) and add a year 
or two. 
 
In 1997, Imhoff, Lipe and Wright (p. 17) argued that the assumption on the 
duration of future cash flows is somewhat more ambiguous than the interest-rate 
                                                          
43 For example, a remaining life of 12.3 becomes 13 
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assumption. This is even more troublesome, since the lease portfolio often consists 
of two categories: land and buildings, and other (such as machinery and 
equipment). Both asset types have significantly different economic lives. This was 
one of the major objections that Beattie, Edwards and Goodacre (1998) had against 
the Imhoff et al. approach. They analysed the pattern of operating-lease 
commitments and concluded that uniform total- and remaining lease lives (as used 
by Imhoff et al.) are unable to capture the diversity of lease durations. To overcome 
this shortcoming, Beattie et al. investigated the diversity between lease duration of 
assets, related to their asset category. They analysed both the UK and the US lease 
disclosures of 13 companies by asset category (‘land and buildings’ and ‘other’) and 
by lease-expiry date (leases expiring within one year, between one and five years, 
and after five years). By comparing the US and the UK disclosures, they were able 
to collect additional information by combining next year’s annual lease payments 
(UK disclosures) and the total minimum future lease payments (US disclosures). 
This resulted in a base estimation of different remaining lease lives and total lease 
lives for the two asset categories and the three lease-expiry dates. Table 4.4 shows 
these base estimations. 
 
Table 4.4 Base estimates of remaining- and total lease lives 
Beattie, Edwards and Goodacre (1998), p. 243  
 REMAINING LEASE LIFE 
(RLBASE) 
TOTAL LEASE LIFE 
(TLBASE) 
 
Lease-expiry category (e) 
Land and 
Buildings Other 
Land and 
Buildings Other 
Less than one year 1 1 1 1 
One to five years 3 3 5 5 
More than five years 16 7 25 10 
 
Table 4.4 was used in their sample of 232 UK companies to calculate the weighted 
average of the remaining- and total lives for each separate company. For example, 
for a company with a historical lease portfolio that has most leases expiring within 
the first lease-expiry category (expiring within one year), this lease-expiry category 
should have a heavier weight on the calculated remaining lives and total lives than 
the other lease-expiry should have. They use the cumulative historic volumes of 
leases, since this will give a more reliable indication of the average proportion of 
lease life expired than the use of data from a single year. The formula used for this 
weight (we) of each lease-expiry category (e) is: 
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The weight for each lease-expiry category is subsequently used to calculate the 
weighted average of remaining lives (RLi) and total lives (TLi) of the lease portfolio 
of company i, by multiplying the weight (we) with the base remaining lives (RLbase) 
and base total lives (TLbase), as shown in Table 4.4.  
 RLi,BEG = ∑
=
3
1
RL*
e
baseew  (8) 
 TLi,BEG = ∑
=
3
1
TL*
e
baseew  (9) 
The usage of base remaining lives and total lives described above was essential for 
UK companies, since this could not be derived from the companies’ financial 
statements themselves. Also, for companies disclosing in conformity with IAS 17, 
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this procedure can be applied to estimate the weighted total life of each company’s 
lease portfolio (equation (9)). This cannot be derived from the disclosures according 
to IAS17. The weighted remaining life used by Beattie refines the depreciation 
charge incorporated in the annual lease payment, while the assumptions of Beattie 
et al. make it possible to derive that depreciation should be calculated using the 
average remaining life. 
  
As is the case in the multiple-methods formula, a total lease term of 25 years (total 
life) is also assumed for the present-value method of Ely, and since she also 
assumes that firms enter into leases each year, the remaining life becomes 
irrelevant.  
  
This study takes into account the maturity pattern of the future lease obligations 
when calculating the remaining- and total life of the lease portfolio. As put forward 
by Beattie et al., this refines the calculation of the remaining life and total life 
because it takes into account whether a company has more short-term or long-term 
leases. However, Beattie et al. used ‘base estimates’ to calculate the weighted 
remaining- and total life (see Table 4.4), due to the fact that the (non-weighted) 
remaining life of the lease portfolio could not be estimated with SSAP 21. 
 
For disclosures according to RJ292 (or IAS17 and FAS13), the (weighted) remaining 
life can be calculated and therefore the (weighted) remaining life of the entire lease 
portfolio in this study is calculated as follows. The weight of each lease-expiry 
category is calculated by dividing the commitment of that particular expiry category 
by the total commitment (equation 10). This results in three weights, w1, w2, and 
w3. These weights are used to calculate the weighted average remaining life, by 
multiplying each weight with the remaining life of each corresponding lease-expiry 
category (equation 11). The remaining life of the first lease-expiry category is one 
year, and for the second we use an average of three years (which agrees with 
Beattie et al. base estimates). The remaining life of the third lease-expiry category 
is more complex. The total remaining life of the lease portfolio is the same as that 
calculated by Imhoff et al. (see equation 6). This differentiates between companies 
with different payment schedules, instead of using the fixed base estimates of 
Beattie et al. for this lease-expiry category. 
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It is particularly the calculation of the remaining life in this study that will 
differentiate this study from the studies of Imhoff  et al. and Beattie  et al.. The 
remaining life and the weights of each lease-expiry category will influence the 
depreciation used to adjust net income. This is discussed in section 4.5.6 and 
illustrated by Figure 4.3 in that section. 
 
This study assumes that the total life is twice the weighted remaining life (in line 
with Imhoff et al.) because no information is disclosed in the financial statements, 
which gives some indication of the original maturity of the lease. An equal division 
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of remaining and passed maturity seems fair. To test this assumption, this study 
will test whether the capitalisation results are sensitive to this assumption by 
varying the relation between remaining life and total life. 
 
4.5.3 Division of lease payments over years (CFe and CFt) 
As shown in Table 4.1 and described in chapter 2, with IAS17 and RJ292the 
disclosed information of the operating-lease commitments for two lease-expiry 
categories are summed; the lease commitments of years two through four are 
summed, and the lease commitments after year five are summed44. In order to 
calculate a present value of these commitments, the commitments have to be 
divided over calendar years.  
 
Table 4.5 shows the difference in the assumptions of the future lease payments for 
each of the lease capitalisation approaches.  
Table 4.5 Assumptions on division of lease payments over future years 
CAPITALISATION 
APPROACH DIVISION OF LEASE-PAYMENTS 
Multiple methods  
8-times rent Irrelevant; only annual lease payment required 
UBSWarburg Assuming equal lease payments after year 5; no suggestions given, however 
Multiple Ely Irrelevant; only annual lease payment required 
Present-Value methods  
Imhoff, Lipe and Wright Equal annual lease payments after year 5: 
5RL
CFCF 3−=
=
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e
t
, for t>5 
Beattie, Edwards and Goodacre For IAS17 companies, as Imhoff et al. 
PV Ely Decreasing annual lease payments after year 5: 
)4TL)(5TL(
CF*2*))1(TL(CF 3,5 −−−−=
=
>
e
Elyt t  
This study As Imhoff et al. 
 
Multiple methods 
The division of lease payments over future calendar years is not relevant for the 
multiple methods using a constant, since only next year’s annual lease payment is 
required. The lease commitments for the first lease-expiry category (CFe=1, leases 
expiring within one year) are equal to the lease commitments of that year (CF1). 
The commitments for the years after t=1 are ignored.  
 
Although UBSWarburg suggests calculating the weighted remaining life of the 
lease portfolio using annual payments, they do not describe how the accounting 
number in the after-year-5 lease commitments (CFe=3) should be divided over future 
years. They assume in three different papers, however, an equal payment during 
the remaining life of the lease, which they assume is known (UBSWarburg (2001, 
(2002, (2003). No division of lease payments over future years is necessary for the 
calculation of Ely’s multiple. 
 
Present-value methods 
The articles of Imhoff et al. (1991. 1997) use the FAS13 requirements of operating-
lease disclosure, which means that for each of the first five years the minimum 
lease payments are disclosed. In their articles, Imhoff et al. therefore did not make 
                                                          
44 FAS13 requires disclosing the annual lease commitments up to year five and the total of the lease commitments 
after year five (see chapter 2).  
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assumptions on the division of lease payments for situations where the obligations 
for years two through five are summed (RJ292 and IAS17). With respect to the 
lease obligations after year five, the latter part of the remaining-life formula is used 
to calculate the minimum lease payments for years 6 until the end of the remaining 
life. For t > 5, the minimum annual lease payments (CFt) are 
 
5RL
CFCF 3−=
=
ILW
e
t   (12) 
As Beattie et al. analysed UK companies with SSAP 21 disclosure, they use the next 
year’s operating-lease commitments and divide these into the three expiry 
categories by using the remaining lives derived from the US disclosure. This results 
in three different annuities (for each lease-expiry category), each with a different 
base remaining life (see Table 4). For example, for lease-expiry category 3 (leases 
expiring after year five), Beattie et al. assume a remaining life of sixteen years for 
the category: ‘land and building’ and seven years for the category: ‘other’. This 
analysis, however, is based on annuities payments derived from next year’s 
operating-lease commitments. This is therefore not applicable to companies 
disclosing according to IAS17. From the article of Beattie et al. it appears that they 
use the equal division of lease payments as in equation (12 ) also for the US dataset.  
 
Ely assumes a continuous process of lease commitments over the total life of the 
lease portfolio. She assumes a pattern of decreasing lease payments. The minimum 
lease payments after year 5 for year t (thus t>5) are calculated as follows: 
 )4TL)(5TL(
CF*2*))1(TL(CF 3,5 −−−−=
=
>
e
Elyt t
 (13) 
This equation results in a decreasing pattern of lease commitments compared to the 
equal division of lease payments used by Imhoff et al. and Beattie et al. This study 
adopts the equal division of lease payments, as used by Imhoff et al., Beattie et al. 
and UBSWarburg. 
 
4.5.4 Capitalised lease liability (PVOL) 
Ultimately, the main purpose of the capitalisation approaches is to estimate an on-
balance equivalent of the operating-lease commitments (see also section 4.2). Table 
4.6 summarises the calculations of the different approaches. 
 
Table 4.6 Capitalised lease liability (PVOL) 
CAPITALISATION 
APPROACH CAPITALISED LEASE LIABILITY (PVOL) 
Multiple methods  
8-times rent 
1CF*constantPVOL =  
UBSWarburg 
1CF*multiplePVOL =  
Multiple Ely 
1CF*multiplePVOL =  
Present-Value methods  
Imhoff, Lipe and Wright ∑
= +=
n
t
t
t
i1 )1(
CFPVOL  
Beattie, Edwards and Goodacre 
∑
= ⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
⎡
+−=
3
1
,
,1
)1(
11
*PVOL
e
eRLbase
e i
iCF
 for SSAP21 disclosures. 
 (as Imhoff  et al. for IAS17 disclosures)  
PV Ely ∑
= +=
n
t
t
t
Ely i1 )1(
CFPVOL  
This study As Imhoff  et al. 
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Multiple methods 
The multiple methods multiply the annual lease payment, the next year’s lease 
obligation, with a multiple that can be either a constant or a multiple derived from 
a formula. The capitalised lease liability (PVOL) is therefore calculated according to 
equation (14): 
 1CF*mPVOL ultiple=  (14) 
Present-value methods 
The present-value methods all calculate the capitalised lease liability (PVOL) by 
discounting the future obligations. The differences mainly occur from the 
assumptions made on the implicit interest rate, the remaining- and total life and 
the division of lease payment. Furthermore a difference arises from the different 
way of disclosure between FAS13 (Imhoff et al. and Ely) and SSAP21 (Beattie et 
al.). For FAS13 (and IAS17 or RJ292) the lease commitments can be discounted 
using a present-value formula for different cash flows on different timings. Under 
SSAP 21 the disclosed lease obligations can be split into three annuities (for each 
lease-expiry period) with three different remaining lives, for which the present 
value can be calculated using the present-value formula for annuities. 
 
Using the implicit interest rate and the annualised lease obligations, Imhoff et al. 
(1991) calculate the capitalised operating-lease liability as follows. 
 
  ∑
= +=
n
t
t
t
ILW i1 )1(
CFPVOL  (15) 
 
The present value of the three annuities as used by Beattie et al. is as follows: 
 
  ∑
=
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
⎡
+−= 3
1
,
,1
)1(
11
*PVOL
e
eRLbase
eBEG i
iCF  (16) 
In this equation, CF1,e is next year’s annual lease payment disclosed under SSAP21, 
divided into the lease-expiry periods (e). For example, CF1,1 is the part of next year’s 
lease payment that expires in the next year; the remaining life is one year. It may 
be assumed that if the lease commitments were not disclosed as an annuity (as in 
IAS17), Beattie et al. would have used the same equation as Imhoff et al. To 
calculate PVOL, Ely uses the same formula as Imhoff et al. (1991), the difference 
arising from the calculations of cash flows after year five (see above). Also, Ely 
assumes that the company enters into new leases every year and that the value of 
these leases is always the same, PVOL0: 
 
∑
= +=
n
t
t
t
Ely i1 )1(
CFPVOL
 (17) 
This study also adopts a present-value approach because it best captures the 
differences in the timing of the future lease commitments and it deducts the 
interest part of these commitments. This is essential to make the amount 
comparable to the amount capitalised on the balance sheet for other financing forms 
such as non-leasing debt and financial leases. Since Imhoff et al., Beattie et al. and 
this study do not differ in the division of the lease payments after year five and in 
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the total remaining life (the difference lies within the calculation of the (weighted) 
remaining life), PVOL is for these three methods the same. 
 
4.5.5 Capitalised lease asset (PVA and AP) 
The capitalised lease liability (PVOL) be capitalised on the balance sheet just like 
other long-term liabilities, and some financial ratios will be adjusted accordingly. 
However, attached to the liability of the lease, the leased asset should also be 
capitalised on the asset side of the balance sheet. This capitalised leased asset 
(PVA) gets less attention than the capitalised lease liability (PVOL). Some of the 
methods even do not mention the adjustment of the leases asset on the balance 
sheet, and it may be assumed that the capitalised leased asset is equal to the 
capitalised leased liability. Table 4.7 summarises the assumptions of the 
capitalisation approaches to estimate the capitalised leased asset (PVA). 
 
Table 4.7 Capitalised leased asset (PVA) 
CAPITALISATION 
APPROACH CAPITALISED LEASED ASSET (PVA) 
Multiple methods  
8-times rent PVA =PVOL 
UBSWarburg PVA =PVOL 
Multiple Ely See below 
Present-Value methods  
Imhoff, Lipe and Wright 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +−
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +−
==
i
i
i
i
AP
RL
TL
))1(1(1*TL
))1(1(1*RL
UL
UA
, PVA = AP * PVOL 
Beattie, Edwards and Goodacre As Imhoff et al. 
PV Ely 
∑
=
−+−
+−−= TL
t
tTL
TL
Ely
i
i
1
)()1(
11
)1(
11
*
2
1TLAP
, PVA =AP * PVOL  
This study As Imhoff et al. 
 
Multiple methods 
None of the multiple methods describes how the leased asset should be capitalised. 
Therefore, the capitalised lease asset (PVA) is assumed to be equal to the 
capitalised lease liability. 
 PVOLPVA =  (18) 
Present-value methods 
Imhoff et al. (1991) do not limit their study to the effects on the liability side of the 
balance sheet when capitalising operating leases, but also explore the effects on the 
asset side. They estimated the associated unrecorded asset (PVA), in order to fully 
address the overall balance-sheet effects of constructive capitalisation. The 
unrecorded asset measurement depends on the scheduled lease commitments, the 
interest rate and the remaining life of the lease. 
 
Three assumptions were therefore introduced. First, the assumed depreciation 
method for the leased assets is the straight-line method. Second, it is assumed that 
at the inception of the leases both the unrecorded asset and the unrecorded liability 
equal 100 percent of the present value of the future lease payment. Third, at the 
end of the lease period both the unrecorded asset and the unrecorded liability equal 
zero. These assumptions are comparable with normal (100%) debt financing based 
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on annuities and a related asset that is depreciated in a straight line. Within the 
first annuity of the loan, the repayment part is smaller than the first depreciation of 
the asset, since interest takes a bigger part in the annuity. At the end of the loan 
and the life of the asset, however, the loan is fully repaid and the asset is fully 
depreciated. This relation is shown in Figure 4.2. 
 
Figure 4.2 The relation between the unrecorded operating-lease asset and the unrecorded operating-lease 
liability (Figure 1 of Imhoff et al. (1991), page 57) 
time
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The difference between the capitalised operating-lease liability (PVOL) and the 
capitalised leased asset (PVA) can be calculated using the asset proportion (AP). 
The AP defines the relation between PVA and PVOL (see equation 19).  
 PVOL*APPVA =  (19) 
Although Imhoff et al. use in their study a fixed AP of 70% in 1991, and 75% in 
1997, it is a function of the interest rate and the remaining- and total life (see 
equation 20).  
 AP =
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−
i
i
i
i
RL
TL
))1(1(1*TL
))1(1(1*RL
 (20) 
Beattie et al. refined Imhoff et al.’s approach in order to take into account the 
company-specific duration of the lease portfolio. Therefore, although they use the 
same formulas (19) and (20) (the basis for Imhoff et al.’s fixed-asset proportion), the 
difference arises from the usage of the weighted remaining- and total life (see 
section 4.5.2).  
 
Also Ely describes that the asset proportion (called leasehold in her study) is a 
function of PVOL. In the appendix she describes the calculation (see equation 17) of 
the asset proportion. As described before, however, Ely uses some specific 
assumptions (interest is 10%, total life is 25 years and entry into new leases occurs 
every year), and therefore the asset proportion can fixed at 0.725. 
 
∑
=
−+−
+−−= TL
t
tTL
TL
Ely
i
i
1
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11
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11
*
2
1TLAP  (21) 
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Equation (21) can be used to calculate the AP of other datasets, using the total life 
and interest rate estimated for that particular dataset. Equation 21 is sensitive to 
these assumptions, however, which will lead to an AP of more than 100% when the 
interest rate is high and total life is low.  
 
In contrast to the fixed-asset proportion used by Imhoff et al., this study uses 
equations (19) and (20) for each company, to enable an individual calculation for 
each company based on the respective difference between remaining- and total life 
However, in contrast to Imhoff et al. (who use the full remaining life in equation 
(20)), but in line with Beattie et al., this study uses the weighted remaining life and 
total life. This again best captures the difference between the differences in lease 
maturities between companies with long- or short-term leases. Since the weighted 
remaining- and total lives of this study’s approach differ from those of Beattie et al., 
all three studies in the end differ in the calculated asset proportion (AP) and the 
related capitalised leased asset (PVA). Since the capitalised lease liability (PVOL) of 
these three studies is equal, the major differences come from the calculation of the 
leased asset and the depreciation charge derived thereof (see the next section). 
  
4.5.6  (Indirect) impact on other accounting variables  
Equity and deferred tax liability 
The differences between the methods of the capitalised lease liability and leased 
asset, PVOL and PVA, have an impact on other accounting variables. The impact on 
equity and net income is addressed in this section and summarised in Table 4.8.  
Table 4.8 Impact on equity and net income 
CAPITALISATION 
APPROACH EQUITY NET INCOME 
Multiple methods   
8-times rent No change No change 
UBSWarburg No change 
)PVOL*
RL
PVOLCF(*)t1(NetIncome 1 i−−−+  
Multiple Ely No change See PV Ely 
Present-Value methods   
Imhoff, Lipe and Wright Equity = (1-t) * (PVOL- PVA) )PVOL*
RL
PVACF(*)t1(NetIncome 1 i−−−+  
Beattie, Edwards and Goodacre As Imhoff et al. 
PVOL*
 RLweighted
PVACF(*)1(NetIncome 1 it −−−+
PV Ely No change  No change in net income, only in earnings before 
interest and tax: PVOL*EBITEBIT ipost +=  
This study As Imhoff et al. )PVOL**CF(*)1(  NetIncome 11 iPVAwt −−−+
 
The impact on equity follows from the difference between the capitalised lease 
liability and lease asset, PVOL and PVA. This is therefore only applicable to the 
present-value methods. Although Ely assumes PVA is not equal to PVOL, she only 
adjusts debt and not equity in the calculation of the debt-equity ratio. The other 
approaches do adjust equity. Since PVOL always exceeds PVA, this will negatively 
affect equity. However, due to the existence of taxes, some part of the difference 
between the PVOL and PVA will also have an impact on the deferred tax liability on 
the balance sheet. Imhoff et al. use the following equation (which is also adopted by 
Beattie et al. and in this study) to adjust equity: 
 
 )PVAPVOL(*)1(Equity −−= t  (22) 
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Net income 
Multiple methods 
The 8-times-rent method focuses on the capitalised lease liability and ignores the 
other effects of lease capitalisation, including the impact on net income. 
UBSWarburg focuses on three adjustments relating to the income statement, 
opposed to adjustments to the balance sheet. The three adjustments are made to the 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation (“EBITDA”), to the 
earnings before interest and taxes (“EBIT”) and to net income. UBSWarburg 
maintains that these adjustments would improve the comparability of ROCE 
(return-on-capital-employed), leverage and other book ratios. Net income is adjusted 
according to the following equation: 
 )PVOL*
RL
PVOLCF(*)t1(NetIncomeNetIncome 1 ipost −−−+=  (23) 
Present-value methods 
Imhoff et al. (1991) only sketch the effect of capitalisation on net income. However, 
the underlying assumption of Figure 4.2 (the difference between amortisation and 
depreciation) also affects net income. The annual lease payments of operating leases 
are fully deductible from pre-tax income, whereas interest and depreciation can be 
deducted for capitalised lease obligations. Figure 4.2 showed that depreciation and 
interest in the early years of the asset exceed the annual lease payments (on 
annuity bases). This relationship is reversed in the last years of the lease term. The 
effects on net income and operating income were the purpose of the enhanced 1997 
version of the 1991 article. In 1997, they examine the effects of operating leases on 
return on assets, return on equity, price-to-book ratio and the price-earnings ratio. 
The net-income effect is calculated by adding the tax impact of rent expenses to net 
income, and deducting the tax impact of depreciation and interest expenses.  
 
The formula of Imhoff et al. to adjust net income is as follows: 
 )PVOL*
RL
PVACF(*)t1(NetIncomeNetIncome 1 ipost −−−+=  (24) 
 
This is identical to UBSWarburg’s approach, except that Imhoff et al. calculated 
separately the capitalised lease asset (PVA), which is depreciated over time.  
 
Beattie et al. calculate the effect on net income, making the same adjustments as 
Imhoff et al. (1991) and UBSWarburg (see equation 24). When Beattie et al. deduct 
the annual straight-line depreciation of the capitalised asset, we must assume that 
they use the weighted average of the remaining life instead of the total remaining 
life, to include different weights on each lease-expiry category. We therefore follow 
their assumption that companies with a heavy weight on the first lease-expiry 
category (leases expiring within one year) would depreciate faster than those with a 
heavy weight on the last lease-expiry category (leases expiring after year five).  
 
 )PVOL*
 RLweighted
PVACF(*)1(NetIncomeNetIncome 1 itpost −−−+=  (25) 
Ely does not adjust net income, but only the earnings before interest and tax 
(EBIT). Although she assumes the PVA not to be equal to PVOL, she does not 
differentiate between repayment and depreciation. Net income therefore does not 
change in her study. Ely does adjust earnings before interest (EBIT) by adding the 
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interest part of the lease rental. Since Ely assumes a fixed interest rate of 10%, the 
interest part can simply be calculated as 10% times PVOL. 
 
 PVOL*EBITEBIT ipost +=  (26) 
Ely thus calculates the return on assets (ROA), which is one of the explanatory 
variables in her study, using EBIT instead of net income. 
 
In this study, PVA is depreciated using the weights of each lease-expiry category. 
Imhoff et al. fully ignore the expiry pattern of the lease portfolio, and depreciate the 
assets in a straight line over the total remaining life. The weighted remaining life 
as used by Beattie refines the depreciation charge incorporated in the annual lease 
payment. This improvement on the Imhoff method can be explained as follows: 
imagine company A, with a lease portfolio consisting of many short-term leases 
(remaining life two years; cars, for example). However, company A also has one 
long-term lease (remaining life fifteen years; a building, for example) in its portfolio. 
If the remaining life is not weighted, then all assets are depreciated using the 
fifteen-year term; by weighting the remaining life, we bring this more in line with 
the composition of the portfolio.  
 
However, the disadvantage of the Beattie et al. approach using a weighted average 
remaining life is that the assets will be fully depreciated before the total remaining 
life has ended. Therefore, this study allows the leased assets to be depreciated using 
the weights of the different lease-expiry categories, instead of a weighted remaining 
life. This will follow more accurately the remaining lives of all assets in the lease 
portfolio. Net income in this study will therefore be adjusted according to equation 
(27). The weights are calculated as shown in equation (10). 
 
 )PVOL**CF(*)1(NetIncomeNetIncome 11 iPVAwtpost −−−+=  (27) 
Using a simplified example, Figure 4.3 illustrates the differences between this 
study and the approaches of Imhoff et al. and Beattie et al..  
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Figure 4.3 Differences in depreciation between this study and those of Imhoff et al. and Beattie et al. 
This figure shows the possible disclosure in the financial statements of a lease portfolio of which the remaining 
commitments expire as follows: 50% expires in the first year and the remaining 50% expire in equal parts during 
years 2 through 7. The remaining life is therefore seven years, the original total life is unknown. The present value 
of the lease commitments (PVOL) is for all three methods the same (assumed to be 100). When PVOL is calculated 
at a certain moment in time (here t=0), the lease portfolio has already passed some of the total life, and the 
corresponding present value of the leased asset (PVA) at that moment is assumed to be 80% of PVOL for all 
methods. Imhoff et al. depreciate in a straight line over the total remaining life of the asset, resulting in a PVA that is 
higher than PVOL as from year 1. Beattie et al. depreciate in a straight line over the weighted remaining life, which 
results in a fully depreciated asset after year 3, since some part of the asset is still leased and in use. This study 
depreciates the asset following the same pattern as the lease repayment schedule, resulting in a PVA that follows the 
expiry of the lease.  
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As described before, PVOL is the same for these approaches. If we assume that the 
leased asset is also equally set at 80% of PVOL for these three studies (see the 
description of PVA in section 4.5.5), then the three studies have the same starting 
point. However, to arrive at an estimate of an adjustment of net income, we must 
estimate the depreciation charge. The method of Imhoff et al. depreciates the leased 
assets over a straight line until the end of the remaining life, resulting in a correct 
assessment of depreciation duration. The method, however, ignores the real expiry 
of the leases and the related assets, which results in an underestimated 
depreciation charge in the first year. Moreover, the difference between the 
repayment part of the lease liability and the depreciation charge of the leased asset 
is too high, which results in a positive effect on net income that is also too high. 
 
Beattie et al. (1998) do make an adjustment that weights the duration of the lease 
and the related asset, but the asset is still linearly depreciated, resulting in a fully 
depreciated leased-asset portfolio before the remaining life has actually ended. As 
shown in Figure 4.3, this increases the depreciation charge in the net-income 
adjustment, but still underestimates the depreciation charge of the first year. 
Therefore, to calculate the depreciation charge in this study, we not only depreciate 
the leased assets over the full remaining life of the assets (as Imhoff et al.), but also 
take into consideration the real expiry pattern of the leases and the related assets 
(as Beattie et al.) It is important to realise that the capitalisation of the lease 
commitments concerns several assets in one lease portfolio. If only one leased asset 
was under consideration, it could be linearly depreciated. In the annual report, 
however, information is available only for the entire lease portfolio. By weighting 
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the depreciation with the expiry pattern of all leases in the portfolio, we follow more 
accurately the duration of the lease liabilities. Appendix 4.I shows how the three 
approaches differ, using the Royal Dutch KPN’s (“KPN”) 2004 annual report. 
4.6 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter described and discussed the capitalisation of operating leases. The 
purpose of operating-lease capitalisation is to estimate an on-balance equivalent as 
if the operating lease had been treated as a financial lease or any other form of on-
balance debt from its inception. This should improve comparability between 
companies with and without leases.  
 
Although in the finance literature a consensus has been reached in the theoretical 
valuation of operating leases, this valuation is too abstract to use with the 
information available in practice (section 4.3 described the model of Myers, Dill and 
Bautista (1976)). The most important differences between theory and practice are 
first, the valuation of one lease at inception of the lease (theory) versus an entire 
lease portfolio that has expired already for some part (practice), and second, the 
availability of variables, such as the discount rate or future annual lease payments, 
which are essential for the calculations.  
 
Section 4.4 divided the seven different capitalisation approaches into the more 
simplistic multiple methods and present-value methods. Multiple methods consider 
only the next-year annual payment and are therefore more rigid than the present-
value methods, which consider all future lease commitments. Multiple approaches 
may not have a theoretical background; since analysts and companies use them in 
practice45, however, they will be included in the empirical test of chapter 5. 
 
Present-value approaches are more in line with the theoretical model of Myers, Dill 
and Bautista (1976). The future lease commitments are divided over future 
calendar years and are discounted using a(n) (estimated) discount rate. The method 
of Ely (1995) was the most rigid of these methods because she does not look at the 
lease expiry of individual companies, but fixes this at 25 years for all companies. 
She also assumes the lease portfolio to be the same each year, which means that the 
estimation of the remaining life is not necessary. Imhoff, Lipe and Wright (1991) 
developed a lease-capitalisation approach based on present values, which was the 
basis for the two remaining present-value approaches discussed in this chapter: 
that of Beattie, Edwards and Goodacre (1998), and that of this study. Beattie et al. 
improved Imhoff et al.’s approach by introducing the weights of each lease-expiry 
category to calculate a weighted remaining- and total life, and by taking into 
account the difference between the asset categories ‘land and building’ and ‘other’.  
 
This study enhances the approaches of Imhoff et al. and Beattie et al. with respect 
to the weights of the different lease-expiry categories. The difference was described 
in section 4.5, and illustrated in Figure 4.3. These weights were calculated for each 
individual company (in contrast to Beattie et al., which used base estimates), and 
have also been used in the calculation of the capitalised leased asset and the 
depreciation part comprised in the lease commitments. This especially has 
consequences for the impact in net income of the capitalisation of operating leases. 
Since Imhoff et al. and Beattie et al. over- or underestimate the depreciation charge 
                                                          
45 See Unilever’s 2004 annual report 
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of the leased asset in the adjustment in net income, these approaches are expected 
to show a bigger impact on net income, as opposed to this study, where the 
depreciation charge of the leased asset follows the same expiry pattern as the 
repayment of the lease liability. This is an improvement of the existing lease-
capitalisation approaches. 
 
The next chapter calculates the impact on key financial ratios using the seven 
lease-capitalisation approaches. These results will be used to address the issue of 
the decision usefulness of the required operating-lease disclosures. 
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Appendix 4.I Differences in operating-lease capitalisation approaches 
The 2004 annual report of Royal Dutch KPN (“KPN”) serves as an example for the 
differences in the lease-capitalisation approaches. This example was chosen for two 
reasons. First, KPN discloses nothing more and nothing less than the minimum 
required by RJ 292 and/or IAS 17. The operating-lease obligations are disclosed for 
each of the three lease-expiry categories e1,, e2 and e3, expiring within one year, 
between one- and five years, and beyond five years. Second, KPN has total nominal 
operating leases obligations of 2,224 million Euros, which is in nominal terms 10% 
of their total assets (21,519 million Euro). This is a relatively high lease propensity, 
but not exceptional for Dutch listed companies. 
 
The financial situation of KPN is showns below, including the disclosures of the 
operating-lease commitments and the thereof calculated weight per lease-expiry 
category. 
 
 KPN 2004 financial statement data and leasing footnote  
 
In million Euros 
 2004 
Balance Sheet  
Operating-lease footnote (p. 166, annual report 
2004) 
Total assets 21,519 Lease-expiry category 
Total debt 9,442 e CFe 
Long-term debt 7,792 1 324 
Equity 6,821 2 931 
Income Statement  3 969 
Net sales 11,731 Total 2,224 
EBIT 2,542   
Net income 1,511   
  Weights per lease-expiry category 
Financial Ratios  e weight 
Return on assets 7.0% 1 0.15 
EBIT/TA 11.8% 2 0.42 
Total debt to total assets 0.44 3 0.44 
Long-term debt to capital employed 0.53  1.00 
Total debt to equity 1.38   
 
The above shows that the calculated weights for each lease-expiry category are 
respectively 0.15, 0.42 and 0.55. Thus, 15% of the lease liability (PVOL) expires 
next year. I am of the opinion that also 15% of the leased assets (PVA) should be 
depreciated next year. Both Imhoff et al. and Beattie et al. depreciated in a straight 
line (using respectively the total remaining life and the weighted remaining life). 
The differences this caused in the depreciation charge of the leased assets is shown 
below, for all seven approaches the differences in capitalisation results are 
presented. The subsequent change in five financial ratios is shown for illustrative 
purposes.  
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Capitalisation results of seven different approaches 
See for abbreviations and calculations chapter 4. The adjustments to the financial ratios are described in chapter 5. 
CAPITALISATION RESULTS 8-rent UBS 
Warburg 
Multiple- 
Ely 
ILW BEG PV 
-ELY 
This study 
multiple  8.0 3.9 8.1 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
PVOL  2,592 1,267 2,624 1,677 1,677 1,557 1,677 
RL  n/a 10.0 n/a 10.0 10.0 n/a 10 
TL  n/a n/a 25 20.0 n/a 25 20 
wRL  n/a 4.6 n/a n/a 6.4 n/a 5.8 
wTL  n/a n/a n/a n/a 9.9 n/a 11.5 
AP  n/a n/a n/a 0.78 0.91 0.48 0.86 
PVA  2,592 1,267 2,624 1,306 1,528 747 1,438 
         
Depreciation next year n/a 276 n/a 131 238 n/a 209 
Interest  156 76 157 101 101 93 101 
Effect on net income n/a -18 n/a 60 -10 n/a 9 
Effect on EBIT n/a 248 167 223 223 231 223 
IMPACT ON RATIOS reported 8-rent UBS- 
Warburg 
Multiple- 
Ely 
ILW BEG PV- 
ELY 
This study 
ROA 7.02% 6.27% 6.55% 6.26% 6.88% 6.51% 6.79% 6.62% 
EBITTA 11.81% 10.54% 12.24% 11.22% 12.12% 12.00% 12.45% 12.05% 
TDTA 0.44 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.49 0.48 0.49 0.48 
LTDCE 0.53 0.61 0.58 0.60 0.59 0.58 0.60 0.59 
TDE 1.38 1.76 1.57 1.77 1.69 1.65 1.75 1.67 
         
change in ROA -10.8% -6.7% -10.9% -2.0% -7.2% -3.4% -5.7% 
change in EBITTA -10.8% 3.7% -5.0% 2.6% 1.6% 5.4% 2.0% 
change in TDTA 13.8% 7.1% 13.9% 11.0% 9.9% 12.6% 10.4% 
change in LTDCE 14.5% 8.5% 13.3% 10.6% 9.7% 12.1% 10.1% 
change in TDE 27.5% 13.4% 27.8% 22.1% 19.4% 26.2% 20.5% 
 
PVOL of the leases of KPN vary from a maximum of 2,642 million Euro for the 
multiple method of Ely to a minimum of 1,267 million Euro for the multiple method 
of UBSWarburg. Due to the calculation of an average remaining life, USBWarburg’s 
multiple is a more cautious measure than that of Ely and the 8-rent method. 
However, due to the fact that for KPN the next annual payment is rather low as 
compared to the expiries after year 1 (see the weights of each expiry category) 
UBSWarburg in this case underestimates the real liability.  
 
As described in this chapter, due to the identical calculations PVOL is the same for 
Imhoff et al., Beattie et al. and this study. Due to the high multiplier, the 8-rent 
method results in a rather high PVOL. The two methods of Ely differ because both 
ignore the schedule of lease payments of KPN, and Ely assumes for all leases a 
fixed maturity of 25 years. Therefore, the multiple of Ely is 8.1 (based on an interest 
rate of 6% and a total life of 25 years), resulting in a high PVOL. On the other hand, 
due to the distribution of the future commitments over a period of 25 years, the 
present value is lower than for the other approaches that do take into account the 
payment schedule. These results show already the rigidity of Ely’s approach in 
assuming a fixed maturity for all leases in the portfolio for all companies and 
ignoring the remaining life of the leases46.  
                                                          
46 While a maturity of 25 years seems long I will adjust the 25 years to a more reasonable average for companies in 
the Netherlands in the empirical investigation in chapter 5. This follows the reasoning of Ely who also took a 
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The weighted remaining- and total lives as calculated by Beattie et al. and using my 
approach express the differences in weights of each lease-expiry category. Beattie et 
al. have the disadvantage of needing their generalised base estimates for all lease 
portfolios of all companies in order to calculate the weighted remaining- and total 
lives. This is a result of the UK SSAP21 disclosure of an annuity instead of the 
disclosure of the total commitments as required under IAS17 and RJ292. Therefore, 
the weights as used in this study’s approach take greater account of the individual 
remaining lives and total lives of each company. With regard to KPN, this has only 
a limited effect on the calculation of the asset proportion— for Beattie  et al. and for 
this study. 
 
A closer look at the impact on the financial ratios and the difference between the 
approaches reveals that the relative change is the highest for the ratios based on 
the balance sheet, using some measure of debt.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
reasonable average looking at the entire sample. No adjustments, however, will be made to the assumption of Ely to 
fix the maturity for the entire sample. 
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CHAPTER 5 EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE USEFULNESS OF 
OPERATING-LEASE DISCLOSURES 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter rounds off Part II of this thesis, which questions whether the required 
operating-lease disclosures are useful to the individual user of the financial 
statements. Chapter 3 described the general, qualitative criteria of decision 
usefulness as defined by several accounting regulators. These criteria were also 
described with respect to operating leases. Based on that analysis, the study 
formulated five research questions to investigate whether the requirements of 
operating-lease disclosures satisfy the criteria described. Since the estimation of an 
on-balance equivalent of operating leases (capitalisation) is an important aspect of 
the decision usefulness of operating-lease disclosures, this estimation was described 
separately in chapter 4. Different capitalisation approaches are available, and the 
choice of the capitalisation approach might influence the results of the 
capitalisation.  
 
Chapter 5 now turns to test empirically the criteria for decision usefulness of 
operating-lease disclosures using the information available in the financial 
statements of non-financial Dutch listed companies during the period 2000-2004. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 describes the sample and data 
collection. Section 5.3 describes the methodology and the difficulties arising when 
financial ratios are investigated empirically. The results appear in section 5.4, 
followed by the conclusions in section 5.5. 
 
5.2 Sample and data collection 
Companies 
The sample consists of all non-financial listed companies at the Amsterdam Stock 
Exchange during the period 2000-2004. Financial institutions are excluded because 
they often act both as lessee and lessor (since leasing is a financial product). Nine 
companies were eliminated due to lack of data, and five others due to the reporting 
year ending on a date other than December 31st (this has consequences for data 
collection and analysis). The final sample consists of 584 firm-year observations.  
 
Lease data 
The operating-lease data were manually extracted from the footnotes in the 
financial statements of the companies in the sample for the period 2000-2004. As 
described before, no financial database exists that offers sufficient availability of 
operating-lease data. 
 
Financial ratios 
The study investigates the impact on several financial ratios once operating-lease 
commitments have been capitalised. Table 5.1 shows the different ratios analysed 
in this study, and the impact of the lease capitalisation on each particular ratio. The 
choice for these ratios follows from the previous studies on the impact of operating-
lease capitalisation on facilitating comparison. Table 5.1 also shows the expected 
signs of the operating-lease capitalisation. 
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Table 5.1 Definitions of financial ratios analysed  
PVA is the capitalised leased asset, PVOL is the capitalised lease liability, PV(CF1) is the present value of next 
year’s annual lease payment, i is the applicable interest rate, EBIT is earnings before interest and  tax, and TA is 
total assets. 
FINANCIAL RATIOS BEFORE- CAPITALISATION 
AFTER- 
CAPITALISATION SIGN 
PROFITABILITY    
Net profit margin NPM Profit after tax 
Total sales 
Profit after tax + change in Net Income 
Total sales 
+/- 
Return on equity ROE Profit after tax 
Total share capital and reserves 
Profit after tax+ change in Net Income 
Total share capital and reserves +change Equity 
+/- 
Return on assets ROA Profit after tax 
Total assets 
Profit after tax + change in Net Income 
Total assets +PVA 
+/- 
EBIT/TA EBIT/TA Profit before tax and interest 
Total assets 
Profit before tax and interest + i* PVOL 
Total assets + PVA 
- 
Return on capital 
employed 
ROCE Profit after tax 
Total capital employed 
Profit after tax+ change in Net Income 
Total capital employed + PVOL-PV(CF1) 
+/- 
LEVERAGE     
Long-term debt to 
capital employed 
LTDCE Long-term debt 
Total capital employed 
Long-term debt + PVOL-PV(CF1) 
Total capital employed + PVOL-PV(CF1) 
+ 
Total debt-asset ratio TDTA Total debt 
Total assets 
Total debt + PVOL 
Total assets + PVA 
+ 
Total debt-equity ratio TDE Total debt 
Total share capital and reserves 
Total debt + PVOL 
Total share capital and reserves +change in Equity 
+ 
Interest cover IC Profit before tax and interest 
Interest 
Profit before tax and interest + i*PVOL 
Interest + i*PVOL 
+ 
LIQUIDITY     
Current ratio CR Current assets 
Current liabilities 
Current assets  
Current liabilities + PV(CF1) 
- 
TURNOVER     
Total asset turnover AT Sales 
Total assets 
Sales 
Total assets + PVA 
- 
 
The impact on net income may be positive or negative for individual companies, 
depending on the remaining life of the lease portfolio and the weights of each lease-
expiry category. The signs of the financial ratios that have net income in the 
numerator may therefore be either positive or negative. 
 
Interest rate 
The implicit interest rate used should ideally be the interest rate applicable to 
finance leases or the long-term debt for each individual company, “the incremental 
borrowing rate” (see section 4.5.1, and also IAS17.3, RJ292.102). The long-term 
borrowing rate was extracted manually from the financial statements of all 
companies. The interest rate for financial leases was available for only a few 
companies, also because only a few companies disclose financial leases (for example, 
36 companies disclose financial leases, as opposed to 103 disclosing operating leases 
in 2004; see section 2.6). The interest rate for other forms of debt was available for 
approximately 98 companies— although the variance between the interest rates is 
very large. The minimum interest rate disclosed was 2.4% (Pink Roccade) and the 
maximum was 15% (Alanheri). This indicates that the interest rates disclosed are 
probably not a reasonable estimate of the credit risk of the company and would 
therefore not reflect the alternative borrowing rate of these companies. Using these 
rates would distort the results, since differences in the capitalisation results do not 
come from differences in credit risk but from an unreliable underlying assumption.  
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An alternative could have been to link on an objective basis the interest rate to the 
ratings of the individual companies, as suggested by Damodaran (2001). 
Damodaran uses a model where the spread above long-term government bonds 
depends on the rating issued by Standard and Poor’s. This would solve the problem 
of the large variances that might be caused by aspects other than the credit risk of a 
company. This also was not applicable here, however, since approximately only 
twenty companies in the sample have a rating from either Moody’s or Standard and 
Poor’s. 
 
Therefore, to be able to compare the methods and the differences arising from these 
methods without the influence of different interest rates, this study uses a fixed 
interest rate for all approaches and all companies. This is in line with the studies of 
Ely (1995), Imhoff et al. (1991) and Beattie et al. (1998), for example, who all used a 
fixed rate of 10%. Nowadays, a discount rate of 10% would be inappropriate, since 
interest rates have decreased since the ‘90s. For example, in the Netherlands the 
average interest rate charged on a ten-year loan in 1991 was 8.74%, while in 2003 
this was 4.12% (source:www.statistics.dnb.nl). Another example is the decrease in 
the mean of the Finance House Base rate as used by Beattie et al. The mean for the 
six-year period 1998-2004 was 5.4%, compared to the 10% mean for the six-year 
period 1988-1994 used in their study (source: www.fla.org.uk). The average interest 
rate in 2003 of the 98 companies available in the total sample is 5.8% (median: 
5.6%). This is also a reasonable estimate of the long-term debt rate in the 
Netherlands during the research period. The interest rate is therefore fixed at 6% 
for all companies during the entire research period. The sensitivity to this 
assumption will be tested by varying the interest rate by +/- 2%. 
 
5.3 Methodology 
5.3.1 Research questions related to the use of the sample 
This chapter empirically tests different criteria of decision usefulness. Five research 
questions were formulated in chapter 3. These are repeated in Table 5.2, together 
with the requirements that the operating-lease information should fulfil in order to 
be relevant (RQ1 and 4), neutral (RQ2), complete (RQ3) or comparable (RQ4 and 5). 
The appropriate part of the sample is included in Table 5.2.  
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Table 5.2 Research questions 
SECTION RESEARCH QUESTION REQUIREMENTS SAMPLE 
RELEVANCE   
5.4.3 1 Are the amounts material and 
thus relevant?  
 
Materiality is tested by three different tests 
(see Table 3.1): 
1) PVOL exceeds 5% of total assets 
2) PVOL exceeds 25% of long-term debt 
3) Annual lease payment (AP) exceeds 
20% of total capital costs 
Companies for which 
PVOL or AP is available, 
including the companies 
that disclose PVOL 
themselves as well as 
non-leasing companies 
(PVOL=0) 
RELIABILITY   
5.4.1 2 Do companies with operating 
leases comply with the footnote 
disclosure rules? (neutrality) 
 
Operating-lease disclosures are neutral if all 
companies disclose according to 
RJ292/IAS17, since the standard leaves no 
room for different ways of presentation. 
 
All companies in sample 
5.4.4 3 Is the information required by 
the lease-accounting standard 
sufficient to permit informed 
users to estimate the 
consequences of operating 
leases? (completeness) 
 
Because financial statement users must make 
assumptions on interest and remaining life, 
and must choose a capitalisation approach, 
the disclosed information is by definition not 
complete. If PVOL is not sensitive to these 
assumptions, however, the information 
provided is sufficient.  
Companies for which 
PVOL had to be 
calculated, excluding 
companies that disclose 
PVOL themselves and the 
non-leasing companies 
COMPARABILITY   
5.4.5 4 Are key financial ratios 
affected? (comparability and 
materiality) 
 
Material operating-lease commitments are 
likely to change also in a material way the 
financial ratios derived from the balance 
sheet. If these financial ratios change 
significantly, this will threaten both the 
comparability criteria and the relevance 
criterion (material change in ratios used in 
decision-making). 
 
5.4.5 5 Does the capitalisation of 
operating leases change the 
ranking between companies? 
(comparability) 
 
Does it matter for the ranking of the 
companies whether the operating leases are 
either ignored or capitalised? If it does, then 
the information provided should be more 
consistent and complete (reliability) to enable 
the user to capitalise the leases easily. 
 
 
 
 
Companies for which 
PVOL is available, 
including the companies 
that disclose PVOL 
themselves and the non-
leasing companies 
(PVOL=0) 
 
The research questions apply to different parts of the dataset, as shown in Table 
5.2. Research question 1 is only feasible for those companies for which PVOL is 
available (tests one and two), or the annual payment is available (test three). PVOL 
is not available for all companies. Research question 2 analyses for how many 
companies of the total sample the capitalisation of the lease-commitments is 
possible (PVOL is known), and consequently for how many companies PVOL is not 
available. Subsequently, the sensitivity of PVOL to the assumptions or 
capitalisation methods applies, of course, only to those companies for which PVOL 
was calculated. Research question 3 therefore excludes companies that disclose 
PVOL themselves or where PVOL=0 (the non-leasing companies). The PVOL of 
these companies is not sensitive to any of the assumptions and would therefore 
distort the tests. Finally, research questions 4 and 5 include all companies for which 
PVOL is known, even the companies that disclose PVOL themselves and the non-
leasing companies. It can be argued that inclusion of the non-leasing companies 
lowers the impact of lease capitalisation on financial ratios, but inclusion of these 
companies (especially, comparing them based on their ranking) is more reliable. 
Since for the non-leasing companies the financial ratios have not changed, they 
improve, compared to high-leasing companies that were equally ranked before 
capitalisation. The comparison between companies based on their ranking is more 
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reliable than the comparison based on their percentage change. This is described in 
greater detail in the following sub-section, which describes the usage of financial 
ratios in statistical tests. 
 
5.3.2 Comparison of financial ratios 
Several methodological studies (Lev and Sunder (1979), Barnes (1987), Whittington 
(1980), Ionnidis, Peel and Peel (2003), for example) have explored the usage of 
financial ratios in accounting research. Whittington (1980) identifies two uses of 
ratios: normative and positive. The normative use is for the measurement of 
performance in relation with a certain standard. The positive use is in estimating 
an empirical relationship for predictive purposes. The positive use of ratios in 
accounting research will be addressed in chapters 6 and 7, which investigate the 
relationship between company characteristics and operating-lease intensity; 
chapters 8 and 9 investigate the predictive power of operating leases in financial-
distress prediction. The normative use of financial ratios compares a calculated 
ratio with a standard (Whittington (1980)). This comparison leads to a conclusion 
whether the calculated ratio is high or low, compared to the standard. The standard 
may have a theoretical foundation, may be based on the same historical ratio of the 
studied companies, or may be the ratio of another firm for comparison reasons. The 
different statistical models available for the normative (comparison) or positive 
(predictive) use of financial ratio require different statistical properties of the 
underlying data. 
 
While section 5.4 focuses on the comparison of accounting numbers that are either 
adjusted or not for operating-lease commitments, this section is a normative study. 
This chapter compares each financial ratio for each company before- and after-
capitalisation of the operating leases. The comparison can be made using the 
arithmetic mean or the median. Whereas the mean is affected by ‘extreme’ values, 
however, the median is not, as it takes into account only the rank order of the 
observations. Tests based on the variances between the data (mean-test) are 
parametric tests; tests based on the rank order of the observations (median-test) are 
non-parametric tests. Parametric tests are considered to be more powerful because 
they not only take into account the rank order of the observations but also are able 
to calculate the variances. However, a parametric test is only applicable when the 
data satisfy the assumptions on which parametric tests are based: 
1) Interval measurement; the data should have equal intervals; financial 
ratios, which are numerical measures, must have equal intervals in 
order to permit a parametric test to be conducted 
2) Normal distribution; the data should be normally distributed in order 
that the extreme values do not overly influence the test. Distributions 
with extreme values at one end are skewed, and when the distribution 
is substantially skewed (the hypothesis of a normal distribution is 
rejected), a non-parametric test is preferable. Since financial ratios are 
known to have a skewed distribution and often do not have a normal 
distribution (Barnes (1987)), it is therefore very likely that a 
parametric test cannot be conducted. 
3) Homogeneity of variance; the variance of the data should be equally 
distributed. Since the financial ratios are compared for the same 
companies pre- and post capitalisation (paired samples), this 
requirement of homogeneity of variance will probably be met. 
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The difference-tests conducted in this study therefore depend greatly on the 
statistical properties of the data. Figure 5.1 shows which test will be applicable 
when these statistical properties are known (based on figure 11.1 of Burns (2000)). 
 
Figure 5.1 Type of experimental design in hypotheses of differences 
 
ANALYSIS OF 
DIFFERENCE OR 
RELATIONSHIP?
difference between 
before- and after-
capitalisation ratios
difference between
seven after-
capitalisation ratios
relationship between the 
seven post-capitalisation 
ratios
DIFFERENCE RELATIONSHIP
between
subjects
matched
subjects
Parametric Non-parametric
Independent
t-test
Mann-Whitney
Parametric Non-parametric
Paired
t-test
Wilcoxon
Parametric Non-parametric
Pearson
correlation
Spearman
correlation  
 
 
Comparable studies analysing the impact of operating leases use different tests. In 
a study analysing the impact on three ratios for a sample of 80 companies, Imhoff, 
Lipe and Wright (1995) focussed on the medians instead of means because of the 
impact of extreme observations. They therefore used Spearman rank correlations 
instead of the Pearson correlations. Ely (1995) analysed the sensitivities to certain 
assumptions by using both the Pearson and Spearman correlations, but did not 
perform a differences analysis. Beattie et al. (1998) focussed on the differences in 
mean between the pre- and post capitalisation ratios; they only report the results of 
the paired t-test. They did acknowledge, however, the non-normal distribution of 
many ratios (see footnote on p.245), and mentioned that the Wilcoxon non-
parametric test produced results of greater significance. Goodacre (2001) conducted 
a similar study based on the previous Beattie et al. (1998) study (in which Goodacre 
participated); this time, he did focus on the differences in medians and the 
significance according to the Wilcoxon test instead of the paired t-test.  
 
This study presents the results of the differences in both means and medians. 
However, based on the above, the focus will be on the differences in medians. The 
analysis will be completed by showing the results of the impact on some of the 
financial ratios for the individual companies. Although statistical tests are certainly 
valuable in analysing the impact on the entire sample, analysis of the impact on 
individual companies might add insights that are valuable also from an economics 
perspective.  
5.4 Results 
This section presents the results of the empirical analysis. The disclosure of the 
operating leases by the companies in the sample will first be described. Toward that 
end, sub-section 5.4.1 tackles research question 2, which addresses the neutrality of 
the operating-lease disclosures by the companies in the sample. Subsequently, 
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section 5.4.2 describes the capitalisation results of those companies for which the 
PVOL was available. Section 5.4.3 addresses the materiality of the operating-lease 
commitments. The results of the sensitivity tests are presented in section 5.4.4. 
Finally, section 5.4.5 shows the impact of the capitalisation of the operating leases 
on the financial ratios. Starting from section 5.4.4, the companies that did not 
comply with RJ292/IAS17, or did not disclose PVOL themselves, are excluded from 
further analysis because the capitalisation becomes unreliable due to ungrounded 
estimations. 
 
5.4.1 Neutrality 
As described in chapter 2, the financial statements of the companies in the sample 
revealed eight different disclosure formats, of which only three comply with RJ292 
or IAS17. In chapter 2, Table 2.4 showed these eight different formats of operating-
lease disclosure and the informativeness of each format. Table 5.3 presents how the 
companies in the sample used these formats during the research period. Also it 
shows how many companies did not disclose operating leases at all. 
 
Table 5.3 Compliance with RJ292/IAS17 from 2000-2004 
For an example of each disclosure type, see Table 2.4 in chapter 2. 
# Disclosure 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total 
sample 
0 No leases 23 22 15 11 6 77 
1 As FAS13 17 19 20 22 19 97 
2 Less than FAS, more than RJ 1 2 3 4 4 14 
3 As RJ292/IAS17 21 25 35 44 44 169 
4 Present value of leases 5 5 6 5 5 26 
5 Total commitment 15 12 10 6 6 49 
6 Annual payment with  
indication of remaining life 17 15 13 8 8 61 
7 Annual payment 10 11 8 8 4 41 
8 Other  
(combinations of other formats) 9 8 9 11 13 50 
 N= 118 119 119 119 109 584 
 
Table 5.3 allows us to conclude that the number of companies disclosing operating 
leases has increased. In 2000, 23 companies out of 118 did not disclose operating 
leases; in 2004, this decreased to 6 out of 109 companies. Furthermore, the 
disclosure according to at least RJ292/IAS17 (format types one, two and three) for 
the remaining companies with leases increased substantially from 39 out of 95 
(41%) in 2000, to 66 out of 103 (64%) in 2004. This increase is especially 
attributable to companies previously disclosing only the annual payment or the 
lump-sum total commitment. Although this is definitely an improvement of the 
compliance with the lease-accounting standard, it remains indisputable that in 
2004, still 36% of the companies in the sample were not complying with the 
accounting standard.  
 
Figure 5.2 shows that indeed the companies with no operating leases disclosed 
become a small minority (dark grey area) in the sample, and also that the 
companies in compliance increase relatively (light grey area). However, in 2004 still 
33% of the companies of the entire sample (n=109) do not comply (white area) with 
the accounting standards. Relating this number to the companies that disclose 
operating leases (n=103), this is still 36%. For these companies, the capitalisation of 
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the operating-lease commitments cannot be performed, since the necessary 
information is unavailable.  
Figure 5.2 Division of companies in sample in compliance with RJ292/IAS17 
The companies in the sample each year are: 2000: 118; 2001 until 2003:119; 2004:109  
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
No leases disclosed Comply with IAS17 No compliance with IAS17
 
The great number of companies not complying with the accounting standard (which 
leaves no room for misinterpretation) permits us to conclude that although the 
standard itself is neutral, this neutrality is harmed by the lessee companies (and 
their auditors). Moreover, for more than one-third of the companies in the period 
2000-2004, the disclosed operating-lease information, as a consequence of being not 
complete, is neither reliable nor comparable. Furthermore, the analysis of whether 
or not the operating leases of these companies are material remains inconclusive. 
The non-compulsory character of the Dutch accounting regulation until now has 
probably caused compliance with the standard to be of lower priority. Once the two 
new laws with respect to the regulatory supervision of auditors (WTA) and financial 
reporting (WTFV) come into effect (see chapter 2), non-compliance will probably 
decrease— also because the auditors will be held liable for non-compliance47 
(Lückerath (2006)).  
 
Nevertheless, the data until year-end 2004 suggest that the answer to research 
question 2 (Do companies with operating leases comply with the footnote disclosure 
rules?) is that the non-compliance of more than one-third of the companies renders 
the operating-lease information in the financial statements non-neutral. 
 
5.4.2 Capitalisation results 
Since not all companies disclose as required by RJ292/IAS17, it is not possible to 
capitalise the operating-lease commitments for these companies using present-
value approaches. The present value of the lease commitments is therefore 
calculated only for the remaining companies. The results of the capitalisation 
appear in Table 5.4.  
 
                                                          
47 When investigating the involved auditors of the companies that did no comply with RJ292 in 2004, two results 
were striking. First, of the six financial statements not audited by a big four auditing firm (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 
Ernst and Young, KMPG and Deloitte) only one complied with the standard. Second, of the remaining 97 financial 
statements with operating leases and audited by one of the big four auditing firms a 64 complied with the standard. 
However, this majority is caused by especially PWC of which auditing firm only four out of 27 did not comply. 
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Table 5.4 Description of capitalisation results 
Panel A shows the relative usage of operating leases for the entire sample (including the non-leasing companies), 
and for the sample excluding the non-leasing sample. PVOL/TA refers to the capitalised value of the future lease 
commitments divided by total assets (to control for size), PVA/TA refers to the capitalised leased assets divided by 
total assets (before capitalisation). Panel B shows the different weights for each of the three lease-expiry categories 
(lease commitments due within one year, between two- and five years, and after five years). Panel C shows the 
impact of the capitalisation on total debt, total long-term debt, total assets and net income. 
 
EXCLUDING NON-LEASING 
COMPANIES   
INCLUDING NON-LEASING 
COMPANIES 
PANEL A: PVOL and PVA PVOL/TA PVA/TA  PVOL/TA PVA/TA 
N= 302 292  379 369 
mean 17.8% 10.6%  14.2% 8.4% 
median 6.3% 5.5%   4.3% 3.6% 
PANEL B: WEIGHTS PER LEASE-EXPIRY PERIOD    
 < 1 year 1 year < > 5 years > 5 years RL TL 
mean 0.26  0.52 0.23 8 16 
median 0.24  0.52 0.22 7 14 
PANEL C: CHANGE IN TOTAL (LONG-TERM) DEBT, TOTAL ASSETS AND NET INCOME   
Excluding non-leasing companies N Reported After capitalisation % Change  
Total debt 277    t-value/z-value 
mean  1,712,845 2,101,626 22.7% 5.69*** 
median  159,150 231,281 45.3% 14.43*** 
Long-term debt 273     
mean  1,199,513 1,509,328 25.8% 5.49*** 
median  98,579 164,369 66.7% 14.30*** 
Total assets 278     
mean  6,473,178 6,802,590 5.1% 5.89*** 
median  868,083 945,535 8.9% 14.46*** 
Net income 277     
mean  288,007 292,140 1.4% 3.90*** 
median   12,287 13,025 6.0% 12.38*** 
 
Panel A in Table 5.4 shows the capitalised lease liability (PVOL) and the capitalised 
leased asset (PVA), divided by total assets to correct for size differences between 
companies. PVOL/TA and PVA/TA are calculated twice, once excluding the non-
leasing companies and once including them. Of course, excluding the non-leasing 
companies lowers the average impact that the capitalisation has on the balance 
sheet. By presenting both measures, the impact for the entire sample is evident, as 
is the impact the operating leases have for only the leasing companies.  
 
Panel B of Table 5.4 shows the mean- and median values of the lease-expiry 
weights, and the remaining- and total lives of the lease portfolios. The mean and 
median of the weights differ only slightly. From the numbers we can conclude that 
the lease portfolios for the sample consist of approximately 75% of leases expiring 
within the next five years. The average remaining life is seven years, and the 
average total life (assuming that 50% of the lease term has expired) is fourteen 
years. For the companies in the sample, lease portfolios are seldom with a very long 
maturity. These results differ somewhat with those of Ely (1995), who estimated an 
average total life of 25 years of the lease portfolios in her sample of Australian 
companies. The results also differ from those of Beattie et al. (1998), who estimated 
for their UK sample base remaining- and total lives of respectively 16 and 25 years 
for the ‘land and buildings’ category, and seven and ten years for the ‘other assets’ 
category. However, when we assume these categories to be mixed 50:50 for the 
Dutch situation, the average total life of Beattie’s estimates would become 17.5 
CHAPTER 5 
  
126 
years (25 plus 10, divided by 2), which is more in line with the current sample. The 
remaining lives, even when averaged, are definitely shorter in the Netherlands, 
moreover, as in this study the same basic approach in calculating the remaining 
lives is used as Beattie et al. did for the US companies in their sample. 
 
Panel C of Table 5.4 presents the impact on total debt, long-term debt, total assets 
and net income only for those companies for which PVOL could be calculated and 
was not zero. The t- and z-values of the differences in mean and median before- and 
after capitalisation are also presented. All numbers increase significantly at the 
10% level. Concentrating on the changes in the median, it is clear that the highest 
impact is on the leverage of a company, since long-term debt increases by 67% and 
total-debt by 54%. The increase in the median of total asset is 9%, and of net income 
it is 6%. Section 5.4.5 describes how this applies to the financial ratios derived from 
these numbers.  
 
In order to see whether these numbers vary between different industries, Table 5.5 
illustrates the division of the two samples (including and excluding the non-leasing 
companies) over five industries: industrials, consumers, services, information 
technology, and resources.  
 
Table 5.5 Mean and median of PVOL/TA for five industries 
   PVOLTA    
All companies All Industrials Consumer Services IT Resources 
N= 379 143 65 110 50 11 
mean 14.2% 8.3% 4.4% 27.2% 17.5% 4.4% 
median 4.3% 1.8% 2.3% 9.8% 7.4% 3.8% 
       
Excluding non-leasing companies 302 96 51 99 45 11 
mean 17.8% 12.3% 5.6% 30.2% 19.4% 4.4% 
median 6.3% 6.3% 3.0% 10.1% 8.1% 3.8% 
 
The sector with the highest lease commitments is definitely the services sector, 
based on both the mean- and median values. This is closely followed by the IT-
sector. The high proportion of non-leasing companies in the industrials sector 
lowers the mean and median in the total sample. However, the industrial firms that 
disclose leases (excluding the non-leasing companies) seem to lease higher amounts 
than firms in the consumer and resources sectors do. Concerning the determinants 
of lease intensity, chapters 6 and 7 further explore the relation with the industry 
sector. 
 
The difference between the mean and median of PVOL/TA for all companies shows 
the skewed distribution of the relative lease commitments. Although many 
companies do not lease substantial amounts (lowering the median), the companies 
after the median do lease substantially higher amounts, resulting in a higher mean. 
Ignoring the commitments of these companies would probably cause a 
misjudgement of the financial commitments of the individual companies. To 
illustrate this skewed distribution of PVOL/TA, and to show how the high-leasing 
companies influence the mean values, Figure 5.3 shows PVOL/TA in 2004 of the 75 
companies for which PVOL was available. Recall that for the other listed companies 
in 2004 the information was not complete enough to calculate PVOL. Their absence 
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in Figure 5.3 does not mean that these companies might not be high-leasing 
companies. 
 
Figure 5.3 reveals that although for a (small) majority of the companies PVOL/TA is 
less than 5%, the relative operating-lease commitments for the remaining 
companies increase rapidly. The maximum PVOL/TA is calculated for Tie Holdings, 
with a PVOL of 135% of total assets. The numbers two and three (Macintosh:104% 
and Laurus:77%) are rather surprising, considering that these belong to the five 
companies that disclose the present values themselves. An explanation for this may 
be that they are very much aware of their high commitments and do try to avoid a 
too-high capitalisation by other capitalisation approaches.  
 
Section 5.4.3 presents the results with respect to the relevance of the lease 
commitments, based on the materiality of the amounts and the impact this has on 
key financial ratios.  
CHAPTER 5 
 
128 
Figure 5.3 Illustration of PVOL (as a percentage of total assets) for 75 companies in 2004 
(including non-leasing companies and companies disclosing PVOL) 
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5.4.3 Relevance 
Materiality 
To test the materiality of the disclosed operating leases, three materiality tests with 
corresponding threshold values were formulated in chapter 3 (see also Table 3.1). 
The lease commitments are considered to be of a material amount if the capitalised 
lease liability (PVOL) exceeds 5% of total assets (TA), or 25% of long-term debt 
(LTD), or if next year’s annual lease payment exceeds 20% of the total capital costs 
as defined by Sharpe and Nguyen (1995)48. The results of these tests are shown in 
Table 5.6. 
 
Table 5.6 Materiality of operating-lease commitments 
Three materiality tests were conducted. Test I is the percentage of the present value of all future lease payments of 
reported total assets (PVOL/TA) as a materiality measure. The threshold value is 5%. Test II uses the percentage of 
the present value of all future lease payments of reported long-term debt (PVOL/LTD) as a materiality measure. The 
threshold value is 25%. Test III uses the percentage of the annual lease payment to the total costs of capital 
(AP/TCC). The total capital costs are not the weighted average costs of capital, but the costs associated with the use 
of fixed assets (Sharpe and Nguyen (1995, p.278)), and are calculated as the sum of rental commitments, 
depreciation expenses and the opportunity costs of fixed assets (interest times net property, plants and equipment). 
The threshold value is 20%.  
    PVOL/TA>5% PVOL/LTD>25% AP/TCC>20% 
N=  379 321 439 
mean  14.2% 307.5% 27.2% 
1st quartile  0.5% 3.9% 4.3% 
median  4.3% 27.4% 20.7% 
3rd quartile  12.1% 120.9% 45.7% 
Exceeding threshold 172 167 224 
    45% 52% 51% 
 
Although the materiality tests do not show identical results, they are quite similar, 
and it can be concluded that the lease commitments are for many companies of a 
material amount49. The highest scores arose from the second test (PVOL/LTD): at 
least 52% of all observations exceeded the threshold. With the first materiality test, 
(PVOL/TA) 45% of all observations exceeded the threshold. The third test (AP/TCC) 
resulted in 51% of the companies exceeding the threshold. The advantage of this 
test was that more companies were taken into account; the test makes it possible to 
test the materiality for those companies that disclose only the annual commitment 
of next year. Due to the fact that in the total 2000-2004 sample 77 observations 
relate to non-leasing companies and that only six of these observations relate to 
2004, these results are even higher for 2004 (54% exceeds PVOL/TA>5%, 61% 
exceeds PVOL/LTD>25% and 54% exceeds AP/TCC>20%). This demonstrates the 
ever-growing importance of operating leases. 
 
These tests reveal that the operating-lease commitments for the majority of the 
companies account for more than 25% of the companies’ long-term commitments. 
Even using the more cautious materiality tests, for 45% of the companies the 
operating leases are still of a material amount. Also, considering the exponential 
increase in relative commitments (PVOL/TA) after the median in 2004 (as shown in 
                                                          
48 The total capital costs as defined by Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) are the costs associated with the used of fixed 
assets and do not relate to the usual explanation of total capital costs as the weighted average costs of capital. 
49 A fourth materiality test based on the annual payment divided by net income, as suggested by De Bos (see chapter 
3) would result in 50% exceeding the threshold of 10% (median 9.9%). 
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Figure 5.3), one may conclude that for the majority of the companies the operating 
leases are of a material amount and cannot be ignored in the financial analysis. 
 
Therefore, the answer to research question one, “Are the amounts material?”, is for 
many companies affirmative, which renders the information of the operating leases 
of these companies as relevant. 
 
5.4.4 Reliability 
Two criteria of reliability, neutrality and completeness, are tested in this chapter. 
Neutrality was described already in section 5.4.1, which showed the results of 
compliance with the standards. Therefore, this section investigates whether the 
information required by RJ292/IAS17 is sufficiently complete. As mentioned before, 
the capitalisation of operating leases requires the user to make assumptions on the 
interest rate and the remaining- and total life of the lease portfolio. The user can 
also choose from different capitalisation approaches, from simplistic rules-of-thumb 
(such as the 8-rent multiple method) to more sophisticated present-value 
approaches. This section presents the results of the sensitivity to the assumptions 
and to the capitalisation approaches. The sensitivity tests are only applicable to 
those observations for which capitalisation was executed. This means that for this 
analysis both the non-leasing companies as well as the companies disclosing the 
present values themselves are excluded. Since PVOL of these observations is fixed 
and is therefore not sensitive to any of the assumptions, their inclusion would 
distort the results. Before the empirical results are presented of the sensitivity to 
the assumptions, it will first be illustrated by a simplified example. 
 
I. Illustrative example of sensitivity to assumptions 
Figure 5.4 shows the sensitivity of the capitalised lease liability (PVOL) and 
the capitalised leased asset to three assumptions; the interest rate, variances 
in the remaining life and the variance in the relation between the remaining 
life and the total life. 
 
Using a simplified example, Figure 5.4 illustrates the relation of PVOL and 
PVA to the above-described assumptions. The total nominal operating-lease 
commitment used in Figure 5.4 was 100 (this allows the representation of 
percentages of PVOL and PVA), and this was divided over the lease-expiry 
categories by using the median weights as shown in Table 5.4 (respectively, 
24%, 52%, 24%). In the base-case scenario, the interest rate was 6%, the 
remaining life was seven years (calculated as described in chapter 450) and the 
total life was twice the remaining life. The last assumption leads to an asset 
proportion of 91%, (PVA is 0.91*PVOL)51. This resulted in the base-case 
scenario of PVOL and PVA being respectively 81.6% and 74.1%. The interest 
rate was varied from 3% to 10%. The remaining life was varied by extracting 
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one year52 and by adding years one through eight. The relation between total 
life and remaining life is varied by total life is equal to the remaining life 
(TL=1*RL) to total life is three times the remaining life (TL=3*RL).  
 
Figure 5.4 Illustration of sensitivity to variance in interest rate (top left), remaining life (top right) and total 
life related to remaining life (bottom left) 
The three graphs in this figure illustrate the sensitivity of the present value of the lease liability (PVOL) and the 
present value of the leased asset (PVA) to three of the assumptions. The base case (indicated in each graph by the 
dotted line) is an operational lease with 100 nominal commitments, an interest rate of 6%, a remaining life of seven 
years (based on a division of the lease-expiry categories of respectively 24%, 52%, and 24%), which was assumed 
to be 50% of total life (lease halfway expiry). This resulted in PVOL being 82 and a related PVA of 74 (chapter 4 
describes the calculations). The sensitivities of these base-case values are illustrated by varying 1) the interest rate 
between 3% and 10% (top left graph), 2) the calculated remaining life with minus one and plus eight years (top right 
graph) and 3) the relation between the remaining life and total life from 1:1 (remaining life is total life, lease has just 
begun) to 1:3 (remaining life is 33% of total life, 67% has expired) (bottom left graph). 
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sensitivity to variance in interest rate 
A change in the interest rate definitely has an impact on both PVOL and 
PVA. For example, if the interest is varied by -2% and +2%, (i.e. 4% and 8%, 
which are still reasonable discount rates to be used), then PVOL and PVA 
increase to respectively 87.1% and 81.5% of the nominal commitment for the 
decrease in the interest rate, and decrease to respectively 76.7% and 67.6% of 
the nominal commitment for the increase in the interest rate.  
 
                                                          
52 Extracting more years was not possible, since the estimated remaining life was seven years; extracting more than 
one year would lead to a remaining life of less than five years, which does not match with lease commitments 
expiring after year five. 
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sensitivity to variance in the remaining life 
The impact on a change in the assumption on remaining life seems to be less 
apparent. A decrease of the remaining life by one year resulted in 
respectively an increase of PVOL and PVA to 82.1% and 75.0% of the total 
nominal commitment. On the other hand, an increase of the remaining life by 
one year leads to a decrease of PVOL and PVA to 81.1% and 73.2% of the 
total nominal commitment. To achieve a similar decrease in PVOL as the 
change in interest rate caused, the remaining life should be increased by 
more than eight years53. 
 
sensitivity to variance in the relation between remaining life versus total life 
The relation between PVOL and PVA, the asset proportion, depends on the 
assumption made about how much of the total life has expired. In both Imhoff 
et al. and this study it was assumed that the leases are halfway through their 
expiry period, and that the total life of the lease portfolio is twice the 
remaining life (TL= 2*RL). Varying this assumption has no consequences for 
PVOL, but only for PVA, because it determines the relation between these 
two. In the last graph of Figure 5.4 PVOL remains at the level of the base 
scenario (i.e. 81.6%). If we assume that the remaining life is equal to the total 
life (the lease portfolio has just commenced), PVA is equal to PVOL54. If total 
life is three times the remaining life (thus, 67% has expired), then PVA 
decreases to 67.5%. Recall that the differences between PVA and PVOL 
accrue during the life of the lease due to the differences between the 
depreciation of the asset and the repayment of the liability. Figure 5.4 makes 
this clear. 
 
Although the graph with a variance in the interest rate shows the highest 
impact on the capitalised values, it cannot be concluded from this that the 
sensitivity is the highest for variances in the interest rates. Such a conclusion 
can only be made if the variances between the assumptions can be compared 
with one another— for example, if it can be argued that a change in the 
interest rate of one percent is as likely to occur as a change in the remaining 
life of one additional year. However, Figure 5.4allows a preliminary 
conclusion that the disclosure of the (average) interest rate implicit in the 
lease portfolio will allow a more precise capitalisation of the operating-lease 
liabilities by the users of the financial statement. 
 
II. Empirical test of sensitivities 
Sensitivities to assumptions 
Table 5.7 shows the empirical results of sensitivities to the three 
abovementioned assumptions. Section 5.2 described the arguments used in 
the choice of a fixed 6% interest rate. In this section, the interest rate will be 
varied with plus and minus two percent, i.e. 4% and 8%. The sensitivity to 
the remaining life is tested by varying the remaining life for each company 
with plus or minus two years. Finally, for each company it was assumed that 
                                                          
53 An increase of the remaining life by eight years resulted in a decrease of PVOL and PVA to respectively 78.3% 
and 67.8% of the nominal lease commitments. 
54 See also Figure 4.2 in chapter 4, which showed that PVA at the inception of the lease is equal to PVOL. 
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the total life is twice the remaining life (TL = 2* RL). The sensitivity of this 
assumption is tested by varying the maturity expired as opposed to maturity 
remaining. This assumption is varied by using a relation of a) TL= 1.33 * RL 
(meaning 25% of the lease has expired, 75% still outstanding) and b) TL=3 * 
RL (meaning 67% of the lease has expired, 33% still outstanding). 
 
Table 5.7 Sensitivity to interest rate and remaining- and total lives of lease portfolio 
Three sensitivities of the underlying assumptions of PVOL and PVA (both related to total assets, in order to control 
for size difference) are tested: First is sensitivity to the interest rate. The interest rate in the base model was 6%. In 
the sensitivity test, this interest rate is varied by plus and minus two percent (i.e. 4% and 8%). Second, sensitivity to 
the total life compared to the remaining life is tested. The base model uses a relation of TL= 2* RL, meaning the 
lease portfolio is 50% expired and 50% still outstanding. This assumption is varied by using a relation of first, TL= 
1.33 * RL (meaning 25% of the lease has expired, 75% is still outstanding) and second, TL=3 * RL (meaning 67% 
of the lease has expired, 33% is still outstanding). Third, sensitivity to the remaining life is tested by varying the 
remaining-life assumption. The base model assumes that the lump-sum payment after year five is divided equally 
over the future years, using the lease payment of year five; the sensitivity to this assumption is tested by adding or 
distracting to this assumption two years. 
    INTEREST RATES 
TOTAL LIFE vs.  
REMAINING LIFE REMAINING LIFE 
    i=4% i=6% i=8%   TL=1.33RL TL=2RL TL=3RL   RL-2 RL RL+2   
PVOL/TA n=276             
mean  16.3% 15.2% 14.1% *** 15.2% 15.2% 15.2% no impact 15.3% 15.2% 15.0% ***
median  6.4% 6.0% 5.7% *** 6.0% 6.0% 6.0% no impact 6.0% 6.0% 6.0% ***
PVA/TA n=278             
mean  10.3% 9.3% 8.4% *** 10.0% 9.3% 8.4% *** 9.5% 9.3% 9.1% ***
median   5.6% 5.1% 4.5% *** 5.4% 5.1% 4.4% *** 5.1% 5.1% 4.9% ***
 
Table 5.7 shows that the capitalisation of the operating leases is most 
sensitive to the interest assumption. As described before, the assumption on 
how much of the lease life has expired has no influence on PVOL. As expected 
(see Figure 5.4), the increase or decrease in the remaining life has less of an 
impact than a change in interest on PVOL/TA. The changes in PVA/TA follow 
mainly the changes in PVOL/TA, except for the assumption on the relation 
between total- and remaining life. Whereas this has no influence on 
PVOL/TA, it does affect PVA/TA, due to the impact that depreciation has on 
the leased asset. All impacts were statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 
Sensitivity to chosen capitalisation approach 
Normally, the sensitivity to the chosen capitalisation approach should be 
tested without adjusting these approaches; however, some of the assumptions 
made by the researchers cannot be maintained, due to the differences in data. 
The adjustments described below do not alter the rationale behind the 
approaches. 
 
Remaining life and total life by Beattie et al.  
The weighted remaining life used by Beattie et al. requires the 
distinction between the two asset categories ‘land and buildings’ and 
‘other’. The distinction is not required by RJ292/IAS17, and this 
information is therefore not available for the companies in the sample. 
To be able to calculate PVOL and PVA using Beattie et al.’s method, 
we must assume that 50% of the lease liability relates to ‘land and 
building’ and 50% to ‘other’. The base estimates of remaining- and total 
life of Beattie et al. (see Table 4.4) are therefore adjusted. However, the 
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adjustment affects only the base estimates of remaining- and total life 
in the last lease-expiry category, since for the other categories the 
remaining- and total life were equal for both asset categories. 
 
Table 5.8 Adjusted base estimates of remaining- and total lease lives 
Adjustment to estimates of Beattie, Edwards and Goodacre (1998), p. 243, original estimates between 
brackets (see also Table 4.4) 
Lease expiry 
category (e) 
Remaining ife 
RL base 
Total Life 
TL base 
Less than one 1 (1) 1 (1) 
One to five 3 (3) 5 (5) 
More than five 11.5  
(7 for ‘other’, 16 for ‘land and buildings’) 
17.5  
(10 for ‘other’, 25 for ‘land and buildings’) 
 
Fixed life by Ely 
The fixed total life of 25 years for all companies as used by Ely does not 
seem reasonable when looking at the Dutch sample of this study (see 
Table 5.4), and holding on to this 25 years would make the approach of 
Ely a priori a bad estimator. Furthermore, Ely herself indicated that 
she choose 25 years because it served as a reasonable estimation for 
her sample. For this study’s sample, the (not-weighted) remaining life 
is 7.7 years on average (median: 7.0) for the entire sample (based on 
the assumption that 50% of total life has passed, the total life is 15.6 
on average (median: 14.0)). Therefore, in this study a fixed total life of 
fifteen years is used for Ely’s method. Together with the fixed interest 
rate of 6%, the asset proportion of Ely is fixed for the entire sample at 
0.52. The multiple of Ely is therewith fixed at 5.955. 
 
Table 5.9 shows the mean- and median values of PVOL and PVA (divided by total 
assets in order to control for size differences), comparable with Table 5.456. Table 5.9 
also shows the percentage change in mean- and median value of total debt, long-
term debt, total assets and net income for all seven of the capitalisation approaches.  
                                                          
55 As described in chapter 4, Ely calculates the asset proportion as follows: 
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56 This table is identical to Table 5.4, although PVOL/TA and PVA/TA are included when a capitalisation procedure 
could be conducted, since the purpose is of the current section is to show the difference in the capitalisation 
approaches. Companies with no operating-lease commitments (PVOL=0) and those disclosing the present value of 
operating-lease commitments (format 4 in Table 5.3) are thus excluded. This affects the mean- and median values of 
PVOL/TA and PVA/TA (compared to Table 5.4), since the companies that disclose PVOL themselves are included 
in Table 5.4. The mean and median of PVOL/TA are respectively 17.8% and 6.3% in Table 5.4, as opposed to 
15.2% and 6.0% in Table 5.9. This decrease due to elimination of 26 observations is explainable when looking at 
Figure 5.3. Two of the four companies disclosing PVOL themselves are numbers two and three in the list of highest 
leasing companies. These are now excluded in the comparison, which caused the mean and median to decrease. 
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Table 5.9 Percentage change of reported values after capitalisation using seven different methods 
The mean and median of the size of the capitalised operating-lease liabilities (PVOL) and capitalised leased asset 
(PVA) and the percentage change in total debt (TD), long-term debt (LTD), total assets (TA), and net income (NI). 
Except for PVOL and PVA also the size according to the balance sheet is given (‘reported’). The percentage change 
is defined as the difference between the before-capitalisation (reported) amount and the after-capitalisation amount, 
divided by the before-capitalisation amount, i.e. (TAreported -TA8times rent)/ TAreported. Obviously, for PVOL, no 
percentage change can be calculated.  
    REPORTED MULTIPLE METHODS PRESENT-VALUE METHODS 
 N  8-Rent UBSWarburg Multiple Ely ILW BEG ELY This study 
PVOL/TA  276         
mean   23.7% 9.2% 17.5% 15.2% 15.2% 10.3% 15.2% 
median   12.6% 5.0% 9.3% 6.0% 6.0% 5.6% 6.0% 
PVA /TA 278         
mean   23.7% 9.2% 9.1% 8.5% 9.7% 5.4% 9.3% 
median   12.6% 5.0% 4.8% 4.6% 5.3% 2.9% 5.1% 
TD ('000 E) 277  Change in TD %     
mean   1,712,845  41.3% 20.9% 30.5% 22.7% 22.7% 22.7% 22.7% 
median    159,150  104.5% 45.2% 76.4% 45.3% 45.3% 45.1% 45.3% 
LTD ('000 E) 273  Change in LTD %     
mean   1,199,513  52.8% 23.2% 37.1% 25.8% 25.8% 25.9% 25.8% 
median     98,579  164.9% 54.6% 123.0% 66.7% 66.7% 65.5% 66.7% 
TA ('000 E) 278  Change in TA %     
mean   6,473,178  10.9% 5.5% 4.2% 4.6% 5.5% 3.1% 5.1% 
median    868,083  17.0% 7.9% 5.8% 8.2% 9.0% 4.5% 8.9% 
NI ('000 E) 277  Change in NI %     
mean    288,007  0.0% -1.8% 0.0% 8.0% 0.6% 0.0% 1.4% 
median      12,287  0.0% -3.0% 0.0% 47.1% 7.7% 0.0% 6.0% 
 
The mean- and median values of the 8-rent method give very high estimates. The 8-
rent method overestimates the lease liability. An example of the overestimation 
that can occur due to this method is PinkRoccade. According to the 8-rent approach, 
the capitalisation of the lease commitment for PinkRoccade in 2003 is more than 
400 million euro (8 times 52.9 million euro, next year’s lease payment). However, 
PinkRoccade discloses a total nominal commitment of only 187 million euro 
(complying with RJ292). The present value of this commitment is 152 million euro. 
The 8-rent approach overestimates almost 2.5 times the real commitment. Figure 
5.5 at the end of this sub-section shows the differences between the method used in 
this thesis and the 8-rent method.  
 
The second-highest estimator is the multiple method of Ely. The fixed assumptions 
for all companies in her sample allow a fixed multiple to be calculated. In this study 
(using a 15-year total life and 6% interest) the multiple was 5.9. Ely ignores 
company-specific lease portfolios and argues (p.403, see also chapter 4 of this thesis) 
that indeed the present value collapses to a constant multiplied by the first 
minimum lease payment (the multiple method). The multiple method of Ely differs, 
however, from her present-value approach (as can be seen from Table 5.9). 
 
Based on the medians, the other approaches (even the multiple method of 
UBSWarburg) seem to be more in line with each other with respect to PVOL. When 
it comes to PVA, however, the methods differ from each other, and also in the mean 
values some differences are visible. PVA as calculated in this thesis lies in-between 
the PVAs of Imhoff et al. and Beattie et al. This can be explained by the calculation 
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of the asset proportion (see section 4.5.5); whereas Imhoff et al. use the full 
remaining life, Beattie et al. and this study use a weighted remaining life.  
 
The impact on net income applies only to the methods of the underlying study and 
for UBSWarburg, Imhoff et al. and Beattie et al. The 8-times rent method does not 
imply an adjustment to net income, and Ely assumes that the depreciation part 
when capitalising the leased asset is equal to the repayment part in the lease 
payments. Therefore, Ely asserts that capitalisation affects only EBIT and not net 
income. For the four remaining methods, some impact on net income is present, 
although it is less than the impact on the balance-sheet items. The effect for the 
Imhoff et al. method is the highest and for the other three— the underlying study, 
UBSWarburg and Beattie et al.— the impact is much smaller. The change in the 
median of net income for Imhoff et al. is a 47% increase compared +6% (this study), 
+7.7% (Beattie et al.) and -3% (UBSWarburg). This result reflects the fact that 
Imhoff et al. depreciate the leased asset (PVA) over the total remaining life of the 
assets, whereas the three other methods depreciate the asset using a weighted 
measure. The weighted average remaining life is shorter than the total remaining 
life, resulting in a bigger depreciation charge for these methods. Since the effect on 
net income is quite small for these methods, the repayment part for these methods 
is almost equal to the depreciation part of the lease payment. 
 
The statistical tests to see whether the differences in the calculation are 
statistically significant are shown in Table 5.10, which reports the results of the 
comparisons of mean and median of PVOL/TA and PVA/TA between the seven 
different capitalisation approaches. Subsequently, Table 5.11 shows the correlation 
coefficients between these approaches. Although the correlation is significant 
between all approaches, the analysis of differences shows that the approaches differ 
significantly from each other. When focussing on the median tests it can be 
concluded that for PVOL/TA it does matter which approach is used to capitalise the 
lease commitments. Except for this study, Imhoff et al. and Beattie et al., all 
approaches differ significantly at the 1% level. With respect to PVA/TA, this study’s 
results do not differ significantly from the results of UBSWarburg and the multiple 
approach of Ely. All other approaches differ significantly at the 1% level.  
 
Table 5.11 shows the correlation coefficients (both Pearson and Spearman) between 
PVOL/TA and PVA/TA for all seven of the capitalisation approaches). 
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Table 5.10 t- and z-values of comparison of mean and medians of PVOL/TA and PVA/TA using seven different capitalisation approaches 
Paired samples t-test t-statistics Wilcoxon signed rank test z-statistics
PVOL/TA 8-rent UBSWarburg MultipleEly ILW BEG Ely PVOL/TA 8-rent UBSWarburg Multiple Ely ILW BEG Ely
This study 3.5*** 3.2*** 0.5ns same same 3.9*** This study 10.6*** 8.6*** 8.5*** same same 9.2***
8-rent 10.2*** 13.2*** 3.5*** 3.5*** 9.6*** 8-rent 14.5*** 17.2*** 10.6*** 10.6*** 14.4***
UBSWarburg 9.6*** 3.2*** 3.2*** 4.0*** UBSWarburg 14.3*** 8.6*** 8.6*** 7.9***
Multiple Ely 0.5ns 0.5ns 8.5*** Multiple Ely 8.5*** 8.5*** 13.3***
Imhoff et al.(ILW) same 3.9*** ILW same 9.2***
Beattie et al. (BEG) 3.9*** BEG 9.2***
t-statistics z-statistics
PVA/TA 8-rent UBSWarburg Multiple Ely ILW BEG Ely PVA/TA 8-rent UBSWarburg Multiple Ely ILW BEG Ely
This study 10.7*** 0.5ns 1.2ns 11.0*** 9.1*** 8.8*** This study 14.7*** 0.4ns 1.2ns 14.8*** 14.7*** 14.8***
8-rent 10.2*** 13.2*** 10.8*** 10.5*** 10.5*** 8-rent 14.4*** 17.2*** 14.7*** 14.6*** 14.8***
UBSWarburg 0.4ns 3.0*** 2.2** 10.5*** UBSWarburg 1.6ns 8.5*** 4.1*** 14.2***
Multiple Ely 1.6ns 2.3** 8.5*** Multiple Ely 3.7*** 3.2*** 13.4***
Imhoff et al. (ILW) 11.2*** 8.3*** ILW 14.8*** 14.7***
Beattie et al.(BEG) 9.0*** BEG 14.8***  
 
Table 5.11 Correlation coefficients 
N=276 PEARSON SPEARMAN 
PVOL/TA 
This 
 study 8-rent
UBS 
Warburg 
Multiple 
Ely ILW BEG Ely PVOL/TA 
This 
 study 8-rent
UBS 
Warburg 
Multiple
Ely ILW BEG Ely 
This study 1 0.414 0.474 0.414 1 1 0.496 This study 1 0.886 0.927 0.886 1 1 0.940
8-rent . 1 0.956 1.000 0.414 0.414 0.896 8-rent . 1 0.956 1.000 0.886 0.886 0.937
UBSWarburg   1 0.956 0.474 0.474 0.956 UBSWarburg   1 0.956 0.927 0.927 0.982
Multiple Ely    1 0.447 0.447 0.896 Multiple Ely    1 0.886 0.886 0.937
ILW     1 1.000 0.496 ILW     1 1.000 0.940
BEG      1 0.496 BEG      1 0.940
Ely       1 Ely       1 
N=278 PEARSON SPEARMAN 
PVA/TA 
This 
study 8-rent
UBS 
Warburg 
Multiple  
Ely ILW BEG Ely PVA/TA 
This 
 study 8-rent
UBS 
Warburg 
Multiple
Ely ILW BEG Ely 
This study 1 0.915 0.957 0.915 1.000 0.999 0.996 This study 1 0.946 0.980 0.946 1.000 1.000 0.998
8-rent  1 0.956 1.000 0.913 0.908 0.896 8-rent  1 0.956 1.000 0.946 0.942 0.937
UBSWarburg   1 0.956 0.954 0.958 0.956 UBSWarburg   1 0.956 0.978 0.981 0.982
Multiple Ely    1 0.913 0.908 0.896 Multiple Ely    1 0.946 0.942 0.937
ILW     1 0.999 0.996 ILW     1 0.999 0.998
BEG      1 0.999 BEG      1 0.999
Ely             1.000 Ely             1 
All correlations are significant at the 1% level 
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The high correlation indicates the relationship between the capitalisation approaches 
(see Figure 5.1) and is not an analysis of differences. For illustrative purposes, Figure 
5.5 shows four different graphs: At the top left is the %-difference between PVOL/TA 
of this study (and of Imhoff et al. and Beattie et al.) and the 8-rent method. At the 
top right is the %-difference between PVOL/TA of this study and the present value 
calculated using Ely’s method. Below left is the %-difference between PVA/TA of this 
study and the PVA/TA of both Imhoff et al. (“ILW”) and Beattie et al. (“BEG”). Below 
right, is the difference between PVA/TA of this study and the 8-rent approach. 
 
These figures reveal that the 8-rent method overestimates PVOL/TA in all cases; the 
present-value approach of Ely overestimates PVOL/TA in approximately twenty 
cases. PVOL/TA is the same for this study, Imhoff et al. and Beattie et al.; however, 
PVA/TA differs between the three studies. Compared to this study, Beattie et al. 
overestimate PVA/TA in all cases with a minimum of 3% and maximum of 16%. 
Compare the above to this study and the results using Imhoff et al.’s approach, which 
underestimate PVA/TA in all cases with a minimum %-difference of -7% and a 
maximum of -13%.  
 
Figure 5.5 Illustration of % change in PVOL/TA and PVA/TA as opposed to this study’s results 
At the top left is the %-difference between PVOL/TA of this study (and of Imhoff et al. and Beattie et al.) and the 8-
rent method. At the top right is the %-difference between PVOL/TA of this study and the present value calculated 
using Ely’s method. Below left is the %-difference between PVA/TA of this study and the PVA/TA of both Imhoff et 
al. (“ILW”) and Beattie et al. (“BEG”). Below right, is the difference between PVA/TA of this study and the 8-rent 
approach. 
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Both the statistical analyses and interpretation of the results from Table 5.9 and 
Figure 5.5 allow us to conclude that it does matter which capitalisation approach is 
used. Together with the results of the previous section (the sensitivity to the 
assumptions), it can be said that if a user of the financial statements wishes to 
capitalise the operating lease, this will be influenced by the choices and assumptions 
made by this user. Therefore, the information disclosed on operating leases is not 
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complete and this poses a threat to the reliable-criterion. The answer to the third 
research question: “Is the information required by the lease-accounting standard 
sufficient to permit informed users to estimate the consequences of operating 
leases?” is therefore negative.  
 
5.4.5 Comparability 
The comparability criterion is tested by analysing how the capitalisation of operating 
leases impacts key financial ratios and by questioning whether the ranking between 
companies based on these financial ratios would (statistically significantly) change 
after the capitalisation. As expected (see section 5.3.2), the financial ratios in this 
study do not have a normal distribution. Even the elimination of a few outliers would 
not solve this problem. Therefore, the financial ratios are compared with each before- 
and after capitalisation, using both the t-test (comparison of means) and the non-
parametric Wilcoxon test (comparison of medians). Table 5.12 shows the mean and 
median of the eleven financial ratios analysed. For each ratio, the before- and after 
capitalisation value is presented. Furthermore, the difference is shown and the 
percent change. For the differences in mean the t-value is shown, and for the 
differences in ranks the z-value, both with the significance of the difference. 
 
Table 5.12 Differences between mean and median of financial ratios before- and after capitalisation of 
operating leases in 2004 
For the abbreviations and calculation of the ratios, see Table 5.1. The sample includes companies that disclosed 
according to RJ292/IAS17 (n=67), the companies with no-leases (6) and the companies disclosing the present value of 
the commitments divided over the lease-expiry categories (n=3). The ratios ROE, ROCE, LTDCE and TDE are 
excluded for those companies with negative equity or negative capital employed. 
    MEAN   MEDIAN   
 N before after %diff sig. t-value before after % diff. sig. z-value 
NPM 72 -24.38% -24.30% 0.34% * 1.84  2.81% 2.87% 2.14% *** 4.66  
ROE 71 10.71% 11.10% 3.63% ** 2.61  11.54% 11.87% 2.86% *** 4.55  
ROA 73 4.00% 3.69% -7.77% ** 1.99  4.45% 3.92% -11.91% *** 3.82  
EBITTA 65 8.84% 8.85% 0.03% ns 0.03  8.16% 7.61% -6.74% ns 0.03  
ROCE 68 7.59% 6.97% -8.17% ** 2.42  6.94% 6.52% -6.05% *** 3.52  
LTDCE 66 29.25% 43.08% 47.28% *** 5.63  26.17% 41.06% 56.90% *** 6.37  
TDTA 74 23.54% 30.99% 31.63% *** 6.75  22.31% 27.67% 24.03% *** 7.13  
TDE 68 86.17% 128.14% 48.71% *** 5.36  64.25% 100.69% 56.72% *** 6.85  
IC 65 0.36 0.29 -20.16% ns 1.27  0.15 0.24 61.23% *** 3.05  
CR 78 1.91 1.69 -11.05% *** 3.08  1.45 1.35 -7.07% *** 7.48  
AT 73 1.64  1.45  -11.74% *** 5.22  1.54  1.42  -7.58% *** 7.12  
 *,**,*** means significant at respectively 10%, 5% and 1% levels. ns means not significant 
 
The results of Table 5.12 show that the difference in medians is significant for all 
ratios except one (EBITTA). The ranking of the companies based on these ratios has 
thus significantly changed, due to the capitalisation of the operating leases. A closer 
look at the mean changes of the ratios reveals that the significance is especially 
limited to those ratios that relate to the capital structure of the company. The 
percentage change in the median of these ratios varies from 24% for total debt to 
total assets, to 57% for long-term debt to capital employed. It should be noted that in 
these ratios also the companies are included that have no leases at all (change is nil). 
For example, it could be reasoned, based on the table, that a decrease of return on 
assets from 4.45 to 3.92% is not striking. Even a statistical significance might not 
change this reasoning. However, it is especially the 50% of the observations that lie 
beyond the median of which the operating-lease disclosures should be carefully 
watched. To illustrate this, Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.7 show the percentage change of 
CHAPTER 5 
140 
the long-term debt to capital employed ratio (LTDCE) and return on assets (ROA) in 
2004 for those companies in the sample for which the leases were capitalised. The 
financial analysis of the companies in, for example, the last quartile is definitely 
different between users either ignoring or capitalising the operating leases. Even 
when it does not apply to the majority, the ratios of a major part of the companies are 
changed, and ignorance of the operating leases would alter the decisions based 
thereon. The conclusion is therefore that for the comparability of companies the 
operating-lease commitments are valuable information and should be taken into 
account.  
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Figure 5.6 Percentage change of long-term debt to capital employed 
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Excluded are Imtech and Pink Roccade with an increase in LTDCE of respectively approx. 4,000% and 2,000% which is caused by very low levels of LTDCE before capitalisation (resp. 0.6% and 2.5%) increasing to 
high levels of LTDCE after capitalisation (resp. 26% and 57%). Also other high-leasing companies (see Figure 5.3) are not shown in this figure due to negative capital employed (Tie Holdings), LTDCE before 
capitalisation was zero (Macintosh) or long-term debt portion of PVOL/TA could not be determined due to PV-disclosure type (Laurus). 
Figure 5.7 Percentage change of return on assets 
% change in ROA
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Table 5.13 compares this study’s results with the results of previous studies on 
lease capitalisation. Not every study used the same methodology, of course. Imhoff 
et al. (1995) focused on the median, instead of means, because of the impact of 
extreme observations. Ely (1995) analysed the sensitivities to certain assumptions 
by using both Pearson and Spearman correlations, but did not perform a differences 
analysis. Beattie et al. (1998) focused on the differences in mean between the pre- 
and post-capitalisation ratios, and they report only the results of the paired t-test. 
They do acknowledge, however, the non-normal distribution of many ratios (see 
footnote on p.245), and mention that the Wilcoxon non-parametric test produced 
results of greater significance. Also Beattie et al. mention that their study consisted 
of 16% non-leasing companies. In the underlying study it was shown in Table 5.4 
that 77 out of 353 companies were non-leasing companies (22%) and this influences 
the impact measured. Goodacre (2001) conducted a similar study based on the 
Beattie et al. study (of which he was co-author), and focused on the differences in 
medians and the significance according to the Wilcoxon-test instead of the paired t-
test. Bennet and Bradbury (2003) report only descriptive values of mean and 
median, and do not perform a statistical test of significance in difference. The 
methodology of the underlying study is most in line with Goodacre (2001), since he 
reports both mean and median tests. 
 
Based on the results of this study and on the results of previous study the answers 
to the last two questions: “Are key financial ratios affected?” and “Does the 
capitalisation of operating leases change the ranking between companies?” is that 
yes, key financial ratios are indeed significantly affected and that also the ranking 
of the companies changes after the lease has been capitalised. This again stresses 
that operating leases should be taken into account in any comparison of companies. 
The lack of sufficient information to capitalise the operating leases, due to both non-
compliance with the accounting standard and insufficiently complete information, is 
therefore also a threat to the comparability criterion of useful information. 
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Table 5.13 Comparison of present study with previous studies on lease capitalisation 
Nelson (1963) Ashton 
(1985)
Imhoff et al.  (1991) Beattie, 
Edwards and 
Goodacre (1998)
Country US UK US UK
Year of analysis Not reported 1983-1984 1988 1994
mean 
%change 
median % change Impact/#. companies 
changed rank
mean mean % change mean median Mean mean 
%change
median % 
change
mean median
Increase TD 23.6 53.1 22.9 11.7
Increase long-term debt 27.1 63.8 39.3
Increase TA 5.2 8.9 6.3 8.8 5.2
Change NI 1.4 -1.8
NPM 0.3ns 2.1*** 1.023 12.1*** 51.4*** 39.0***
ROE 3.6** 2.86*** 2.85 -12.8/-267.8 2.1/-21.4 4.8** 35.1*** 17.6***
ROA -7.8** -11.9*** -22.0 11.9 /-31.9 2.4/2.0 -10.8*** -44.8*** -2.8***
EBITTA 0.0ns -6.74ns -8.73% -6.80%
ROCE -8.2** -6.05*** Yes/0 0.24 -0.6 -32.8*** -19.8***
LTDCE 47.3*** 56.9*** 92.8*** 433.2*** 1,160.7***
DCE Yes/9 -20.11***
TDTA 31.6*** 24.0*** 10.6 13.4
TDE 48.7*** 56.7*** Yes/9 119.0 48.7*** 295.0*** 220.1***
IC -20.2ns 61.2*** Yes/10 2.74 -25.9 -79.3*** -7.73***
CR -11.1*** -7.1*** Yes/7 -14.4 -3.4
AT -11.7*** -7.6*** -0.77 -12.5 -55.2*** -50.7***
Separately for 51 groceries/ 
29 airlines
38
Bennet and 
Bradbury (2003)
2000-2004 1984-1990 1999
This study Imhoff et al  (1995) Goodacre (2001)
Netherlands US UK New Zealand
14 matched pairs
1995
232 102 only retailersN= 278 companies of which PVOL 
was available, ratios based on 
2004 accounts
11 23
 
 
Notes: 1. Beattie et al. (1998) show a similar table in their article in which they compare their results with those of Ashton (1985) and Imhoff et al. (1991). For the sake of completeness, these results are also reported 
here. 2. The present study calculated the value for the 278 observations with operating leases and for which PVOL could be calculated. The eleven companies of Nelson were all companies with leases. Aston’s sample 
consisted of 23 companies with only financial leases. The samples of Imhoff et al. (1991) and Bennet and Bradbury (2003) consisted of only companies with leases. The sample of Beattie et al. (1998) consisted of 16% 
non-leasing companies. Imhoff et al. (1995) and Goodacre (2001) do not mention the elimination of non-leasing companies. 3. Ashton and Beattie et al. calculate the operating profit margin instead of the net profit 
margin. 4. Ashton (1985) calculates the effect on Debt-to-Capital-Employed, and this ratio declines. Beattie et al. (1998) comment that the decline of the ratio should be a mistake, since the direction of the change must be 
positive (Table 8, note 3). We do not agree with this, however, since the ratio calculated by Ashton will decline if the increase in capital employed exceeds the increase in (total) debt. The leverage ratio calculated in this 
study and also by Beattie et al. is long-term debt to capital employed, and the change in this ratio will indeed always be positive (while by definition the change in capital employed cannot exceed the change in long-term 
debt). 5. Beattie et al. (1998) show only the results of the mean test, but indicate that the Wilcoxon-test of differences in medians produced results of greater significance. 6. Imhoff et al. (1991) matched seven high-
leasing companies with seven low-leasing companies. Six pairs were retailers; one pair came from the transportation sector. For each of these pairs they calculated the change in return on assets and debt-equity. The mean 
values reported here are the average values of these 14 changes in ratios. Imhoff et al. (1991) do not produce any statistical tests. 7. Nelson (1963) reported for each of the eleven companies in the sample the change in 15 
ratios. He concluded that the ratios change substantially, and indicated for each ratio whether capitalisation would help the ratio meet its objectives (this is here indicated as ‘yes’. Furthermore, he concluded that the 
ranking changed significantly after capitalisation, indicated by the number of companies that changed in ranking after capitalisation. 8. Bennet et al.  (2003) do not produce a statistical test of significance of differences. 
The percentage changes in the financial ratios were not reported in this article, but are derived from the mean- and median values as reported in the article.  
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5.5 Summary and conclusions 
Section 5.4.1 showed that in 2004 36% of the leasing companies in the sample still 
did not comply with RJ292/IAS17. Although this is an improvement of the 
percentage in 2000 (when 59% percent of the companies with operating leases did 
not comply), the conclusion remains that this non-compliance compromises the 
neutrality of operating-lease disclosure. The user of the financial statements cannot 
capitalise the operating leases, is not able to estimate the on-balance equivalent of 
the commitments and cannot determine in many cases whether the commitments 
are material or relevant. This non-compliance makes the financial statements 
inconsistent and therefore not neutral; this harms the reliability criterion of useful 
information. The non-complying companies cannot be compared on a fair basis with 
the companies that do comply with the standards or that do not disclose operating 
leases. This is a result from both the non-compulsory character of the Dutch 
accounting standard until 2005 and the lack of any supervision of the compliance 
with the accounting standards. By including the compliance with IAS in Dutch law 
as from financial years starting after 2005 the non-compulsory character is no 
longer applicable. Also the new regulatory supervision of auditors and financial 
reporting by the Dutch financial supervisor AFM (the laws of which only became 
effective in 2006) is definitely a necessity with respect to the leasing standard.  
 
Section 5.4.2 presented the capitalisation results. The relative lease commitments 
of the companies showed a skewed distribution, the mean of PVOL/TA was 14% and 
the median 4.3%. This distribution was illustrated by figure 5.3.1, where the 
companies were ranked in descending order. It appeared that the difference 
between the lease intensity of the companies in the sample is substantial, varying 
from no leasing (PVOL =0% of total assets) to PVOL being 130% of total assets. 
Section 5.4.3 subsequently reported for how many companies the commitments 
were material, and thus relevant, using three different tests. Even the test with the 
lowest results (PVOL/TA), indicates that 45% of all companies in the sample had 
lease commitments of a material amount. The other results were respectively 51% 
(annual payment divided by total capital costs) and 52% (PVOL divided by long-
term debt). The results of all three tests for the year 2004 were even higher, 
indicating a still-growing importance of operating leases. Information on operating-
lease commitments is therefore relevant information. 
 
Section 5.4.4 explored the completeness of operating-lease disclosure. Completeness 
is part of the reliability criterion of useful information. It was shown that especially 
the interest rate assumption influences the capitalised value of the lease liability 
and the leased assets. Furthermore, the chosen capitalisation approach also does 
matter when capitalising the commitments. This was shown by statistical tests and 
by interpreting the difference between the approaches for the individual companies. 
Standards setters should consequently require companies at the least to disclose the 
interest rate applicable. Preferable, however, would be the requirement of 
disclosure in the footnotes of the present value of the operating-lease commitments, 
including the interest rate used. This would also harmonise the accounting 
standards between financial and operating leases, thereby making the standards 
more consistent. 
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Finally, section 5.4.5 addressed the comparability criterion of useful information. It 
was shown that the capitalisation of operating leases affected key financial ratios to 
a greater or lesser extent. The ranking between the companies was statistically 
significantly changed after the capitalisation. This was to be expected, since the 
previous section had already concluded that for almost 50% of the companies the 
operating-lease commitments were of a material amounts and thus relevant. 
Considering that the other 50% of the companies have no material lease 
commitments, this will alter the ranking between these companies. However, the 
calculation of the impact on the ratios could only be performed for those companies 
that comply with the accounting standards and for which the leases could be 
capitalised. Furthermore, the previous section concluded that lease capitalisation is 
subsequently sensitive to choices made by financial statement users. The 
comparability of companies will therefore also be enhanced first, by enforcing 
company compliance with the accounting standard and second, by requiring 
disclosure of the present value of the lease commitments instead of the nominal 
commitments. 
 
The final chapter of this thesis formulates recommendations that might overcome 
some of the weaknesses of the lease-accounting standard and its observance. 
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PART III:  DETERMINANTS OF THE OPERATING-LEASE DECISION 
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Part III of this thesis concerns the determinants of the operating-lease decision. 
Chapter 2 described how operating leases offer several advantages to the lessee. 
Some of these advantages relate particularly to operating leases due to the off-
balance-sheet and the fact that they allow the lessor to retain economic ownership 
of the asset. Part II showed that the off-balance-sheet character of operating leases 
has indeed a major impact on financial ratios derived from the balance sheet. Part 
III now empirically investigates the determinants of the operating-lease decision. 
Chapter 6 describes previous studies in this field and the related theories. Only a 
few studies have investigated the determinants of operating-lease intensity 
separately from the determinants of financial leases or all leases. Many studies, 
moreover, ignore the impact that operating leases have on the variables used in 
their models, and this has led to an endogeneity problem for determinants related 
especially to debt and to total assets. Chapter 7 empirically tests an extensive list of 
possible determinants of operating-lease intensity, based on two different measures: 
first, a relative measure (the present value of operating leases divided by total 
assets), and second, a dichotomous variable (dummy with a value of one or zero) 
classifying each company as either a high- or low-leasing company. 
The research questions addressed in chapters 6 and 7 are as follows: 
o What determines the choice of a company’s management for operating leases? 
o What are the characteristics of high-leasing companies as opposed to low-
leasing companies? 
o Are these characteristics in accordance with what might be expected from 
accounting choice research? 
These questions give some insight into the motives of a company’s management to 
choose operating leases. This is valuable information for standard setters, whether 
the choice for operating leases is mainly sensible business or whether the company’s 
management objective to choose operating leases is guided by non-sensible 
accounting reasons.  
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CHAPTER 6 PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON THE DETERMINANTS OF 
THE OPERATING-LEASE DECISION 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the previous literature of the determinants of the (operating) 
lease decision. Previous studies investigating the determinants of leasing did not 
always distinguish between operating- and financial leases (for example, Mehran, 
Taggart and Yermack (1999); Adams and Hardwick (1998)), or investigated solely 
financial leases (for example, Lasfer and Levis ((1998); Ang and Peterson (1984); 
Deloof and Verschueren (1999)), or did investigate solely operating leases but with 
limited characteristics investigated (for example, Sharpe and Nguyen (1995); Duke, 
Franz, Hunt and Toy (2002)). For some of the determinants, however, the 
distinction between operating leases and financial leases is essential, because the 
underlying reason to choose leasing (for example, preserving debt capacity or 
improving leverage ratios) is only (or mainly) achieved by operating leases. As 
shown in chapter 2, however, financial leases are not as important in the 
Netherlands as operating leases are. This was also found for the US (Duke et al. 
(2002); Mehran et al. (1999); Graham et al. (1998)), and in the UK (Beattie et al. 
(2004)).  
 
This thesis investigates particularly the determinants of the choice for operating 
leases. Since some of these determinants refer to the accounting treatment of 
operating leases, special emphasis will be on the accounting-choice literature. 
Studies in the field of accounting choice investigate whether and why accounting 
matters. Chapter 6 describes the accounting-choice literature and previous studies 
on the determinants of (operating) leasing choice. This chapter also formulates the 
hypotheses.  
 
The chapter is set up as follows. Section 6.2 describes the positive accounting 
theory, financial contracting theory and accounting choices, which are closely 
related. Section 6.3 describes the main purpose of the different studies, and points 
out how they differ in the dependent variable (some lease-intensity measure). Also 
this section addresses the issue of endogeneity problem of several determinants.  
Due to the substantial list of determinants that might have an relation with the 
operating-lease intensity, the structure of the sections 6.4 through 6.12 is 
determined by these determinants; each section addresses one possible 
determinant. Subsequently, each section will consist of a sub-section addressing the 
previous results of studies investigating the concerning determinant, followed by 
the formulation of the hypothesis/(-es). Section 6.13 draws some conclusions.  
 
6.2 Positive accounting theory, financial contracting theory and accounting 
choices 
This section addresses three areas of finance and accounting research (positive 
accounting theory, financial contracting theory and accounting choices), since most 
of the determinants, described in the next section, relate to these areas. These areas 
are very closely related and often refer to the same characteristics. 
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Positive accounting theory 
The positive accounting theory investigates why accounting matters. This theory 
does not present a rule for choosing among alternative accounting procedures, 
but rather provides an explanation for accounting and auditing practice (Watts 
and Zimmerman (1986)). Positive accounting theory views a company as a nexus 
of contracts; in other words, a company can be described by the set of contracts 
into which it enters. Furthermore, the company’s goal is to minimize the 
contracting costs associated with these contracts, such as negotiation, monitoring 
and the expected costs of bankruptcy. Since many of these contracts involve 
accounting variables, accounting choice or policies is part of this minimizing of 
contracting costs. Although the accounting choice of a company’s management 
should stay within in the boundaries of the accounting regulation, many 
accounting issues allow the management some flexibility in choosing from a set of 
accounting policies, such as depreciation method, historical versus current costs 
and also operating versus financial leases. 
 
Accounting choice 
Fields et al. (2001) analysed previous studies on accounting choice. The 
fundamental question on accounting choice addresses whether accounting 
matters. They state (p.256), ‘an accounting choice is any decision whose primary 
purpose is to influence (either in form or substance) the output of the accounting 
system in a particular way, including not only financial statements but also tax 
returns and regulatory filings’. According to Fields et al. (2001), this includes the 
decision to choose operating- instead of financial leases. Chapter 5 showed that 
operating leases influence importantly the output of the accounting system and 
would indeed fall within this definition.  
 
Financial contracting theory 
Financial contracting is the theory of what kinds of deals are made between 
financiers and those who need financing. Financial contracting theory starts with 
the theorem of Modigliani and Miller: that in an ideal world, where there are no 
taxes, or incentives or information problems, the way a project or firm is financed 
does not matter57. Much research has been concerned with trying to find what is 
missing in Modigliani and Miller’s world, and the focus has been on taxes and 
incentive (agency) problems (Hart (2001)). The capital structure of a company, 
the debt-to-equity ratio, is influenced by these aspects. As shown in Figure 2.1, 
which illustrates the characteristics of corporate liabilities, operating-lease 
commitments have the highest priority to the claimholder— higher even than 
secured debt. According to Sharpe and Nguyen (1995), this makes it a highly 
desirable financial contract. Other characteristics of (operating) leases may also 
be considered from the perspective of financial contracting theory. These will be 
described in section 6.3. 
 
These three topics in finance and accounting research are very closely related. Also 
Fields et al. (2001) based their classification of accounting choice literature on the 
theories developed by Modigliani and Miller of complete and perfect markets. In 
such complete and perfect markets, accounting choice has no role because if 
                                                          
57 Cross reference from Hart (2001), Modigliani F., and M. Miller, 1958, The cost of capital, corporation finance 
and the theory of investment, American Economic Review 48, 261-297 
PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON THE DETERMINANTS OF THE OPERATING-LEASE DECISION 
151 
accounting matters to one or more decision-makers, the markets would be neither 
complete nor perfect. Three forms of market imperfections make accounting 
important: agency costs, information asymmetry and externalities affecting 
contracting parties. First, agency costs relate to contractual issues such as 
managerial compensation and debt covenants. Second, information asymmetries are 
associated with better-informed managers and less-informed investors. And third, 
other externalities relate to contracts with other third parties, such as tax 
authorities and suppliers, for example.  
 
Furthermore, the classification of Fields et al. (2001) coincides with the positive 
accounting theory, which suggests that the management of a company will choose 
the particular accounting policy that is in their own best interest (Scott, 1997). The 
categories of Fields et al. (2001) are consistent with those of Watts and Zimmerman 
(1986), with the distinction that Watts and Zimmerman (1986) broadly interpret 
contracting costs, which include almost all market imperfections. Indeed, this 
interpretation difference can be derived from the example given by Fields et al. 
(2001) on information asymmetries. They describe managers attempting to 
influence stock prices, which should have an impact on their remuneration and 
reputation. Watts and Zimmerman assume this to be an agency problem.  
 
The three market imperfections as described by Fields et al. can be used as a basis 
for determining three categories of goals or motivations for accounting choice. Watts 
and Zimmerman (1986) summarised several studies on positive accounting theory 
and formulated three hypotheses on the opportunistic behaviour of company’s 
management. Additionally, Fields et al. (2001) also incorporate capital-market 
effects of accounting choice. The differences, however, are apparently not that big 
that their hypotheses (Watts and Zimmerman (1986)) and goals of accounting 
choices (Fields et al. (2001)) cannot be described simultaneously. As stated before, 
financial contracting theory refers to all kinds of market imperfections that make it 
relevant which financing structure is chosen. However, in the following list of Fields 
et al. (2001), financial contracting is assumed to relate to contracts that mitigate 
internal and external agency conflicts. The two remaining market imperfections 
(information asymmetry and impact on third parties) are categorised separately. 
 
Financial contracting 
Contracting costs as defined by Fields et al. (2001) is based on the theory that 
many contractual arrangements are structured in a way to mitigate internal 
and external agency conflicts (financial contracting theory). These contracts 
often rely on accounting numbers that provide incentives to managers to 
choose among accounting methods to achieve desired financial reporting 
objectives. The debt-covenants hypothesis and the bonus-plan hypothesis (see 
below) of Watts and Zimmerman (1986) fall both within this goal of 
accounting-choice theory. The first is an external agency conflict (bondholder 
versus shareholder), and the second is an internal agency conflict (owner 
versus manager).  
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- The debt-covenant hypothesis 
The debt-covenant hypothesis is based on the evidence that audited 
financial statements are used to monitor debt contracts. Public and 
private debt contracts alike include covenants that use accounting 
numbers to restrict management actions. A breach under such contract is 
considered to be a default and provides the lender with the possibility of 
taking action. Debt covenants are effective only if some restrictions are 
placed on the manager’s ability to control whether their choice of 
accounting numbers is restricted. Typically, these restrictions do not 
come only from accounting principles but especially in the case of debt 
covenants, some variations to these principles exist to overcome its 
shortcomings. To illustrate this, Watts and Zimmerman (1986) give an 
example of lease liability, which was often required to be included in 
debt/equity ratios in bond covenants but was a non-recognised liability 
according to GAAP. The closer a company is to violating accounting-based 
debt covenants, the more likely the company manager is to select 
accounting procedures that shift reported earnings from future periods to 
the current period (Scott, 1997). The primary function of debt covenants 
is to alleviate agency costs by better aligning the incentives of the parties 
(Fields et al., 2001). Therefore, companies may make the accounting 
choice for operating leases instead of financial leases in order to avoid 
covenant violation. 
 
- The bonus-plan hypothesis 
The definition of bonus-plan hypothesis is based on the idea that if bonus 
plans are based on accountancy-based measures, the management of a 
company will choose the accounting method that best fulfils their 
interests. Although this results in a restriction of managerial choice of 
accounting procedures, it cannot eliminate all managerial accounting 
manipulation as long as contracting and monitoring is costly.  
 
According to Mehran et al. (1999), a well-designed financial contract can 
enhance corporate value in three ways: First, it transfers risks between 
parties. Second, it can affect the incentives of the parties (positive incentives, 
as in the case of bonus plans; negative incentives, as in the case with debt 
covenants). And third, a financial contract may transfer tax liabilities.  
 
Information asymmetries and asset-pricing motivations 
The second category of motivations for accounting choices concerns 
accounting choice employed to influence asset prices, which is enabled by 
information asymmetries between well-informed insiders and less-informed 
third parties. Accounting choice can be made by companies to influence less-
informed parties. Fields et al. (2001) give two examples of this behaviour. 
First, accounting choice can be made by managers who belief that higher 
earnings will result in higher stock prices (and consequently higher 
management compensation and better reputation). The second example 
refers to accounting choice made in order to meet analyst’s earnings forecasts 
to avoid negative stock price reactions afterwards that might arise in the 
event a forecast has to be adjusted. Fields et al. state that most research in 
this field tests market efficiency by examining whether accounting choices 
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with no direct cash-flow implications are associated with changes in stock 
prices.  
 
Impact on third parties 
The third category of market imperfections that affects accounting choices 
relates to the attempt to influence other third parties. These third parties 
include, for example, tax authorities, the government, suppliers and 
competitors. Through accounting numbers, managers try to influence the 
decisions made by these third parties. Fields et al. (2001) mention that the 
most common hypotheses in this category relate to accounting choices that 
reduce or defer taxes and that avoid potential regulation. These accounting 
choices often referred to as political costs. Watts and Zimmerman (1986) 
formulated the political costs hypothesis as follows. 
 
- The political costs hypothesis 
The political costs hypothesis implies that accounting numbers are used 
in political process. For example, accounting numbers may be used to set 
price guidelines to control inflation (public utilities), to regulate the 
quantity and type of services offered (banks). Tax policy may also be 
influenced by accounting numbers (Watts and Zimmerman, p.223, 1986). 
Since the political process is a competition for wealth transfers, the 
management of a company will adopt accounting procedures that reduce 
the transfers. A special feature of the general political costs hypothesis is 
the size hypothesis. The size hypothesis assumes that large companies 
are more politically sensitive than small companies are, and therefore are 
subject to different incentives in their accounting procedures. 
 
While the goal of this study is the usefulness of the current lease-accounting 
standard, particularly the distinction between financial- and operating leases and 
the related accounting choice, the study will focus mainly on the financial 
contracting motivations, the internal and external agency conflicts, as described by 
Fields et al. (2001). 
6.3 Previous literature on the determinants of lease decisions 
The theoretical background of the determinants of leasing policy was described by 
Smith and Wakeman (1985). They discussed eight non-tax incentives for leasing. 
Three of these are related to the leased asset, suggesting that leasing is more likely 
if;  
1. the asset is less sensitive to use and maintenance,  
2. the asset is not specialised to the company, and  
3. the expected period of use is shorter than the useful life.  
Two incentives are related to lessor characteristics, suggest that leasing is more 
likely if; 
4. the lessor has market power, and  
5. the lessor has a comparative advantage in disposing of the asset.  
Finally, three incentives relate to the above-described agency costs and financial 
contracting costs, and suggest that leasing is more likely if;  
6.  corporate bond contracts contain specific financial policy covenants, 
7. management compensation is a function of return on invested capital, and, 
8. the company is closely held.  
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This study does not investigate the incentives related to the leased asset and to the 
lessor characteristics, since this relates to information that is not available in the 
financial statements and does not relate to the lessee. The main purpose of this 
study is to find evidence on the characteristics of the lessee that determine his 
choice for (operating) leases. The main emphasis will therefore be on the above-
listed incentives six, seven and eight, as defined by Smith and Wakeman (1985).  
 
This section describes nine empirical studies that investigated the relation between 
the characteristics of leasing- and lessee companies. The different studies on the 
determinants of leasing choice have different backgrounds. Roughly, the studies can 
be divided into three categories. First are studies in the field of the lease-debt 
substitutability discussion (Ang and Peterson (1984) and Deloof and Verschueren 
(1999)). The second category comprises studies looking for evidence on financial 
contracting theory and accounting choice (El-Gazzar et al. (1986), Sharpe and 
Nguyen (1995), Adams and Hardwick (1998), Lasfer and Levis (1998), Mehran et al. 
(1999) and Duke et al. (2002)). The third category can be typified by the study of 
Graham et al. (1998), and focuses on the tax reason to lease.  
 
However, before we can describe the characteristics and their relation with leasing 
choice in the previous studies, we must note that these studies use different 
definitions and formats of leasing. In other words, the dependent variable varies 
between these models. For example, some studies concern only financial leases, 
some concern both financial- and operating leases, and only three studies include a 
model solely with operating leases. Furthermore, the dependent variable varies in 
its appearance as a ratio measuring the lease intensity (financial lease share, 
operating-lease share of total lease share) or as lease dummy (the existence of 
operating- or financial leases). This section therefore proceeds as follows. After 
describing the dependent variables used in the studies, the discussion will hone in 
on the choice of the dependent variable in this study and the endogeneity of certain 
variables affected by operating leases.  
 
Table 6.1 summarises the previous studies on the determinants of leasing choice. 
For the purpose of comparison and in anticipation of the hypotheses formulated at 
the end of each-sub section, a summary of the methodology and data of this study is 
also included. 
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Table 6.1 Comparison of previous empirical studies on the determinants of leasing choice 
BVE=Book value of equity, MVE=Market value of equity, TA=Total assets, TD=Total debt, LTD=Long-term debt, D/E=Debt/equity, EBITDA= Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and 
amortisation, EBIT=Earnings before interest and tax, EBT= Earnings before tax, ROE= Return on equity, EPS=Earnings per share, DPS=Dividends per share, DY=Dividend yield, PPE=Plant, 
property and equipment, CE=Capital employed, CR=current ratio  
    
Study: Ang and 
Peterson 
(1984) 
El-Gazzar et 
al. (1986) 
Sharpe and 
Nguyen (1995) 
Adams and 
Hardwick 
(1998) 
Lasfer and 
Levis (1998) 
Graham et al. 
(1998) 
Mehran et al. 
(1999) 
Deloof and 
Verschueren 
(1999) 
Duke et al. 
(2002) 
This study 
(2006) 
Research 
period 
1976-1981 1976 1986, 1988, 1991 1994 1982-1996 1981-1992 1986-1991 1992-1994 1985 2000-2004 
Country US US US UK UK US US Belgium US Netherlands 
Companies in 
sample 
600 154 2,000 100  3,008 n/a 176, only 
manufacturing 
1,066 182 119 
Observations 3,600 154 6,110 100 23,411 18,193 1,056  3,198 182 584 
Method Tobit 
 
Probit (NPA) 
and MDA 
  
 
Logit   OLS Tobit Ordered logit and 
OLS 
Logit and OLS 
Focus on: Financial  Financial and 
dummy 
Financial, 
operating and total 
Total lease 
share 
Financial Operating and 
financial 
Financial and 
total 
Financial Operating Operating 
-Lease ratio financial 
leases/BE.00     
financial 
leases/TA 
 
 
1. rental 
commitments/total 
capital costs1 
2. net financial 
leases/net PPE 
3. combination of 
1 and 2 
Total lease 
share, as 
Sharpe and 
Nguyen 
 1. Operating 
leases2/ MVE 
2. Financial 
leases/ MVE 
1. financial 
leases/TA 
2. Total lease 
share, as 
Sharpe and 
Nguyen 
financial 
leases /TA 
nominal lease 
payments due in 
five years/TA 
PVOL/TA 
-Lease 
dummy 
 1 if only 
operating 
leases; 0 if 
only finance 
leases 
  1 if company 
uses financial 
lease; 0 if not 
    1 if high-leasing 
company; 0 if 
low- leasing 
company 
Explanatory variables:  
Leverage Debt/BVE 3 D/E ratios  LTD plus 
prior charge 
capital/TA 
LTD/CE 
Bank loan/TD 
 TD/(TD+MVE) LTD/TA Covenants 
dummy 
LTD/E 
LTD/CE 
TD/TA 
Performance 
measure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EBITDA/sales 
Return on net 
PPE 
CR 
10-year sales 
variability 
 
 EBITDA/sales 
Bond rating 
No dividend 
dummy 
 
 EBIT 
EBT 
ROE 
EPS 
DPS 
DY 
3 financial 
distress 
measures: 
Expected costs 
of financial 
distress 
Altman’s Z-score 
dummy for 
negative book-
value equity 
 
 
4-year average 
EBIT/TA 
Prior 2-year 
average 
dividend paid/ 
BVE 
7-year standard 
deviation of 
EBIT/TA 
EBIT/TA 
Variability of 
income 
 ROA 
EBIT/TA 
EPS 
CR 
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Study: Ang and 
Peterson 
(1984) 
El-Gazzar et 
al. (1986) 
Sharpe and 
Nguyen (1995) 
Adams and 
Hardwick 
(1998) 
Lasfer and 
Levis (1998) 
Graham et al. 
(1998) 
Mehran et al. 
(1999) 
Deloof and 
Verschueren 
(1999) 
Duke et al. 
(2002)          
This study 
(2006) 
Size TA Sales Ln(# employees) Ln(sales) 
Ln(sales)2 
Ln(total assets) 
Ln(sales) 
Ln(market value 
of equity) 
Ln(market value 
company) 
Ln(sales) 
Ln(sales)2 
Ln(TA)  Ln(TA) 
Ln(MVE) 
Ln(sales) 
Investment 
opportunity/ 
growth 
PE ratio   PE ratio Fixed capital 
investments/TA 
R&D/sales 
2-year sales 
growth 
Pay-out ratio 
MTB 
MTB Market-to-book 3-year TA 
growth 
 PE ratio 
5-year TA 
growth 
MTB 
Capital 
intensity 
asset 
structure 
  Annual capital 
costs1/#employees 
Equipment age = 
1- 
PPEnet/PPEgros 
  netPPE/TA 
(‘collateral’) 
 Current 
assets/TA 
Fixed financial 
assets/TA 
 netPPE/TA 
TCC/employeer 
sales/employee 
CA/TA 
equipment age 
Tax   Effective tax 
rate 
Tax/EBT 
Large tax-loss 
carry forward 
dummy 
 5 tax measures 
among which 
Tax/EBT 
-Tax 
recoverable=rep
orted tax/future 
tax liability 
Simulated before 
financing tax rate 
Simulated 
before financing 
tax rate 
 Effective tax 
rate 
Effective tax rate 
tax dummy 
Sharpe 
Tax-loss dummy 
 
Management 
compensation 
 Management 
compensation 
dummy (1 if 
based on 
income net of 
interest) 
      As El-Gazzar 
et al. 
ln(management 
compensation) 
change in MC 
% bonus 
plan/base salary 
Ownership 
structure 
   Proportion of 
shares held 
by top three 
share-
holders 
  % common 
shares held by 
CEO (and also 
squared) 
 Largest of: -% 
held by 
officers and 
directors -% 
held by largest 
single owner 
% closely held 
shares 
Industry   6 industry 
dummies 
  3 industry 
dummies 
Regulated 
industry dummy 
(telephone and 
utilities) 
   5 industry 
dummies 
telecom dummy 
Other      Year dummy    Year dummy 
1 total annual capital costs = rental commitments + depreciation + i*net ppe; 2 Lease ratio is calculated by dividing the current rental expenses plus present value of operating-lease commitments 
for next 5 years, discounted at 10% by the market value of the company. Graham et al. also uses the debt ratio and the capital leases to market value as dependent variable. 
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6.3.1 The dependent leasing variable in previous studies 
This thesis concerns particularly operating leases as explained in chapter 2. The 
main research question of this chapter is what company characteristics determine 
whether a company is a high- or low- operating leasing company. As shown in Table 
6.2, many of the studies that have investigated the determinants of leasing choice 
concerned only financial leases. Only the studies of Sharpe and Nguyen (1995), 
Graham et al. (1998) and Duke et al. (2002) include a model in which operating 
leases are separately investigated. El-Gazzar et al. (1986) also investigate operating 
leases separately, but only by dividing companies into ‘capitalisers’ (only financial 
leases reported) and ‘non-capitalisers’ (only operating leases reported). Table 6.2 
shows that of the remainder of the nine investigated studies, three concern only 
financial leases and four use financial and operating leases together as a dependent 
variable in their model. Furthermore, Table 6.2 shows that all studies use a ratio as 
dependent variable (the lease intensity defined as the lease quantity divided by 
some other measure). Two studies, El-Gazzar et al. (1986) and Lasfer and Levis 
(1998), additionally include a model with a lease dummy as a dependent variable, 
where the dummy takes a value of one if a company discloses operating leases and 
no financial leases (El-Gazzar) or if a company reports financial leases regardless of 
whether they also disclose operating leases (Lasfer and Levis). 
 
Table 6.2 Appearance of the dependent variable in the eight investigated studies 
Different studies are categorised by the type of lease used in the study (either separately financial- or operating 
leases, or both types combined) and by whether the dependent variable is used in a relative measure (lease intensity) 
or in a dichotomous variable (lease dummy). 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
FINANCIAL LEASE 
SEPARATELY 
OPERATING LEASE 
SEPARATELY 
COMBINED FINANCIAL 
AND OPERATING LEASES 
Lease dummy Lasfer and Levis (1998)  El-Gazzar et al. (1986) 
 
 
Lease intensity 
 
Ang and Peterson (1984) 
Graham et al. (1998) 
Deloof and Verschueren (1999) 
Mehran et al. (1999) 
 
 
Graham et al. (1998) 
Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) 
Duke et al. (2002) 
 
El-Gazzar et al. (1986) 
Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) 
Adams and Hardwick (1998) 
Mehran et al. (1999) 
 
The main purpose of the study of Ang and Peterson (1984) was to find evidence on 
the lease-debt substitutability question (are leases and debt supplementary or 
complementary to each other?). They incorporated only financial leases. They used 
data from the period 1976 through 1981, and mentioned that the percentage of 
companies with operating (non-capitalised) leases shrank from thirteen percent in 
1976 to eight percent in 1977, to one percent in 1978, and to even less than one 
percent in the years thereafter. They concluded that this sharp decline might be 
attributable to the lease classification criteria of FAS13 (see chapter 2), which 
became effective from 1980. This probably resulted in a reclassification of operating 
leases as financial leases. Therefore, Ang and Peterson assumed that operating 
leases could not possibly play a role in explaining the lease-debt substitutability 
coefficient; operating leases were thus not included in their study58. In their 
analysis, the lease ratio is a negative function of the debt ratio and the debt 
capacity of a company. The debt capacity of a company is a function of six other 
financial variables; being operating leverage, sales variability, profitability, 
                                                          
58 Their findings of the insignificance of operating leases is in sharp contrast with the findings of similar studies in 
the US of for example Graham et al. (1998) or more recently the SEC (2005) who have evidence that the opposite is 
true  (financial lease only a fraction of operating leases).  
CHAPTER 6 
158 
expected growth, size and liquidity. They concluded (p.1064) that their findings 
might be declared as ‘ an unsolved puzzle’ in finance. 
 
The study of El-Gazzar et al. (1986) aimed to find evidence on managerial lease-
accounting choice using leverage-, bonus plan- and political costs variables. They 
tested two models, one with lease intensity as a dependent variable and one with a 
lease dummy as a dependent variable. The lease intensity was calculated as both 
financial- and operating leases divided by total assets (so no separate analysis for 
operating leases). The operating-lease part within the lease-intensity measure is 
the present value of the lease liabilities (FAS13 disclosure type; see chapter 2). 
However, El-Gazzar et al. did not indicate which discount rate they used or how 
they divided the lease payments after year five over the future years. The second 
model used a lease dummy with a value of one if a company used only operating 
leases and zero if a company used only financial leases. El-Gazzar et al. therefore 
used an all-or-nothing approach in which they tried to distinguish the differences 
between companies that capitalise leases and companies that do not.  
 
Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) analysed the incentive to lease from the perspective of 
capital-market imperfections. They included the financial-lease share and 
operating-lease share as dependent variables— both separately as well as in a total 
leasing share. The operating-lease share was calculated by dividing rental 
commitments by total capital costs. (See also chapter 5, where this measure was 
used to test the materiality of lease commitments). In their paper, Sharpe and 
Nguyen focused on the role of leasing in alleviating financial contracting costs. 
Their hypothesis was that companies facing higher costs of external funding might 
be able to economize on fixed capital costs through leasing. In other words, leasing 
lowers average capital costs for companies facing high premiums. Their analysis 
was based on three variables that act as indicators for higher premiums on external 
funds. These variables are no dividend paid, poor cash-flow generation and low 
rating. Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) were therefore most interested in the 
performance indicators of a company. Other variables (such as size and tax 
obligations) were also included to define what motivates leasing, but these variables 
were less important in the investigation of their hypothesis. 
 
Adams and Hardwick (1998) included both financial and operating leases in their 
study by calculating a total leasing share (rental payments divided by total capital 
costs). Although their approach was identical to that of Sharpe and Nguyen (1995), 
they did not investigate operating leases separately (as Sharpe and Nguyen did). 
Adams and Hardwick (1998) aimed to provide evidence on the possible relationship 
between leasing decisions and four company-specific characteristics: leverage, 
company size, ownership structure and the investment opportunity set. They 
argued in a footnote that in contrast to prior UK studies that excluded operating 
leases, they included operating leases, since their study tested for differences 
between leasing and non-leasing decisions rather than examining choices between 
different types of leasing. They assumed with this that the choice for operating- and 
financial leases is influenced by the same determinants.  
 
The purpose of the study of Lasfer and Levis (1998) was to show the determinants 
of the leasing decision, and to investigate whether these determinants differ 
between quoted- and non-quoted companies and between small- and large 
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companies. Although their study  included eighteen different variables to analyse 
the determinants of leasing decisions, it was limited in two ways. First, they 
included only financial lease and hire purchase as recognised in the borrowing 
section of the balance sheet. They explicitly excluded operating leases from their 
analysis, since these were deemed ‘short-term cancellable leases’ (p.166). The 
second limitation of their study was the differentiation made in their analysis 
between lessee and non-lessee companies (a non-lessee company does not have 
financial leases and a lessee-company does). This distinction was used in both the 
univariate- and the logit analysis. Only when investigating the univariate size 
differences between lessee and non-lessee companies, and quoted and non-quoted 
companies, did they include an average lease propensity of these sub-samples. This 
lease propensity is the ratio of financial leases and hire purchases divided by total 
debt. Of course, this ratio is zero for the non-lessee companies.  
 
The study of Graham et al. (1998) is one of the three studies that also focuses 
separately on operating leases. Since their major goal was to analyse the 
relationship of the tax status of a company and the company’s usage of leasing, they 
focussed on operating leases, which are classified as true leases by the IRS. They 
tested three different models using three different financial claims as dependent 
variables: debt (excluding financial leases), financial leases and operating leases, all 
three as a fraction of the market value of the company. The present value of 
operating leases was calculated as the present value of the current-year rental 
expense plus rental expenses over the next five years, discounted at 10%. Although 
they worried about the bias that might have arisen from using a fixed 10% for all 
companies59, they did not mention the bias that might have arisen while they 
ignored the lump-sum lease commitments after year five. For example, the 
discussion in chapter 5 of this thesis showed that in the Netherlands, the lump-sum 
payment after year five accounts for approximately 23% of the total commitments. 
Ignoring these commitments would seriously distort a lease-intensity measure.  
 
Worth mentioning, furthermore, is the difference between the findings of Graham et 
al. (1998) compared to those of Ang and Peterson (1984) with respect to the number 
of companies with operating leases. The sample of Graham et al. consisted of 18,193 
company-year observations during the period 1981 through 1992 (Ang and 
Peterson’s period of 1976 through 1981 had 3,600 such observations). Graham et al. 
showed that 99.9% of these observations had operating leases in their capital 
structure, against 52.6% financial leases. They explained the high incidence of 
operating leases by the fact that (p.139) ‘most firms lease at least some items, such 
as office equipment or automobiles’. As mentioned before, Ang and Peterson ignored 
operating leases, since less than 1% of the companies disclosed operating leases 
during the period 1979 through 1981. Both studies used US companies and the 
Compustat database. A reason for this difference might be that Ang and Peterson 
based their study solely on information from Compustat, whereas Graham et al. 
might have manually extracted the operating-lease information from annual 
reports. As described in chapter 5, many databases do not include operating leases 
in their databases because of the divergent formats that different companies use for 
disclosing operating leases. 
 
                                                          
59 See also chapters 4 and 5. Graham et al. used as alternative discount rate the short-term borrowing rate of each 
company; this led to many missing observations but also did not change the qualitative nature of their results. 
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Mehran et al. (1999) analysed the lease decision also within the framework of 
financial contracting theory. They argued that financial contracting theory suggests 
that ownership structure is potentially an important determinant of debt financing 
and leasing, but that its effect on leasing had not yet been explored. They also 
controlled for other explanatory variables that had been found in previous leasing 
studies. The dependent variable in the model of Mehran et al. (1999) was the lease 
intensity; this variable included operating leases. Mehran et al. (1999) argued that 
ignoring the operating leases in their measurement of lease intensity would cause 
them to miss important findings on, for example, the tax effects of leasing. They 
also referred to Graham et al., who had pointed out that operating leases were more 
likely to qualify as ‘true leases’ and that under the US Internal Revenue Service 
guidelines (IRS) only true leases allow the transfer of non-debt tax shields from 
lessee to lessor. Therefore, in addition to their two models using only financial 
leases as dependent variables, they also included a model featuring the share of 
lease payments (financial leases and operating leases) in total capital costs as a 
dependent variable (see Sharpe and Nguyen, 1995)). Despite their arguments about 
how important operating leases are in capturing tax effects, Mehran  et al. did not 
include a measure that solely included operating leases. 
 
The study of Deloof and Verschueren (1999) is the only one that analyses companies 
outside the US or the UK. Unfortunately, they also considered only financial leases. 
The dependent variable was a lease ratio calculated as financial leases divided by 
total assets. Their study falls within the lease-debt substitutability discussion (see 
Ang and Peterson, 1984)); their focus was therefore on the relationship between five 
different leverage ratios and the lease ratio. They also included variables 
representing profitability, variability of income, size, growth and the nature of 
assets. 
 
Duke et al. (2002) aimed to test empirically the company-specific variables that 
were linked theoretically in prior studies to operating leases. More specifically, they 
sought to test the theoretical reasoning of Smith and Wakeman (1985). They 
focused on the three agency costs / financial contracting incentives to lease as 
described by Smith and Wakeman (1985) (compensation contracts, debt covenants 
and ownership structure). Although they focused on operating leases, they did 
compromise on the validity of their dependent variable. According to Duke et al., 
the best measure as dependent variable would theoretically be the present value of 
minimum lease payments for operating- and financial leases. However, as they 
mention, this value is neither disclosed as such in financial statements nor is it 
available in databases. Furthermore, based on the study of Ely (1992; see also 
chapter 4), they concluded that using a capitalisation method is problematic due to 
the underlying assumptions. Therefore, Duke et al. alone took into account the 
cumulative next five-year’s nominal lease payments and divided these by total 
assets. As an alternative measure, they divided the cumulative figure by purchased 
assets instead of total assets. 
 
6.3.2 Choice of dependent variable in this study 
The purpose of this study is to find evidence on the determinants of the choice for 
operating leases. Four of the above-described studies had a similar purpose (El-
Gazzar et al. (1986; Sharpe and Nguyen (1995), Graham et al. (1998) and Duke et 
al. (2002)). All focused on a limited set of determinants, and Sharpe and Nguyen 
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(1995) and Graham et al. (1998), for example, both excluded the variable on which 
operating leases had the highest impact: leverage. Also the study of El-Gazzar et al. 
(1986) distinguished the usage of operating leases, but theirs was an all-or-nothing 
approach: a company has either only financial leases or only operating leases. There 
was no measure for high leasing- versus low-leasing companies. As described in 
chapter 2, almost all companies have operating leases nowadays, and the method of 
El-Gazzar et al. (1986) would exclude the majority of companies that report having 
both types of leases. The study of Duke et al. (2002) did investigate the relative 
usage of operating leases. However, due to insufficient data and difficulties in 
capitalising the lease liability, they calculated the lease intensity by taking into 
account only the nominal lease commitments of the next five years.  
 
The other studies analysed either only financial leases or only total leases 
(financial- and operating leases combined). The focus on financial leases is easier, 
due to the availability of data derived from financial databases (see chapter 5). 
However, many of the hypotheses formulated by the researchers relate to the off-
balance-sheet advantage of operating leases. For example, the debt-covenants 
hypothesis assumes that companies with a high leverage are more likely to lease, 
since they might avoid the debt constraints on existing debt. However, this refers to 
off-balance-sheet leases and not on-balance. Moreover, the bonus-plan hypothesis 
assumes that managers will choose the accounting method that best fulfils their 
interests. Bonus plans based on accounting numbers are more likely to encourage 
off-balance leases instead of on-balance leases. Furthermore, the tax transfer 
between lessees (charged lower taxes) and lessors (charged high taxes) is only 
applicable for true leases: operating leases.  
 
Smith and Wakeman (1985) argued that since financial leases are not ‘true leases’, 
but are accounted for on-balance, incentives associated with bond contracts and 
executive compensation contracts cannot explain the choice of financial leases. 
Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) found different statistical results between the financial-
lease share and the operating-lease share. The results of all studies taking into 
account only financial leases cannot be applied to a model for operating leases only; 
the results of the studies with both types of leases combined will also probably be 
influenced by the proportion of financial leases. It is surprising that El-Gazzar et al. 
(1986) did not test the lease intensity of operating leases separately. They had the 
data (the present value of the operating-lease liability), and their main focus was on 
why companies choose operating leases instead of financial leases. Mehran et al. 
(1999) argued that consideration of financial leases alone might cause researchers 
to miss the true effect of some of the determinants. Furthermore, they argued that 
another difficulty with only using financial leases is that they are not used by many 
companies. In their sample of 176 companies, only 68 companies reported financial 
leases. However, their model investigated only the effect of ownership structure on 
financial and operating leases combined, and did not study separately the effect of 
ownership structure on operating-lease intensity.  
 
Therefore, an improvement of this study as compared to the prior studies lies within 
the dependent variable: operating leases alone. In contrast to El-Gazzar et al. 
(1986), who tested the choice between operating- and financial leases, this study 
tests how certain determinants relate to the intensity of the (accounting) choice for 
operating leases. Also, the operating-lease intensity measure used in this study is 
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more refined than the measure used by Duke et al. This study takes into account all 
future lease commitments (not only those in the next five years), and calculates the 
present value of the lease liability (instead of nominal commitments). 
 
6.3.3 The endogeneity of certain variables 
The argument of Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) that total assets, because of its 
endogeneity, is not appropriate as explanatory variable for size is also applicable to 
other variables that are significantly affected by the capitalisation of operating 
leases. Chapter 5 proved that these variables are especially the ratios in which 
either debt or total assets are adjusted. However, most studies that analyse the 
relation between operating-lease intensity and company characteristics ignore the 
impact that operating leases have on the balance sheet of a company. This study 
tests the relationship between the determinants before- and after-capitalisation of 
operating leases and the operating-lease intensity. For example, chapter 5 showed 
that operating leases significantly affect the leverage ratios of a company. This 
indicates that a company with an average leverage ratio might choose operating 
leases instead of on-balance debt to prevent their leverage ratio increasing to above-
average levels. The leverage ratio for this company before capitalisation might not 
have differed with the leverage ratio of a non-leasing company; the company 
succeeded in its goal to circumvent the disadvantages arising from a too-high 
leverage. Therefore, the choice of using a leverage ratio before capitalisation or after 
capitalisation will affect the outcome of the results. This is an important distinction, 
as will be illustrated by Figure 6.1. It is evident that not all determinants are 
endogenous (size can be measured by total assets, but also by sales or the market 
value of equity).  
Figure 6.1 Illustration of determinants before- or after operating-lease capitalisation 
 
Assume two companies A and B with the following balance sheets: 
A
Equity
Debt
Total
Assets 100 20
80
100
B
Equity
Debt
Total
Assets 80 20
60
80  
 
In an attempt to avoid the violation of their debt covenants, the management of company B has successfully 
decreased their on-balance liabilities in the past by choosing operating leases instead of normal debt financing to 
finance their assets. Company A has no operating leases. The present value of the lease commitments of company B 
is 30. (For the sake of convenience, this is also the value of the leased assets.) PVOL/TA of B is consequently 
37.5% (30/80).  
Total debt to total assets is 0.8 for company A, and 0.75 for company B. Through their leasing policy, company B 
has successfully lowered their leverage. Based on these numbers, an empirical study would result in a negative 
relationship between leverage and operating-lease intensity (higher leverage, fewer leases). This would consequently 
lead to the rejection of the debt hypothesis. Also, when examining size measured by total assets, the relation is 
negative. A larger company has fewer operating leases. However, if we test the relationship between size and 
leverage (as if the operating leases would have been capitalised), the results show the opposite. The balance sheet of 
company B will be adjusted as shown below. 
A
Equity
Debt
Total
Assets 100 20
80
100
B,after lease capitalisation
Equity
Debt
Total
Assets 110 20
90
110  
Although the leverage of company A remains 0.80, company B’s leverage increases from 0.75 to 0.82. Now the 
relationship between leverage and operating lease intensity is indeed positive, and the debt hypothesis is confirmed. 
In addition, the relationship size and operating-lease intensity become positive.  
PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON THE DETERMINANTS OF THE OPERATING-LEASE DECISION 
163 
 
The previous example shows the impact that the capitalisation of operating leases 
may have on empirical studies investigating the determinants of the operating-
lease decision. As a measure of size, variables can be chosen that are not affected by 
operating leases, which solves for size as a determinant the endogeneity issue. 
However, no measure of leverage exists that is not affected by the operating leases. 
Also, many ratios are calculated by dividing by total assets, which expands the 
endogeneity issue on this variable. Therefore, to bring companies to a comparable 
base, this study adjusts the explanatory variables for operating leases, if 
appropriate. It is therefore implicitly assumed that (operating) leases and debt are 
substitutes and not complements. 
 
Finally, in contrast to all studies discussed, this study does not focus on a limited 
set of variables, but investigates all determinants discussed above using, at the 
least, the univariate approach. The hypotheses for each determinant are formulated 
in the next sub-sections. 
 
Although these differences prohibit a comparison between the studies based on 
equal variables, the argumentation why certain determinants are included is still 
relevant and will be discussed in the following sections. However, not only the 
dependent variable (leasing choice in different forms) differs between the studies, 
also different arguments are used for the same independent variable to have an 
impact on the leasing choice. For example, the variable ‘size’ is a measure of 
political costs, according to El-Gazzar et al. (1986), because large companies are 
more likely to suffer from excess regulation (see section 6.2). However, Lasfer and 
Levis (1998) argue that company size can be a measure of the extent to which 
companies have the ability to redeploy assets internally, and this might indicate 
that large companies are less likely to lease assets. The discussion will now turn to 
address consecutively the following determinants of leasing choice: leverage (6.4), 
size (6.5), profitability (6.6), growth/investment opportunity set (6.7), capital 
intensity/asset structure (6.8), effective tax rate (6.9), management compensation 
(6.10), ownership structure (6.11) and industry (6.12). Each sub-section presents a 
literature review and formulation of the related hypotheses. 
6.4 Leverage 
6.4.1 Literature review 
Chapter 5 showed that the capitalisation of operating leases had the highest impact 
on the leverage ratios of a company. This was in line with previous research on the 
impact of operating-lease capitalisation (Imhoff et al. (1991, (1997), Beattie et al. 
(1998) and others). Most studies summarised in Table 6.1 include one or more 
measures of leverage; Deloof and Verschueren (1998) even include five different 
measures of leverage. Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) and Graham et al. (1998) did not 
include a leverage measure. This is especially regrettable, since these two studies 
analysed separately operating leases as dependent variable. The results on leverage 
are summarised in Table 6.3 and described thereafter. 
 
CHAPTER 6 
164 
Table 6.3 Prior results on leverage 
STUDY DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
MEASURE OF 
LEVERAGE 
SIGN SIGNIFICANCE 
Ang and Peterson Financial lease Debt/ book value of equity Positive Significant 
El-Gazzar et al. Lease dummy  Change in Debt/Equity 
Debt/Equity 
Debt/Equity net of industry 
Positive 
Positive 
Positive 
Significant 
Significant 
Significant 
Adams and 
Hardwick 
Total leases Long-term debt /total assets Positive Significant 
Lasfer and Levis Financial lease 
dummy 
Long-term debt/capital 
employed 
Positive 
Large companies: positive 
Not significant 
Significant 
Mehran et al. Total leases (predicted) total debt/capital 
employed 
Positive Not significant 
Deloof and 
Verschueren 
Financial leases Long-term debt/total assets Negative 
Positive small companies 
Negative large companies 
Significant 
Not significant 
Significant 
Duke et al. Operating lease Long-term debt/equity 
Covenants existence 
Positive 
Positive 
Significant 
Not significant 
 
As described before, Ang and Peterson’s (1984) study falls within the lease-debt 
substitutability discussion, and they investigated only financial leases. The leverage 
ratio used by Ang and Peterson is defined as debt-to-book-value-of-equity. They 
found a significant, positive relationship between the lease ratio and the debt ratio. 
Their results showed that leases and debt are complementary, meaning greater 
debt is associated with greater leasing. One of the explanations they formulate is 
that the market for debt and debt-like securities may not be efficient. They use as 
an example Abdel-Khalik (1981), who reported that a high percentage of lenders 
apparently ignore non-capitalized leases. It is surprising that Ang and Peterson 
quote Abdel-Khalik’s conclusion, since they did exactly the same (ignoring non-
capitalised leases) and even formulate arguments for their exclusion of operating 
leases (see discussion above). 
 
El-Gazzar et al. (1986) analysed the differences between companies with either 
financial leases (the capitalisers) and operating leases (the non-capitalisers). They 
used three different measures of leverage in their study: the change in the debt-
equity ratio, the debt-equity ratio and the industry-adjusted debt-equity ratio. They 
hypothesised a positive relation between all three measures and the choice for 
operating leases (instead of financial leases). They based their hypotheses on 
previous research that indicated that companies with financial ratios closer to the 
limits of covenants should be motivated to loosen the covenant constraints. 
Violation of the covenants imposes costs because it restricts investments and 
financing possibilities (debt capacity) and could also lead to technical default, 
triggering debt renegotiation costs. All three leverage hypotheses were confirmed by 
their results.  
 
Adams and Hardwick (1998) argued that high corporate leverage is often associated 
with increased contracting costs (higher cost of capital and increased monitoring 
expenditures). Leasing, however, allows company managers to circumvent debt 
covenants and to generate cash flows that could be used to finance bonuses and 
perquisite consumption. This is in line with debt and leases being complementary 
instead of substitutes, because lenders do not view leases as equivalent to debt. 
Adams and Hardwick (1998) argued in favour of the complementary view of leasing 
managers in highly leased companies being able to differentiate more easily the 
claims of shareholders and debt-holders on future cash flow generated from 
projects. They hypothesised that highly leveraged companies have a higher leasing 
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share (operating- plus financial leases) because leasing would mitigate incentive 
conflicts between owners, debt-holders and managers in highly leased companies. 
Their results confirmed this hypothesis. 
 
Lasfer and Levis (1998) investigated whether the relationship between leverage and 
leasing is different for small and large companies. They followed Smith and 
Wakeman (1985), who argued that the results of Ang and Peterson (1984) reflect 
the difficulties to control for debt capacity. Companies with higher debt capacity 
may also have other characteristics that make leasing relatively attractive. For 
example, companies with certain asset characteristics might have a higher debt 
capacity and therefore can afford to use more debt and leasing than other 
companies do. They hypothesise that if leasing is a substitute for debt financing, 
lessee companies will exhibit lower leverage ratios than will non-lessee companies. 
The results of Lasfer and Levis (1998) showed in a univariate analysis that a high 
leverage ratio was positively related to more leasing for not only the entire sample, 
but also the subs-sample of quoted companies. Also in the logit-regression was the 
leverage ratio significantly positively related to the probability of using leasing for 
the entire sample. However, when the sample was split into sub-samples, the 
results were not significant for the quoted companies in the sample. Their results 
also showed that the reason to lease is different for quoted and unquoted companies 
and for small and large companies. 
Although Mehran et al. (1999)’s major goal was to define the relationship between 
ownership structure and the lease decision, they also explored the relationship 
between leasing and other debt financing. A leverage ratio was used indirectly in 
predicting the lease intensity. In their study lease intensity is a function of debt 
intensity and control variables60. They assume that a company first determines its 
overall fixed-claim capacity (based on tax considerations and contracting costs), and 
then considers how to allocate this capacity between debt and leasing. The use of 
debt (the debt intensity) depends on a set of control variables. Next, the use of 
leasing depends on the use of debt plus a set of additional control variables. They 
found evidence of a positive relationship between debt and financial leases, but 
when they included operating leases, they found no significant interaction. 
 
Deloof and Verschueren (1999) sought to test the debt-substitution hypothesis for 
Belgian companies. They limited their study to financial leases, whereas the ratio of 
financial leases to total assets was the dependent variable. Deloof and Verschueren 
estimated a model with six different forms of long-term debt, and they also 
incorporated a set of factors determining the overall debt ratio of a non-leasing 
company. Their results indicate a significant negative relationship between long-
term debt and the lease ratio. This relationship is even stronger for larger 
companies, which have on average higher debt ratios as well as higher lease ratios. 
 
The study of Duke et al. (2002) is set up to test empirically the Smith and Wakeman 
(1985) model, which theoretically linked certain variables to the choice for leasing. 
Although Smith and Wakeman did not mention leverage, they were able to conclude 
                                                          
60 The indirect approach of Mehran and Taggart (1999) may be expressed as follows: First, calculate debt intensity = 
f (control variables); second, use the debt intensity to calculate the lease intensity = g (debt intensity, control 
variables). 
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that operating leasing61 is more likely if corporate bond contracts contain specific 
financial policy covenants. Although this is in line with El-Gazzar et al., El-Gazzar 
did not include the existence of debt covenants in their analysis, but argued that the 
closer a company is to breaking the covenants, the more operating leases it will 
have. El-Gazzar therefore used leverage ratios to test this relationship. Duke et al. 
tested the relationship by including a debt-covenants dummy (with a value of one 
when covenants existed and zero if not). They also included a leverage ratio (long-
term debt/equity) in their study for two reasons. The first has to do with the positive 
correlation found by El-Gazzar et al. between the debt-equity ratio and the use of 
operating leases. The second has to do with the explanatory power that the 
debt/equity ratio has in models that include debt covenants provisions as shown in 
prior studies. Duke et al. use three different methods (ordered logit, multinominal 
logit and OLS), each of which yielded different results. Both variables, covenants 
dummy and D/E ratio show a steady positive relation with operating leases, but for 
both variables significance occurs only once. Duke et al.’s conclusion: that the 
method chosen influences the outcome, and that further research is necessary. 
 
6.4.2 Debt hypothesis 
Leverage is probably the most investigated variable in explaining the choice for 
leases. However, although much evidence is available regarding the impact that 
operating leases have on leverage (see also chapters four and five), it is surprising 
that only one study (El-Gazzar et al.) takes into account adjusted leverage ratios 
(change in debt/equity ratio through capitalisation). Most studies hypothesise that 
companies with a higher leverage are more inclined to lease, since they are closer to 
breaking their debt covenants or to exhausting their debt capacity. All but one 
study found a positive significant effect (see Table 6.3). Only Deloof and 
Verschueren (1999) found a negative relationship between leverage and financial 
leases for large companies. However, as shown in Figure 6.1 in the previous sub-
section, a negative relationship between leverage and the operating-lease intensity 
might occur if companies succeed in lowering their leverage ratios through leasing 
to a below-average level. The debt hypotheses in this study will therefore be 
twofold, one tests the leverage ratio before capitalisation and one tests it afterward. 
Since operating leases are a means of lowering too-high leverage ratios, the 
leverage ratio before capitalisation for high- and low-leasing companies can be 
evened-out. Since the on-balance equivalent of operating leases has a significant 
impact on the leverage ratio, however, the leverage ratio after capitalisation for 
high-leasing companies will be higher than for low-leasing companies.  
 
                                                          
61 Although the Smith and Wakeman study concerns both financial and operating leases, they mention that their 
prediction concerning covenants in bond contracts and executive compensation contracts relate to incentives that are 
only achieved by operating leases and not by financial leases.  
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We may thus formulate two hypotheses on leverage. Based on the above, the debt 
hypotheses are formulated as follows: 
 
hypothesis 6.1. Leverage-before-capitalisation hypothesis 
No significant relationship is expected to exist between the 
leverage ratio before capitalisation and the lease intensity. 
 
hypothesis 6.2. Leverage-after-capitalisation hypothesis 
A positive relationship is expected to exist between the leverage 
ratio after capitalisation and the lease intensity. 
6.5 Size 
6.5.1 Literature review 
Most research on the relationship between size and operating leases suggested a 
negative relationship. One of the reasons for this is that large companies are more 
diversified. Lasfer and Levis (1998) argue that company size can be a measure of 
the extent to which companies have the ability to redeploy assets internally, and 
this might indicate that large companies are less likely to lease assets. This is also 
addressed by Sharpe and Nguyen (1995), who state that large companies are more 
likely to have alternative uses for equipment that is no longer used, or that they 
might have a well-developed mechanism for remarketing equipment. Also smaller 
companies face great uncertainty regarding their future need for equipment or 
(office-) buildings. Smith and Wakeman (1985) and Adams and Hardwick (1998) 
also see a negative relationship between leasing and company size: large companies 
are more likely to fully utilise fixed assets or have alternative uses for buildings, 
equipment and other assets. Another reason why a difference might exist between 
small- and large companies is that smaller companies face higher costs of obtaining 
external funds (Graham et al. (1998)). This is also the basis for one of the 
hypotheses of Sharpe and Nguyen (1995), that companies facing high costs of 
external capital are more inclined to lease. These companies are mainly the young, 
fast-growing and innovation-intensive companies. Table 6.4 shows the prior results 
on size, which are not conclusive.  
 
Table 6.4 Prior results on size 
STUDY DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
MEASURE OF SIZE SIGN SIGNIFICANCE 
Ang and Peterson Financial lease Total Assets Changing signs Not significant 
El-Gazzar et al. Lease dummy  Sales Positive Not significant 
Sharpe et al. Operating lease # Employees Negative Significant 
Adams and Hardwick Total leases Sales Negative1 Significant 
Lasfer and Levis Financial lease 
dummy 
Total assets 
Sales 
Market value of equity 
Positive 
Positive 
Positive 
Significant 
Significant 
Significant 
Graham et al. Operating lease Market value of equity Negative Significant 
Mehran et al. Total lease Sales Negative Significant 
Deloof and Verschueren Financial lease Total assets Positive Significant 
1 Adams and Hardwick found that the partial derivative δlease/δsize is negative for small companies and becomes 
positive for companies larger than 30 million pounds. Therefore, they are not fully convinced by the significant 
negative relation between size and lease intensity, and argue that this relation changes for different sizes. 
 
Ang and Peterson (1984) used as a measure of size the total assets at year-end. 
Their results changed each year during the period 1976 through 1981: the sign of 
the relationship between size and lease intensity changes and only twice is the 
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relationship significant (1976 and 1981; in both years the relationship was positive). 
Their results were therefore not unambiguous. 
 
Based on prior studies, El-Gazzar et al. (1986) investigated size as a measure of 
political cost. Large companies are more likely to suffer excess regulation and/or 
higher taxes. They argue that large companies have a greater motivation to choose 
accounting methods that lower current-period income and therefore avoid operating 
leases. El-Gazzar et al. used total sales as a measure of size, and found (in contrast 
to their hypothesis) a positive relation, however insignificant, between company size 
and operating leases. 
 
Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) used as measure of size the log of the number of 
employees, of which the alternative log of sales gave the similar results. They 
argued that the standard measure of size, the log of total assets, is inappropriate 
because of its endogeneity. As they pointed out, companies that lease more will have 
a lower level of book assets. They preferred the usage of employees since it is, unlike 
total assets, invariant to the leasing choice. The results confirmed the hypothesis of 
Sharpe and Nguyen that small companies lease more than large companies. This 
negative relationship between size and lease intensity was significant. 
 
The Adams and Hardwick (1998) study measured size as annual turnover. In line 
with Sharpe and Nguyen (1995), they argued that total assets are inappropriate, 
since assets are part of the dependent variable proxy. The results of Adams and 
Hardwick provided only limited support for the view that small companies are more 
likely to lease than large companies are. In their regression, the coefficient of the 
size variable was significantly less than zero, which suggested the inverse 
relationship between leasing and size. However, Adams and Hardwick also 
considered the partial derivative δlease/δsize. They thus investigated whether a 
change in company size had the same effect on the leasing share for companies of 
all sizes. Their results showed that the leasing share tended to fall as company size 
increased for companies up to £30 million turnover, but increased for larger 
companies. 
 
In the study of Lasfer and Levis (1998), size was included not only as explanatory 
variable but also as a measure to differentiate between different types of companies. 
They investigated whether the financial lease decision differs between large- and 
small companies. While they consider the size of a company as a measure of the 
extent to which companies can redeploy internally (the diversification argument of 
why large companies use less leases), they also acknowledge that the difference 
between the availability of financing opportunities and the costs varies between 
small and large companies. Size is also used to divide the companies in the sample. 
Their results showed that the determinants of the leasing decisions are size 
dependent. For example, tax reasons are less important for small companies; their 
lease decision is affected more by their growth opportunities. The significance of 
these determinants is reverse for large companies. The univariate analysis results 
show that companies that lease are larger than companies that do not. Within the 
sample of companies that lease, however, they found a negative relationship 
between size and leasing. Furthermore, in the logit analysis they found a positive 
relationship between size and leasing. Lasfer and Levis use three measures of size: 
total assets, market value of equity and sales. 
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Using size-based theories, Graham et al. (1998) expected that larger companies are 
more likely to use debt financing (instead of leasing) than are smaller companies. 
They argued that large companies are more diversified and thus have more stable 
cash flows. They also mentioned economies of scale when issuing securities for 
larger companies, and higher issuing costs for obtaining external funds by smaller 
companies, due to information asymmetry. All three arguments lead to the 
expectation that size and lease usage are inversely related. Graham et al. 
(1998)used the natural log of market value of the company as a proxy for company 
size, but their results were unchanged using total assets adjusted for operating 
leases or total sales as proxies. Indeed, their results showed a significant negative 
relationship between size and operating leases to the market value of a company. 
 
Based on the studies of Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) and Graham et al. (1998), 
Mehran et al. (1999) argued that company size might be a proxy for the cost of 
issuing securities and for a company’s investment flexibility and diversification 
possibilities. Their study uses total sales as the measure of size. Their results show 
that size not only has a strong positive effect on debt financing, but also is positively 
related to the leasing share of total capital costs.  
 
Deloof and Verschueren (1999) also analysed the difference between large- and 
small companies and the determinants of the financial lease decision, although this 
difference was not the major intention of their study (as with Lasfer and Levis). 
Using total assets as a measure of size, they found a significant positive relation for 
the entire sample, but also for the small-company sample (1st quartile) and the 
large-company sample (4th quartile) separately.  
 
Table 6.4 showed previous results on size as an explanatory variable in explaining 
the lease intensity of a company. All eight studies included size as an explanatory 
variable. The results are mixed. Six studies found a significant relationship between 
size and lease intensity, but of these six studies four found a negative relationship 
and two a positive. The two studies that investigated operating-lease intensity 
separately both found a negative, significant relationship. However, El-Gazzar et al. 
found a positive non-significant relationship between companies with only operating 
leases, in contrast to companies with only financial leases. Of the three studies that 
investigated separately financial leases, two found a significant positive 
relationship, and the third was indecisive. These results indicate that size may have 
a different impact on the financial or operating leasing decision and that a model 
including only a combination of both types of leases is not appropriate to analyse 
this relationship.  
 
6.5.2 Size hypothesis 
The above-described studies thus differ greatly with respect to their results on the 
relation between size and leases. Also the hypotheses formulated by the different 
authors differ greatly. Valid arguments can be made for either a negative or a 
positive relation between size and operating-lease intensity. A negative relation is 
explainable when size is related to the flexibility motive in choosing leasing. 
Flexibility is less important for large companies, since these are more diversified, 
and therefore capable of redeploying assets internally, or are less sensitive to 
changes in production or market demand. Also financial contracting theory suggests 
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that larger companies have better access to financial markets and are less inclined 
to lease. However, the management of these companies is more capable in enforcing 
financial contracts that are in their best interest, which might be off-balance 
financings. Furthermore, also the political cost hypothesis might also lead to the 
expectation that large companies are more carefully scrutinised and thus have an 
incentive to improve their financial ratios. The results of Lasfer and Levis (1998) 
illustrated the mixed results on size as a determinant of the lease decision in one 
study. They showed the differences between large- and small-, quoted- and 
unquoted-, lessee- and non-lessee companies— and these results are also mixed. 
They found that non-lessee companies are smaller than lessee firms (indicating a 
negative relation), but within the lessee company sub-sample, the smaller firms had 
a higher lease propensity (indicating a positive relation). The difficulty in 
explaining the relation was also expressed by Adams and Hardwick (1998, p.493), 
who argued that, although they found an significant negative relation between size 
and total lease intensity, “this is only limited support of the view that small 
companies are more likely to lease than large companies”. They distinguished 
between very small companies that lease more because they are growing and need 
to minimize costs, and the largest companies that lease more specific assets such as 
cars and equipment. 
 
Chapter 5 explained that in our sample only 77 out of 584 observations did not use 
operating leases; the distinction as made by Lasfer and Levis (1998) between lessee- 
and non-lessee companies is therefore not worthwhile. However, as suggested by 
Adams and Hardwick (1998), the relationship between size and operating lease 
intensity might be the opposite for very small- and very large companies. The 
outcome of the entire sample is then only an average that can go both ways. This 
would partly explain the different results of different studies. To solve this issue, we 
test the relationship between size and operating-lease intensity not only for the 
entire sample, but also for the smallest and largest companies in the sample. 
 
In this study a positive relationship is expected to exist between size and operating-
lease intensity based on the political-cost hypothesis and financial contracting 
theory. The political-cost hypothesis is based on the idea that since larger 
companies are watched more closely by external parties, they may be more 
motivated to improve certain financial ratios. Furthermore, according to the 
financial contracting theory, larger companies are better informed, and have better 
access to financial markets, which will allow them to choose the financial contracts 
that are in their best interest.  
 
hypothesis 6.3. Size hypothesis 
A positive relationship is expected to exist between the size of a 
company and the operating-lease intensity. 
6.6 Performance measures 
6.6.1 Literature review 
Six of the eight studies included some measure of performance in their analysis of 
the lease decision. These performance measures can be related to profit, cash-flow 
generation, shares or even financial distress as defined by Altman’s z-score. This 
section combines these measures, since most authors provide the same arguments 
for including one of these measures: ceteris paribus, companies generating poor 
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cash flow (Lasfer and Levis (1998): lower profitability) probably face higher funding 
costs: therefore, a greater cash flow enhances a company’s debt capacity (Sharpe 
and Nguyen (1995)). El-Gazzar et al. (1986), and Adams and Hardwick (1998) do 
not include a profitability measure in their analysis. 
 
Table 6.5 Prior results on performance measures 
STUDY DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
MEASURE OF 
PERFORMANCE 
SIGN SIGNIFICANCE 
Ang and 
Peterson 
Financial leases Return on net PPE 
EBITDA/Sales (10 years) 
Variability of Sales (10 
years) 
Current ratio 
Negative 
Negative 
Changing signs 
Changing signs 
Significant 
Significant 
Not significant 
Not significant 
Sharpe et al. Operating leases EBITDA plus rent/sales 
Bond rating 
 
Changing signs 
Negative for higher ratings 
Changing signs for lower ratings 
Inconclusive 
Significant 
Not significant 
Lasfer and Levis Lease dummy Earnings per share 
 
Positive for all companies 
Positive for large companies 
Negative for small companies 
Not significant 
Significant 
Significant 
Graham et al. Operating leases z-score 
Negative equity dummy 
EBITDA/Total assets times 
R&D and advertising/TA 
Positive 
Positive 
Positive 
Significant 
Not significant 
Significant 
Mehran et al. Total leases EBIT/Total Assets  
Dividend/Book value of 
equity 
Not directly tested, but through predicted leverage ratio 
(see leverage) 
Deloof and 
Verschueren 
Financial leases EBITDA/Total Assets Negative for all companies 
Positive for 25% smallest 
companies 
Negative for 25% largest 
companies 
Significant 
Not significant 
Not significant 
 
Ang and Peterson (1984) used as profitability measure the return on net property, 
plant and equipment (PPE), although they did not define ‘return’, which makes it 
more difficult to compare their results with those of the other studies. Furthermore, 
they used a measure of operating leverage defined as the ten-year change in 
operating earnings on sales. The results showed for both variables a significant 
negative relationship. As with the other variables in their study, they did not 
ground their choice of variables on any theory or previous research, and they 
provide no explanation as to why these variables are significantly negative. 
 
As described above, Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) tested their hypothesis that high 
external financing costs are positively related with leasing intensity. They therefore 
used a cash-flow measure because it is a proxy for relative funding costs. As an 
alternative they used the rating of a company (Standard and Poor’s) and also a 
dummy variable for no dividend pay out. These are all indicators that a company 
faces higher costs of external financing. Their measure of cash flow was equal to the 
ratio of earnings before interest, depreciation, rent and tax (EBITDA plus rent 
expenses) to sales. Rental expenses are added back to avoid creating a cash-flow 
measure that is influenced by the choice between renting and buying. Sharpe and 
Nguyen (1995) analysed three different models (total leasing share, only financial 
leasing share and only operating leasing share) for three different years (1986, 1988 
and 1991). Focusing on the results in 1991 for the model explaining the operating-
lease share, Sharpe and Nguyen found a negative, but not significant, relation 
between cash flow and lease propensity. In 1986 this relation was positive and 
significant, however. With respect to the total leasing share model, the relationship 
was negative and significant (except 1991). For the financial leasing model it was 
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positive, but only significantly so in 1988. No-dividend has a significant positive 
relation with the operating-lease propensity, and finally a high bond rating had a 
significant negative relation with the lease propensity. Although for low bond 
ratings the sign became positive, this relation was not significant. These results 
were the same for the total leasing share model, but differences occur within the 
financial leasing share model (ratings not significant, cash-flow ratio significantly 
positive). According to Sharpe and Nguyen (1995), this suggests that it may be 
inappropriate to ignore the operating leases when testing their hypothesis. 
 
Lasfer and Levis (1998) included profitability as an explanatory variable, since 
previous studies have shown that leasing is used by less profitable companies, since 
these companies pay higher premiums for external funds (they refer to Sharpe and 
Nguyen (1995)). They defined six different profitability measures: earnings before 
interest and taxes, earnings before tax, return on equity, earnings per share, 
dividend per share and yield. The results of their analysis of differences (univariate) 
provided empirical evidence that lessee companies in their sample are on average 
more profitable than non-lessee companies. This applied to all variables but one: the 
dividend yield. In their regression they take only the earnings per share as a 
performance measure. These results differed for their sub-groups of large-, medium- 
and small companies and between listed and non-listed companies. For the entire 
sample of listed companies (most relevant for this thesis) the earnings per share 
were higher for lessee companies than for non-lessee companies, but this was not 
significant. When split into subgroups of large- and small listed companies, the 
relation was significantly positive for the large companies, and significantly 
negative for the small companies. Lasfer and Levis concluded from these results 
that for large listed companies leasing contributes to their profitability, and for 
small listed companies leasing contributes to their survival.  
 
Graham et al. (1998) did not investigate the relationship between performance 
measures and lease intensity. They did investigate, however, the relationship 
between financial distress and lease intensity. They argued that leasing, as opposed 
to debt, has a higher priority in bankruptcy. Within a bankruptcy, the lease 
payments have a higher priority than debt payments, and also the legal ownership 
of the leased asset remains with the lessor. According to Graham et al. (1998), this 
meant that companies facing financial distress were able to arrange lease financing 
on more favourable terms than other forms of financing. Graham et al. 
(1998)therefore expected a positive relation between leasing and financial distress 
measures. The financial distress measures they used are a modified version of 
Altman (1968)’s z-score62, a negative equity dummy and a variable relating the 
likelihood of financial distress with the company’s level of intangibility (while this 
indicates the value of the company that will be lost in liquidation). The relationship 
between financial and operating leasing and the z-score was significantly positive at 
the 5% level, but Graham et al. concluded (p.154) that the evidence was 
inconclusive. They ignored the fact that both z-scores lean heavily on total assets 
(see footnote 62), and their results with respect to operating leases were 
consequently affected by their off-balance-sheet character.  
                                                          
62 Graham et al.’s modified z-score is: 
Assets Total
Capital Working2.1
Assets Total
gsRet.earnin4.1
Assets Total
Sales0.1
Asets Total
EBIT3.3 +++ , as opposed to 
Altman’s (1968) z-score: 
debt eBook  valu
equity ueMarket val6.0
Assets Total
Capital  Working2.1
Assets Total
gsRet.earnin4.1
Assets Total
Sales0.1
Asets Total
EBIT3.3 ++++  
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As described before, Mehran et al. estimated the usage of leasing by first predicting 
the debt intensity and then using the debt intensity to predict the lease intensity. 
Their performance measures were EBIT/total assets and dividends/equity. The 
results showed a significant and positive relationship with debt intensity, but this 
was not tested directly in the leasing-intensity equation. The predicted debt 
intensity, however, had a positive but not significant relation with the total leasing 
share.  
 
Deloof and Verschueren (1999) included profitability as well as the EBITDA/total 
assets ratio. Profitability showed a positive relationship with the lease ratio for the 
25% smallest companies (1st quartile), but a negative relationship for the 25% 
largest companies (4th quartile). However, both relationships were not significant. 
For the entire sample they found a negative, slightly significant, relationship. Their 
ratio is less appropriate for testing operating-lease intensity, since it is heavily 
influenced by total assets, which are lowered through operating leases. Moreover, if 
size is a determinant of the operating-lease decision, it would be inappropriate to 
distinguish between small- and large companies based on total assets.  
 
6.6.2 Performance hypothesis 
Chapters 4 and 5 showed that the impact that operating leases have on income-
based performance measures is less significant than the impact they have on the 
balance-sheet items. El-Gazzar et al. (1986) argued that operating leases shift 
income from future periods to the current period, and that this provides an 
incentive for managers to choose operating leases. Chapter 5 showed that this is not 
necessarily true. The impact on the performance ratio based on net income was, 
however, less significant than the leverage ratio. Therefore, it is not expected that 
the goal of shifting net income is driving the decision to lease. Furthermore, the 
results on performance measures of the studies described were also mixed; see 
Table 6.5, which is partly attributable to the different measures used. For example, 
EBITDA is tested by dividing it by sales or by total assets. The EBITDA divided by 
total assets is influenced by the endogenous variable total assets, and this might 
cause an increase in EBITDA to total assets for high-leasing companies. 
Furthermore, since the operating-lease rentals are deducted from EBITDA, and 
depreciation when owning the assets is not, EBITDA (all else equal) will be lower 
for high-leasing companies. This effect was rightly adjusted by Sharpe and Nguyen 
(1995) by adding the annual lease payment to EBITDA. Their results are therefore 
more trustworthy than those of Ang and Peterson (1984), who use the same 
measure (EBITDA/sales) but not adjusted.  
 
In any analysis of performance based on ratios relating income to total assets, the 
results are influenced by the fact that shifting assets off of the balance sheets 
lowers total assets. These ratios are therefore less appropriate as tools with which 
to test the relationship between performance and operating leases, unless the high- 
and low-leasing companies are brought to a comparable base. The hypotheses for 
performance therefore lean on two ideas: first, lower performing companies may 
choose operating leases to improve performance ratios derived from the financial 
statement (accounting choice) based on total assets; second, lower performing 
companies face higher external financing costs, are closer to exhausting their debt-
capacity and their internal funding (financial contracting costs). Although both 
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explanations hypothesise a negative relationship between performance and 
operating-lease intensity, the first explanation (choosing operating leases because 
they improve the financial ratios) will be seen only when the ratio is adjusted to the 
level before the leasing choice was made.  
 
Therefore, the hypotheses on return on assets will be tested using both a before- 
and after- capitalisation value. Since operating leases lower total assets, but only 
have a minor impact on (operating) income, the return on assets (ROA) before 
capitalisation improves when operating leases are chosen. This smooths the 
difference in ROA between high- and low-leasing companies. No significant 
difference is therefore expected to exist between the ROA of high- and low-leasing 
companies before capitalisation. If high-leasing companies succeed in improving 
their ROA, this adaptation will be undone after the capitalisation of operating 
leases. Thus, a negative relation should exist between ROA after capitalisation and 
the operating-lease intensity. ROA after capitalisation will be expected to be lower 
for high-leasing companies than for low-leasing companies. Performance will also be 
tested using variables exogenous to the lease decision. Since lower performing 
companies face higher costs of external financing and will be closer to the 
exhaustion of internal and external financing possibilities, a negative relation is 
expected to exist between performance measures and operating-lease intensity. 
High-leasing companies should perform less well than low-leasing companies do. 
 
This leads to the following hypotheses based on the impact that operating leases 
have on financial ratios (6.4 and 6.5) and financial contracting rationales (6.6): 
 
hypothesis 6.4. ROA-before-capitalisation hypothesis 
No relationship is expected between the return on assets (ROA) 
before capitalisation and the operating-lease intensity. 
  
hypothesis 6.5. ROA-after-capitalisation hypothesis 
A negative relationship is expected between the return on assets 
(ROA) after capitalisation and the operating-lease intensity. 
 
hypothesis 6.6. Performance hypothesis 
A negative relationship is expected between the performance 
measures and the operating-lease intensity. 
6.7 Growth/investment opportunity set 
6.7.1 Literature review 
Growth opportunities of companies have been investigated by Ang and Peterson 
(1984), Lasfer and Levis (1998), Graham et al. (1998), Krishnan and Moyer (1994), 
Deloof and Verschueren (1999) and Adams and Hardwick (1998). Since growth is 
often used as a measure of investment opportunities, both growth and investment 
opportunities-measures are described in this section. In this study a distinction will 
be made between (past) growth and (future) investment opportunities. Table 6.6 
shows the results of these studies. 
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Table 6.6 Prior results on growth/investment opportunity set (IOS) 
STUDY DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
MEASURE OF 
GROWTH/IOS 
SIGN SIGNIFICANCE 
Ang and Peterson Financial leases Price earnings ratio Changing signs Not significant 
Sharpe et al. Operating leases No dividend dummy Positive Significant 
Adams and Hardwick Total leases Price earnings ratio Negative Not significant 
Lasfer and Levis Financial lease 
dummy 
Additions to other tangible 
fixed assets/TA 
R&D/sales 
Sales growth 
Market-to-book 
Positive 
 
0 
0 
Positive 
Significant 
 
Not significant 
Not significant 
Significant 
Graham et al. Operating leases Market-to-book Negative Significant 
Mehran et al. Total leases Market-to-book Positive Significant 
Deloof and Verschueren Financial leases 2-year total asset growth Negative Not significant 
Note: The market-to-book ratios are calculated differently by the different authors: market-to-book for Graham et al. 
is calculated as market value of the company divided by total assets plus the present value of operating leases. 
Lasfer and Levis use the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity. Mehran et al. do not describe 
their calculation of MTB, although it may be assumed that they use also the measure of Lasfer and Levis, since this 
is a more generally accepted calculation of market-to-book value (also used in financial databases).  
 
Ang and Peterson (1984) define expected growth as the price/earnings ratio. They 
did not find a significant relation between growth and leasing, and the direction of 
the relationship is indecisive. They do not explain why growth is chosen as a 
variable in their model and they also do not explain why the results change during 
their research period 1976-1981. 
 
Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) use two growth-related measures to test their 
hypothesis that companies facing higher costs of external capital are more likely to 
lease. These measures are the variance in sales growth and a no-dividend dummy. 
The first measure, variance in sales growth, relates to the uncertainty of production 
capacity and the need of a company to not fully possess their assets. This measure 
is therefore described in the next section on capital intensity. Incorporation of a no-
dividend dummy as a growth variable can be explained as follows. Sharpe and 
Nguyen argue that especially companies that are young, fast growing and 
innovation intensive are likely to have many investment opportunities. These 
companies also face severe information asymmetries and are forced to finance 
projects from their retained earnings. Sharpe and Nguyen (p.279) argue the 
companies that pay no cash dividend are consequently likely to be among those 
most burdened by asymmetric information. Therefore, Sharpe and Nguyen include 
a no-dividend dummy as an indicator of information asymmetry. They also consider 
previous research of Smith and Watts (1992), who argue that dividend pay outs 
should be lowest for those companies at greatest risk of facing the under-investment 
problem. Companies with more growth opportunities can tolerate more restrictions 
on dividends. This strengthens Sharpe and Nguyen in their hypothesis that non-
dividend-paying companies have a greater propensity to use leases, since doing so 
alleviates some of the expected costs associated with the under-investment problem.  
 
Adams and Hardwick (1998) hypothesise that companies with more growth options 
in their investment opportunity will be more likely to lease than companies with 
more assets in place. They argue that companies with high growth options are 
likely to be associated with uncertain future cash flows and therefore encounter 
high contracting costs. The investment opportunity measure used by Adams and 
Hardwick is the price/earnings ratio that is based on a study of Booth (1992). They 
do not elaborate on this choice, however. The study of Booth (1992) uses the 
earnings/price ratio as a proxy for the company’s ratio of assets in place to 
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investment opportunities. Booth expects an increase in earnings/price to result in 
lower contracting costs and lower borrowing rates. Since Adams and Hardwick use 
price/earnings instead of earnings/price, a higher price/earnings would increase 
contracting costs and would have a positive relationship on the leasing share. Their 
results therefore show an unexpectedly negative, but not significant, relationship. 
 
Also Lasfer and Levis (1998) relate the growth opportunities of a company to agency 
and contracting costs. They argue that leasing is more likely to occur if the asset is 
not specialised to the company and if it is easily redeployable. They expect growth 
opportunities to be positively related to leasing. They define five variables to 
measure growth opportunities: market-to-book ratio, fixed capital investments, 
R&D/sales, sales growth and the payout ratio. Their results provide some evidence 
on the effect of growth potential on leasing decisions. Companies with high fixed-
asset investments are more likely to lease. Also, they found that small companies 
with growth potential are more likely to lease, which is not the case for medium-
sized and large companies with growth potential. The results limited to the quoted 
companies show that the market-to-book ratio has a positive significant relation 
with the financial leasing share. Furthermore, they found a significant positive 
relation for the additions to other than property and building tangible fixed assets.  
 
Graham et al. (1998) hypothesise, based on previous studies, among them Sharpe 
and Nguyen, that companies with more growth options in their investment 
opportunity set should have a lower proportion of fixed claims in their capital 
structure. Fixed claims in the analysis of Graham et al. include the present value of 
the operating leases. They therefore hypothesise that growth negatively affects the 
leasing intensity, which they argue should be in line with the financial contracting 
theories. They used the market-to-book ratio as their proxy for the company’s 
investment opportunity set, and they expect it to be negatively related to both debt 
and the lease intensity (the fixed claims according to Graham et al.). Graham et al. 
(1998) indeed found a significant negative relation between the market-to-book 
ratio and both the financial- and operating lease shares. However, Graham et al. 
mention only that they include the present value of operating leases in the 
denominator and not in the numerator of the market-to-book ratio. The ratio is 
then, by definition, negatively related to the operating-lease intensity: the higher 
the operating-lease intensity, the lower the market-to-book ratio, since the 
denominator increases and the numerator does not. On the other hand, Graham et 
al. base their choice of the market-to-book ratio on Rajan and Zingales (1995), when 
they calculate the market-to-book ratio as (p.1453): book value of assets – book 
value of equity + market value of equity all divided by book value of assets. Using 
this calculation would suggest that the present value of the operating leases should 
be taken into account in both the numerator and the denominator. Also Barclay and 
Smith (1995) use this market-to-book ratio. They argue that their market-to-book 
ratio is a measure of growth options, while the balance sheet of a company does not 
include intangible assets like growth options (which should be included in the 
market value of a company). Therefore, the higher the market-to-book ratio, the 
more growth options a company has. They found evidence that the more growth 
options a company has, the less it will use fixed claims such as debt and leases, and 
it will choose more preferred stock. The results of Barclay and Smith include only 
financial leases, and the total assets in their analysis do not incorporate the assets 
financed through operating leases.  
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Also Mehran et al. (1999) base their hypothesis of the growth opportunities of a 
company on financial contracting theories. They argue that the importance of 
growth opportunities relative to assets in place and the company-specificity of 
assets will influence both debt-financing and leasing. However, they are also aware 
of the difference in previous studies on the effect of growth opportunities on both 
debt and leasing. They summarise previous findings by asserting that high 
proportions of growth opportunities and company-specific assets are favourable 
neither for debt nor for leasing. However, for a given level of fixed-claim financing, 
greater growth opportunities should be associated with more leasing. 
 
Deloof and Verschueren (1999) use as a measure of investment opportunities the 
three-year average rate of total asset growth; this does not seem to affect the lease 
decision.  
 
Table 6.6 summarised the results of the seven studies that had a measure of growth 
in their analysis. The market-to-book ratio is used in three of these. In contrast to 
the studies of Lasfer and Levis (1998) and Mehran et al. (1999), which both found a 
positive significant relation with lease intensity, Graham et al. (1998) found a 
significant negative relation between the market-to-book ratio and both the 
financial- and operating-lease shares. The market-to-book ratio of Graham et al. is, 
however, a different measure than the one used by the others, due to using total 
assets as the book value of a company instead of equity, and due to the inclusion of 
the present value of operating leases in the book value of a company. The results 
are thus not comparable. 
 
6.7.2 Growth and investment opportunity hypotheses 
Table 6.6 summarised the results on growth and investment opportunities of a 
company. Most studies expect the leasing choice (both financial and operating) to be 
positively related to growth and investment opportunities. The studies that found a 
significant relationship were indeed all positive, with the exception of Graham et al. 
(1998). The latter used a different market-to-book value than the others, however, 
dividing the market value of the company by the book value of total assets plus the 
present value of the operating leases. This measure was also used by, amongst 
others, Barclay and Smith (1995) and Rajan and Zingales (1995). They hypothesised 
that the higher the market-to-book ratio, the more growth options a company has. 
They found evidence that the more growth options a company has, the less it will 
use fixed claims such as debt and financial leases, and it will choose more preferred 
stock. Their analysis excluded operating leases, however, and other studies suggest 
that operating leases may be advantageous for growing companies due to their 
flexibility and the exclusion of risk attached to economic ownership. Companies that 
have been growing in the past or that have many investment opportunities in the 
future are more inclined to lease due to the uncertainty in their production process, 
and leasing permits more flexibility than owning an asset does. Therefore, a 
positive relation is expected to exist between operating-lease intensity and growth 
in the past and investment opportunities in the future. High-leasing companies are 
expected to have grown more than low-leasing companies, and they also are 
expected to have more investment opportunities. Therefore, it is hypothesised that 
both past growth (increase in sales or total assets) as well as possible future growth 
(investment opportunity set) are positively related to the operating-lease choice.  
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hypothesis 6.7. Growth hypothesis 
A positive relation is expected to exist between operating-lease 
intensity and growth in the past. 
 
hypothesis 6.8. Investment-opportunity hypothesis 
A positive relation is expected to exist between operating-lease 
intensity and investment opportunities in the future.  
 
Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) maintain that young, innovative and fast-growing 
companies might lease more than other companies. Therefore, also the age of a 
company might be an explanatory variable when investigating operating-lease 
intensity. Young companies have not yet reached maturity and are therefore less 
certain of their future production levels as more mature, established, companies. 
None of the authors has, however, included company age as a measure of growth 
opportunities in their set of variables. This study uses a dummy to define whether a 
company has been recently established (and is thus young). Based on the arguments 
of Sharpe and Nguyen, we expect that more recently established companies lease 
more than more-established companies.  
 
hypothesis 6.9. Age hypothesis 
A positive relation is expected between young companies and 
operating-lease intensity. 
6.8 Capital intensity/ asset structure 
6.8.1 Literature review 
Only three studies (Sharpe and Nguyen (1995), Deloof and Verschueren (1999) and 
Graham et al. (1998)) incorporated in their analysis the capital intensity or asset 
structure of a company. 
 
Table 6.7 Prior results on capital intensity/asset structure 
STUDY DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
MEASURE OF ASSET 
STRUCTURE 
SIGN SIGNIFICANCE 
Sharpe et al. Operating lease Total capital costs / #employees 
Age PPE 
Variance in sales growth 
Changing signs 
Positive 
Changing signs 
Not significant 
Significant 
Not significant 
Graham et al. Operating lease Net PPE/total assets Positive Significant 
Deloof and 
Verschueren 
Financial lease Current assets / total assets 
Fixed financial assets / total assets 
Negative 
Negative 
Significant 
Significant 
 
Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) use three variables related to the asset structure of a 
company. First, they include the ratio of total annual capital costs to the number of 
employees. They expect the capital intensity of a company to be negatively related 
with the leasing intensity, since capital-intensive companies thus used specialised 
equipment that is less appropriate for leasing. Second, Sharpe and Nguyen use the 
age of the PPE as an explanatory variable. However, this variable is designed 
particularly for their model, where the leasing share is calculated as a portion of 
total capital costs. They argue that the older the equipment is, the more the book 
value of the asset will be underestimated, and consequently also the capital costs. 
The lease intensity will then be biased upward. This effect is measured by the age of 
PPE variable. Third, they use the sales-growth variable as an uncertainty measure 
of productivity. Companies with high variance in their sales growth could have 
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unpredictable or temporary asset needs. Leasing then alleviates the problem of 
owing assets that are not expected to have productive use on a full-time basis. Only 
the second variable, the age of PPE, has a positive significant relationship with the 
lease intensity. However, these results might very well be caused by the bias in the 
total capital costs used to calculate the lease intensity. 
 
Graham et al. (1998) argue that a leasing contract is by definition tied to a specific 
fixed asset. Therefore, they argue that companies that use more fixed assets in the 
production process will use more lease financing. They expect both debt and leases 
to be positively related to the ratio of net property, plants and equipment to total 
assets. They call this variable ‘collateral,’ and it measures asset tangibility. Their 
results confirm this hypothesis. In a footnote (p.147, note 17) they mention that 
(under the presumption that operating leases are tied to fixed assets) they also 
examined this relation by adding operating leases to both the numerator as well as 
the denominator. The unreported results using this definition are qualitatively 
identical to those reported in the text.  
 
Deloof and Verschueren (1999) found in a previous study that the current assets to 
total assets and the fixed financial assets to total assets have a significant influence 
on capital structure. They therefore include these ratios also in this study, and as 
they expected, both ratios have a significant negative effect. 
 
6.8.2 Capital-intensity and asset-structure hypotheses 
Table 6.7 summarised the results on the capital structure or asset structure as 
determinants of lease intensity. It is surprising that only three studies investigated 
this variable, since, as mentioned by Graham et al. (1998), leasing is by definition 
tied to a fixed asset. Labour-intensive companies will have less possibilities to lease 
because they have less fixed assets, than capital-intensive companies will. Yet, 
operating leasing causes the fixed assets on the balance sheet to be less than would 
be the case when these assets are bought. It is perhaps this endogenous relationship 
between fixed assets and leasing that has caused most studies to ignore this 
variable. Yet, the results of the studies that did investigate the capital structure are 
not convincing. To overcome the endogenous relation between the variables used 
and operating-lease usage, this study measures the capital- and labour intensity by 
relating the total capital costs and the number of employees to sales. Since labour-
intensive companies have fewer possibilities to lease, it is expected that low-leasing 
companies will be more labour intensive than the high-leasing companies. A 
negative relationship is thus expected between the sales per employee and 
operating-lease intensity. 
 
hypothesis 6.10. Labour-intensive companies hypothesis 
A negative relationship between the sales per employee and the 
operating lease intensity is expected. 
 
Although capital-intensive companies have more choice with regard to leasing, the 
leased assets are not shown on the balance sheet and the ratio of fixed assets to 
total assets is not appropriate to test the capital intensity of a company. The on-
balance ratio of fixed assets to total assets of a high-leasing company (although it 
may be a capital-intensive company) may be lower than that of a low-leasing 
company that is not capital intensive. Consequently, the ratio of current assets to 
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total assets will increase relatively more for a high-leasing company. The 
relationship may reverse once these measures have been adjusted for operating 
leases. This is hypothesised as follows. A positive relationship is expected to exist 
between the ratio of current assets to total assets before capitalisation and the 
operating-lease intensity. The relationship is expected to be negative for the ratio of 
fixed assets to total assets and operating-lease intensity. However, when taking into 
account the value of the leased assets when calculating the capital intensity, it is 
expected that the ratio of current assets to total assets will become negatively 
related to operating-lease intensity, and that the ratio of fixed assets to total assets 
will become positively related to operating-lease intensity. 
 
hypothesis 6.11. Capital intensity before capitalisation hypothesis 
A positive relationship is expected to exist between the ratio of 
current assets to total assets before capitalisation and the 
operating-lease intensity. The relationship is negative for the 
ratio of fixed assets to total assets and operating-lease intensity.  
 
hypothesis 6.12. Capital intensity after capitalisation hypothesis 
A negative relationship is expected between the ratio of current 
assets to total assets after capitalisation and operating-lease 
intensity. The relation is expected to be positive between the ratio 
of fixed assets to total assets after capitalisation and operating-
lease intensity. 
6.9 Effective tax rate 
6.9.1 Literature review 
Taxes are an important reason for leasing rather than buying an asset. Many 
studies on leasing in the 1970s (such as Myers et al. (1976) and Miller and Upton 
(1976)) focused their lease-or-buy discussion on the tax incentives of leasing. A true 
lease allows the transfer of tax shields from the lessee to the lessor. This might be 
worthwhile when both parties have different tax rates or when the lessee has no tax 
capacity. As described by Smith and Wakeman (1985), if the lessee and the lessor 
face different effective marginal tax rates, leasing might reduce the total tax bill. As 
described in chapter 2, the transfer of tax shields in the Netherlands is also a 
reason that firms choose leasing. In 1998, energy companies were tax exempt and 
therefore were not able to benefit from certain tax schemes. Eligible assets under 
these schemes were leased instead of bought (Lückerath (1998)). The tax advantage 
of operating leases is one of the (sensible) economic reasons for leasing, compared 
with some of the (non-sensible) accounting reasons to lease (Brealey and Myers 
(2003)). This advantage, however, is related to operating leases and not to financial 
leases (see chapter 2). Nevertheless, five studies (two of which include financial 
leases) did include a tax measure in their analysis. Three of these studies focus on 
operating leases. Ang and Peterson (1984), Adams and Hardwick (1998) and Deloof 
and Verschueren (1999) did not include a tax variable. 
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Table 6.8 Prior results on tax rate 
STUDY DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
MEASURE OF TAXES SIGN SIGNIFICANCE 
El-Gazzar et al. Lease dummy  Tax charge/gross margin Negative Significant 
Sharpe et al. Operating leases Tax charge/EBT 
Low tax-loss carry-forward dummy 
High tax-loss carry-forward dummy 
Changing sign 
Changing sign 
Positive 
Not significant 
Not significant 
Significant 
Lasfer and Levis Financial lease 
dummy 
Tax charge/EBT 
Tax carry-forward/TA 
Recoverable advanced corporate tax (ACT) / 
market-value equity 
Provision ACT / ME 
Written off ACT / ME 
Negative 
Positive 
Positive 
 
Positive 
Positive 
Not significant 
Significant 
Significant 
 
Significant 
Not significant 
Graham et al. Operating leases Before financing marginal tax rate Negative Significant 
Mehran et al. Total leases Before financing marginal tax rate Positive Not significant 
Duke et al. Operating leases Tax charge/gross margin Negative Significant 
 
El-Gazzar et al. (1986) use the tax rate for two different hypotheses. First, they 
argue that the effective tax rate is a measure of political costs. Companies with the 
highest political costs will be the most motivated to lower their political visibility by 
minimizing income. They hypothesise that companies with a high effective tax rate 
are more likely to choose income-reducing options, such as financial leases (instead 
of operating leases). Second, they agree with the advantages that operating leases 
have in shifting tax advantages from lessee to lessor. They hypothesise that low-
tax-rate companies are more likely to use operating leases instead of financial 
leases. The results do not support the first hypothesis on political costs, but do 
support the tax-incentive hypothesis. Again, El-Gazzar et al. focus on the choice 
between two types of leases (financial and operating).  
 
Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) also focus on the advantages of operating leases in 
shifting tax advantages from lessee to lessor. They use two different variables for 
the tax status of a company: tax expense divided by pre-tax income and tax-loss 
carry-forwards. With respect to the first variable, the tax rate, they expect that 
companies that pay little or no taxes are more likely to take on operating leases. 
They argue that the tax rate should ideally be the rate before lease financing. 
Therefore, as a better proxy they use a dummy variable that indicates the presence 
of high- or low loss carry-forward. Companies with significant tax-loss carry-
forward will be tax-exhausted for a period of years, and thus able to take full 
advantage of tax benefits of ownership, including accelerated depreciation and 
investment tax credits. High carry-forward is defined as tax-loss carry-forward 
exceeding current-year EBITDA. With respect to the tax rate, no significant 
relationship with leasing was found. Sharpe and Nguyen found a significant 
positive relation between high-loss carry-forward and leasing. 
 
Although Lasfer and Levis (1998) focus on financial leases, they used the tax 
differential between lessee and lessor as one of the three main reasons for the 
existence of leasing. They ignored the fact that this relates most to true leases (i.e. 
operating leases). They included in their model five different tax variables, three of 
which relate only to quoted companies. The tax variables related to all companies 
are the tax charged to profits before tax and the tax carried forward. The tax 
variables for quoted companies are focused on the Advanced Corporate Tax (see 
Table 6.8 for the variables). Three of the five variables have a positive significant 
relation with the (financial) lease intensity for quoted companies, although the 
results again are different between small- and large (quoted) companies. Their main 
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conclusion was that companies that use leasing are more likely to have tax losses, 
although this is not the major determinant for small companies. 
 
The primary goal of Graham et al. (1998) was to analyse the effect of the corporate 
tax rate. Testing their hypothesis that low-tax-rate companies lease more than 
high-tax-rate companies do, they found a significant negative relation. Although 
Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) had already mentioned that the tax rate should ideally 
be a before-leasing tax rate, Graham et al. were the first to address head-on the 
issue of endogeneity of the tax rate. They objected to, for example, the findings of 
Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) that their tax results might have been caused by the 
endogeneity of corporate tax status because using leases can lower a company’s 
observed tax rate. They also objected to all previous studies investigating the effect 
of taxes on financial leases, since these are not true leases (as operating leases are). 
However, they argued that high tax rates have a positive effect on financial leases, 
since the interest payments of a financial lease are tax deductible (like debt). 
Therefore, the same positive relationship found by previous studies between debt 
and the tax rate is assumed to be applicable to financial leasing and the tax rate. 
Based on the tax implications for true leases (operating leases), Graham et al. 
argued that the use of true leases should be negatively related to a company’s tax 
rate. To avoid the problem of endogeneity, they simulated the before-financing-
decision marginal tax rate. Their estimate was based on a simulation, assuming the 
company’s taxable income follows a random walk. They found a negative, significant 
relationship with the operating-lease intensity. 
 
Mehran et al. (1999) adopted the approach of Graham et al. to estimate a before-
financing marginal tax rate, but they again tried to explain the relationship 
between all leases and the tax rate. They argued that companies with little or no 
tax liabilities would be less likely to use debt financing, but would be more likely to 
lease assets. In their conclusions Mehran et al. describe that their findings related 
to the tax rate were disappointing and opposite to those of Graham et al. They 
attributed this to the larger sample of Graham et al. and did not mention the 
difference between the samples (Graham et al. used only operating leases, Mehran 
et al. used all leases) even though this difference is described extensively (and 
criticized) in the Graham et al. study. (Although Mehran et al. argued for inclusion 
of operating leases because of their potentially importance in capturing the tax 
effect, they were inconsistent with their own arguments, since they did not 
distinguish between the two leasing types.) 
 
Duke et al. (2002) argued that the reason to lease based on different marginal tax 
rates between lessees and lessors would be difficult to test directly, given that 
lessees lease from different lessors, and information regarding their identity (not to 
mention their tax profiles) is unavailable. However, they decided to include the 
effective tax rate of a company in their model grounded on the theoretical prediction 
of Smith and Wakeman, and based on the previous empirical results of such studies 
as El-Gazzar et al. (1986) and Sharpe and Nguyen (1995). Their results likewise 
showed a significant, negative relationship between the effective tax rate and 
operating-lease intensity. 
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6.9.2 Tax hypothesis 
The tax advantages of operating leases are an important determinant in choosing 
operating leases, as proven by the previous literature and empirical studies (see 
chapter 2). The situation in the Netherlands is no exception to that. Therefore, 
lessees with a below-average tax rate are more inclined to lease, since this enables 
them to shift tax advantages from lessee to lessor. Although Graham et al. (1998) 
referred to the endogeneity of the tax rate, the results of chapter 5 showed that the 
impact on net income is only marginal, which consequently also applies to the 
effective tax rate. Only when relating net income to balance-sheet items such as 
total assets, does the impact become significant. Therefore, this thesis uses the 
effective tax rate to investigate the tax incentive to lease. Thus, since operating 
leases enable a low-taxpaying entity (the lessee) to shift tax advantages to a high-
taxpaying entity (the lessor), a negative relationship is expected to exist between 
the effective tax rate of the lessee and the lease intensity. High-leasing companies 
are expected to have lower effective tax rates. 
 
hypothesis 6.13. Effective-tax-rate hypothesis 
A negative relationship is expected between the effective tax rate 
of the lessee and the operating-lease intensity. 
6.10 Management compensation 
6.10.1 Literature review 
As described in section 6.2, accounting choices may be guided by management’s own 
interest (bonus-plan hypothesis). 
 
Table 6.9 Prior results on management compensation 
 
STUDY 
 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
MEASURE OF 
MANAGEMENT 
COMPENSATION 
 
SIGN 
 
SIGNIFICANCE 
El-Gazzar et al. Lease dummy  Bonus dummy (1 if 
incentive plan based on net 
income exists) 
Positive Significant 
Duke et al. Operating leases Bonus dummy (1 if 
incentive plan based on net 
income exists) 
Positive Not significant 
 
El-Gazzar et al. (1986) included management compensation in their study, while 
previous studies on accounting choice proposed that managers of companies with 
bonus plans would be more likely to choose accounting procedures that shift 
reported earnings from future periods to the current period. They argued that most 
of these plans base the bonus on income relative to the book value of assets (ROA) 
or equity (ROE). They hypothesised that companies whose incentives plans are 
defined on an after-interest basis would choose the operating method for lease 
reporting (instead of the financial leases). As with other explanatory variables used 
in El-Gazzar et al.’s study, they focussed on the income effect of operating leases. 
Although El-Gazzar et al. explicitly mention the ratios of income related to assets or 
equity, they did not even mention the impact of capitalizing a lease on the 
denominator (asset or equity) instead of the numerator (net income). Management 
compensation was taken into account by a dummy, which took the value of 1 if a 
compensation plan exists based on net income, and 0 if not. The relationship 
between management compensation plans and the use of operating leases was 
found to be positive and significant. 
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Smith and Wakeman (1985) hypothesised that leasing is more likely if management 
compensation is a function of return on invested capital (ROIC). They argued that a 
manager whose bonus depends on ROCE will argue strongly in favour of leasing 
rather than purchasing office space, since with a purchase the denominator of the 
performance measure increases. They also mentioned that  this incentive could of 
course be controlled by including the capitalised value of the operating leases in the 
calculation of invested capital. In contrast to El-Gazzar et al.’s study, Smith and 
Wakeman focussed on the effect of operating leases on the denominator instead of 
the numerator. Although Duke et al. (2002) tested the hypothesis of Smith and 
Wakeman by using the same management compensation measure as El-Gazzar et 
al., their results did not support the hypothesis. They did not find this surprising, 
due to several reasons. The first had to do with the poor performance of 
management compensation variables in past accounting-choice studies. The second 
reason had to do with the mass of other variables that affect management 
compensation, and the third with the various forms of management compensation 
nowadays.  
 
An interesting study on the effect of operating leases on management compensation 
is the study of Imhoff, Lipe and Wright (1993). They tested whether the executive 
compensation committee is influenced by the footnote disclosure of operating leases. 
They related the change in management compensation (%∆COMP) to the change in 
return on assets (ROA) and the change in return on equity (ROE). Subsequently, 
they adjusted ROA and ROE by capitalising the operating leases, and again tested 
the relationship between the change in management compensation and the 
adjusted ratios. Based on (univariate) rank correlations, the ability of ROA and 
ROE to explain raises in management compensation diminishes when these ratios 
are adjusted for operating leases. Thus, the capitalisation of operating leases does 
not provide incremental explanatory power in determining management 
compensation. Based on the results of Imhoff et al., Duke et al. (2002) concluded 
that ‘presumably managers are free to engage in compensation-increasing leasing 
behaviour without the fear that compensation committees will undo their efforts on 
payday’.  
 
6.10.2 Bonus-plan hypothesis 
Imhoff et al. (1993) tested whether the executive compensation committee takes 
operating leases into account when determining management salaries. They tested 
whether the increase in management’s compensation could be explained by an 
increase in ROA and ROE. The explanatory power of ROA and ROE adjusted for 
operating leases diminished instead of increased. This indicates that management 
compensation does not differ between high- and low-leasing companies. In line with 
the study of Imhoff et al., this study tests whether the change in management 
compensation can be explained by a change in operating-lease intensity, and 
whether this differs between high- and low-leasing companies. When the 
remuneration of a company’s management is based on measures that can be 
influenced by operating leases, the management will have an incentive to choose 
leasing. In high-leasing companies one might therefore expect greater use of these 
easily influenced measures, leading to a positive relation between the increase in 
management compensation and the increase in lease intensity.  
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hypothesis 6.14. Increase in management compensation hypothesis 
A positive relation is expected between the increase in 
management compensation and the increase in operating-lease 
intensity.  
 
Duke et al. (2002) mentioned that management compensation as a variable in 
empirical studies takes various forms. However, due to the attention given to 
management compensation plans in recently developed international corporate 
governance codes, the extent to which accounting choices are driven by 
management compensation incentives has become less clear. For example, the 
Dutch corporate governance code requires (section II.2) that the remuneration 
structure is such that it does not encourage management board members to act in 
their own interest (Corporate Governance Committee (2003)). If the remuneration 
consists of a fixed- and a variable part, the variable part shall be linked to 
previously determined, measurable targets, which must be achieved in both the 
short- and long term. The remuneration of the individual board members must be 
disclosed in the notes to the financial statements. These developments have two 
consequences: first, the information on management compensation will become 
increasingly available from the time the corporate governance codes became 
effective (January 2004); second, management compensation will be based less on 
targets that promote earnings management. However, based on the bonus-plan 
hypothesis and the impact that operating leases have on several financial ratios, a 
positive relation is thus also expected to exist between the level of management 
compensation and operating-lease intensity. 
 
hypothesis 6.15. Bonus-plan hypothesis 
A positive relation is expected between total management 
compensation and the operating-lease intensity.  
6.11 Ownership concentration 
6.11.1 Literature review 
Three studies investigated the relationship between ownership structure and the 
lease decision (Adams and Hardwick (1998), Mehran et al. (1999) and Duke et al. 
(2002)). Mehran et al. (1999) assume they were the first who included this variable 
in a lease-intensity model, and do not refer to the earlier article of Adams and 
Hardwick (1998). The short timeframe between the dates of publishing of the 
articles makes this rather plausible. Table 6.10 shows the results of the three 
studies investigating this relation. 
 
Table 6.10 Prior results on ownership structure 
STUDY DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
MEASURE OF SIZE SIGN SIGNIFICANCE 
Adams and 
Hardwick 
Total leases Total shares by top three shareholders Positive Significant 
Mehran et al. Total leases Fraction shares by CEO 
Fractions shares by CEO squared 
Positive 
Negative 
Significant 
Significant 
Duke et al. Operating leases Larger of % common stock held by directors 
or % owned by largest single shareholder 
Positive Significant 
 
Smith and Wakeman (1985) relate ownership structure to specialisation in risk 
bearing. For a closely held company, risk reduction is more important. According to 
Smith and Wakeman (1985), large shareholders have difficulty in reducing asset 
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risk that is obviously related to the ownership of capital assets. Shareholders of 
closely held firms could mitigate this problem by leasing assets so that the lessor 
bears some of the risk instead of the lessee. Adams and Hardwick (1998) base their 
inclusion of ownership structure in their model on the study of Smith and Wakeman 
(1985). Adams and Hardwick (1998) argue that leasing helps to separate risk 
bearing from asset utilisation. Their results show a significant positive relation 
between ownership structure and the share of total leasing: closely held companies 
are indeed more likely to lease than companies with a more diffuse ownership 
structure. 
 
The variable measuring top management’s share ownership was the focus of the 
study of Mehran et al. (1999). In seeking to explain both corporate leasing and debt 
financing, they found operating leases especially important for analysis of the 
influence of ownership structure on the lease decision. Because the term of an 
operating lease is less than the asset’s useful life (see chapter 2 for the operating-
lease qualifications), the use of leasing prevents personal exposure to obsolescence 
risk. Mehran et al. (1999)argue that this is not the case for financial leases, since 
these cover substantially all of an asset’s useful life. Their results show that CEO 
ownership has a significant positive effect on both debt financing and the financial- 
(FLS) and total leasing share (TLS) of a company. The positive effect on both 
measures of leasing share can be explained by the argument that CEOs with large 
ownership reduce their exposure to obsolescence and other asset-specific risks. As 
mentioned before, however, it is remarkable in light of their arguments that they 
did not investigate separately the operating-lease intensity of a company,  
 
Duke et al. (2002) mention that the conclusion of Smith and Wakeman— that 
leasing reduces the risk attached to the ownership of the assets— might be difficult 
to test when focussing only on operating leases. The risk-reduction effect of leasing 
relates to both leasing types. However, based on the results of Mehran et al., they 
conclude that combining both types might not be necessary, since financial leases 
appear to be less important than operating leases (see also chapter 2 of this thesis). 
In order to capture the effects of both management ownership and non-management 
ownership, Duke et al. extend the study of Mehran et al. They used both the 
percentage of common stock owned by officers and directors and the percentage 
owned by the largest single owner. The variable used in their model is the larger of 
these two percentages. They found a positive significant relationship between 
ownership and operating-lease intensity. 
 
6.11.2 Ownership hypothesis 
A positive relationship between closely held companies and leasing was argued and 
found by Smith and Wakeman (1985) and Mehran et al. (1999). Due to the fact that 
leasing prevents exposure to obsolescence risk, and this is most important to the 
owner of the company, the risk of owning an asset can be shifted from the owner to 
the lessor. On the other hand, financial contracting theory suggests that one might 
expect closer held companies to have less internal agency conflicts (bonus plan), 
which could lead to a negative relationship between ownership concentration and 
operating lease intensity. This, however, could be offset by the external agency 
conflict (debt covenants), which is in the interest of both the company’s owner and 
the company’s management. Therefore, this study expects a positive relationship to 
exist between operating leases and the percentage of closely held shares, since 
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operating leases shift the risk of an asset’s obsolescence from the owner to the lessor 
(and the opposite effect arises from internal and external agency conflicts). High-
leasing companies are expected to have a higher percentage of closely held shares. 
 
hypothesis 6.16. Ownership-structure hypothesis 
A positive relationship is expected between closely held companies 
and operating-lease intensity 
6.12 Industry  
6.12.1 Literature review 
The industry effect of leasing choice is related to both the investment opportunity 
set and the asset structure of a company. As mentioned before, leasing is by 
definition attached to a fixed asset, and industries with more fixed assets have more 
possibilities for leasing. Table 6.11 shows the results of the studies that previously 
investigated the industry effect on lease decisions.  
 
Table 6.11 Prior results on industries 
STUDY DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
DEFINITIONS OF INDUSTRIES SIGN SIGNIFICANCE 
Ang and Peterson Financial leases 22 two-digit SIC-codes, no differences between leasing and non-leasing 
companies 
Finucane Financial leases 52 two-digit SIC-codes, significant univariate differences 
Adams and Hardwick Total leases 4 industry groups, ‘services and utilities’ and ‘other’ above-average lease share, 
construction below-, and manufacturing about average 
Sharpe  et al. Operating leases Industry means are subtracted from all variables 
Graham et al. Operating leases Regulated industries: 
Telephone 
Utilities 
Sic-code dummies for sectorsa 
2000-2999 
3000-3999 
4000-4999 
 
Negative 
Negative 
 
Negative 
Negative 
Negative 
 
Significant 
Significant 
 
Significant 
Significant 
Significant 
a the study of Graham et al. consists of companies with sic codes between 2000 and 6000; codes between 2000 and 3999 all relate 
to manufacturing, 4000 ‘til 4999 refer to transportation, and 5000 ‘til 5999 refer to the trade (retail and wholesale) sector.  
 
Although industry is not included in their model, Ang and Peterson (1984) 
mentioned in a footnote (page 1058) that they investigated the industry effect of 
leasing. Since they divided their sample into a leasing- and a non-leasing group, 
they acknowledged that the industry represented in the groups might be quite 
different. Therefore, they classified the sample into 22 industry groups, based on 
two-digit sic codes. Their results showed that leasing companies were not 
concentrated in a few industries, and that leasing occurred in every one of the 22 
industries, and that non-leasing companies were found in 21 of the industries 
(excluding the Amusements industries). Ang and Peterson investigated only the 
occurrence of leasing in these industries, however, and not the lease intensity. 
 
Finucane (1988) argued that certain industries tend to use leasing to a greater or 
lesser extent than others. He brings up several reasons for this: the specificity of 
assets to a certain industry, industry-wide differences in investment tax credits, the 
availability of assets as collateral, the rate of obsolescence of company-specific 
assets, the characteristics of secondary asset markets, marginal tax rates and debt 
capacity. Finucane’s objection to the study of Ang and Peterson was that they did 
not consider the possibility of different levels of leasing. To overcome this, he 
analysed the mean ratio of financial leases to total assets over a five-year period for 
each industry, and found a different pattern. He investigated the relation between 
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financial leases to total assets and 52 industries (using two-digit sic codes). Using a 
univariate comparison of mean ratios, Finucane found evidence that the air 
transportation- and retail store industries use more leasing than other industries. 
 
Industry as a variable was included by Graham et al. (1998) for two reasons. First, 
they assumed that leasing could be disadvantageous for a regulated company. Their 
explanation is, (p.138) ‘the return for utility shareholders is calculated from the 
firm’s capital base, and operating leases do not count as part of the capital base’. 
The regulated industries in their sample are telecommunications and gas and 
electric (utilities). The two industries are included in the model by assigning a 
dummy to companies that operate in these sectors. The second reason they included 
industry as a variable is based on previous studies such as Sharpe and Nguyen and 
Graham et al., which included three industry dummies to control for industry 
effects. The industries are restricted to one-digit sic groups, and include 
manufacturing (2000-3999), transportation and public utilities (4000-4999) and 
trade (5000-5999). The regulated dummies mentioned above are also part of these 
groups. The trade dummy is excluded from the model and the other dummies all 
show a significant negative relation with operating-lease intensity. Although not 
addressed directly by Graham et al., their results seem to permit the conclusion 
that the sector ‘trade’ has higher operating-lease intensity than the other sectors. 
 
Adams and Hardwick (1998) classified the companies in the sample into four 
groups: construction, services/utilities, manufacturing and other. The average 
leasing share was about 23% for all companies, varying from 29% for ‘services and 
utilities’ and ‘other’ to 9% for ‘construction’. The standard deviation of the mean 
value is rather high, which indicates the high variation in the subgroups. Probably 
for that reason Adams and Hardwick did not present any statistical tests on these 
differences. The industry sector is also not included in their ultimate model. 
 
Mehran et al. (1999) investigated 176 manufacturing companies (sic codes 2000-
3999), and therefore did not investigate differences between industries. Their 
results should therefore be seen from this perspective. The main purpose of their 
study was to investigate the relationship between leasing and ownership. Their 
main conclusion, that CEOs with large ownership stakes use more leasing to reduce 
their exposure to obsolescence and other asset-specific risks, might be influenced by 
the study’s choice to limit the analysis to manufacturers alone. Other studies have 
shown that manufacturers, compared with other industries, are not the heaviest 
users of leasing. 
 
Other studies have also described the industries in which leasing is more dominant, 
compared to other industries. For example, Gosman and Hanson (2000) mentioned 
that leasing is prevalent in airlines and in different kinds of stores and restaurants. 
They argued (p.53) that ‘in many cases a majority, or even all, of an airline’s planes 
or a retailer’s stores are leased’. 
  
6.12.2 Industry hypotheses 
The previous studies allow us to conclude that industry as a explanatory variable in 
explaining lease intensity is based on either to what extent an industry is regulated 
(political costs) or whether the fixed assets in a certain industry are more likely to 
be leased (such as airplanes or retail stores). Since in the Netherlands only one 
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airline is listed (Royal Dutch KLM, merged in 2005 with Air France), this is not a 
sector that can be investigated with regard to possible determinants in the lease 
decisions in the Netherlands. The retail sector is part of the ‘trade’ sector (sic codes 
50-59), which comprises wholesale and retail trade. In line with previous studies, it 
is expected that in this sector operating leases will be used more often than they are 
in other sectors. For the other sectors it is expected that no significant relation 
exists between the lease decision and the respective sector.  
 
hypothesis 6.17. Industry hypothesis 
It is expected that operating-lease intensity will be higher for the 
‘trade’ sector (sic codes 50-59) than in other sectors.  
 
Furthermore, due to privatisation of the post and telecom sector in the Netherlands, 
the Independent Post and Telecommunication Authority (OPTA) was established on 
January 1st 1997. The OPTA ensures that companies in the telecom sector do not 
wrongfully use their economic market power (www.opta.nl). To test the political-
cost hypothesis, and in line with Graham et al. (1998), we expect a negative relation 
to exist between regulated telecom companies and lease intensity63. 
 
hypothesis 6.18. Political-cost hypothesis 
A negative relationship is hypothesised between companies in the 
telecom sector and the operating-lease intensity.  
6.13 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter investigated the possible determinants of the operating-lease decision. 
Section 6.2 described from a theoretical perspective the background of accounting 
choices and the therewith-related positive accounting theory and financial 
contracting theory. As described by Brealy and Myers (2003), the choice for 
operating leases may be driven by non-sensible accounting reasons (keeping debt off 
of the balance sheet) or by more sensible economic reasons to lease (tax advantages, 
flexibility, shifting the risk of obsolescence). The accounting reasons are defined by 
Fields et al. (2001) as an accounting choice whose primary purpose is to influence 
the output of the accounting system. Section 6.2 described how closely the 
accounting-choice literature is related to the positive accounting theory of Watts 
and Zimmerman (1986), who formulated three hypotheses that explain the 
opportunistic behaviour of a company’s management: the debt hypothesis, the 
bonus-plan hypothesis and the political-cost hypothesis.  
 
Section 6.3 described the possible determinants of the lease decision. Table 6.1 
summarised nine different studies on this subject. The results of the described 
studies clash in many cases with each other, due to two main reasons. First, the 
dependent variables take many different formats, and often no distinction is made 
                                                          
63 Also the utility sector in the Netherlands is a regulated sector (see Graham et al. (1998)), and  the Directorate 
Supervision Energy (DTE) supervises the 1998 Electricity law and the Gas law (www.dte.nl). The utility sector in 
the Netherlands is not yet fully privatised, and no utility companies are listed on the stock exchange. Furthermore, 
Dutch electricity companies were, until recently, exempt from the corporate income tax. Due to the Dutch tax 
investment schemes (see chapter 2 and Lückerath, 1998)), the electricity companies often used lease structure in 
order to benefit  from these tax schemes. The political-cost hypothesis, suggesting that regulated companies will 
lease less than non-regulated companies, would then be undone by the tax reason to lease. Because of the absence of 
listed gas- and electric companies, this cannot be investigated.  
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between financial- and operating leases, Second, the explanatory variables also take 
many forms, with often the ignorance of the impact of operating leases on these 
variables (endogeneity). Therefore, sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.3 described two 
contributions of this study to the previous literature. The improvement lies in the 
choice of the dependent as well as the independent variables. With respect to the 
dependent variable, it is important to isolate operating leases from financial leases, 
since especially the hypotheses based on accounting reasons to choose leasing are 
applicable to only operating leases and not to financial leases. Including financial 
leases would inevitably lead to the wrong conclusions. This also applies to the 
inclusion of explanatory variables that are influenced by the operating-lease 
decisions (endogenous variables). Figure 6.1 illustrated the effect this might have 
on empirical results. Investigating the debt hypothesis by including the leverage 
ratio after the lease decision has already been made will lead to other results than 
bringing companies to a comparable base as if the decision had not yet been made. 
 
Each of the possible determinants was subsequently described. The three 
hypotheses from the positive accounting theory were shown to also apply to the 
operating-lease decision. The accounting choice for operating leases might be driven 
by motives to improve leverage (debt hypotheses), to increase management 
compensation (bonus-plan hypothesis) and to avoid excessive regulation (political-
cost hypothesis). However, section 6.3 also described the economic reasons to choose 
operating leases, including tax advantages, flexibility, avoidance of obsolescence 
risk and asset types. Each sub-section concluded with the formulation of the 
hypotheses, in which the above economic reasons were included.  
 
The number of possible determinants under investigation in the next chapter is 
extensive, combining previous studies in order to make the analysis more complete 
than that of any other previous study. 
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CHAPTER 7 EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE DETERMINANTS OF THE 
OPERATING-LEASE DECISION 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter empirically tests the hypotheses formulated in chapter 6. These 
hypotheses all concern determinants of the operating-lease intensity and explore 
whether high- and low-leasing companies differ with respect to these determinants 
or characteristics. This chapter is set up as follows. Section 7.2 describes the dataset 
and the qualification in high- or low-leasing companies. Section 7.3 presents the 
results: subsection 7.3.1 shows the univariate differences in each variable between 
high- and low-leasing companies, and subsection 7.3.2 shows the OLS- and logit 
results of the multivariate approach. 
7.2 Data collection and methodology 
7.2.1 Sample 
The sample used in this section is the one described in chapters 2 and 5. The sample 
consists of non-financial listed companies at the Amsterdam Stock Exchange during 
the period 2000-2004, with a listing period of at least three years. The financial 
companies are excluded because they often act both as lessee and lessor, since 
leasing is a financial product. Six companies were eliminated because the balance-
sheet date was different from December 31st, and this might have influenced the 
interaction of the data collected. The final sample consists of 118 companies in 
2000, 119 in the years 2001 through 2003, and 109 in 2004. The total sample 
therefore consists of 584 company-year observations. 
 
7.2.2 Data 
Chapter 6 showed how previous studies on the determinants of leasing choice used 
two different formats of the dependent variable: either a lease-share- or a lease 
dummy was used (see Table 6.2). This study uses both formats in order to facilitate 
comparisons with these previous studies. First, an operating lease-share is 
calculated, which relates the capitalised operating-lease commitments to total 
assets (PVOL/TA). Second, an operating-lease dummy characterises companies as 
high- or low-leasing companies. The dummy has a value of one for the high-leasing 
companies, and zero for the low-or non-leasing companies. 
 
Operating-Lease intensity measures: 
Relative operating-lease intensity 
The operating-lease commitments were manually extracted from the 2000-2004 
annual reports of the companies in the sample (see also chapter 2). The 
operating-lease commitments were capitalised using the capitalisation approach 
that was described in chapter 4.  
 
Dichotomous lease dummy 
In order to define what the characteristics are of companies with high-leasing 
activity, this study uses an operating-lease dummy that categories companies 
into high- or low-leasing companies. A lease dummy was also used in the studies 
of El-Gazzar et al. (1986) and Lasfer and Levis (1998). Neither of these studies, 
however, assigned a dummy based on the operating-lease intensity, but 
assigned a dummy based on the existence of leasing. The companies in the 
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sample of El-Gazzar et al. (1986) were classified as either ‘capitalisers’ 
(companies with only financial leases) or ‘non-capitalisers’ (companies with only 
operating leases). The companies in the sample of Lasfer and Levis (1998) were 
classified as either ‘lessee-company’ (a company with financial leases) or ‘non-
lessee company’ (a company without financial leases). Lasfer and Levis exclude 
operating leases. The dummy of El-Gazzar et al. (1986) is not useful nowadays, 
since most companies use operating leases and less often use financial leases 
(see also Figure 2.6 and/or Table 5.3). This also renders the dummy of Lasfer 
and Levis (1998) less useful. 
 
To classify companies in high- or low-leasing companies, this study uses the 
capitalised lease liability (PVOL) related to total assets:  PVOL/TA. PVOL/TA 
can only be calculated for 379 observations, however, due to the non-compliance 
of many companies to disclose the total future lease commitments (see Table 
5.3). Therefore, for companies that did not disclose the total commitments but 
did disclose the annual lease payment, we use an alternative measure. For 
these companies the operating lease-share ratio of Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) is 
used to differentiate between high- or low-leasing companies. This lease-share 
ratio relates the next annual lease payment to the total costs of capital 
(AP/TCC), and is also not subject to the variability of net income. The threshold 
value of AP/TCC is set at 18%. This value was chosen since at this value the 
dummy variable assigned (one or zero) is fairly similar to the dummy variable 
assigned by PVOL/TA, and the two measures can be used simultaneously. 
 
7.2.3 Descriptives 
A lease dummy was assigned to 464 observations. Of the remaining 120 
observations of the total sample of 584 companies the information is insufficient to 
categorise the company in either one of the two categories. Table 7.1 shows the 
distribution of the total sample over the research period 2000-2004. Panel A of 
Table 7.1 shows the available lease-dummy observations, and also shows the 
distribution of high- and low-leasing dummies over the years covered in this study. 
Of the total sample of 584 observations, a total of 464 (80.1%) are classified as 
either high- or low leasing. Of these 464 observations, 237 (41%) are classified as 
high-leasing companies and 227 (49%) as low leasing. The sample is therefore 
almost equally divided between low- or high leasing companies, even though this 
was not a goal when qualifying the companies. 
 
Panel B of Table 7.1 shows the mean and median values of the lease ratio PVOL/TA 
for the 379 observations for which this ratio was available. These values are shown 
for each separate year and for the total sample for which PVOL/TA was available. 
The mean and median PVOL/TA for the total sample are, respectively, 14.2% and 
4.3% (see also the description of the capitalisation results in Table 5.4). An annual 
increase is visible in both the mean and median, with the highest mean- and 
median PVOL/TA in 2003; in 2004, a decline is visible. Since the six companies that 
are missing in 2004 (see chapter 2) were not the heaviest leasing companies in 
2003, the decline cannot be explained by the absence of these companies. Panel B 
also shows the mean- and median values for the two sub-sample high- and low-
leasing companies. The mean of PVOL/TA for the high-leasing sample (170 
companies) is 29.8%, compared with 1.6% for the low-leasing sample (209 
companies). This difference is significant at the 1%  level (t-statistic 8.56). Also, the 
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difference in medians (13.5% for the high-leasing sample, and 1.0% for the low-
leasing sample) is significant at the 0.01 level (z-statistic 16.82).  
 
Finally, Panel C of Table 7.1 shows the mean- and median values of the alternative 
operating lease-intensity measure; AP/TCC. Again, the mean and median are 
presented for the sample as a whole, and also for the sample split into the high- and 
low-leasing companies. For 439 companies AP/TCC was available; the mean is 
27.2% and the median 20.7%. The mean of AP/TCC for the high-leasing sample is 
43.7%, as opposed to 9.2% for the low-leasing sample. This difference is significant 
at the 0.01% level (t-statistic 20.59). In addition, the difference in medians (41.9% 
for the high-leasing sample and 5.2% for the low-leasing sample) is significant at 
the 1% level (z-statistic 15.0). The significance of the differences between the two 
samples, shown in panels B and C, confirms the correct classification of the 
observations into these two sub-samples. 
 
Table 7.1 Sample characteristics 
The total sample of 584 company-year observations for the research period 2000-2004 is shown in three different 
panels. Panel A shows, if possible, the classification of the total sample in high leasing (lease dummy=1) or low 
leasing (lease dummy=0) (see section 7.2 for the classification criteria). Since it was not possible to determine for all 
companies the lease intensity, 464 observations in the sample were classified as either high- or low-leasing 
companies. The classification into high-leasing or low-leasing company was subdivided over the five years of the 
research period. Panel B shows the mean- and median values of PVOL/TA, for the total sample, and for the high- 
and low-leasing sample separately. The values are also subdivided over the five years of the research period. 
PVOL/TA is the present value of the operating leases divided by total assets. Panel C shows the mean- and median 
values of AP/TCC, for the total sample, and for the high- and low-leasing sample separately. The values are also 
subdivided over the five years of the research period. AP/TCC is the annual lease payment divided by the total cost 
of capital (see section 7.2). For both Panels B and C the difference in mean and median is statistically tested, t- and 
z-values are reported in parentheses. *** means significance at 1% level. 
PANEL A: CLASSIFICATION OF ALL COMPANIES IN HIGH- AND LOW-LEASING COMPANIES 
 All companies Lease dummies Low-leasing High-leasing 
 N % N 
% 
all companies N 
% of 
available lease 
dummies N 
% of 
available lease 
dummies 
2000 118 20% 88 75% 53 60% 35 40%  
2001 119 20% 95 80% 52 55% 43 45%  
2002 119 20% 97 82% 47 48% 50 52%  
2003 119 20% 100 84% 38 38% 62 62%  
2004 109 19% 84 77% 37 44% 47 56%  
All 584 100% 464 79% 227 49% 237 51%  
PANEL B: DIFFERENCES IN MEAN- AND MEDIAN VALUES OF PVOL/TA BETWEEN HIGH- AND 
LOW-LEASING COMPANIES   
 All companies with PVOL/TA Low-leasing High-leasing 
  N   Mean   Median   N   Mean   Median   N   Mean   Median  
2000 67 5.7% 1.5% 50 1.4% 0.7% 17 18.6% 11.4% 
2001 73 5.8% 3.2% 49 1.4% 0.4% 24 14.7% 9.9% 
2002 79 10.0% 4.5% 44 1.8% 1.7% 35 20.3% 11.9% 
2003 84 32.4% 10.2% 32 1.6% 1.4% 52 51.4% 23.9% 
2004 76 14.0% 6.3% 34 1.7% 1.5% 42 24.0% 14.6% 
All 379 14.2% 4.3% 209 1.6% 1.0% 170 29.8% 13.5% 
      (8.56)***  (16.82)***     
PANEL C: DIFFERENCES IN MEAN- AND MEDIAN VALUE OF AP/TCC BETWEEN HIGH- AND LOW-
LEASING COMPANIES   
 All companies with AP/TCC Low-leasing High-leasing 
  N   Mean   Median   N   Mean   Median   N   Mean   Median  
2000 83 24.7% 14.5% 49 7.6% 3.1% 34 49.5% 57.0% 
2001 90 24.2% 18.1% 49 7.7% 4.3% 41 44.0% 40.8% 
2002 92 27.3% 22.2% 43 10.7% 5.9% 49 41.8% 40.9% 
2003 97 28.5% 22.3% 36 9.1% 6.2% 61 40.0% 38.3% 
2004 77 31.3% 25.0% 33 11.8% 10.2% 44 45.9% 46.1% 
All 439 27.2% 20.7% 210 9.2% 5.2% 229 43.7% 41.9% 
           20.59)***  (15.00)***        
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7.3 Results 
This section presents the results of the empirical tests. The determinants of the 
leasing decision are analysed by looking at company-specific characteristics. First, 
section 7.3.1 describes the results of each of the determinants separately (the 
univariate analysis). The univariate results show the Spearman rank-correlation 
coefficient between the determinants and the lease-intensity measure PVOL/TA, 
and also show the difference in mean- and median between the high- and low-
leasing companies. The focus is on the differences in the medians due to the 
statistical properties of the data (for an extensive description, see chapter 5). The 
correlation results provide a preliminary answer on the relationship between the 
selected determinants and the operating-lease decisions. Section 7.3.2 then 
describes the results of two different regression models. First, an ordinary least 
squares regression (OLS) is performed with the operating-lease intensity PVOL/TA 
as dependent variable. A logit analysis then tests which determinants have 
predictive power in distinguishing between high- or low-leasing companies.  
 
7.3.1 Univariate results 
The univariate results are presented by reporting two relationship indicators for 
each possible determinant of operating lease intensity. First is the Spearman rank-
correlation coefficient between each of the tested variables and the lease intensity 
(PVOL/TA), followed by the differences in mean- and median values for the high-
leasing and low-leasing companies. 
  
Leverage 
Table 7.2 Leverage differences between high- and low-leasing companies 
Mean- and median values are shown for three leverage variables, both before and after the constructive operating-
lease capitalisation. LTD=Long-term debt. The long-term part of PVOL is PVOL minus the present value of next 
year’s annual payment (AP). LTD/CE is LTD divided by total capital employed. LTD/CE-after is calculated by 
adding to both the numerator and the denominator the long-term part of PVOL. TD/TA is total debt divided by total 
assets. TD/TA-after is (TD + PVOL)/(TA + PVA). PVA is the present value of the leased assets. Difference analysis 
between high-leasing and low-leasing companies was conducted using both a parametric test (comparison of means) 
and a non-parametric test (median-test). The available observations (N) for each variable differ due to data-
availability. Especially for the variables after capitalisation, PVOL was fundamental (although it was not available 
for all observations). Correlation coefficients are Spearman-rank correlations. 
  PVOL/TA 
ALL COMPANIES  
WITH LEASE DUMMY 
LOW-LEASING 
 COMPANIES 
HIGH-LEASING  
COMPANIES 
 N rank corr. N mean median N mean median N Mean t-value median z-value 
LTD/CE 367 0.21*** 452 28.3% 24.5%  222 26.1% 20.4% 230 30.3% 1.67 * 30.7% 2.51 ** 
LTD/CE-after 359 0.49*** 360 36.3% 34.1%  204 27.5% 21.3% 156 47.7% 6.00 *** 46.5% 7.94 *** 
TD/TA 379 0.06ns 464 25.8% 24.3%  227 25.4% 23.2% 237 26.2% 0.45 ns 26.1% 0.94 ns 
TD/TA-after 369 0.34*** 370 31.2% 29.6%  209 26.7% 23.9% 161 37.0% 5.12 *** 35.4% 5.71 *** 
 TD/TE  353 0.08ns 427 143.6% 74.4% 210 163.8% 61.6% 217 124.0% 0.62 ns 84.8% 2.48 ** 
TD/TE-after  360 0.367*** 361 203.5% 98.2% 204 205.5% 58.9% 157 200.8% 0.05 ns 128.5% 6.04 *** 
***, ** and * significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, ns= not significant, t-values (mean-test) or z-values (median-test) in parentheses 
 
Table 7.2 shows first the Spearman rank-correlation coefficients between the lease 
intensity PVOL/TA and the three leverage ratios LTD/CE, TD/TA and TD/TE, all 
before and after capitalisation. The correlation coefficients are all positive, and 
significant at the 1% level for all after-capitalisation ratios. Only the before- 
capitalisation of LTD/CE is significantly positively correlated with PVOL/TA. Both 
TD/TA and TD/TE before capitalisation are not significantly correlated with 
PVOL/TA. The correlation of the leverage ratios after capitalisation increases 
substantially. Table 7.2 also presents the differences in the three leverage ratios 
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE DETERMINANTS OF THE OPERATING-LEASE DECISION 
195 
between low- and high-leasing companies. Although the high-leasing companies 
succeed in lowering their leverage ratio to a level closer to that of the low-leasing 
companies, they still have a higher LTD/CE, TD/TA and TD/TE ratio before 
capitalisation. The differences in medians are all significant, except for TD/TA. 
With respect to the TD/TA ratio before capitalisation, the difference is positive but 
not significant, and the high-leasing company succeeds in equalising this leverage 
ratio with that of the low-leasing companies. The differences in means show the 
same results and lead to the same conclusion. 
 
Table 7.2 showed a positive relationship between leverage and operating-lease 
intensity, both before and after the capitalisation of the off-balance sheet operating 
leases. Furthermore, the leverage ratio is higher for high-leasing companies 
compared to low-leasing companies, even without the operating leases having been 
taken into account when the leverage ratio was calculated. 
 
Size 
Table 7.3 shows the univariate results of the different size variables. Table 7.4 
shows the difference between the 25% smallest companies and the 25% largest 
companies in the sample (as suggested by Adams and Hardwick (1998)). 
 
Table 7.3 Size differences between high- and low-leasing companies 
Mean- and median values are shown for four size variables (the natural log of total assets (TA), market value of 
equity (MVE), number of employees and sales). TA is calculated twice: first, without taking the operating leases 
into account and second, with the operating leases capitalised. TA-after = TA+PVA, where PVA= the present value 
of the leased assets. Difference analysis between high- and low-leasing companies was conducted using both 
parametric tests (comparison of means) and non-parametric tests (median-test). The available observations (N) for 
each variable differ due to data availability. Particularly TA-after, where PVA is fundamental, is not available for all 
observations. Correlations are Spearman rank-correlation coefficients. 
 PVOL/TA 
ALL COMPANIES WITH 
LEASE DUMMY 
LOW-LEASING 
COMPANIES 
HIGH-LEASING 
COMPANIES 
 N rank corr. N Mean median N mean median N mean t-value median z-value 
ln(TA) 379 0.24*** 464  12.91    13.00  227 12.78 12.59 237 13.04 1.27 ns 13.20 1.80 * 
ln(TA-after) 369 0.27*** 370  13.11    13.33  209 12.80 12.47 161 13.60 3.39  ***  13.76 3.85 *** 
ln(MVE) 374 0.22*** 425  12.47    12.43  221 12.32 12.13 223 12.60 1.14  ns  12.79 1.56 ns 
ln(employees) 369 0.39*** 454   7.84     8.27  218 7.26 7.51 236 8.38 5.08  ***  8.79 4.87 *** 
ln(sales) 371 0.35*** 456  13.13    13.51  221 12.69 12.55 235 13.55 3.86  ***  13.79 3.99  *** 
***, ** and * significant at1%, 5%, and 10%  levels 
 
Table 7.4 Difference lease intensity between smallest and largest companies (1st quartile-4th quartile) 
The total sample of 371 companies with a known PVOL/TA are split into small (1st -quartile) and large (4th -
quartile) companies based on total sales. The table shows mean- and median values of PVOL/TA for all companies 
and for the small and large companies separately. Also shown is the Spearman correlation between PVOL/TA and 
ln(sales).  
 
ALL COMPANIES  
WITH PVOL/TA 
SMALL COMPANIES  
(1ST QUARTILE) 
LARGE COMPANIES  
(4TH QUARTILE) 
 N mean median N mean median N mean t-value median  z-value  
lnSales 371 13.29 13.60        92  10.00 10.03 95 16.16   15.70   
PVOL/TA 371 14.2% 4.3%        92  7.1% 1.0% 95 18.3% 1.95 *** 6.0% 6.34 *** 
Correlation 371 0.35***          92   -0.02ns    95 0.03ns           
***, ** and * significant at1%, 5%, and 10%  levels 
 
Table 7.3 presents the correlation between size variables and the differences in 
mean and medians between high- and low-leasing companies. From the correlation 
coefficients it can be concluded that size and the PVOL/TA are positively, highly 
significantly, correlated with the operating-lease intensity. In line with Graham et 
al. (1998), total assets are less appropriate for testing the size relationship, since 
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total assets are influenced by the lease intensity. The correlation results of the 
alternative variables (market value of equity, number of employees and sales) 
provide, however, quite similar results. For all variables, the numbers of the high-
leasing companies are larger than those of the low-leasing companies, and only for 
the market value of equity is this relationship not significant.  
 
Table 7.4 shows the same relationship between the lease intensity and size— but 
only for the 25% smallest and the 25% largest companies. This is to test whether 
the relationship is different for the very small- versus very large companies (as 
suggested by Adams and Hardwick (1998)). The results of Table 7.4 are consistent 
with those of Table 7.3: that larger companies have higher lease intensity than 
smaller companies do. The median of PVOL/TA for the 25% largest companies is 6% 
(as opposed to 1% for the 25% smallest companies): a highly significant difference. 
However, the correlation coefficients between PVOL/TA and size are not significant 
for both the small- and large companies in the sample, although they are highly, 
positively, significant for the entire sample. 
 
Performance 
Table 7.5 presents the univariate results of the performance variables. 
 
Table 7.5 Performance differences between high- and low-leasing companies 
Mean- and median values are shown for six performance variables (Return on Assets (ROA), earnings-before-
interest-and-tax (EBIT) divided by total assets (TA), earnings-per-share (EPS) and current ratio (CR)). Except for 
EPS, all variables are calculated twice: first, without taking into account the operating leases and second, with the 
operating leases capitalised, if appropriate. ROA is net income divided by total assets. ROA-after is calculated by 
adding to net income the effect caused by the difference between the depreciation of the asset and the repayment 
part of the lease payment (for an extensive description, see chapter 4). EBIT-after is calculated by adding to EBIT 
the annual payment of next year and deducting the depreciation part of PVA. TA-after = TA+PVA, where PVA = 
the present value of the leased assets. Difference analysis between high- and low-leasing companies was conducted 
using both parametric tests (comparison of means) and non-parametric tests (median-test). The correlation 
coefficient is Spearman’s rank correlation. 
 PVOL/TA 
ALL COMPANIES 
WITH LEASE DUMMY 
LOW-LEASING 
COMPANIES 
HIGH-LEASING 
COMPANIES 
 N rank corr.  N  mean median N mean median N mean t-value median z-value 
ROA % 378 -0.09* 462 -1.5% 3.7% 227 -3.2% 4.1% 235 0.1% 1.25 ns 3.2% -1.35 ns 
ROA-after % 368 -0.12** 369 -2.3% 3.2% 209 -3.8% 3.9% 160 -0.4% -1.11 ns 2.5% -2.40 ** 
EBITDA/sales 362 -0.32*** 444 -0.1% 7.9% 218 -6.9% 11.8% 226 6.5% 0.60 ns 5.9% -5.10 *** 
EBITDA+rent/sales 362 -0.18*** 444 2.0% 10.2% 218 -5.8% 12.3% 226 9.6% 0.70 ns 8.9% -2.50 ** 
EPS 375 -0.11** 458 0.55 0.84 223 0.70 0.93 235 0.41 0.75 ns 0.65 -1.80 * 
CR 360 -0.13** 440 1.69 1.31 208 1.87 1.34 232 1.52 2.31 * 1.28 -1.72 * 
CR-after 360 -0.24*** 440 1.56 1.25 208 1.80 1.32 232 1.35 3.47 *** 1.15 -3.76 *** 
***, ** and * significant at1%, 5%, and 10%  levels, ns= not significant 
 
From the correlation coefficients in Table 7.5 it can be concluded that the 
performance measures ROA, EBIT/TA, EPS and CR all show a negative 
relationship with the operating-lease intensity. This relationship is significant both 
before- and after capitalisation, with one exception: EBIT/TA-after, for which the 
relationship is not significant. These results are in line with previous studies 
showing that leasing is used by less profitable companies, which face higher 
premiums for external funds (Lasfer and Levis (1998)). The comparison of the 
medians between high- and low-leasing companies is also negative for these 
performance variables, although not significant for ROA and EBIT/TA before 
capitalisation. The differences become significant after the operating leases have 
been capitalised, but only at the 10% level. Also the difference between the medians 
of EPS and CR is significant at the 10% level. 
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Growth/investment opportunity 
Table 7.6 shows the relationship between growth and investment opportunities and 
operating-lease intensity. Table 7.7 show the cross-tabulation of an age-dummy 
with the high- or low-leasing companies dummy, since Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) 
rightly relate younger age to growth opportunities (but do not test this relationship 
themselves). Although the market-to-book ratio is used by many studies as a 
measure of investment opportunity, this measure was calculated differently in 
previous studies (see section 6.7). Therefore, the analysis was conducted for two 
different market-to-book ratios: first, calculated as the market value of equity 
divided by the book value of equity (Lasfer and Levis (1998) and Mehran et al. 
(1999), and second, calculated as the market value of the firm (book value of assets 
minus book value of equity plus market value of equity) divided by the book value of 
total assets (Graham et al. (1998), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Barclay and Smith 
(1995)). 
 
Table 7.6 Growth and investment opportunity  
Mean- and median values are shown for the price/earnings ratio (PE ratio), two different market-to-book ratios 
(MTB) and the 5-year average growth in sales and in total assets. MTB-equity is calculated as the market value of 
equity divided by the book value of equity. MTB-Rajan is the market-to-book ratio using the Rajan and Zingales 
(1995; Graham et al. (1998) calculation, being the market value of the firm (book value of assets – book value of 
equity + market value of equity) divided by the book value of total assets. Both MTB ratios are calculated before 
and after the capitalisation of operating leases. Difference analysis between high- and low-leasing companies was 
conducted using both parametric tests (comparison of means) and non-parametric tests (median-test). The 
correlation coefficient is Spearman’s rank correlation. 
 PVOL/TA 
ALL COMPANIES 
WITH LEASE DUMMY 
LOW-LEASING 
COMPANIES 
HIGH-LEASING 
COMPANIES 
 N rank corr. N mean median N mean median N mean t-value median z-value 
PE ratio 194 -0.02ns 242 17.20 11.40 120 15.38 12.50 122 18.99 1.00 ns 11.10 -0.61 ns 
MTB-equity before 347 0.03ns 425 2.77 1.73 202 2.82 1.70 223 2.72 -0.14 ns 1.76 0.91 ns 
MTB-equity after 329 0.08ns 330 3.02 1.77 180 3.38 1.73 150 2.59 -0.71 ns 1.83 -0.48 ns 
MTB-Rajan before 347 0.04ns 425 1.52 1.24 202 1.51 1.26 223 1.53 0.22 ns 1.24 -0.46 ns 
MTB-Rajan after 337 0.00ns 338 1.47 1.21 184 1.52 1.26 154 1.40 -1.36 ns 1.19 -0.71 ns 
5-year sales growth 350 0.12** 431 10.6% 9.0% 207 7.0% 7.1% 224 13.9% 3.48 *** 10.8% 3.69 *** 
***, ** and * significant at1%, 5%, and 10%  levels, ns= not significant 
 
The investment opportunity set measures (measuring possible future growth) are 
all non-significant in both the correlation with the operating lease intensity and the 
comparison of mean and medians between high- and low-leasing companies. With 
respect to the market-to-book ratios, it does not matter whether one uses the 
market-to-book value of total assets (Rajan and Zingales (1995)), or the market-to-
book value of only equity. Moreover, capitalisation of the operating lease does not 
materially change these outcomes. However, past growth of total sales does show a 
significant positive relation with the operating-lease intensity, and the high-leasing 
companies experienced a significantly higher growth rate than the low-leasing 
companies. The above discussion leads to the conclusion that companies with an 
above-average growth rate use more operating leases than do companies with a 
below-average rate. However, the choice for operating lease is not made in 
anticipation of future growth opportunities. 
 
To test whether younger companies (which are assumed to have more growth 
opportunities) lease more than older companies, we assigned an age dummy to each 
company. The dummy takes the value of one if a company was established less than 
ten years ago; if the company was established more than ten years ago, the dummy 
takes the value of zero. Since the age of ten years was arbitrarily chosen, the 
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analysis was also conducted with a discriminating value of establishment within 
the past five years and within the past fifteen years. These dummies, however, did 
not change the results as reported in Table 7.7 below. 
 
Table 7.7 Age differences between high- and low-leasing companies 
Companies classified as ‘young’ if the company was established less than ten years ago. These companies were 
assigned a dummy of one; other companies have a dummy of zero.  
  ALL LOW-LEASING HIGH-LEASING 
Age<10 years 73 32 41 
Age>10 years 380 187 193 
Pearson chi-square 0.40 Ns 
ns=not significant, changing in 5 or 15 years does not change the results 
 
From Table 7.7 it can be concluded that the age of a company does not determine 
the operating-lease decision, since based on the age dummy no significant difference 
is revealed between high- and low-leasing companies. 
 
Capital intensity/asset structure 
Table 7.8 Capital intensity/asset structure differences between high- and low-leasing companies 
TCC, total capital costs as calculated by Sharpe and Nguyen (1995), is calculated as follows: 
  PVOL/TA 
ALL COMPANIES WITH 
 LEASE DUMMY 
LOW-LEASING  
COMPANIES 
HIGH-LEASING  
COMPANIES     
 N 
Rank 
 corr. N mean median N mean median N mean t-value median z-value 
TCC/#employees 351 -0.09ns 436 26.69 10.53 207 38.37 11.41 229 -16.14 -3.12 *** 9.90 -2.95 *** 
TCC/sales 354 -0.02ns 439 0.11 0.06 210 0.13 0.07 229 0.09 -1.90 ** 0.06 -1.87 * 
Ln(sales/employee) 368 -0.15*** 453 308.93 180.13 218 331.73 195.66 235 287.78 -0.90 ns 160.24 -2.8 *** 
Net PPE/TA 374 -0.17*** 459 27.2% 22.6% 224 32.9% 32.2% 235 21.8% -6.22 *** 16.3% -5.67 *** 
Net PPE/TA-after 364 0.06ns 365 33.3% 31.0% 206 33.6% 33.0% 159 33.0% -0.28 ns 29.0% -0.08 ns 
CA/TA  360 0.11** 440 56.1% 57.1% 208 52.3% 54.0% 232 59.5% 3.58 *** 61.8% 3.64 *** 
CA/TA-after 350 -0.08ns 351 51.2% 53.2% 192 51.7% 53.2% 159 50.7% -0.49 ns 53.7% 0.26 ns 
***, ** and * significant at1%, 5%, and 10%  levels, ns= not significant 
Most variables suggested by previous studies to measure capital intensity are 
affected one way or another by operating-lease intensity. For example, the total 
capital costs as suggested by Sharpe et al. (1995) include the lease payments; 
excluding them leads to different results. The relationship between total capital 
costs per employee is negative (in line with the results of Sharpe et al.), which 
according to Sharpe et al. was due to more capital extensive companies using more 
specialised equipment (which is less appropriate for leasing). However, the 
correlation is not significant. The difference in median is significantly negative. Also 
the alternative measure, ‘sales per employee’ is negatively related to the operating-
lease intensity, and the difference between high- and low-leasing companies is 
significant. This is as expected, since the higher the sales per employee, the more 
labour intensive a company is and the fewer possibilities it will have, compared to a 
more capital intensive company, to lease. The other variables show similar results, 
but these are less reliable, due to the impact of total assets in the denominator.  
 
The ratio of current assets to total assets (not adjusted) is significantly positively 
related to operating-lease intensity. The fixed asset- to total-asset (net PPE/TA) 
ratio is negatively related to operating-lease intensity. This is consistent with 
hypothesis 6.11, which hypothesises that if the leased asset is not taken into 
account, the capital-intensity measures will not be appropriate to test whether 
capital intensity is a determinant in the operating-lease decision. The results are 
not in line with Deloof and Verschueren (1999), who found a negative significant 
relationship between lease intensity and the ratio of current assets to total assets. 
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However, since they investigated only financial leases, fixed assets were not 
removed from the balance sheet. This also emphasises the different determinants of 
the financial- and operating-lease decision; not only can these not be investigated at 
the same time, but also the results cannot be compared to each other as if these 
leases are the same. The above-described relationships are not significant after the 
leased asset has been adjusted to both the numerator and the denominator.  
 
Due to the endogeneity of the capital-intensity measures (including total assets), 
the regression will be executed using the sales per employee as explanatory variable 
to explore the relationship between capital intensity and operating-lease intensity. 
 
Tax 
Table 7.9 shows the univariate results of the relation between the effective tax rate 
and the operating-lease intensity and differences in the effective tax rate between 
high- and low-leasing companies.  
 
Table 7.9 Tax differences between high- and low-leasing companies 
Tax-rate = income-tax/income-before-tax, this rate is only calculated for companies with positive income tax.  
 PVOL/TA 
ALL COMPANIES 
WITH LEASE DUMMY 
LOW-LEASING 
COMPANIES 
HIGH-LEASING 
COMPANIES 
 N rank corr. N mean median N mean median N mean t-value median z-value 
Tax rate 260 0.14** 326 35.7% 33.2% 167 35.1% 31.7% 159 36.4% 0.30 ns 34.4% 3.15 *** 
Tax rate  
5-yr average 176 0.14* 224 35.8% 33.5% 105 32.3% 32.0% 119 38.9% 1.38 ns 34.2% 2.38 ** 
***, ** and * significant at1%, 5%, and 10%  levels, ns= not significant 
 
The correlation coefficient for both the 5-year average tax rate as well as last year’s 
effective tax rate is +0.14, and in both cases significantly related. This is contrary to 
what could be expected on the tax rate, since a negative relationship was expected. 
Low-taxpaying entities can still benefit from certain tax schemes through operating 
leases, and this implies a negative relationship between the tax rate and operating-
lease intensity. Also the differences in medians show a significantly higher effective 
tax rate for the high-leasing companies (34.4%) than for the low-leasing companies 
(32.0%). This is not the case for the differences in means.  
 
Management compensation 
Table 7.10 shows the correlation of total management compensation and operating-
lease intensity and the differences with regard to management compensation 
between high- and low leasing companies. Also it shows the relationship in 2004 
between the lease-intensity and the percentage of the bonusplan related to the basic 
salaries of management. In line with the study of Imhoff et al. (1993), it shows the 
correlation between annual increases in management compensation and annual 
increases in operating-lease intensity. 
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Table 7.10 Differences in management compensation between high- and low-leasing companies 
lnCOMP is the natural log of the absolute amount of management compensation. %change COMP is the percentage 
change in management compensation calculated as (COMPt – COMPt-1)/COMPt-1, the total compensation of the 
current year minus the total compensation of last year divided by the latter. Also given is the rank correlation of the 
change in operating-lease intensity (PVOL/TAt – PVOL/TAt-1)/PVOL/TAt-1. The correlation coefficient is 
Spearman’s rank correlation. 
 PVOL/TA 
ALL COMPANIES WITH 
LEASE DUMMY 
LOW-LEASING 
COMPANIES 
HIGH-LEASING 
COMPANIES 
 N rank corr. N mean median N mean median N mean t-value median z-value 
COMP 335 0.27*** 410 7.10 7.22 193 6.92 6.93 217 7.26 2.94 *** 7.32 2.72 *** 
Bonus/ 
base salary 67 0.14ns 67 45.0% 40.7% 29 38.4% 31.6% 38 50.2% 1.51 ns 47.0% 1.49 ns 
  % change PVOL/TA           
%change COMP  101 0.20**                           
***, ** and * significant at1%, 5%, and 10%  levels, ns= not significant 
 
The total amount of management compensation reported in the financial statement 
is significantly positively related to the operating-lease intensity. Also, a look at the 
differences in mean and medians between the high- and low-leasing companies 
reveals that high-leasing companies have significantly higher management 
compensations. This is consistent with the bonus-plan hypothesis. However, the 
total amount of management compensation is affected by other factors, such as 
number of members of the management board or size of the company, and is 
therefore not a relatively measure that can be compared from company to company.  
The percentage of the bonuses paid to management related to base salaries also 
show as positive relationship with the lease-intensity. Both the Spearman 
correlation as the differences in mean and median between high- and low-leasing 
companies show that bonuses take a greater part in total management 
compensation for high-leasing companies. Whereas for the low-leasing companies 
the median of bonus related to basic salary is 38%, this is 47% for high-leasing 
companies. The differences are, however, not significant. 
 
In line with the analysis of Imhoff et al. (1993)64, this study tests whether the 
change in management compensation is related to a change in operating-lease 
intensity. Although this reverses the relationship to be explained, these variables 
are indeed significantly positively correlated: the management of a company indeed 
succeeds in increasing their salaries by increased operating-lease activity. Based on 
the results of Imhoff et al., Duke et al. (2002) concluded that ‘presumably, managers 
are free to engage in compensation-increasing leasing behaviour without the fear 
that compensation committees will undo their efforts on payday’.  
 
Ownership concentration 
The univariate results of ownership concentration are shown in Table 7.11. 
Ownership concentration is measured by the percentage shares that are closely held 
and is available in DataStream. Closely held shares are those shares that are held 
a) by officers, directors and their immediate families, b) in trust, c) by any other 
corporation (except shares held in a fiduciary capacity by banks or other financial 
institutions), d) by pension/benefit plans and e) by individuals who hold 5% or more 
of the outstanding shares.  
 
                                                          
64 Imhoff et al. (1993) tested whether the change in return on assets caused by operating-lease capitalisation resulted 
in a change in management compensation; see also chapter 6. 
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Table 7.11 Ownership differences between high- and low-leasing companies 
%shares closely held are the shares held by insiders divided by total common shares *100%. It includes shares held 
a) by officers, directors and their immediate families, b) in trust, c) by any other corporation (except shares held in a 
fiduciary capacity by banks or other financial institutions), d) by pension/benefit plans and e) by individuals who 
hold 5% or more of the outstanding shares.  
  PVOL/TA 
ALL COMPANIES 
 WITH LEASE DUMMY 
LOW-LEASING 
 COMPANIES 
HIGH-LEASING 
COMPANIES 
 N Rank corr. N mean median N mean median N mean t-value median z-value 
%shares 
closely held 293 0.06ns 363 39.6 37.5 162 37.0 36.1 201 41.8 1.67 * 42.5 1.73 * 
***, ** and * significant at1%, 5%, and 10%  levels, ns= not significant 
 
Previous studies found a positive relationship between more closely held companies 
and operating-lease intensity, explained by the risk related to the ownership of a 
company (see chapter 6). This is confirmed by the results of the underlying sample, 
only with respect to the differences between high- and low-leasing companies. The 
correlation between the percentage of closely held shares and the operating-lease 
intensity is positive but very small, and not significant. The median of the 
percentage of closely held shares is higher for high-leasing companies (42.5%) than 
for low-leasing companies (36.1%). This relationship is only significant at the 10% 
level, based on both the mean and the median.  
 
Industry 
Table 7.12 shows mean and median of PVOL/TA, and the difference in the 
classification of high- and low-leasing companies, for five different sectors 
(construction, manufacturing, transport & public utilities, trade, and services). The 
classification in the sectors is based on the two-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification codes (sic codes). In line with Graham et al. (1998), also a telephone 
dummy was assigned to the companies active in this sector to test the hypothesis 
that regulated firms use less lease financing. 
 
Table 7.12 Industry differences between high- and low-leasing companies 
sic-codes   15-17 20-39 40-49 50-59 70-89 
PVOL/TA TOTAL CONSTRUCTION MANUFACTURING 
TRANSPORT & 
PUBLIC 
UTILITIES TRADE SERVICES 
N 379 17 173 43 64 82 
Mean 14.2% 35.9% 11.1% 7.8% 24.1% 12.0% 
Median 4.3% 16.0% 3.9% 4.4% 8.6% 2.9% 
Between groups analysis of 
difference F-statistic 3.9***    
COMPANIES WITH LEASE DUMMY     
 TOTAL CONSTRUCTION MANUFACTURING 
TRANSPORT & 
PUBLIC 
UTILITIES TRADE SERVICES 
N 464 30 200 44 87 103 
Low-leasing companies 227 11 105 25 33 53 
High-leasing 
companies  237 19 95 19 54 50 
Pearson chi-square   8.4*           
***, ** and * significant at1%, 5%, and 10%  levels, ns= not significant 
 
The median of PVOL/TA suggests that the ‘construction’ and ‘trade’ sectors use 
significantly more operating leases than the other three sectors do. Whereas the 
median of PVOL/TA for all sectors is 4.3%, the ‘construction’ and ‘trade’ sectors 
have medians of PVOL/TA of 16.0% and 8.6%, respectively. The median of the 
‘transport’ sector (4.4%) is slightly higher than that of the total sample. The inter-
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group analysis of variance shows that the difference between the operating-lease 
intensity of the five sectors is significant at the 1% level (F-statistic 3.9).  
 
The results of the qualification in high- and low-leasing companies for the five 
sectors allow us to conclude that the majority of companies in the ‘construction’ and 
‘trade’ sectors are high-leasing companies, whereas for the ‘manufacturing’, 
‘transport’ and ‘services’ sectors this is opposite. Especially for the latter three 
sectors, however, the division between high- and low-leasing companies is close to a 
fifty-fifty division. Still, the Pearson chi-square (8.4) shows that the difference 
between the sectors in the classification as high- or low-leasing companies is 
significant at the 1% level.  
 
To test the political-cost hypothesis that companies in a regulated sector are more 
active in leasing, we assigned a telecom dummy to the companies in the sample that 
were active in the telecom sector. Of the total of 379 observations with a known 
PVOL/TA, seventeen were assigned with a dummy of one, since the company is 
active in the telecom sector. The results of these seventeen observations showed a 
mean and median of PVOL/TA of 3.9% and 3.2%, respectively. For the 362 non-
telecom companies, the mean and median of PVOL/TA were 14.7% and 4.5%, 
respectively. In line with the results of Graham et al. (1998), the telecom companies 
indeed use fewer operating leases, although in our sample the difference is not 
significant65. Also the classification in high- or low-leasing companies does not result 
in significant differences for telecom companies.  
 
7.3.2 Regression models 
This section presents the results of the regressions. As with the univariate analysis, 
both the operating-lease intensity (PVOL/TA), and the dichotomous lease dummy 
(high- vs. low-leasing companies) are tested. The relation between the selected 
determinants and PVOL/TA is tested using the linear regression method, since 
PVOL/TA is a continuous variable. The classification in high- or low-leasing 
companies resulted in a binary dependent variable (with value of one or zero), and 
the relationship between this variable and the selected determinants is tested using 
the binary logistic method (Logit). Appendix G briefly describes both methods.  
 
Model construction 
To avoid multicollinearity and an overabundance of models, we selected one 
measure for each of the determinants discussed in chapter 6 and tested in the 
univariate analysis. The choice was based on the results of the univariate analysis, 
and the aim was to choose variables that were not affected by operating leases 
(avoiding the endogenous variables). The models to be estimated take the following 
forms: 
 
LEASE = β1+ β2 (LEVERAGE) + β3 (SIZE) + β4 (PERFORMANCE) + β5 (GROWTH) 
+ β6 (INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY) + β7 (CAPITAL INTENSITY) + β8 
(TAX) + β9 (COMPENSATION) + β10 (OWNERSHIP-
CONCENTRATION) + β11(TELECOM-DUMMY) + β12(TRADE-
DUMMY) + β13 (YEAR-DUMMY) + ε 
 
                                                          
65 Both the difference in means and medians are not significant (t-value is -1.25 and z-value is -1.46) 
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE DETERMINANTS OF THE OPERATING-LEASE DECISION 
203 
whereas the dependent variable, LEASE, is measured as either PVOL/TA in the 
linear regression models or LEASE dummy (one for high-leasing companies and 
zero for low- or non-leasing companies) in the logit-regression model. The 
explanatory variables are LEVERAGE, measured by the ratio of total debt to total 
assets (TD/TA); SIZE, measured by the natural log of sales (lnSales); 
PERFORMANCE, measured by earnings per share (EPS); GROWTH, measured by 
the 5-year average sales growth; INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY, measured by the 
market-to-book value of equity (MTB); CAPITAL INTENSITY, measured by the 
natural log of sales divided by the number of employees; TAX, measured as the 
effective tax rate; COMPENSATION, measured by the natural log of the absolute 
amount of management compensation; OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION, 
measured by the % closely held shares in a company; TELECOM-DUMMY, used to 
distinguish between regulated and non-regulated sectors (dummy is assigned a 
value of one for companies active in this sector); TRADE-DUMMY, is the industry 
dummy with value of one if a company has a sic code between 50-59 (Trade) and 
zero otherwise, and finally a year-dummy, used to control for differences in lease 
intensity for the years 2000-2004. 
 
Appendix 7.II shows the Spearman rank correlations between the different 
determinants that appear in the regression models. Both the leverage ratio (TDTA) 
and the investment opportunity set measure (MTB) appear twice in the table; once 
without the operating leases capitalised and once with them capitalised. Due to the 
sometimes-significant correlation between leverage and the other determinants, we 
construct one of the models excluding leverage. The numbers of observations of the 
ownership variable (% closely held shares) and management compensation are 
relatively small, and this would limit the number of observations included in the 
models. Therefore, model 3 is equal to model 1, but with the inclusion of ownership 
and management compensation. Models 1 through 3 include leverage and MTB, 
unadjusted for the capitalised operating leases. Models 4 and 5 include leverage and 
MTB, both after the operating leases have been capitalised. As with the before-
capitalisation models, one model excludes ownership (model 4), and one includes 
ownership (model 5). Especially the impact on leverage changes the results between 
the before-capitalisation models (models 1 through 3) and the after-capitalisation 
models (4 and 5). An after-capitalisation model excluding leverage and including 
size (a variation on model 2) does not change the results. Model 2 is therefore not 
included in the table.  
 
Table 7.13 shows the results of the linear regression, and Table 7.14 shows the 
results of the logit analysis. Table 7.15 summarises the findings of each of the 
investigated determinants of both the univariate analysis and multivariate 
regressions. Thereafter, the conclusions on the hypothesis will be formulated. 
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Table 7.13 Linear regression  
This table summarises the results from four different linear regressions. The dependent variable is the percentage of 
the present value of the operating leases of total assets (PVOL/TA) as a measure of operating-lease intensity. 
Observations with a PVOL/TA exceeding twice the standard deviation are excluded. This concerns four 
observations with a PVOL/TA exceeding 84%. Models (1) and (2) include explanatory variables that ignore the 
presence of operating leases in the footnotes, and the variables are not adjusted by the capitalisation of the lease 
liability (PVOL) or the leased asset (PVA). Models (3) and (4) adjust the explanatory variables with PVOL or PVA, 
if appropriate. This concerns the ratio of total debt to total assets (LEVERAGE) and the market value of equity 
divided by the book value of equity (MTB, as a measure of INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY). The explanatory 
variables used: SIZE, measured by the natural log of sales (lnSales); PERFORMANCE, measured by earnings per 
share (EPS); GROWTH, measured by average 5-year sales growth; CAPITAL INTENSITY, measured by the 
natural log of sales divided by the number of employees; TAX, measured by the effective tax rate; 
COMPENSATION, which is the natural log of total management compensation; OWNERSHIP, measured by the % 
closely held shares in a company; TELECOM, which is a dummy with a value of one if the company is a telecom 
company; TRADE, which is a dummy with value of one if a company has sic codes between 50-59, and zero 
otherwise; and a year-dummy for each of the calendar years 2000-2004. Models (2) and (4) exclude OWNERSHIP 
and MANAGEMENT COMPENSATION, since these variables limit the total number of valid observations. 
Absolute t-values are presented in parentheses, *, ** or *** is significant at respectively the 10%, 5% or 1% levels. 
  
WITHOUT OPERATING  
LEASES CAPITALISED   
WITH OPERATING  
LEASES CAPITALISED 
Model: (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Variable      
Intercept -14.38 10.06  -5.70 15.72 
 (1.09) (1.03)  (0.42) (1.66)* 
LEVERAGE -18.89 -14.23  12.09 19.26 
 (3.09)*** (2.56)**  (1.63) (3.08)*** 
SIZE 3.80 1.89  1.77 0.65 
 (3.01)*** (3.73)***  (1.27) (1,26) 
PERFORMANCE -1.67 -1.65  -0.50 -0.62 
 (2.45)** (2.80)***  (0.69) (1.02) 
GROWTH 6.67 10.63  4.51 8.53 
 (0.98) (1.71)*  (0.64) (1.38) 
INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY -0.30 -0.17  -0.36 -0.37 
 (0.66) (0.52)  (0.65) (1.13) 
CAPITAL INTENSITY -3.08 -3.68  -2.52 -3.13 
 (2.20)** (2.84)***  (1.76)* (2.45)** 
TAX 0.42 -0.03  1.45 0.77 
 (0.20) (0.02)  (0.68) (0.39) 
OWNERSHIP 0.20   0.16  
 (4.03)***   (2.98)***  
COMPENSATION -1.32   -0.03  
 (0.54)   (0.01)  
TELECOM-DUMMY -6.48 -3.60  -8.27 -5.54 
 (0.98) (0.60)  (1.23) (0.95) 
TRADE-DUMMY 10.56 9.96  8.37 6.73 
 (3.09)*** (3.42)***  (2.37)** (2.30)** 
YEAR-DUMMY -0.91 -0.86  -1.78 -1.69 
 (1.14) (1.28)  (-2.15)** (2.69)** 
n 155 196  151 192 
R2 0.29 0.19  0.22 0.17 
adj-R2 0.24 0.15  0.16 0.12 
F-statistic 5.31*** 4.61***   3.58*** 3.84*** 
The adjusted R2 increases from a maximum of 0.18 in the models without the 
operating leases capitalised (models 1, 2 and 3) to 0.27 in the models with the 
operating leases capitalised in leverage and MTB (models 4 and 5). These adjusted 
R2 are in line with the study of Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) (adj-R2 between 0.17 and 
0.21), Adams and Hardwick (1998) (R2 0.20) and Graham et al. (1998) (R2 of 
operating-lease model 0.25). As with the linear regression models, the models after 
capitalisation of the operating leases show increased predictive power.  
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Table 7.14 Logit analysis  
This table summarises the results from four different logit regressions. The dependent variable takes the form of a 
dummy, where the dummy has a value of one for high-leasing companies and zero for low- or non-leasing 
companies. Models (1) and (2) include explanatory variables that ignore the presence of operating leases in the 
footnotes, and the variables are not adjusted by the capitalisation of the lease liability (PVOL) or the leased asset 
(PVA). Models (3) and (4) adjust the explanatory variables with PVOL or PVA, if appropriate. This concerns the 
ratio of total debt to total assets (LEVERAGE) and the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity 
(MTB, as a measure of INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY). The explanatory variables used: SIZE, measured by the 
natural log of sales (lnSales); PERFORMANCE, measured by earnings per share (EPS); GROWTH, measured by 
average 5-year sales growth; CAPITAL INTENSITY, measured by the natural log of sales divided by the number of 
employees; TAX, measured by the effective tax rate; COMPENSATION, which is the natural log of total 
management compensation; OWNERSHIP, measured by the % closely held shares in a company; TELECOM, 
which is a dummy with a value of one if the company is a telecom company; TRADE, which is a dummy with a 
value of one if a company has sic codes between 50-59, and zero otherwise; year-dummy is a dummy for each of the 
calendar years 2000-2004. Models (2) and (4) exclude OWNERSHIP and MANAGEMENT COMPENSATION, 
since these variables limit the total number of valid observations. Wald-statistics are shown in parentheses. *, ** or 
*** is significant at respectively the 10%, 5% or 1% level. 
  
WITHOUT OPERATING 
 LEASES CAPITALISED   
WITH OPERATING 
 LEASES CAPITALISED 
Model: (1) (2)  (4) (5) 
Variable      
Constant -1.59 -2.40  -0.77 2.50 
 (0.59) (2.59)  (0.10) (1.92) 
LEVERAGE -2.37 -1.98  2.28 3.31 
 (4.70)** (5.03)**  (3.08)* (8.77)*** 
SIZE 0.74 0.25  0.40 0.25 
 (12.06)*** (9.88)***  (2.37) (6.82)*** 
PERFORMANCE -0.24 -0.22  -0.17 -0.23 
 (4.08)** (4.82)**  (1.51) (3.40)* 
GROWTH 1.52 2.56  1.55 2.78 
 (1.88) (7.48)***  (1.27) (5.54)** 
INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY 0.12 0.03  -0.08 -0.07 
 (1.86) (0.42)  (0.48) (1.52) 
CAPITAL INTENSITY -1.25 -0.91  -1.21 -1.10 
 (17.47)*** (17.48)***  (12.84)*** (15.43)*** 
TAX -0.42 -0.37  -0.42 -0.46 
 (1.46) (1.29)  (1.26) (1.62) 
OWNERSHIP 0.02   0.02  
 (7.91)***   (3.10)*  
COMPENSATION -0.23   0.19  
 (0.44)   (0.70)  
TELECOM-DUMMY -1.08 -1.22  -1.36 -1.23 
 (0.78) (1.12)  (1.15) (1.01) 
TRADE-DUMMY 0.59 0.58  0.74 0.66 
 (1.36) (1.97)  (1.51) (1.56) 
YEAR-DUMMY -0.10 -0.14  -0.31 -0.37 
 (0.77) (1.81)  (4.12)** (8.54)*** 
n 217 270  168 208 
Nagelkerke R2 0.35 0.23  0.36 0.38 
Chi-square 65.7*** 49.9***  53.3*** 55.1*** 
%correct 72% 66%  74% 69% 
No-model 52% 52%  52% 55% 
Table 7.15 summarises the results of the univariate analyses, and the multivariate 
analyses. It also indicates whether the results are consistent with the formulated 
hypothesis or whether the hypothesis is relected. 
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Table 7.15 Summary of results 
     UNIVARIATE 
ANALYSIS 
MULTIVARIATE  
ANALYSIS 
  
HYPOTHESES 
 
VARIABLE 
 
EXPECTED 
SIGN 
 
PVOL/TA 
 
LEASE 
DUMMY 
LINEAR 
REGRESSIONS; 
PVOL/TA 
LOGIT 
REGRESSION: 
LEASE 
DUMMY 
DETERMINANTS         
LEVERAGE hypothesis 6.1 Rejected TD/TA-before 
capitalisation 
- +ns +ns -*** -** 
 hypothesis 6.2 Consistent TD/TA-after capitalisation + +*** +*** +*** +*** 
SIZE hypothesis 6.3 Consistent Ln(Sales) + +*** +*** +***1 +*** 
PERFORMANCE hypothesis 6.4 Rejected2 ROA-before capitalisation 0 -* -ns endogenous 
 hypothesis 6.5 Consistent2 ROA-after capitalisation - -** -** endogenous 
 hypothesis 6.6 Consistent EPS - -** -* -***1 -** 
GROWTH hypothesis 6.7 Rejected Average 5-year sales 
growth 
+ +** +*** +ns +**3 
INVESTMENT 
OPPORTUNITY 
hypothesis 6.7 Rejected MTB-before capitalisation + +ns +ns -ns +ns 
  Rejected MTB-after capitalisation + +ns -ns -ns -ns 
 hypothesis 6.9 Rejected Age dummy (one if age<10 
years) 
+ n/a +ns n/a n/a 
CAPITAL 
INTENSITY 
hypothesis 6.10 Consistent Ln(sales/#employees) - -*** -*** -** -*** 
 hypothesis 6.11 Consistent2 CA/TA-before 
capitalisation 
+ +** +*** endogenous 
 hypothesis 6.12 Rejected2 CA/TA-after capitalisation - -ns +ns endogenous 
TAX hypothesis 6.13 Rejected Effective tax rate - +** +*** -ns -ns 
MANAGEMENT 
COMPENSATION 
hypothesis 6.14 Consistent2 Change in compensation-
/change in lease intensity 
+ +** #N/A 
 hypothesis 6.15 Rejected Ln(management 
compensation) 
+ +*** +*** -ns +/-ns 
OWNERSHIP 
CONCENTRATION 
hypothesis 6.16 Consistent % closely held shares + +ns +* +*** +** 
INDUSTRY         
TRADE hypothesis 6.17 Consistent Trade-dummy + +*** +* +*** +ns 
REGULATED 
INDUSTRY 
hypothesis 6.18 Rejected  Telecom-dummy - -ns n/a -ns -ns 
1Only significant in the model before lease capitalisation, 2 Based on univariate analysis only, 3 Only significant in the models that exclude ownership 
concentration and management compensation
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Leverage 
With respect to leverage, both the linear- and the logit models show consistent 
results. Leverage unadjusted for operating leases is significantly, negatively related 
to the operating-lease intensity. When leverage is adjusted for operating leases the 
relationship becomes significantly positive. The debt hypothesis of Watts and 
Zimmerman (1986) that higher leverage leads to more operating leases is confirmed 
by these results. However, as described in the previous chapter, leverage is affected 
by the decision to use operating leases; the choice for operating leases might cause 
the leverage ratio to become lower for high-leasing companies than for low-leasing 
companies. Therefore, the adjustment of the leverage ratio with the operating-lease 
commitments is essential when testing the debt hypothesis. This is easy to identify 
by the change of the coefficient’s sign of leverage before and after capitalisation. The 
results of both models are consistent with hypotheses 6.1 and 6.2. However, since 
the univariate analysis does not show results that support hypothesis 6.1, this 
hypothesis is rejected. It cannot be concluded that by choosing operating leases the 
high-leasing companies improve their leverage ratio to a level even better than the 
low-leasing companies. The results are, however, supportive of the debt hypothesis: 
that companies with a higher leverage ratio will have higher lease intensity.  
 
The above allows us to conclude that improvement of the leverage ratio is an 
important determinant in the operating-lease decision, and that investigation of 
this determinant can only be executed by including operating leases in the leverage 
measure. 
 
Size 
As mentioned before, the previous studies had mixed results on size as a 
determinant in the (operating-) lease decision. Also El-Gazzar et al. (1986) were 
confused by their unexpected results on this measure. In line with the results of El-
Gazzar et al., this study finds the relationship between size and operating leases 
significantly positive, both in the univariate analysis and in the regressions. The 
endogeneity of total assets as size measure was confirmed by the univariate 
analysis (before- and after capitalisation of operating leases), and in the regression 
size was therefore measured by the natural log of total sales (as suggested by 
Sharpe and Nguyen (1995)). A separate analysis of the 25% smallest and the 25% 
largest companies did not alter the results. The different results from the previous 
studies might be caused by the high correlation of size with some of the other 
determinants (see Appendix 7.II). In most models the coefficient on size is positive 
and highly significant: the results are consistent with hypothesis 6.3 that larger 
companies choose relatively more operating leases than smaller companies do. 
 
Performance 
In the univariate analysis, return on assets was negatively related with operating-
lease intensity, and this relation was significant only at the 10% level. The 
difference in means and medians between high- and low-leasing companies was 
negative, but not significant. The first hypothesis on ROA (before capitalisation), 
hypothesis 6.4 (that operating leases are a means of equalising performance based 
on ROA and therefore no difference was expected between high- and low-leasing 
companies), is rejected.  
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However, when looking at ROA after the operating leases have been capitalised, the 
results are consistent with hypothesis 6.5. hypothesis 6.5 hypothesised that ROA 
after capitalisation results in a significant difference between high- and low-leasing 
companies. Indeed hypothesis 6.5 is confirmed, since ROA after capitalisation is 
significantly lower for high-leasing companies than for low-leasing companies. The 
results on both hypotheses indicate that by means of operating leases companies 
increase their ROA, although high-leasing companies have not fully reconciled their 
ROA with those of the low-leasing companies; ROA before capitalisation is still 
lower for the high-leasing companies than for the low-leasing companies. Also the 
correlation between ROA before capitalisation and the operating-lease intensity is 
negative and significant at the 10% level. ROA was not included in the regressions 
due to its endogeneity. 
 
In the regressions the performance measure included is earnings per share, as an 
exogenous measure. In the univariate analysis, EPS was negatively related to the 
operating-lease intensity— and in all cases this relationship was significant. The 
negative relationship implies that the better the performance of a company, the less 
it will choose operating leases; this is in line with financial contracting theory, 
which says that better performing companies have better access to cheaper 
financing forms. Also in the regressions is the coefficient of EPS in all models 
significantly negative. The results of both the univariate and the mulitvariate 
analyses are consistent with hypothesis 6.6, and the hypothesis cannot be rejected.  
 
Growth/investment opportunity 
Growth was measured by both past growth (increases in sales) and future growth 
(investment opportunity set measured by market-to-book ratio). Furthermore, it 
was tested whether the age of a company, as a measure of future growth 
possibilities, could be a determinant explaining the lease decision. The average 
growth rate of total sales66 in the univariate analysis is significantly positively 
related with the operating-lease intensity at in any case the 5% level. High-leasing 
companies had a significantly (1% level) higher growth rate than low-leasing 
companies. In the regression models this relationship is in all models positive, 
although it was significant in only three out of the eight models. Growth is 
significantly positively related to operating-lease intensity only when management 
compensation and ownership concentration are excluded from the model. This is 
probably caused by the significant correlation between growth and management 
compensation, which causes multicollinearity when both variables are included in 
the model. Therefore, the results are not all consistent with hypothesis 6.7, and this 
hypothesis is rejected. 
 
Also the results on the future growth options, the investment opportunity set, are 
mixed. The relationship between the MTB before capitalisation is (as expected) 
predominantly positive in the univariate analysis and in the regressions. After the 
MTB ratios were adjusted for operating leases (changing the book value of equity in 
the denominator, which lowers the ratio), the correlation with PVOL/TA remained 
positive; although the difference between high- and low-leasing companies becomes 
negative, neither of these relations is significant. MTB is not significant in any of 
                                                          
66 Growth of total assets was excluded from the regressions due to its endogeneity. 
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the eight regression models (neither before nor after operating leases are adjusted). 
hypothesis 6.8 is therefore rejected. 
 
To test whether younger companies lease more than older companies do, we 
assigned an age dummy. The dummy (one if a company was established less than 
ten years ago, zero otherwise) did not show a relation with operating-lease 
intensity. Also hypothesis 6.9 is rejected. 
 
Capital intensity 
A negative relationship between capital intensity was hypothesised by Sharpe and 
Nguyen (1995): companies that are highly capital intensive have more specialised 
equipment, which is less appropriate for leasing. A positive relationship was 
hypothesised by Graham et al. (1998), based on the principle that leasing is, by 
definition, attached to fixed assets and the more fixed assets a company uses, the 
more possibilities the management has to choose operating leases. This study 
focuses on sales per employee, since the value of the fixed assets is of course heavily 
affected by operating-lease intensity, since assets are removed from the balance 
sheet. This, together with the different results of previous studies, leads to a 
hypothesis that focuses more on the labour intensity of a company, which can be 
measured exogenously from the operating leases. The more sales per employee, the 
less labour intensive a company is, and the fewer possibilities that will be available 
to the management of the company to choose operating leases (comparable with the 
argumentation of Graham et al. (1998)). Sales per employee were therefore expected 
to negatively relate with the operating-lease intensity, and this was confirmed by 
both univariate- and regression models. The relationship was highly significant at 
the 5% level, at the least. The above is consistent with hypothesis 6.10, that more 
labour-intensive companies less often choose operating leases.  
 
Tax 
As described by Hart (2001), taxes are one of the missing ingredients of the 
complete and perfect markets of Modigliani and Miller. The tax differential between 
lessee and lessor has therefore often been described as an important reason to 
choose leasing instead of other forms of debt financing. Operating leases allow lower 
taxpaying lessees to shift tax advantages to higher taxpaying lessors. The 
relationship between the tax rate and operating leases was therefore expected to be 
significantly negative. The results of this study, however, do not confirm this 
hypothesis. In the univariate analysis the relationship is even significantly positive, 
although in the regression the relation is predominantly negative but not 
significant. Therefore, hypothesis 6.13 is rejected. This permits us to conclude that 
in the Netherlands the listed companies do not choose operating leases to shift tax 
shields from a low taxpaying entity to a high taxpaying entity.  
 
Management compensation 
The management-compensation hypothesis was based on the bonus-plan hypothesis 
of Watts and Zimmerman (1986). The univariate analysis showed a significantly 
positive relation between operating-lease intensity and the absolute amount of 
management compensation. In addition, it showed that an increase in management 
compensation (which makes the variable a relative measure instead of an absolute 
measure) is positively related to an increase in operating-lease intensity in the 
CHAPTER 7   
210 
same year. These results are consistent with hypothesis 6.15 and hypothesis 6.14, 
respectively. The increase in management compensation related to the increase in 
operating-lease intensity was only limitedly available, and this variable was not 
used in the regressions. The absolute amount of management compensation in the 
regression models showed a negative relationship three times, and a positive only 
once; in none of the four models was the relationship significant. Therefore, 
hypothesis 6.14 is rejected. 
 
Ownership 
The results on ownership concentration are positively related with operating-lease 
intensity in the univariate- and regression models. In both regression models this 
relation is significant at the 5% level, at least. Also the univariate analysis 
regarding the differences between high- and low-leasing companies shows that 
high-leasing companies have a significantly higher ownership concentration than 
low-leasing companies. The correlation between PVOL/TA and the % closely held 
shares is positive but not significant, indicating that the relation is not linear. 
Therefore, the results are predominantly consistent with hypothesis 6.16, that 
ownership concentration is a determinant positively affecting the operating-lease 
decision.  
 
Industry 
The univariate analysis shows that the industry of a company is a determining 
factor in its operating-lease decision. The ‘trade’ sector has (as expected in 
hypothesis 6.17) an above-average median usage of operating leases. Also the 
‘construction’ sector has an above-average higher median of operating-lease 
intensity. However, the coefficient of the trade dummy is significant only in the 
linear regression. In the logit analysis, neither of the industry dummies is a 
significant contributor in the classification in high- or low-leasing companies. This 
was already to some extent visible in Table 7.12, which shows a fairly equal division 
between high- and low-leasing companies within each of the sectors. The above 
proves that operating leases are a well-accepted financing form within all sectors, so 
that within each sector companies choose to lease more or less, but that the trade 
sector as a whole is an above-average leasing industry. 
 
With respect to hypothesis 6.18, that regulated companies will lease less than other 
companies, the results do not show significant outcomes. The only regulated sector 
within the dataset is the telecom sector, and only seventeen company-year 
observations were available. These companies indeed report fewer operating leases 
than the average or median of the total sample. However, no conclusions can be 
drawn from this, since the telecom companies are part of the ‘transport and public 
utilities’ sector (sic 40-49), which is not a sector heavily involved in leasing. The 
telecom sector is no exception to that, and the low-leasing intensity of telecom sector 
companies may not arise from the fact that these companies are closely watched. 
Therefore, hypothesis 6.18 cannot be accepted. 
7.4 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter presented the results of the empirical tests of the determinants of the 
operating-lease decision. Possible determinants had been described in chapter 6, 
where hypotheses were also formulated. As described in chapter 6, the choice for 
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operating leasing is often driven by financial contracting rationales, and operating 
leases have many features that make a difference in the choice between normal 
debt, or even financial leases. This contrasts with the complete and perfect markets 
of Modigliani and Miller, who argued that in such markets the way a project is 
financed does not matter. However, as pointed out by Fields et al. (2001), also the 
accounting environment causes the market to be neither perfect nor complete. 
Accounting choices (including the operating-lease decision) do matter in the 
financial contracting. Fields et al. (2001) defined three market-imperfection 
categories67, which all relate more or less also to the operating-lease decision. Most 
important for this study were the financial contracting reasons, including the 
internal agency conflicts (bonus plans) and external agency conflicts (debt 
contracts). In addition, characteristics of the lessee company may determine the 
choice for operating leases— as pointed out by Graham et al. (1998), operating 
leases are by definition attached to a fixed asset, and more capital-intensive 
companies will thus lease more.  
 
Chapter 6 described how the endogeneity of certain variables might have an impact 
on studies like this. This chapter demonstrated for several variables that it does 
matter whether the variable used is affected by the operating-lease decision— most 
strikingly, because many studies use an explanatory variable, the usage of the 
leverage ratios as a determinant. The relationship between operating-lease 
intensity and leverage changes signs after leverage is adjusted for operating leases. 
This confirms the formulated hypothesis, because operating leases are a means of 
lowering the leverage ratio. The same applies for return on assets (as a performance 
measure) and the ratio of current assets to total assets (as a capital intensity 
measure), and to a lesser extent for the market-to-book value. Using these variables 
either adjusted or unadjusted will significantly alter the results of a study like this. 
Some of the previously described studies have therefore become less meaningful. 
 
This study has therefore aimed to include in the regression only those variables 
that are not directly influenced by lease intensity. Only with leverage and the 
market-to-book value was no alternative available. The determinants with a 
positive significant relationship with operating-lease intensity were leverage (but 
only after capitalisation), size, ownership concentration and ‘trade’ companies. The 
determinants with a negative significant relationship were leverage (before 
capitalisation), performance (earnings per share) and labour intensity. Recalling the 
division of Brealy and Myers (2003) of economic versus business reasons to lease, 
the above suggests that both the accounting and the economic reasons to lease 
determine the lease decision. Whereas size, (the identity as) trade companies and 
labour intensity related to the ‘sensible’ economic reasons to lease, also the debt 
hypothesis was confirmed (the accounting reason to lease). Furthermore, although 
the bonus-plan hypothesis was rejected, the univariate results indicate that further 
research might be interesting on this subject, and a relationship is indisputable. 
Finally, the concentration of ownership relates to both economic reasons (avoiding 
risk of obsolescence) and accounting reasons (avoiding breaching debt covenants).  
 
                                                          
67 See section 6.2, these three market imperfections were, first, financial contracting aspects (both internal and 
external agency conflicts), second, information asymmetries and market efficiencies and, third impact on third 
parties.  
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Appendix 7.I :Description of linear- and logistic regressions 
 
Linear regression 
In linear regression the goal is to find the best-fitting line by minimising the 
residuals. The linear regression model with several explanatory variables takes the 
following form: 
 
 εβββα +++++= nn XXXY ...2211  (1) 
 
where Y is the dependent variable, X1…n are the explanatory variables, β1...n are 
the coefficients showing the relationship between X and Y, and ε is the residual. 
The R2 statistic (goodness of fit) measures how well the model explains the relation 
between Y and X. Since R2 does not decrease when additional variables are added, 
the adjusted R2 is more often used, since the adjusted R2 is ‘penalised’ for adding too 
many explanatory variables. 
 
 
Logistic regression 
Logit analysis (logistic regression) can be used to discriminate between two classes, 
for example high- vs. low-leasing companies or bankrupt vs. non-bankrupt 
companies (see also chapter 8 on financial-distress prediction). The model estimates 
a logistic regression equation and then uses a critical level of Z to classify 
observations into one class or the other (Collins and Green (1982)). The dependent 
variable takes the form of a dummy variable and can either be 1 or 0.  
 
The logistic model can be calculated as: 
 εβββα +++++−+
=
nn XXXe
ZP ...22111
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 (2) 
which is equivalent to: 
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where P(Z) is the chance of the dependent variable reaching its maximum value, or 
obtaining a successful outcome, )1( Z
Z
−  is the likelihood ratio (the “odds”), the 
probability that a successful outcome (Z=1) is obtained, β1...n are the coefficients 
showing the relationship between X and the odds ratio, and X1…n are the 
independent variables. 
 
Next fgure illustrates the cumulative probability curve of logistic regression used 
for bankruptcy prediction. The probability ratio P(Z) varies between 0 and 1 for Z 
varying from minus infinite to plus infinite. When the value of Z is 0, then the 
probability of default P(Z) is 0.5, which is often used as the critical value to classify 
companies in either one of the categories.  
 
 
 
 
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE DETERMINANTS OF THE OPERATING-LEASE DECISION 
213 
Cumulative probability curve of logistic regression 
Z=0
P(0) =0.5
P(+∞)≈1
Z= +∞Z= -∞
P(-∞)≈0
predicted bankruptpredicted healthy
 
 
 
Because with logistic regression the dependent variable is not a continuous one, the 
goal of logistic regression is different; the model predicts the likelihood that Y is 
equal to one (rather than zero), given certain value of X. If X and Y have a positive 
linear relationship, the probability is that Y=1 will increase as values of X increase. 
Instead of the R2 in linear regression models measuring the overall fit of the model, 
with logistic regression the chi-square measures the goodness of fit of the observed 
and the expected values. 
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Appendix 7.II Spearman correlation matrix 
Table 7.16 LEVERAGE is measured by total-debt-to-total-assets ratio, once before the operating leases are 
capitalised and once after. SIZE is measured by the natural log of sales (lnSales), PERFORMANCE measured by 
earning per share (EPS), GROWTH is measured by the average 5-year sales growth, INVESTMENT 
OPPORTUNITY is measured by the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity, (MTB), TAX is 
measured by the effective tax rate, COMPENSATION is the natural log of total management compensation, 
OWNERSHIP is measured by the %-closely held shares in a company, CAPITAL INTENSITY is measured by the 
natural log of sales divided by the number of employees. 
   PVOL/TA
LEV- 
before
LEV-
after SIZE PERF. GROWTH
IO- 
before 
IO- 
after TAX OWN COMP
CAP 
intens
PVOLTA coeff. 1.00 0.06 0.34 0.34 -0.11 0.12 0.03 0.08 0.13 0.06 0.27 -0.16 
 sig.  0.27 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.62 0.14 0.03 0.33 0.00 0.00 
 n  379 369 371 375 350 347 329 260 293 335 366 
LEVERAGE-before coeff.  1.00 0.89 0.34 -0.08 0.10 0.03 0.14 -0.11 0.10 0.24 0.08 
 sig.   0.00 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.49 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.05 
 n   370 575 578 533 528 330 406 455 528 570 
LEVERAGE-after coeff.   1.00 0.33 -0.05 0.13 0.10 0.20 -0.05 0.12 0.25 -0.06 
 sig.    0.00 0.36 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.44 0.05 0.00 0.26 
 n    362 365 341 338 330 258 284 327 357 
SIZE coeff.    1.00 0.27 0.19 0.04 0.05 0.03 -0.25 0.83 0.27 
 sig.     0.00 0.00 0.35 0.41 0.51 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 n     573 526 518 323 399 447 526 570 
PERFORMANCE coeff.     1.00 0.13 0.08 0.02 -0.14 0.03 0.14 0.16 
 sig.     . 0.00 0.08 0.71 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.00 
 n      530 520 325 401 453 524 565 
GROWTH coeff.      1.00 0.23 0.18 0.08 -0.02 0.11 0.08 
 sig.       0.00 0.00 0.11 0.61 0.02 0.09 
 n       485 306 377 431 486 519 
INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY coeff.       1.00 1.00 -0.02 -0.09 0.08 -0.10 
BEFORE sig.        0.00 0.78 0.06 0.09 0.02 
 n        330 361 419 483 513 
INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY coeff.        1.00 -0.02 -0.12 0.19 -0.16 
AFTER sig.         0.79 0.05 0.00 0.00 
 n         230 262 299 318 
TAX coeff.         1.00 -0.06 0.06 -0.06 
 sig.          0.30 0.22 0.26 
 n          328 366 396 
OWN coeff.          1.00 -0.44 -0.01 
 sig.           0.00 0.85 
 n           421 445 
COMP coeff.           1.00 0.11 
 sig.            0.01 
  n                       522 
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PART IV: THE CONTRIBUTION OF OPERATING-LEASE 
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Part IV investigates whether operating leases can improve the classification 
accuracy of financial-distress or bankruptcy-prediction models. While bankruptcy-
prediction studies often investigate companies that are not yet bankrupt but are 
financially distressed (for example companies with a suspension of payment), in this 
study the usage of ‘financial-distress’ prediction is preferred to ‘bankruptcy’-
prediction. Since the 1960s, financial-distress prediction studies have emerged as a 
particular focus in the methods used. The usage of financial ratios in financial-
distress prediction does not seem to be based on any theory but on logical sense and 
intuition. Financial ratios have proven to be useful, however, in financial-distress or 
bankruptcy prediction. Leverage-, profitability- and cash-flow ratios have 
particularly proven their usefulness in financial-distress prediction. Only three 
previous studies on bankruptcy prediction incorporated operating leases in their 
analysis (Elam (1975), Altman et al. (1977) and Lawrence and Bear (1986)). Elam 
and Lawrence and Bear tested whether the classification accuracy improved when 
operating-lease information was included; both concluded that the classification 
accuracy did not improve. However, the following results of the previous parts of 
this thesis can be used to support a renewed analysis of this subject: (1) the 
increased usage of operating leases in the last decennia, (2) improvements in the 
information disclosed (part I), (3) the impact that operating leases have on financial 
ratios, (4) the ignorance of operating leases that distorts a fair comparison between 
companies (part II), and (5) the avoidance of a too-high leverage as an important 
determinant in the operating-lease decision (part III). Furthermore, the analyses of 
Elam and Lawrence and Bear may be updated regarding the method they used 
(multiple discriminant analysis versus logit analysis).  
Chapter 8 describes previous financial-distress prediction studies with a special 
emphasis on the studies that incorporated operating leases. At the end of the 
chapter the hypotheses will be formulated. Chapter 9 empirically tests the 
hypotheses and presents the results. The chapter concludes with an answer to the 
question of whether operating leases do, or do not, improve the classification 
accuracy of bankruptcy prediction. 
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CHAPTER 8 PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON FINANCIAL-DISTRESS 
PREDICTION AND OPERATING LEASES 
8.1 Introduction  
Financial ratios have been used for decades to predict financial distress. Starting 
with the early work of Beaver (1966) and Altman (1968), subsequent research on 
the predictability of financial distress emerged especially in the method used. 
Whereas Beaver and Altman used discriminant analysis, the statistical properties 
of accounting data forced research to use methods with less restrictive assumptions 
such as logit- and probit analysis, or even the relatively new neural network models 
(see Ohlson (1980), Collins and Green (1982), Altman, Marco and Varetto (1994) 
and Lennox (1999)). However, with respect to financial ratios (the explanatory 
variables), less progress has been made. Previous studies established that especially 
profitability-, leverage- and cash-flow ratios have important effects on the 
probability of bankruptcy (Lennox (1999)).  
 
Parts II and III of this thesis demonstrated the impact that operating leases have 
on the financial ratios of a company, and showed also that a company’s 
management deliberately chooses operating leases to improve their leverage ratio. 
It was shown, for example, that a leverage ratio not adjusted for operating leases 
does not allow a fair comparison between high- and low-leasing companies. Also, 
high-leasing companies improved their leverage ratio to a level equivalent with that 
of low-leasing companies. Chapter 6 (Figure 6.1) explained how this might lead to 
incorrect conclusions if non-adjusted ratios are used in empirical studies. 
 
Only a few studies used disclosures of operating leases in the financial-distress 
prediction model. Elam (1975) and Lawrence and Bear (1986) investigated 
separately the impact that operating leases have on the accuracy of bankruptcy 
prediction. Both concluded that adjusting financial ratios with regard to the 
operating-lease liability did not improve the accuracy of prediction. Although 
Altman et al. (1977) adjusted their 1968 model (Altman (1968)) to include the 
capitalisation of operating leases, they did not mention whether this improved the 
accuracy of the model. Although Elam (1975) and Lawrence and Bear (1986) 
presented disappointing results on the explanatory power of operating leases (which 
led other researchers to ignore operating leases (see Dambolena and Khoury (1980), 
for example)), there are at least three reasons why it is surprising that operating 
leases get so little attention in the recent financial-distress prediction literature.  
 
First, the lease-debt substitutability discussion has received a great deal of 
attention in the finance and accounting literature with the question of whether 
leasing is complementary or supplementary to debt (among others: Ang and 
Peterson (1984), Beattie et al. (2000b), Lewis and Schalheim (1992), Myers et al. 
(1976), and Deloof and Verschueren (1999)). Although it seems that no consensus 
has been reached on this subject, it is clear that debt and leases are comparable. 
Yet, in financial-distress prediction models leverage is one of the variables with the 
highest predictive power. These two facts combined (leasing similar to debt, 
leverage having high predictive power) might suggest that the relative amount of 
operating leases would also have predictive power. Or, as put forward by Lawrence 
and Bear (1986, p.573): ‘to the extent any lease, financial or operating, may be a 
CHAPTER 8   
218 
substitute form of debt, the improvement (if any) from including this additional 
information in bankruptcy models should be investigated’. 
 
Second, the early financial-distress prediction models (Altman (1968), Beaver 
(1966), Ohlson (1980)) might not have incorporated operating leasing data as useful 
information. Leasing was still considered to be an ‘innovative’ way of financing, and 
was applied by a small minority of companies. Moreover, the information disclosed 
might have been insufficient to estimate the real (on-balance equivalent) liability. 
In the last decade, however, leasing has shown a constant growth in new businesses 
each year and although operating-lease disclosures are still not ideally transparent, 
data on these disclosures have become more available in recent years and might be 
suitable now for analysis in bankruptcy prediction (see chapters 2 and 5). 
 
Third, as shown in Part III, the off-balance-sheet character of operating leases is 
often a reason that a firm seeks financing through operating leases. The debt 
hypothesis was confirmed by the results of chapter 7. What the ultimate effects 
might be of bringing too many obligations off the balance sheet has been shown by 
the Enron bankruptcy. Therefore, any available data of off-balance-sheet liabilities 
might be interesting for bankruptcy prediction. 
 
Part IV aims to measure the impact of operating leases on the ex post classification 
accuracy of financial-distress prediction models. This is in line with the study of 
Lawrence and Bear (1986). The impact of operating leases will be analysed by 
testing the accuracy of financial-distress prediction models using models with- and 
without operating leases. This chapter is set up as follows. Section 8.2 describes 
previous studies on bankruptcy prediction. Sub-section 8.2.1 first describes two 
methods often used in bankruptcy prediction: multiple discriminant analysis and 
logit analysis. Sub-section 8.2.2 subsequently describes the classification accuracy, 
which can be used as a measure of success of a financial-distress prediction model. 
Sections 8.2.3 and 8.2.4 describe respectively the financial ratios often used in 
bankruptcy prediction, and the selection of the bankrupt versus healthy sample in 
the studies. Sub-section 8.3 describes extensively three financial-distress prediction 
studies that included operating leases in the model. Section 8.4 concludes with the 
formulation of the hypotheses that will be empirically tested in chapter 9. 
 
8.2 Financial-distress prediction studies 
8.2.1 Methods used in predicting financial-distress 
Previous research into predicting financial-distress used several methods. A 
distinction can be made between univariate models, or single ratio predictive 
models, and multivariate models. Univariate models examine the predictive ability 
of one ratio at a time (for example, Beaver (1966)); multivariate models examine the 
predictive ability of ratios using several ratios at the same time (for example, 
Altman (1968), Elam (1975)). Laitinen and Kankaanpaa (1999) argue that new 
methods have been applied in an effort to increase the accuracy of financial-distress 
prediction. Their brief historical overview of methods starts in 1960 with the 
multiple discriminant analysis (MDA) as used by Beaver (1966) and Altman (1868). 
Logistic regression (Logit-analysis, as used by Ohlson (1980), for example) 
subsequently replaced MDA in the 1970s and 1980s. Thereafter, alternative 
methods occurred as recursive portioning and survival analysis, which never 
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became as popular as MDA and logit, according to Laitinen et al. More recently, 
neural networks have been introduced (see also Pompe and Bilderbeek (2000)).  
 
Dimitras et al. (1996) reviewed 47 studies published on financial-distress prediction 
in twelve different countries. They described ten different methods used in these 
studies. Some studies used more than one method (thus, the total of methods used 
is larger than 47), but their study still showed a clear distinction between the 
preferred methods: 26 times MDA, 15 times logit analysis, six times linear 
probability model and all other methods either once or twice. Laitinen and 
Kankaanpaa (1999) comparison of the above-described methods resulted in their 
conclusions that no superior method has yet been found, and no significant 
differences between the results were found. They stated (p.84): ‘one of the latest 
applications, neural networks, is in its present form as effective as discriminant 
analysis was thirty years ago”. Similar conclusions were formulated by Pompe and 
Bilderbeek (2000) and Altman et al. (1994). 
 
Since this study will be compared with the studies of Elam (1975) and Lawrence 
and Bear (1986), which both used discriminant analysis (see the section 8.3), 
discriminant analysis will also be used in this study. However, since the use of 
MDA decreased after the ‘80s and logit-analysis has become more popular since the 
study of Lawrence and Bear (1986), also this method will be used as an alternative 
approach (Dimitras et al. (1996), Laitinen and Kankaanpaa (1999)). Both methods 
will now be described. 
 
Discriminant analysis 
Multiple discriminant analysis (MDA) is used to classify observations into 
discrete categories (for example, bankrupt or non-bankrupt) dependent on the 
observation’s characteristics. With (linear) MDA, a linear combination is 
derived that best discriminates between these categories. This discriminant 
function can have the following form: 
  
Where βi are the discriminant coefficients, and Xi are the independent 
variables (i= 1,2,..n). Y is the score that is calculated for each company. Based 
on the sample results a cut-off point is calculated so that the companies below 
the cut-off point are classified as bankrupt, and those with a score above the 
cut-off point are expected to remain healthy (Laitinen and Kankaanpaa 
(1999)). 
 
The statistical requirements of linear MDA are that the independent variables 
for both groups have a normal distribution, and that the covariance matrices of 
both groups are the same. As described in chapter 5, financial ratios are often 
not normally distributed (see also Lennox (1999), Barnes (1987), Pompe and 
Bilderbeek (2000)). Despite the remark of Elam (1975) that many researchers 
postulate that the financial ratios are normally distributed, it is to be expected 
that this statistical requirement is often violated in linear MDA financial-
distress prediction models. The second statistical requirement can be avoided 
by using quadratic discriminant analysis, which does not require equal 
covariance matrices. Nevertheless, MDA has been ‘the most popular technique 
ε β β β α +++ + + = nn XX XY ...2 2 1 1
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of bankruptcy studies’ (Ohlson (1980, p.112)) and is ‘by far the dominant 
methodology’ (Altman (2002, p.192)). Pompe and Bilderbeek (2000) compared 
the classification accuracy results of (linear) MDA with the results of neural 
networks, and concluded that although the statistical requirements may be 
violated, the accuracy of (linear) MDA was similar to that of the neural 
networks used. Also Altman et al. (1977) compared linear MDA with the 
quadratic MDA and found equal accuracy results in the classifications. The 
accuracy of the linear MDA was even superior to that of the quadratic MDA 
when a hold-out sample was used. 
 
Logit analysis 
Ohlson (1980) mentioned three issues when using MDA: first, the statistical 
requirements limit the usage of the model to only a discriminating device; 
second, the outcome of MDA is only a ‘score’, with little intuitive 
interpretation; and third, the matching procedures68 typically used in MDA 
make it uncertain what these matching procedures add to or detract from the 
predictability of the model. The violation of the two statistical requirements is 
also mentioned by Collins and Green (1982, p.350). Ohlson (1980) and Collins 
and Green (1982) (among others) therefore both prefer logit analysis, the main 
advantages of which are that no assumptions have to be made regarding prior 
probabilities of financial-distress and/or the distribution of predictors, and 
lower type-1 errors (type-1 and type-2 errors are described hereafter in the 
sub-section on classification accuracy). 
 
As described in chapter 7, logit analysis (logistic regression) can be used to 
discriminate between two classes (for example, bankrupt vs. non-bankrupt, or 
high-leasing vs. low-leasing companies). The model estimates a logistic 
regression equation and then uses a critical level of Z to classify observations 
into one class or the other. The dependent variable takes the form of a dummy 
variable and can be either one or zero. 
  
The logistic model may be calculated as follows: 
 εβββα +++++−+
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where P(Z) is the chance of the dependent variable reaching its maximum 
value, or obtaining a successful outcome; )1( Z
Z
−  is the likelihood ratio (the 
“odds”), the probability that a successful outcome (Z=1) is obtained. β1...n are 
the coefficients showing the relationship between X and the odds ratio, and 
X1…n are the independent variables (see also Appendix 7.I).  
 
Although logit seems preferable to MDA because of the limitations of MDA, studies 
comparing the two methods have not proved higher classification accuracy for logit 
                                                          
68 Failed and non-failed firms are matched according to criteria such as size and industry. This might be arbitrary. 
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as opposed to MDA (Dimitras et al. (1996), Pompe and Bilderbeek (2000)). The next 
chapter section will test this for the underlying study. 
 
8.2.2 Classification accuracy 
Financial-distress prediction models categorise companies in two categories: those 
that are expected to go bankrupt and those that are expected to remain healthy. 
The classification accuracy is measured as the percentage of correct classifications 
of the total number of companies classified. As with the R2 in regression analysis 
(where R2 measures the success of the regression in predicting the values of the 
dependent variable within the sample), the classification accuracy percentage in 
financial-distress prediction is also a measure of how much of the variation in the 
dependent variable is explained by the independent variables in the model. 
However, since no perfect method exists that has 100% prediction accuracy, some 
companies are classified in the wrong category. Two potential errors can be made: a 
bankrupt company is classified as healthy or a healthy company is expected to go 
bankrupt. The first situation is called a Type-1 error; the second is called a Type-2 
error (see Table 8.1) 
 
Table 8.1 Classification accuracy 
  PREDICTED GROUP MEMBERSHIP 
 Bankrupt Healthy 
Bankrupt correct Type-1 error 
Healthy Type-2 error correct 
 
Type-1 errors are sometimes found to be more severe than Type-2 errors. This can 
be explained as follows. Assume that a bank lends money to a company based on 
the expectation that this company will stay healthy. If the company goes bankrupt 
(Type-1 error), the misclassification costs might include the non-repayment of the 
loan. If, however, a company is expected to go bankrupt but in fact should be 
classified as healthy (Type-2 error), the bank may have denied the loan and the 
misclassification costs include the lost (interest-) income on the loan, which is 
probably less than the cost of the non-repayment of the loan. Therefore, models with 
the same overall accuracy but lower Type-1 errors will be preferred above models 
with higher Type-1 errors (Collins and Green (1982)). Alternatively, researchers 
may assign different weights to each type of error (see Altman et al. (1977)), or 
lower the cut-off point that determines whether a company is classified as bankrupt 
or as healthy. However, it is also common to attach no weights to the different types 
of errors. As expressed by Holmen (1988, p.54), users have their own ideas 
regarding the relative seriousness of each type of error; he therefore leaves the 
weighting of the errors to each reader. 
 
Financial-distress models can be compared to each other based on their prediction 
accuracy. The z-statistic that tests the null hypothesis that a new model (model 
two) does not significantly outperform the old model (model one) is calculated as 
follows (see also Heij, Boer de, Franses, Kloek and Dijk van (2004), Laitinen and 
Kankaanpaa (1999), Elam (1975) and Lawrence and Bear (1986)): 
Npp
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where CR1,2 is the classification rate of model one compared with the alternative of 
model two, and p is the random hit rate, calculated as 
2
2
)1(
N
n
N
np bb −+=
, 
where nb is the number of bankrupt companies in the total sample.  
 
The null hypothesis of no significant differences is rejected when z exceeds the 
critical value of the chi-square distribution with one degree of freedom. In this 
study these tests will also be used to test whether the differences between the 
different models are statistically significant. 
 
8.2.3 Financial ratios 
Financial-distress models focus on three financial ratios: profitability-, leverage- 
and cash-flow ratios. Previous empirical research established that a company is 
more likely to fail if it is unprofitable, highly leveraged and suffers cash-flow 
difficulties (Lennox (1999), Beaver, McNichols and Rhie (2005)). Independent 
variables are often selected not based on any theory, although they are the ones 
most often used in the literature (Ohlson (1980), Lawrence and Bear (1986), Elam 
(1975), Altman (1968)). Due to the lack of a unified financial-distress prediction 
theory, some variables are chosen ‘intuitively’ (Laitinen and Kankaanpaa (1999), 
Mossman, Bell, Swartz and Turtle (1998)). Scott (1981) mentioned that since the 
financial-distress models are not based on explicit theory, their success suggests the 
existence of a strong underlying regularity. He argued that the models69 he analysed 
relied on accounting data, which implies that such data does contain useful 
information. 
 
In their review of 47 financial-distress prediction studies, Dimitras et al. (1996) also 
summarised the ratios used in twelve different countries. The most frequently used 
financial ratios: working capital to total assets (16 times), total debt to total assets 
(15 times), current assets to current liabilities (12 times), EBIT to total assets (12 
times) and net income to total assets (11 times). As argued by Mossman et al., the 
‘debt to equity’ and ‘current assets to current liabilities’ ratios seem intuitively 
related to the probability of financial-distress, as they indicate the relative debt 
burden and the liquidity of a company. They also argued that although ratio models 
have been implemented successfully, there is little agreement regarding the best 
financial ratio to determine the likelihood of financial distress. 
 
Beaver et al. (2005) investigated in their study whether financial ratios have 
become less informative over time in financial-distress prediction. They reported 
that the results of previous financial-distress prediction studies were robust with 
respect to financial statement data. They also stated that the precise combination of 
financial ratios used in financial-distress prediction seems to be of minor 
importance with respect to the overall predictive power, because the explanatory 
variables are correlated. Their conclusion: that the robustness of predictive models 
is strong over time, with a slight decline, which is offset by an improvement in the 
predictive abilities of market-related variables. 
 
                                                          
69 Scott (1981) compared the bankruptcy models of Altman (1968), Altman et al. (1977), Beaver (1966), Deakin 
(1972) and Sinkey (1975). 
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The above leads to the conclusion that the choice of the financial ratios in the 
analysis is not guided by any theory and that many combinations lead to the same 
conclusions. In their study investigating the impact of operating leases, Lawrence 
and Bear (1986) decided to include all of their chosen variables (15) simultaneously 
in their models. They made no attempt to eliminate the variables that did not make 
some minimum contribution to the model. Since this study also aims to find 
evidence for the predictive power of operating leases in financial-distress prediction, 
the choice has been made to select other financial ratios based on previous studies. 
.  
8.2.4 Sample selection 
Matched pair- versus full-control samples 
 Finally, in constructing a financial-distress prediction model the sample is an 
important factor. Many studies use matched-pair samples in their research; 
each bankrupt company is matched with another company according to 
industry classification and size (Holmen (1988), Deakin (1972), Altman (1968), 
Altman et al. (1977), Beaver (1966), Elam (1975), Dambolena and Khoury 
(1980), Lawrence and Bear (1986), Mossman et al. (1998), Laitinen and 
Kankaanpaa (1999)). With a matched-pair sample, the size of the bankrupt 
sample is equal to the size of the healthy sample. Other studies use a full-
control sample, where no match is achieved between bankrupt and healthy 
companies, and the size of the full sample is therefore bigger than the 
bankrupt sample (Grice and Dugan (2001), Ohlson (1980), Beaver et al. (2005), 
Pompe and Bilderbeek (2000)). The use of a full sample, according to Ohlson 
(1980, p.117), is ‘ideal’, and he criticises the matching principle, since 
‘variables should be included as predictors rather than to use them as 
matching criteria, the matching criteria tend to be somewhat arbitrary and it 
is by no means obvious what is gained or lost by different matching 
procedures’ (p.112). This study uses and compares both sample selection 
procedures. 
 
Definition of financial distress 
Most studies limit their research to companies that actually filed for 
bankruptcy. However, some studies extend the research to financially 
distressed companies. Johnsen and Melicher (1994) included a definition of 
financially weak companies; these companies had stock ratings from Standard 
and Poor’s of B, B- or C. Grice and Dugan (2001) and Grice and Ingram (2001) 
also included companies in their distressed sample that are ‘vulnerable’ to 
default. As criteria they used Standard and Poor’s bond and stock ratings: 
companies with a bond rating of CC or below, or stock rating of ‘low B’ or below 
were classified as financially distressed. They argued that some financial-
distress prediction models might be more generally useful for predicting 
financial distress, not just bankruptcy. Hill, Perry and Andes (1996) 
distinguished financially distressed- from bankrupt companies and defined 
financially distressed companies as those that have cumulative negative 
earnings over a three-year period. Altman et al. (1994) distinguished between 
healthy and ‘unsound’ companies, defining unsound as follows: being involved 
in some form of bankruptcy proceedings, being wound up in temporary 
receivership or having stated that they are unable to fulfil their payment to 
the bank.  
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In order to discover the differences, this study investigates both the more 
broadly defined financially distressed companies as well as the bankrupt 
companies. 
8.3 Operating leases in financial-distress prediction studies 
This section describes three financial-distress prediction studies that incorporated 
operating leases (Elam (1975), Altman et al. (1977) and Lawrence and Bear (1986)).  
 
Elam (1975) 
Elam (1975) was the first to incorporate operating-lease data into the model of 
predicting bankruptcy. His study aimed to contribute to the discussion over the 
footnote disclosure of operating leases and the need for new information about the 
reporting of leases70.  
 
Elam analysed 48 firms that went bankrupt during 1966-1972 and which reported 
leases in the footnote to their financial statements. Each bankrupt firm was 
matched with a non-bankrupt company with the same ESI classification 
(“Enterprise Standard Industry”) that also reported operating leases. Matching was 
thus achieved only if both companies reported operating leases. Elam analysed 28 
different ratios, and adjusted them according to the capitalised operating leases, if 
appropriate. The necessary data was abstracted from the footnotes, and Elam 
described four types of disclosures71 and the therewith-related method of converting 
them into annual lease payments. The estimated annual lease payments were 
consequently discounted using a six percent interest rate. The capitalised leased 
liabilities were added to the company’s net value of plant, property and equipment, 
the long-term liabilities and total assets. Elam adjusted total assets by the total 
amount of capitalised lease liability, and therefore did not differentiate between the 
leased asset and the lease liability (assuming PVA=PVOL; see chapter 4). The 
capitalisation affected 13 out of the 28 ratios analysed by Elam, and as he argued 
(p. 31), ‘no new ratios were ‘invented’ because the purpose of the study was to 
examine the effect of capitalisation on already established tools of the financial 
statement user,’ and ‘the development of new ratios incorporating capitalised lease 
data was left to subsequent research’.  
 
Elam (1975) used multiple discriminant analysis (MDA) to predict bankruptcy. 
Although Elam refers to the statistical requirement of MDA72 that the variables 
should be normally distributed within each class, he ignores this issue by 
mentioning that (p.35) ‘most researchers have postulated the normality of financial 
ratios when using discriminant analysis’. He (p. 35) mentioned two limitations of 
his research: the data were chosen precisely and were not a statistical sample of all 
firms (with or without leases) and the focus on financial ratios and lack of attention 
paid to economic indicators, ratio trends etc. might weaken the conclusions. 
 
                                                          
70 It is remarkable that thirty years later this discussion is again as vivid as ever. 
71 Four disclosure types found by Elam (1975) were 1) the annual payments for each year through the expiration of 
the leases, 2) the annual payment with the remaining life, 3) the annual payment with no remaining life, and 4) the 
total commitment with some indication of the expiry of the commitments.  
72 Section 8.2.1 described the statistical properties of MDA. 
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The null hypothesis (that the probability of correct classification of bankrupt versus 
non-bankrupts classes with ratios including lease data is less than, or equal to, the 
probability of correct classification without lease data) was tested using a chi-
square test for differences in probabilities. Elam tested ten different models: five 
years before bankruptcy were analysed each year, once with- and once without lease 
data. Only for the models with variables from the years two and three before 
bankruptcy did the prediction accuracy improve, but only for the third year was this 
significant. The models with data from one, four and five years before bankruptcy 
did not improve the classification-accuracy. Elam’s main conclusion (p.41) is that 
his findings do not support the hypothesis that: ‘Addition of capitalized lease data to 
a firm’s financial statements will increase the power of financial ratios for 
predicting firm bankruptcy’. He adds that this does not necessarily mean that 
leases should not be capitalised, since the data may be important information for 
other uses of the financial statements.  
 
Altman (1976) commented on the article of Elam (1975). He argued that Elam’s 
conclusion is not very convincing because he failed to investigate rigorously the 
relative use of leases by failed- versus non-failed-companies, he omitted several 
proven ratios and potentially new ratios in his prediction model, and the 
discriminant package and discussion found in the paper were somewhat dated. 
Altman (p. 410) asserted that the analysis should include at least the ratio of 
capitalised leases to total assets, and preferably other proven ratios such as 
working capital to total assets, and earned surplus to total assets.  
 
Altman (1968) and Altman et al. (1977) 
In 1968, Altman developed a model to predict bankruptcy in which he calculates a 
Z-score on the basis of five ratios (after analysing 22 ratios). The z-score was 
calculated using the following formula. 
 
54321 999.0006.0033.0014.0012.0 XXXXXZ ++++=   (1) 
 
Where, X1 =  working capital/total assets 
 X2 = retained earnings/total assets 
 X3 = earnings before interest and taxes (“EBIT”)/total assets 
 X4 =  market value equity/book value of total debt 
 X5 =  sales/total assets 
 Z = overall index 
Altman called this model the Z-score model.  
 
Despite the criticism that Altman expressed in 1976 on the work of Elam (1975), 
Altman adjusted his own 1968-work by incorporating the capitalised operating-
lease liability (Altman et al. (1977)). Altman’s second model took operating leases 
into account, which even seemed to be an important reason for changing the model. 
The article refers to six recent (thus before 1977) and important accounting 
modifications that required an adjusted Z-score model, of which the most ‘important 
and pervasive’ was the capitalisation of all non-cancellable operating and finance 
leases (Altman, Haldeman et al. 1977, p.33).  
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Altman et al. make an adjustment for operating leases as mentioned in the 
footnotes, according to the following equation: 
∑
= ++=
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CL = capitalised lease, 
Lt = lease payment in period t, 
r = average interest rate for new issue high-grade corporate bonds (0.1r is used as 
risk factor) 
N = the number of years of leasehold rights and obligations. 
 
Instead of using five variables, the second model (the “ZETA®-model”) consisted of 
seven variables: two of which were the same (X2 and X3), one of which was very 
similar (X4), and four variables that were new: stability of earnings (variance in X3), 
EBIT/total interest payments (debt service), current assets/current liabilities and 
size (total assets). The capitalised lease obligations were taken into account in the 
debt-service ratio, since Altman et al. calculated interest payable on the lease 
obligations and in the adjusted X4, where book value of total debt was replaced by 
total capital, which included then capitalised lease obligations. 
 
Both in 1968 and in 1977 Altman et al. used discriminant analysis. Unfortunately, 
the 1977 study did not test whether the capitalised lease liabilities improved the 
accuracy of the prediction model. Many studies nowadays that compare financial-
distress prediction models refer to Altman’s studies and seem to relate more often to 
the 1968 model instead of the 1977 model (Grice and Dugan (2001), Mossman et al. 
(1998)). 
 
Dambolena and Khoury (1980, p.1021) explicitly mentioned the ‘significant’ 
adjustment of lease capitalisation made by Altman et al. (1977), and mentioned the 
following two reasons not to forego this adjustment. First, they found the conclusion 
(see above) of Elam (1975) sufficient evidence to exclude operating leases. They 
argued that there was still no proof that that capitalisation of leases improved the 
predictive power of a model, and that if there were such a proof, then the good 
models would turn out to be even better. According to Dambolena and Khoury 
(1980), a proof would be to run the Zeta-model without leases. However, they did 
not undertake this themselves, because (p.1021) “attempts of the authors to obtain 
adequate information on leases, and to carry out a lease capitalisation worthy of the 
time required, have failed”. They argue that the very small information set publicly 
available on leases restricts the usefulness of any lease capitalisation. The 
capitalisation process would be too precise. As mentioned in the introduction of this 
chapter, the second argument of Dambolena and Khoury (1980) sounds valid in the 
1980s. However, due to the emphasis nowadays on transparent information in 
financial statements (corporate governance), the improved lease-accounting 
standards and the increasing usage of operating leases, this argument is no longer 
valid, which enhances the relevance of this study (see also chapter 2).  
 
Lawrence and Bear (1986) 
Also Lawrence and Bear (1986) tried to find evidence that operating leases might 
improve the accuracy of financial-distress prediction models. They attempted to 
measure the impact that operating-lease capitalisation has on the prediction of 
corporate failure. In line with Elam (1975), but in contrast to Altman et al. (1977) 
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and Dambolena and Khoury (1980), they tested models with- and without operating 
leases capitalised. Their hypothesis was similar to that of Elam (1975): adjusting 
financial statements for long-term leases will not improve the ex-post classification 
accuracy of bankruptcy prediction.  
 
Also in line with Elam (1975), Lawrence and Bear (1986) used a matched-pair 
sample73. Pairs were matched according to industry and size (net sales). Sales were 
used instead of total assets, since the authors acknowledged the endogeneity of total 
assets (see also chapter 6). Also Lawrence and Bear (1986) used discriminant 
analysis, and constructed models with- and without leases capitalised. Comparing 
the accuracy of these models should provide a reasonable test of the usefulness of 
capitalised leases in bankruptcy prediction. The financial ratios used were based on 
what was commonly used in previous research, and this led to thirteen explanatory 
variables. They then added two lease-related variables (ratio of capitalised leases to 
total assets and capitalised leases to net sales). This is contrary to Elam (1975), who 
explicitly excluded new ’invented’ ratios.  
 
The matched-pair sample of Lawrence and Bear (1986) included 42 bankrupt and 
42 non-bankrupt companies (31 manufacturers and 11 retailers). Another major 
difference with Elam (1975) is that Lawrence and Bear (1986) used non-bankrupt 
companies with no operating leases. Elam (1975) only used non-bankrupt 
companies that did disclose operating leases, since approximately twenty percent of 
the non-bankrupt companies of the sample Lawrence and Bear (1986) did not 
disclose operating leases. They argues that the restriction used by Elam (1975) 
might have understated the impact of leases if bankrupt companies tend to lease 
more than non-bankrupt companies. 
 
The capitalisation procedure used by Lawrence and Bear (1986) is the technique 
used by Altman et al. (1977), which they argue is an improvement of the technique 
used by Elam (1975). However, the only difference noticed between the technique of 
Altman et al. (1977) and Elam (1975) is the use of the discount rate and the risk 
premium added by Altman et al. 
 
Lawrence and Bear (1986) showed for two ratios (current assets to current 
liabilities and capitalised leases to sales) the mean spreads between bankrupt and 
non-bankrupt companies both before- and after- the ratios were adjusted for 
operating leases, and over a period up to five years before bankruptcy. These results 
are shown in Figure 8.1. 
                                                          
73 See section 8.2.4 on sample selection. 
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Figure 8.1 Spreads between bankrupt and non-bankrupt companies in the study of Lawrence and Bear 
(1986), left; figure 1 p.578, right: figure 2 p.579 
These graphs show for two ratios (current assets to total assets (left) and capitalised leases to net sales (right) the 
difference (spread) between healthy and bankrupt companies. Each graph shows two lines: one is the spread 
between healthy and bankrupt companies unadjusted for operating leases, and one shows the spread calculated 
between the ratios adjusted for operating leases. The ratio of capitalised leases to net sales in Lawrence and Bear’s 
study includes also financial leases, whereby the unadjusted ratio incorporates only financial leases to net sales, and 
the adjusted ratio incorporates all leases (including operating leases) capitalised to net sales. 
current assets to current liabilities
adjusted
unadjusted
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
-1 -2 -3 -4 -5
years before bankruptcy
sp
re
ad
 b
et
w
ee
n 
ra
tio
s
capitalised leases to net sales
adjusted
unadjusted
-0.10
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
-1 -2 -3 -4 -5
years before bankruptcy
sp
re
ad
 b
et
w
ee
n 
ra
tio
s
 
Lawrence and Bear (1986) argued that a priori the larger the difference between the 
lines, the more likely (ceteris paribus) the ratio will be useful in building a 
discriminant model74. For most of their variables the leasing adjustment did not 
appear to be substantial, with the exception of the two new variables that related 
the capitalised leases to total assets or sales. Furthermore, they compared the ratio 
of capitalised leases to total assets with the results of Elam (1975). The major 
difference between lease utilisation by bankrupt and non-bankrupt companies 
between these two studies was that Elam’s results showed a decrease of lease 
utilisation in the last year before bankruptcy for the bankrupt sample, whereas 
Lawrence and Bear (1986)results showed a stable lease utilisation for both the 
bankrupt and the non-bankrupt sample. Based on the information disclosed in both 
articles, the differences are illustrated by Figure 8.2. 
                                                          
74 This is similar to conclusions based on a univariate analysis. 
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Figure 8.2 Ratio of capitalised leases to total assets of Elam (1975) and Lawrence and Bear (1986)  
The two graphs show the results of Elam’s (left) and Lawrence and Bear’s studies of the differences in average 
capitalised leases to total assets between bankrupt and non-bankrupt companies. The bold line shows the average 
capitalised leases to total assets of bankrupt companies, whereas the dotted line shows the average capitalised leases 
to total assets for the non-bankrupt companies. 
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Figure 8.2 show that in both studies the bankrupt companies had a higher average 
capitalised lease ratio than the non-bankrupt companies did. However, this 
difference seemed to be constant over time for the Lawrence and Bear study, since 
in Elam’s study the differences became smaller when bankruptcy was approaching. 
 
Subsequently, Lawrence and Bear (1986) tested several discriminant models in 
which they included all variables simultaneously. As mentioned before, they did not 
try to find the variables with the highest contribution, since their goal was to see 
whether prediction accuracy was improved by adding capitalised leases to the 
model. This goal was in mind in their choice of the evaluation criterion (p.581); ‘this 
research was never intended to be a test of ex ante predictability’, and therefore a 
measure of ex post classification was used. Lawrence and Bear therefore did not use 
a hold-out sample as did Altman (1968), for example75. The results of the twenty 
different models76 indicated that the lease-adjusted data did not improve the 
prediction accuracy of these models. None of the differences were significant at the 
5% level. Finally, they tested separately whether the two new leasing variables 
(ratios of capitalised leases to either total assets or sales) improved the 
classification accuracy. Again, neither of the models improved significantly, as had 
been expected by Lawrence and Bear, due to the narrow spreads between these 
ratios of bankrupt and non-bankrupt companies (see Figure 8.1 and Figure 8.2). 
 
Their major conclusion was that additional lease capitalisation did not improve the 
ex-post classification accuracy of bankruptcy models. This was in line with the 
findings of Elam (1975), which led them to agree with the conclusion of Dambolena 
and Khoury (1980) that no proof of improved predictive power due to operating-
lease capitalisation has yet been offered.  
 
                                                          
75 Observations in a hold-out sample are not included when the model is estimated, but will be classified by the 
estimated model. 
76 5*2*2: five years prior to bankruptcy, adjusted and unadjusted; and linear and quadratic discriminate analysis 
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8.4 Conclusions and formulation of hypotheses 
This chapter has described previous financial-distress prediction studies, focusing 
in particular on studies that incorporated operating leases. A few remarks may be 
appropriate here. 
• Financial-distress prediction studies have especially emerged in the methods 
used. Since the 1980s, logit analysis has caught up with multiple 
discriminant analysis. Other methods have gained attention as well, but have 
never become as popular as discriminant analysis and logit analysis. 
• Although the use of financial ratios in bankruptcy prediction is not based on 
any theory, they have proven useful in bankruptcy prediction. Especially 
leverage-, profitability- and cash-flow ratios have proven their usefulness in 
bankruptcy prediction. 
• Researchers are divided with regard to the samples they use (matched pair- 
versus full-control samples) and in their definition of ‘distressed’ companies 
(limited to only bankrupt companies or including ‘vulnerable for default’ 
companies). 
• The only two studies that investigated whether the incorporation of 
operating-lease data improved the accuracy of bankruptcy prediction both 
concluded that this was not the case (Elam (1975), Lawrence and Bear 
(1986)). 
• One study explicitly mentioned that the information on operating leases— a 
small set of publicly available information— made it impractical to include 
the operating-lease data (Dambolena and Khoury (1980)). 
 
The relationship between financial ratios and operating leases was described 
extensively in Part II of this study. Figure 8.3 (below) shows the relationship 
between the research on bankruptcy prediction described above and the research on 
the impact that operating leases have on financial ratios— and the possible relation 
between these two. Several researchers (Imhoff et al. (1991), Beattie et al. (1998), 
Ely (1995)) investigated the impact that capitalisation of operating leases has on 
financial ratios. These studies were extensively described in part II. Other 
researchers tried to predict bankruptcy using financial ratios without taking into 
account operating-lease obligations (Altman (1968), Ohlson (1980), Dambolena and 
Khoury (1980), Pompe and Bilderbeek (2000), among others). Only three studies 
incorporated operating leases in their bankruptcy models: Elam (1975) and Altman 
et al. (1977) by adjusting the leverage ratio by capitalising operating leases, and 
Lawrence and Bear (1986) by adjusting financial ratios with the capitalised 
operating leases and by using the lease intensity77 as explanatory variable. 
 
                                                          
77 See section 8.2; lease intensity is measured as either PVOL to total assets, or PVOL to total sales. 
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Figure 8.3 Relation between research on operating-lease capitalisation and bankruptcy 
prediction 
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It appears that no study has been undertaken since the article of Lawrence and 
Bear in 1986 on the explanatory power of operating leases in bankruptcy prediction. 
The increased usage of operating leases during the past decades, the increased 
transparency of operating leases and the renewed discussion as to whether 
operating leases should be capitalised on the balance sheet (see chapter 2) validates 
a new look at this issue. Furthermore, the results of the previous parts of this thesis 
validate the expectation that operating leases might add useful information in 
bankruptcy prediction: 
• Part II showed the significant impact operating leases have on especially the 
leverage ratio of a company. The leverage ratio of a company is in many 
bankruptcy studies the variable with the highest predictive power. 
• Part II also showed that companies couldn’t be compared on a fair basis when 
operating leases were ignored in the analysis. In bankruptcy prediction, 
bankrupt companies are compared to healthy companies. Only when both 
sub-samples use operating leases relatively equally, can one ignore the 
influence of operating leases and not alter the results of the bankruptcy 
prediction78. The comparison between bankrupt and healthy companies will 
become unfair if one of these two groups uses significantly more operating 
leases. 
• Part III showed that one of the determinants of choosing operating leases is 
avoiding a too-high leverage ratio (which confirmed the debt hypothesis). 
Again, the predictive power the leverage ratio has in financial-distress 
prediction studies may cause operating leases to have a similar predictive 
power. 
 
Finally, more recently logit analysis has become preferred above the discriminant 
analysis of Elam (1975), Altman (1968) and Lawrence and Bear (1986). Therefore, 
this thesis tests once more the hypotheses of Elam (1975) and Lawrence and Bear 
(1986) 79 using both the ‘old’ discriminant analysis and the ‘updated’ logit analysis.  
 
                                                          
78 If both sub-samples use operating leases relatively equally, the financial ratios used in bankruptcy prediction will 
change, but for both samples in the same proportion; this may therefore not alter the results. 
79 The null hypothesis of both Elam (1975) and Lawrence and Bear (1986) is negatively formulated; it does not 
expect increased classification accuracy. 
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Two hypotheses are now formulated to test, first, whether the relative usage of 
operating leases differs between financially distressed and healthy firms and 
second, whether a different usage of operating leases improves the prediction 
accuracy of financial-distress prediction models.  
 
hypothesis 8.1. Financially distressed companies use more operating leases 
Companies in financial distress will use relatively more operating 
leases than healthy companies will. 
 
hypothesis 8.2. Increased classification accuracy hypothesis 
Financial statements that are adjusted for operating-lease 
capitalisation will improve the ex post classification of bankruptcy 
models. 
 
 
These hypotheses will be empirically tested in the next chapter. 
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Appendix 8.I Financial ratios used in financial-distress prediction studies 
Explanatory variables Beaver (1966) Altman (1968) Deakin (1972) Altman (1977) Elam (1975) Ohlson (1980) Dambolena (1980) Zmijewski (1984)
Lawrence and Bear 
(1986) Hill (1996)
Cash flow to sales X X X
Cash flow to total assets X X
Cash flow to net worth X X
Cash flow to total debt X X X X X
Net income to sales X X X X X
Net income to total assets X X X X
Net income to net worth X X X
Net income to total debt X
Net Income to Net Working Capital X
Net Income to Fixed assets X
Return on total capital
Retained earnings to total assets X X X
EBIT to total assets X X X X
Net operating profit to sales X
Net operating profit to interest X
Net income dummy (1 if  2 years negative, 0 if positive) X
EBIT to capital employed
EBIT to total interest payments X X
EBITDA to total interest payments 
Funds from operations to total debt
Measure of change in net income (stability of earnings) X X
Current liabilities to total assets X X
Long term liabilities to total assets X X
Debt to equity
Long-term debt to capital
Total Debt to capital
Current plus long term plus preferred stock to total assets X X
Market value equity to book value total liabilities X X X
Total debt to total assets X X X X X X X
Total debt to total assets dummy (1 if TD>TA) X
Total debt to EBITDA
Net worth to total liabilities X
Net worth to long-term liabilities R
Net worth to current debt R
Net worth to fixed assets R
Funded Debt to Net working capital X
Times interest earned X
Capitalised leases to total assets X
Capitalised leases to net sales X
Cash to total assets X X X
Quick assets to total assets X X
Current assets to total assets X X X
Working capital to total assets X X X X
Current assets minus inventories to current liabilities X
Cash to current liabilities X X X
Quick assets to current liabilities X X X
Inventory to net working capital X
Current debt to Inventory X
Current assets to current liabilities X X X X X X X
Cash to sales X X R
Accounts receivable to sales X R
Inventory to sales X R R
Cost of Sales to Inventory X
Quick assets to sales X X
Current assets to sales X X
Working capital to sales X X R R
Net worth to sales X R R
Total assets to sales X R R R
Sales to capital employed
Sales to fixed assets X X
Cash interval X
Defensive interval X
No credit-interval X
Qualified opinion (1 if qualified, 0 if not) X
Size X X X X
Age
Unemployment rate (lag 1 year) X
Prime rate (lag 1 year) X
Comparison of means X X X X X X
Dichotomous classification X X X
Likelihood ratios X
Linear probability
Logit X
Probit X
Event history analysis X
Discriminant analysis X X X X X X
financial distress firms 79 32 53 48 105 23 81 42 75
healthy firms 79 32 58 48 2058 23 1600 42 --
matched pairs X X X X X X X
X = ratios used in analysis, R = ratios used but reversed, 
VII.Economic indicators
METHOD
Sample Size/Selection
III.Debt ratios
IV.Liquidity ratios
V.Turnover ratios
VI.Other
Univariate approaches
Multivariate approaches
I.Cash flow ratios
II.Profitability ratios
Bankruptcy prediction
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CHAPTER 9 EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE IMPACT OF OPERATING-
LEASES ON FINANCIAL-DISTRESS PREDICTION 
9.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, two hypotheses were formulated to test first, whether 
bankrupt companies use more operating leases than healthy companies and second, 
if the capitalisation of operating leases improves the classification accuracy of 
financial-distress prediction models. This chapter tests the hypotheses empirically 
using two different financial-distress prediction approaches (discriminant and logit 
analysis), and two different sample selections (matched pairs and full healthy 
sample), which have been derived from previous financial-distress studies. 
 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 9.2 describes the research design, including 
the methodology, sample selection and the financial ratios used in the empirical 
models. Section 9.3 presents the results, starting with the descriptive statistics in 
sub-section 9.3.1, and followed by the results of the multivariate models in sub-
section 9.3.2. Section 9.4 concludes.  
9.2 Research design 
9.2.1 Methodology 
As described in chapter 8, previous studies on financial-distress prediction showed 
that the differences in classification accuracy between the methods used are 
minimal. Although multiple discriminant analysis (MDA) is sometimes labelled 
outdated, and in many studies the data do not meet the statistical requirements of 
MDA, the method has not yet been abandoned in financial-distress prediction 
studies. This is due, among other things, to the still-encouraging results of this 
method. Furthermore, while in this study the results are compared to those of Elam 
(1975) and Lawrence and Bear (1986), which both used MDA, this study also uses 
MDA to test the hypotheses. However, due to the development and popularity of 
logit analysis since the article of Lawrence and Bear, and due to the less restrictive 
statistical requirements, also logit analysis will be used to test the hypotheses. 
 
Therefore, besides the univariate, descriptive statistics of each individual financial 
ratio, two methods are used: MDA and logit analysis. For each method different 
models are constructed, based on financial ratios with- and without the adjustment 
for operating leases. To test whether the classification accuracy improves after 
operating leases enter the model, we compare the classification accuracy of the 
models with and without the adjustment for operating leases using the chi-square 
distribution (with one degree of freedom) and the procedure that was described in 
the previous chapter (see section 8.2.2). 
 
9.2.2 Sample selection 
The companies in the sample are, or were, listed on Euronext Amsterdam during 
the period 1996-2004.  A sample of financially-distressed firms and a sample of 
healthy firms were constructed as follows: 
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Selection of firms in financial distress 
The concept of financial distress is not limited to bankruptcy but is defined as the 
occurrence of one of the following financial problems: 
-  Bankruptcy; 
-  Suspension of payment; 
-  Liquidation or takeover to keep the company from further financial decline; 
-  Suspension of quotation by the stock market because liabilities exceed equity; 
-  Three-year negative net income; 
-  Negative equity. 
 
The last three criteria are financial-distress criteria and do not necessarily imply 
that companies experiencing these go bankrupt. As described in section 8.2.4, Grice 
and Dugan (2001) and Grice and Ingram (2001) also included companies in their 
distressed sample that are ‘vulnerable’ to default. This study includes the above-
mentioned financial distress criteria, since limiting the sample to only the bankrupt 
companies leads to a rather small dataset. The financially distressed companies are, 
as mentioned by Grice and Ingram (2001), vulnerable to default, and this might add 
valuable information. However, to test whether this choice of the sample has 
influenced the results, we conduct tests using both the sample limited to only the 
bankrupt companies as well as the larger financially distressed sample.  
 
The events above were tracked by using database archive of the Dutch financial 
newspaper Het Financieele Dagblad. Furthermore, to be sure not to exclude any 
firm that experienced financial distress at a certain stage, we searched Statline80 on 
inactive Dutch listed firms. Subsequently, Het Financieele Dagblad was used again 
to check what the reason was behind the inactive listing. Information on equity and 
net income was derived from the Worldscope database. The fact that hardly any 
information on operational lease obligations before 1996 is available and that the 
analysis covers a period of four years before financial distress, limited the research 
period to the years 2000-2004. Eventually, 38 companies were defined as financially 
distressed, 21 of which eventually went bankrupt. Appendix 9.I shows the 
financially distressed companies and their last year of financial statement data. 
 
Whether or not the company disclosed operating leases was not a criterion. As 
described in section 8.3, this is in line with Lawrence and Bear (1986), but contrary 
to Elam (1975). The non-leasing companies also add information to the financial-
distress prediction model, by contributing to greater classification accuracy. 
Furthermore, their inclusion in the model is a more reliable reflection of reality 
because in the real world not all companies use operating leases, and their 
exclusion might cause an upward bias. Elam (1975, p.35) himself stated that he 
chose the data too precisely and his sample was not a statistical sample of all firms. 
 
Although the sample size in this study is limited, it is not exceptional in financial-
distress prediction studies. Deakin (1972) (32 bankrupt companies), and Dambolena 
and Khoury (1980) (23 bankrupt companies), for example, used smaller sample 
sizes, and the samples of Elam (1975) and Lawrence and Bear (1986) also consisted 
of only respectively 48 and 42 bankrupt companies. 
 
                                                          
80 Database of all companies on the Euronext Amsterdam since 1997 with a code (99) if the company is still on the 
Euronext or another code if not, and why it has been mutated (for example, 25 in case of bankruptcy). 
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Selection of healthy firms 
As described in 8.2.4 some controversy exists whether the control sample, the 
healthy companies, should be matched based on industry and size, or whether a full 
control sample is more appropriate, since it is less arbitrary. This study therefore 
uses both approaches, one using a matched-pair sample (38 healthy companies) and 
one using a full healthy sample (62 healthy companies).  
 
Full healthy sample 
The full healthy sample consists of 62 companies listed on Euronext Amsterdam 
(during the period 2000-2004. These were derived from the sample used in parts II 
and III of this thesis. However, that sample also includes companies that are not 
bankrupt but are classified as financially distressed, and are still listed. Naturally, 
these firms were eliminated from the healthy sample because they were 
incorporated in the financially distressed sample. Also companies that are the 
successors of bankrupt firms were eliminated (for example, when a company was 
taken over as a consequence of the financial distress). Furthermore, for reasons of 
practicality, only those companies are selected for which the present value of the 
operating leases could be calculated (including those for which this value is zero; 
thus, companies not disclosing operating leases).  
 
The use of a full sample is according to Ohlson (1980, p.117) ‘ideal’, and he criticises 
the matching principle (see 8.2.4). The difficulty with a full control sample is, 
however, that for healthy companies the years of financial distress cannot be 
defined. With a matched-pair sample, the researcher can chose for each pair the 
same years of financial distress and consequently the same t-1 through t-n before 
the financial distress occurred. With a full control sample this is not possible, and a 
random selection procedure is used to choose the ‘financial distress’ years for the 
healthy sample. Due to reasons of impracticality and high costs, Ohlson (1980) did 
not gather all the information for each healthy company but for each company only 
one calendar year. The year of any given firm’s report was obtained by random 
procedures. This study uses the division over the calendar years of the financially 
distressed companies to define which percentage of the healthy companies should 
have a specific calendar year as their last financial statement year. For example, of 
the 38 financially distressed companies, the year 2000 was for ten the year of 
financial distress. For these 26% of the companies in the sample, 1999 was the year 
with the last financial statement. Therefore, also for 26% of the healthy sample (a-
select chosen) 1999 is used as the last year with available financial statement and 
for the other years accordingly.  
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Matched-pair healthy sample 
Most of authors mentioned earlier (Holmen (1988), Deakin (1972), Altman (1968), 
Altman et al. (1977), Beaver (1966), Elam (1975) and Lawrence and Bear (1986)) 
used matched-pair samples for their research based on industry classification and 
size. Notwithstanding the above-mentioned arguments of Ohlson (1980) against the 
usage of matched pairs, the method will be used in this paper for the purpose of 
comparing the results with those of Elam (1975), Altman (1968) and Lawrence and 
Bear (1986). Each of the companies in financial distress was matched with a 
company with the same sic code and similar measure of sales, as an indicator of 
size. As described in chapter 7, total assets is a less appropriate measure, due to the 
endogeneity of this variable. The advantage of discriminant analysis is that the 
year before the financial distress occurred can also be matched with the same year 
of the matched company (with the full control sample, the years prior to financial-
distress are randomly chosen for the healthy sample). Appendix 9.I shows the 
matched-pair sample. 
 
9.2.3 Financial statement data 
As described in the previous chapter many combinations of the chosen financial 
ratios as explanatory variables give similar results in financial-distress prediction 
models. For reasons of comparability, the financial ratios as used by Lawrence and 
Bear (1986) were chosen to be included in this study. These ratios include one or 
two ratios as a measure of liquidity, profitability, leverage, turnover, and cash flow. 
Furthermore two separate measures describe lease intensity. Table 9.1 shows the 
financial ratios that are included in the analysis and the adjustment made to each 
ratio if the operating leases are capitalised. 
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Table 9.1 List of independent variables 
This table shows the independent variables used in the financial-distress prediction models of this study. Each 
variable is shown twice, once unadjusted for operating leases and one adjusted with operating leases, if appropriate. 
PVOL = present value of operating-lease commitments, PVA = present value of leased asset, EBIT= earnings before 
interest and taxes 
 UNADJUSTED MODEL ADJUSTED MODEL 
Operating-lease ratios   
Capitalised operating leases to total assets 
PVA Assets  Total
PVOL
+  
Capitalised operating leases to sales 
Sales
PVOL  
Liquidity ratios     
Current ratio 
sLiabilitieCurrent  
AssetsCurrent  
payment  lease  annual  sLiabilitieCurrent  
AssetsCurrent 
+  
Working capital to total assets 
Assets  Total
sLiabilitieCurrent  - AssetsCurrent  
PVA  Assets  Total
payment lease annual -sLiabilitieCurrent  - AssetsCurrent 
+  
Profitability ratios     
EBIT to total assets 
Assets  Total
 EBIT  
PVA   Assets  Total
PVOL *6%    EBIT
+
+  
Net income to net sales 
Sales
 IncomeNet   
Sales
 IncomeNet   
Leverage ratio     
Total debt to total assets 
Assets  Total
Debt  Total  
PVA   Assets  Total
PVOL  Debt    Total
+
+  
Market value of equity to  
book value of debt  Debt  Total
endyear  tion  capitalisaMarket   
PVOL  Debt    Total
endyear  tion  capitalisaMarket  
+  
Turnover ratios   
Sales to total assets 
Assets  Total
Sales  
PVA    Assets  Total
Sales
+  
Cash flow ratios     
cash flow to total debt 
Debt  Total
FlowCash  
PVOL  Debt    Total
FlowCash 
+  
cash flow to sales 
Sales
FlowCash  
Sales
FlowCash  
 
The capitalised value of the operating-lease liability is included, both as a separate 
explanatory variable and as an adjustment made to other variables, if appropriate. 
Unfortunately not all distressed companies disclose according to the accounting 
standards. Although it is acknowledged that the present value cannot be calculated 
as advocated in chapter 4, it would cause the elimination of thirteen financially 
distressed companies from the analysis. Therefore, based on the mean- and median 
results of chapter 5, the present value of the lease commitments is estimated 
alternatively. The following procedures were used to estimate the capitalised value 
of the lease commitments of the financially distressed sample:  
• For companies disclosing at least as required by RJ292 (14 companies81), the 
capitalisation approach was used (described in chapter 4). 
• Two companies disclosed the present values themselves, and this was used. 
• Seven companies did not disclose operating leases. 
 
The other companies did not comply with RJ292; 
• For companies disclosing the total commitment (five companies), nominal 
operating-lease commitments were multiplied by 0.80. This 0.80, based on 
the results of chapter 5, is approximately the average (0.81) of PVOL divided 
                                                          
81 The number of companies indicated refers to the year before financial distress. The disclosure type used by each 
company may vary during the four year period analysed. 
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by the total nominal commitments for the companies that do disclose as 
required by RJ292 during the period 2000-2004.  
• For companies disclosing only the annual payment (six companies), the lease 
portfolio was assumed to have a weighted remaining life of five years, and the 
present value of an annuity formula was used to discount the annual 
payments. The average remaining life for the companies in the sample was 
shown (see chapter 5) to be seven years. However, since the annual payment 
is most likely to decline during the remaining life, it would be more 
appropriate to use the shorter weighted remaining life (see also the 
capitalisation approach of Beattie et al. (1998), which is described in chapter 
4). The discount rate used was 6%. 
• For companies disclosing the annual payment including the remaining life 
(two companies), the same procedure as above was used, and the fixed five 
years were replaced by the disclosed remaining life. 
 
As described above, the full control sample included only those companies for which 
PVOL could be calculated using the capitalisation approach (described in chapter 
4). However, for the matched-pair sample this was not always the case, and the 
same procedure as above was conducted; thirteen companies disclosed as required 
by RJ292, five disclosed the total commitments, eight disclosed the annual 
payment, four disclosed the annual payment including the remaining life, seven did 
not disclose operating leases, and one disclosed a combination of the above. 
9.3  Results 
9.3.1 Univariate analyses 
In the univariate analyses the ratios of Table 9.1 are compared between the 
financially distressed and healthy samples. This is done for both the matched-pair 
healthy sample and the full control healthy sample. The financially distressed 
sample remains the same in both analyses.  
 
Matched pairs 
A univariate analysis is used in this study because it provides some information; a 
significant difference between the ratios of financially distressed- versus healthy 
companies may indicate that this ratio has predictive power in multi-ratio models. 
However, as pointed out by Elam (1975, p.33), ‘no single ratio can describe a firm 
any more than a single financial statement number fully describes a company; some 
ratios may point to bankruptcy while others indicate financial stability’. Table 9.2 
shows the mean values of the capitalised operating leases divided by total assets 
(PVOL/TA) of both the financially distressed- and the healthy samples. The results 
of Elam (1975) and Lawrence and Bear (1986) are also both shown. The latter also 
compare the study of Elam with their own study, but ignore the fact that Elam 
calculates the ratio without adjusting the total assets (see p.31), while they do 
adjust total assets (see p.576). This also explains partly why the ratio is higher for 
Elam’s study than for Lawrence and Bear’s study, since for the latter both 
numerator and denominator increased, which is not the case with Elam. Table 9.2 
shows both ratios, with- and without adjusting the denominator (total assets).  
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Table 9.2 Capitalised operating leases to total assets, matched-pair sample 
Source: Elam (1975) table 2 p. 31, Lawrence and Bear (1986) table 2 p. 580. Since Elam and Lawrence and Bear 
use a different measure of total assets as denominator, the comparison is split between these two approaches. Elam 
used total assets without adjustment of operating leases, while in the measure of Lawrence and Bear, total assets is 
adjusted according to the capitalised operating leases. The results of this study are calculated twice, once using 
Elam’s approach, and once using Lawrence and Bear’s approach. 
  YEARS BEFORE FINANCIAL DISTRESS 
  -1 -2 -3 -4 
PVOL to total assets (not adjusted)       
This study,                n= 36 34 33 28 
Financially distressed 0.174 0.165 0.147 0.095 
Healthy 0.136 0.131 0.155 0.165 
t 0.94 0.76 -0.13 -1.16 
Elam's study,             n= 48       
Bankrupt 0.197 0.173 0.200 0.311 
Non-bankrupt 0.154 0.167 0.090 0.080 
          
PVOL to Total assets (adjusted)        
This study,                 n= 36 34 33 28 
Financially distressed 0.136 0.128 0.105 0.072 
Healthy 0.109 0.102 0.118 0.122 
t 1.02 0.93 -0.35 -1.37 
Lawrence and Beaver' 
study, n= 42       
Bankrupt 0.154 0.151 0.146 0.145 
Non-bankrupt 0.110 0.108 0.116 0.110 
 
None of the differences between the means of the financially distressed and healthy 
companies is significant (10% level)82,83. The matched-pair analysis is influenced by 
an outlier in the healthy sample, which is a company84 with a ratio of capitalised 
operating leases to total assets (adjusted) of 0.48 in the year t-1. When this outlier 
is removed, the mean of the ratio of capitalised leases to total assets of the healthy 
sample for t-1 decreases to respectively 0.117 (total assets not adjusted) and 0.098 
(total assets adjusted). The differences between the samples are still not significant 
however. 
 
The differences in means of the other variables appear in Appendix 9.II. The results 
are most significant in the year before the financial distress (t-1): the differences in 
mean of five of the twelve investigated ratios are (highly) significant. These are 
(level of significance between brackets): sales to total assets (5% level), interest 
cover (1% level), total debt to total assets (1% level), EBIT to total assets (1% level) 
and market value of equity to book value of debt (5% level)85. The adjustment of the 
operating leases to the variables leads to the same results; the same ratios show 
significant differences in mean, and it is striking that even the levels of significance 
of the adjusted variables remain the same. 
                                                          
82 The results are similar when the sample of financially distressed firms is limited to the 21 companies that went 
bankrupt or had a suspension of payment. PVOL/TAs (TA also adjusted) for these firms (healthy firms within 
brackets) were respectively:  t-1 0.16 (0.11), t-2 0.16 (0.10), t-3 0.14 (0.12) and t-4 0.07 (0.13). 
83 Also the change in the lease intensity was analysed to see whether the increase in PVOL/TA between financially 
distressed- and healthy companies is significantly different. This was also not the case. 
84 The company is ICT-Automatisering 
85 Footnote 82 applies also to the other ten ratios with the following remarks: the difference between sales-to-total 
assets, both adjusted and unadjusted, is no longer significant; the difference between the current ratio unadjusted 
becomes significant. For the other ratios the results are the same, although differences in each ratio become less 
significant.  
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The results of this study might indicate that due to a similar adjustment of the 
ratios of healthy- and financially distressed companies, the use of operating leases 
between the two samples does not differ significantly. For example, the difference 
between the financially distressed- and healthy samples in mean in the ratio of 
total debt to total assets (unadjusted) is 18.9%, significant at the 1% level (TD/TA is 
18.9% higher for the financially distressed sample compared to the healthy sample). 
After operating leases are adjusted to the ratio of total debt to total assets, the 
difference is 16.4%, and still significant at the 1% level. Figure 9.1 illustrates the 
differences between the financially distressed- and the healthy samples for four 
different ratios: PVOL to total assets, total debt to total assets, sales to total assets, 
and market value of equity to book value of debt. Each ratio is shown once 
unadjusted for operating leases (graphs at the left), and once adjusted for operating 
leases (graphs at the right). 
 
Figure 9.1 Illustration of differences between financially distressed- and healthy companies (matched 
pairs), before (left graphs) and after (right graphs) the operating leases were included 
Differences in three ratios (total debt to total assets, sales to total assets and market value of equity to book value of 
debt) between financially distressed- and healthy firms (matched pairs), once unadjusted (a, c, e) and once adjusted 
for operating leases (b, d, f). 
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Figure 9.1 confirms that the differences are biggest in year t-1. Also it clearly shows 
that this is true for both the unadjusted- and the adjusted ratios, although for both 
samples the ratios deteriorate. The lines in the graphs keep the same development, 
but shift up or down, depending on the ratio. In other words, the spread in the 
ratios between financially distressed- and healthy companies remains constant for 
both the adjusted- and unadjusted lines. The same conclusion was made by 
Lawrence and Bear (1986), who mentioned that the larger the spread between 
adjusted and non-adjusted ratios of bankrupt and healthy companies, the more 
likely that the ratio will be useful in building a discriminant analysis. Their leasing 
adjustment did not appear to substantially alter the spreads of variables between 
the groups (see Figure 8.1).  
 
For this study, Figure 9.2 shows the spreads between the financially distressed 
sample and the healthy sample of i) the ratio of total debt to total asset and ii) the 
ratio of EBIT to total assets, adjusted and unadjusted.  
 
Figure 9.2 Spreads between financially distressed- and healthy companies 
The figures show the spread between the total-debt-to-total-assets ratio (left) and the EBIT-to-total-assets ratio 
(right) of the financially distressed- and healthy samples, once unadjusted for operating leases (the continuous line), 
and once adjusted for operating leases (the dotted line).  
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Figure 9.2 shows that the year before financial distress the largest difference is 
visible between the financially distressed- and healthy companies for the two ratios 
(total debt to total assets and EBIT to total assets). This difference, however, is 
hardly influenced by the operating leases adjusted to this ratio.  
 
Full control sample 
The results of the univariate analysis for year t-1 using the full control sample 
appear in Table 9.3. The results are somewhat different than those of the matched-
pair univariate analysis. Most important for this study, the difference between 
financially distressed- and healthy companies in all three lease ratios is significant 
at least at the 5% level. This is obviously caused by the lower means of the full 
sample (PVOL to total assets or to sales between 5% and 7%), as opposed to means 
of the matched-pair sample (between 10% and 13%). Furthermore, the differences 
in mean between financially distressed and healthy companies with regard to the 
sales-to-total-assets ratio and the market-value-of-equity-to-book-value-of-debt ratio 
are not significant (as opposed to the matched-pair sample, where the differences 
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were significant). The differences in the interest cover and the ratios of total debt to 
total assets  and EBIT to total assets remain unchanged but highly significant86. 
 
Table 9.3 Univariate analysis: full control sample for the year before financial distress (t-1) 
For abbreviations and differences between adjusted and non-adjusted ratios, see Table 9.1 
  FINANCIALLY  DISTRESSED HEALTHY 
ANALYSIS OF 
 DIFFERENCE 
  n mean n mean difference in mean t-statistic significance 
PVOL/TA 36 0.174 61 0.067 159.4% 3.84 ** 
PVOL/TA-adj 36 0.136 62 0.068 100.7% 3.04 *** 
PVOL/sales 36 0.181 61 0.059 208.9% 3.25 ** 
CR 36 1.428 61 1.704 -16.2% -0.81 ns 
CR-adj 26 1.439 60 1.598 -9.9% -0.42 ns 
WC/TA 36 0.109 61 0.149 -27.1% -0.92 ns 
WC/TA-adj 35 0.105 61 0.140 -24.7% -0.84 ns 
Sales/TA 37 1.343 62 1.527 -12.0% -1.00 ns 
Sales/TA-adj 36 1.142 62 1.419 -19.5% -1.71 ns 
Interest cover 36 -12.885 54 9.589 -234.4% -3.77 *** 
Interest cover-adj 35 -8.895 55 9.974 -189.2% -2.96 *** 
TD/TA 37 0.709 62 0.587 20.9% 2.84 *** 
TD/TA-adj 36 0.761 62 0.620 22.8% 3.19 *** 
EBIT/TA 36 -0.222 58 0.065 -439.8% -4.07 *** 
EBIT/TA-adj 35 -0.197 58 0.065 -404.0% -4.04 *** 
NI/sales 37 -0.441 61 -0.292 -51.1% -0.36 ns 
CF/TD 37 -0.318 62 0.000 n/a -1.01 ns 
CF/TD-adj 36 -0.294 62 0.022 -1416.5% -1.26 ns 
CF/sales 37 -0.325 61 -0.223 -45.5% -0.26 ns 
MVE/BVD 37 1.739 61 3.485 -50.1% -1.38 ns 
MVE/BVD-adj 36 1.402 61 2.826 -50.4% -1.42 ns 
LnSales 37 11.680 61 13.380 -12.7% -3.64 *** 
 
Looking at the year before financial distress, we see that the univariate analyses 
using either a matched pair- or full healthy sample are consistent in their results on 
the more common ratios (excluding the lease-intensity ratios). Both samples show 
the same ratios that have predictive power in predicting financial distress and 
bankruptcy: EBIT-to-total-assets ratio, the total-debt-to-total-assets ratio and the 
interest cover. All three differ significantly between healthy and financially 
distressed companies. The results are similar using these ratios adjusted or 
unadjusted for operating leases. This was demonstrated for the matched-pair 
sample in Figure 9.2, which showed that the spreads between financially 
distressed- and healthy companies, although increasing when companies 
approached financial distress, are similar for adjusted and unadjusted values.  
 
With respect to the ‘new’ lease-intensity ratios, the univariate results show 
somewhat conflicting results. Figure 9.3 shows for the year before financial distress 
the mean of the ratios of PVOL to total assets (total assets also adjusted in 
accordance with capitalised leased assets) and PVOL to total sales, for the three 
samples: the financially distressed sample (n=36), the matched-pair healthy sample 
(n=36) and the full healthy sample (n=61). 
 
                                                          
86 When limiting the sample to only the bankrupt companies (21) the univariate analysis using the full control 
sample, the same ratios show differences at the same level of significance, the only addition to Table 9.3 is a 
significant difference at the 5% level of sales-to-total assets when adjusted for operating leases. 
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Figure 9.3 Lease intensity of financially distressed, matched pairs- and full healthy-sample 
Two lease intensity measures, capitalised operating leases (PVOL) divided by either total assets (adjusted for the 
capitalised leased asset) or sales, are shown for three different samples. First the financially distressed sample 
(n=36), second the matched pair’s healthy sample (n=36) and third, the full healthy sample (n=61). 
Financially 
distressed 
n=36
Financially 
distressed, 
n=36
Matched pairs  
n=36
Matched pairs  
n=36
Full
 n=61
Full 
n=61
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
PVOL/TA-adj PVOL/Sales
 
Both lease-intensity measures show that the year before financial distress the 
financially distressed sample used relatively more leases than the healthy sample. 
However, the matched-pair sample did not differ significantly from the financially 
distressed sample (t-values respectively 1.02 and 1.64), whereas the full healthy 
sample did differ significantly from the financially distressed sample (t-values 
respectively 3.04 and 3.25). Therefore, the non-parametric median test was 
conducted to determine whether the outliers in the matched-pair sample might 
have influenced the results of this analysis. The results are shown in Table 9.4. 
 
Table 9.4 Significance of differences in medians for the year before financial distress (t-1) 
The median of the capitalised lease liability (PVOL) divided by total assets (including the capitalised leased asset) 
or by sales, for three samples: the financially distressed sample (n=36), the matched-pair healthy sample (n=36) and 
the full healthy sample (n=62). The z-statistic shows the significance of the differences between the financially 
distressed sample and the two healthy samples. 
  FINANCIALLY  DISTRESSED  
MATCHED-PAIR  
HEALTHY SAMPLE  z 
FULL  
HEALTHY SAMPLE z 
 N=36 N=36  N=61  
PVOL/TA 9.9% 6.4% 1.11ns 3.9% 2.82*** 
PVOL/sales 8.9% 7.4% 1.55ns 3.1% 3.42*** 
 
These results are similar when the differences in the medians are analysed, the z-
values of the differences between the matched pair- and the financially distressed 
samples are not significant, and the difference in the medians between the full 
healthy sample and the financially distressed sample is significant.  
 
The multivariate analysis compares the two sample selection approaches (matched-
pair sample versus full healthy sample) on the grounds of their usefulness in 
financial-distress prediction models. 
 
9.3.2 Multivariate models 
Also for the multivariate models, different approaches are used to construct a 
financial-distress prediction model. Each model is constructed using once the 
matched-pair healthy sample and once the full healthy sample. Furthermore, the 
models are constructed using discriminant analysis and logit analysis. Finally, each 
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model is calculated once including the unadjusted ratios, once including the 
adjusted ratios, once including adjusted ratios plus also the lease-intensity ratio 
and finally, once with unadjusted ratios but with the lease-intensity ratio. Thus, 
sixteen models (2*2*4) are analysed. To avoid an even longer and more confusing 
list of models, and because the year before financial distress showed the biggest 
difference between the financially distressed- and the healthy samples, the models 
were limited to t-1. As with the study of Lawrence and Bear (1986), all variables 
were included at once, since the purpose of this study is to test the impact of 
operating leases on the classification accuracy of financial-distress prediction 
models, and not the choice of the ideal combination of variables. Table 9.5 and Table 
9.6 show respectively the results of the sixteen models. Before discussion of the 
results, the differences between the selected samples and the chosen method are 
first described. As will become clear, this keeps the description of the results 
focussed on the full-sample logit analysis. 
 
Comparison of classification accuracy between sample selection and methods 
As described before, two different samples were used (matched-pair sample and full 
healthy sample) and two different methods were used (MDA versus logit). These 
choices also affect the classification accuracy of the financial-distress prediction 
models. The differences between these approaches have therefore been statistically 
tested as well. This was done by comparing the starting models (model 1) with each 
other, in order to ignore the impact that operating leases have on classification 
accuracy.  
 
matched-pair sample versus full healthy sample 
As suggested by Ohlson (1980), the matching devices of the matched-pair 
sample, industry and size (measures by sales), are used in the full models as 
explanatory variables. The classification accuracy of both the discriminant 
analysis and the logit analysis increases when the full sample is used instead of 
the matched-pair sample; in the discriminant analysis the classification 
accuracy increases from 71.9% to 86.2%; in the logit analysis the classification 
accuracy increases from 83.8% to 89.7% (see Table 9.5 and Table 9.6). For both 
methods the increase is significant at the 1% level (z-value respectively 5.6 and 
6.3). The main focus in this study is therefore on the classification accuracies of 
the full healthy sample. 
 
multiple discriminant analysis versus logit analysis 
The methods are also compared for the matched-pair sample and for the full 
healthy samples. Logit analysis has for both sample sizes higher classification 
accuracies, from 86.2% to 89.7% in the full healthy samples and from 71.9% to 
83.8% in the matched pairs sample (see Table 9.5 and Table 9.6). Only for the 
matched-pair sample is this significant at the 1% level (z-score=2.67). With the 
full healthy samples the difference is not significant (z-score=0.64). This 
improvement is, however, not significant (z=0.64). The main focus of this study 
will therefore be on the logit analysis— not only because of these results, but 
also because the statistical requirements of MDA are not met.  
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Discriminant analysis 
Table 9.5 Results of discriminant models  
Eight models are calculated, four using the matched-pair healthy sample and four using the full healthy sample. 
Model one is the starting model, and the classification accuracy of the other models is compared with this model. 
Models two, three and four are models that incorporate operating leases. In models two and three, the ratios WC/TA, 
Sales/TA, the interest cover, TD/TA, EBIT/TA, CF/TD, and MVE/BVD are calculated including the capitalisation 
of the operating leases (see Table 9.1). CR is not adjusted in all models, since the limited information available on 
the annual lease payment reduces the number of observations. Model three adds the operating-lease intensity 
measures, PVOL/TA and PVOL/Sales, to model two. Model 4 is model 1 plus the operating-lease intensity 
measures. Z is a measure of the significance of the difference between the classification accuracy of two models. Z 
is presented twice, once for all models compared with the classification accuracy of a random model (using the 
random hit rate, p) and once for models 2 through 4 compared with the classification accuracy of model one. Z and 
p are calculated as described in section 8.2.2. The table shows the rank of each variable in the discriminant function 
based on the absolute correlation within the function.  
  DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS 
  MATCHED PAIRS FULL MODEL 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
PVOLTA-adj     10 11     7 7 
CR 10 10 12 12 11 12 13 12 
WC/TA 8 9 11 10 10 11 12 11 
Sales/TA 9 8 9 9 9 9 10 10 
Interest cover 2 1 1 2 3 6 6 3 
TD/TA 7 7 7 7 8 7 8 9 
EBIT/TA 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 
NI/sales 5 5 5 5 6 5 5 6 
CF/TD 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 
CF/sales 4 4 4 4 5 3 3 5 
MVE/BVD 6 6 6 6 12 10 11 13 
lnSales 1 2 2 1 
Industry dummy 
used for matching 
7 8 10 8 
classification accuracy 71.9% 80.6% 80.6% 79.0% 86.2% 87.4% 87.4% 86.0% 
z as opposed to random model1 3.50 4.83 4.83 4.57 6.40 6.53 6.53 6.29 
z as opposed to model one2    1.00 1.000 0.75   0.21 0.21 -0.21 
1 all significant at the 1% level, 2 none significant at the 10% level 
 
Table 9.5 shows which variables have the highest absolute correlation with the 
discriminant function. The results show very little variation in the top-three 
discriminating variables in the matched-pair sample (EBIT-to-total-assets ratio, the 
interest cover and cash-flow-to-total-debt ratio). When size, measured by LnSales, 
enters the model with the full healthy sample, this variable enters this top-three 
list, and the cash-flow-to-total-debt ratio falls back to the fourth position. The 
highest position for PVOL/TA is the seventh position in the full sample models. This 
is the same for the models with or- without the relevant variables adjusted for 
operating leases. Models two and three (including the variables adjusted for 
operating leases) for the full healthy sample show a small increase in classification 
accuracy, compared with model one, but this is not significant. However, as 
described above, the results of the full healthy sample using the logit approach will 
lead the way in answering the hypotheses, due to the statistically better foundation. 
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Logit analysis 
Table 9.6 Results of logit models  
Eight models are calculated, four using the matched-pair healthy sample and four using the full healthy sample. The 
independent variable is a dummy with a value of 1 for financially distressed companies and 0 for healthy companies. 
Model 1 is the starting model; the classification accuracy of the other models is compared with this model. Models 
2, 3 and 4 are models that incorporate operating leases. Models 2 and 3 calculate the ratios WC/TA, Sales/TA, the 
interest cover, TD/TA, EBIT/TA, CF/TD, and MVE/BVD including the capitalisation of the operating leases (see 
Table 9.1). CR is not adjusted in all models, since the limited information available on the annual lease payment 
reduces the number of observations. Model 3 adds the operating-lease intensity measures, PVOL/TA and 
PVOL/Sales, to model 2. Model 4 is model one plus the operating-lease intensity measures. Z is a measure of the 
significance of the difference between the classification accuracy of two models. Z is presented twice, once for all 
models compared with the classification accuracy of a random model (using the random hit rate, p), and once for 
models 2 through 4 compared with the classification accuracy of model one. Z is calculated as described in section 
8.2.2. The table shows the coefficients of each variable. *,** and *** means significant at the 10%-, 5%- and 1% 
levels. Nagelkerke R square is presented. 
  LOGIT ANALYSIS 
  MATCHED PAIRS FULL MODEL 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
constant -0.57 -2.69 -2.32 -0.59 6.70 7.74 7.28 9.94 
PVOLTA-adj     1.78 6.88*     -1.23 10.27** 
CR 0.04 -0.18 -0.26 -0.1 4.77** 1.01 1.29 2.93 
WC/TA 0.71 3.89 4.21 1.98 -13.37** -2.44 -3.20 -8.45 
Sales/TA -0.44 -0.69 -0.68 -0.73 -1.41 -1.26 -1.26 -1.62* 
Interest cover 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.23 -0.42** -0.45* -0.15 
TD/TA 2.93 5.37* 4.68 2.7 5.34 4.94 5.59 3.26 
EBIT/TA 3.14 -3.4 -3.4 3.34 27.32*** 36.68*** 38.12*** 29.04*** 
NI/sales 2.78 -1.51 -2.01 2.85 34.92* 16.94 17.12 29.77 
CF/TD -8.88 -8.34 -8.35 -9.99 -14.61 -36.11** -36.73** -30.02** 
CF/sales -4.01 5.68 6.11 -3.78 -57.43* -21.84 -21.91 -41.45 
MVE/BVD -0.11 -0.14 -0.17 -0.21 -0.14 -0.05 -0.04 -0.1 
lnSales -0.99*** -0.81*** -0.83*** -0.97*** 
Industry dummy 
used for matching 
0.90** 0.58 0.62 0.73 
Nagelkerke R2 0.51 0.52 0.52 0.57 0.59 0.67 0.78 0.8 
classification accuracy 83.8% 83.8% 82.4% 82.4% 89.7% 92.0% 92.0% 93.0% 
z as opposed to random model1 5.58 5.58 5.34 5.34 7.05 7.39 7.39 7.58 
z as opposed to model one2  0.00 -0.24 -0.24   0.43 0.43 0.43 
1 all significant at the 1% level, 2 none significant at the 10% level 
 
Also for logit models 3 and 4, compared with the first model using a full sample, the 
results show that for neither of the models does the classification accuracy improve 
significantly. None have significantly better classification accuracy than when the 
assignment to each class was done randomly. Also, as mentioned before, the full 
healthy samples do not outperform the matched-pair samples at a significant level. 
Size, measured by the natural log of sales, is in all full healthy samples a significant 
variable, indicating that the chance that a company becomes financially distressed 
increases when size decreases. This also affects the variable EBIT to total assets, 
which is unexpectedly positively related to the chance of financial distress. This is, 
however, caused by the significantly smaller denominator (total assets) and not by a 
significantly higher EBIT. This is in line with the discriminant analysis, where size 
also was a variable with high discriminating power. In the best model (model 4, full 
healthy sample) the lease-intensity measure is positively related to the chance of 
getting into financial distress. The significance of the variables when comparing 
models 3 (adjusted variable plus PVOL/TA) and 4 (unadjusted variables plus 
PVOL/TA) is not fundamentally different. In both models the natural log of sales, 
EBIT/TA and cash-flow-to-total-debt, are significant at least at the 5% level. In 
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model three also the interest cover is negatively related to the chance of getting into 
financial distress, whereas in model 4 this is replaced by sales-to-total-assets. Both 
relations are only significant at the 10% level. 
9.4 Conclusion 
Chapters 8 and 9 examined the impact of operating leases on financial-distress 
prediction models. Based on previous studies, the changing (leasing) environment 
and the impact of the capitalisation of operating leases on especially the leverage of 
a company, two hypotheses were formulated in chapter eight. The first 
hypothesised that companies in financial distress use more operating leases than 
their healthy counterparts; the second consequently hypothesised that 
incorporation of operating-lease liabilities in financial-distress prediction models 
would increase the classification accuracy of such models. 
 
This chapter empirically tested these hypotheses. Since the two studies (Elam 
(1975) and Lawrence and Bear (1986)) with which this study could be compared also 
used a matched-pair healthy sample and discriminant analysis, this was also the 
starting point of the underlying study. However, since both the matched-pair 
technique and discriminant analysis have their own disadvantages and haven’t 
been updated since the above-mentioned studies, the same models were also 
analysed using a full healthy sample and logit analysis. 
 
Use of the full healthy sample increases the classification accuracy of the financial-
distress prediction models significantly (in both the discriminant and the logit 
analysis). Comparison of the full healthy sample with the financially distressed 
sample in the univariate analysis revealed significantly higher (minimal at the 5% 
level) lease intensity for the financially distressed sample. This was true for all 
three lease-intensity measures used. The same conclusion would also have been 
drawn when the sample was limited to only the bankrupt companies in the sample. 
Therefore, the hypothesis that financially distressed companies use more operating 
leases cannot be rejected. This is in line with the debt hypothesis of Watts and 
Zimmerman (1986), who argued that companies closer to breaking their covenants 
more often choose operating leases than companies that do not have this 
characteristic (see chapters 6 and 7). This suggested that the lease-intensity 
measure might have predictive power in financial-distress prediction.  
 
The adjustment of the other explanatory variables in accordance with operating-
lease commitments did not alter the results of the univariate analysis; the same 
variables remained significant or not significant— not even the levels of significance 
changed. This suggested that the adjustment of the ratios would not improve the 
classification accuracy of the multivariate financial-distress prediction models.  
 
Comparison of the multivariate models using either discriminant analysis or logit 
analysis revealed that logit analysis showed higher classification accuracy than 
discriminant analysis. This improvement was not significant, however, although the 
arguments above could be used to show that the logit model using the full healthy 
sample provided the best results in the classification accuracies. The results of the 
univariate analysis suggest that the lease intensity might increase the classification 
accuracy, although the adjustment of the variables would not.  
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This was indeed the case. Model 4, using unadjusted variables but including the 
lease-intensity measure, showed the highest classification accuracy (93% correct 
predictions). In this model the lease-intensity measure was, indeed, significantly 
positively related to the financially distressed qualification. The increase in the 
classification accuracy is, however, not significant. Therefore, hypothesis 8.2, that 
including operating leases in financial-distress prediction improves the 
classification accuracy of such models, has to be rejected. This is in line with the 
results of Elam (1975) and Lawrence and Bear (1986).  
 
Therefore, although chapter 8 showed that the studies of Elam (1975) and Lawrence 
and Bear (1986) should be updated (particularly in light of the growing importance 
and disclosure of operating leases, and the financial-distress prediction approach 
used), their conclusions on one point remain the same: ‘the additional lease 
capitalisation does not improve the classification of bankruptcy prediction models’ 
(Lawrence and Bear, 1986, p.582). However, we take exception to the conclusion of 
Lawrence and Bear that ‘the usage and accounting treatment of leases by bankrupt 
companies is not an important distinction from their healthy counterparts’. 
Although classification accuracy has not significantly improved, the usage of 
operating leases does differ significantly between financially distressed- and 
healthy companies. However, the results of this study do alleviate the suspension of 
operating leases as a indicator of financial distress, the economic reasons to lease 
are as valuable for healthy companies as the accounting reason might be for 
financially distressed companies. 
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Appendix 9.I :Financially distressed sample and matched-pair sample 
last financial 
statement Financially distressed sample FD sic-code 
Not-financially distressed 
matched pairs 
1999 Baan Company  Taken over after substantial loss 73 Simac Techniek  
1999 Atag group Suspension of payment 36 Nederlands Apparatenfabriek  
1999 Alanheri  NI 3-yr negative 51 Amsterdam Commodities  
1999 Burgman Heybroek NI 3-yr negative 50 Econosto  
1999 Dico International NI 3-yr negative 50 Oranjewoud 
1999 EVC International  NI 3-yr negative 28 Fornix Biosciences  
1999 Begemann Koninklijke Groep Liquidated 67 HAL Trust  
1999 Management Share  Suspension of payment 73 ICT Automatisering  
1999 And International Publishers Suspension of payment 73 Brunel International 
1999 RING!ROSA PRODUCTS  Bankrupt 73 Hitt   
2000 HES-Beheer  NI 3-yr negative 42 Smit International 
2000 De Vries Robbe Groep  Suspension of payment 17 Batenburg Beheer 
2000 LCI Technology Bankrupt 73 Unit 4 Agresso  
2000 Pharming Group  Suspension of payment 80 Crucell  
2000 Toolex International  Bankrupt 35 Draka Holding  
2000 KPNQwest Bankrupt, NI 3-yr negative 73 PINKROCCADE  
2000 Koninklijke textielgroep Twenthe Bankrupt 23 Blydenstein-Willink  
2000 Landis Bankrupt 73 Athlon Holding  
2001 Getronics  NI 3-yr negative, neg Eq 73 USG People  
2001 Tie Holdings  NI 3-yr negative 73 Blue Fox Enterprises  
2001 Vedior  NI 3-yr negative 73 Randstad Holding  
2001 EMIS Bankrupt 87 Rood Testhouse  
2001 Laurus  Negative EQ  54 Schuitema  
2001 UPC Suspension of payment 29 TNT  
2001 Punch Technix  Negative EQ  35 Tulip Computers  
2001 CSS Bankrupt 48 Exact Holding  
2001 AINO  Bankrupt 73 Scala Business Solution 
2001 Versatel Telecom International Suspension of payment, negative eq 48 KPN 
2002 Asml Holding  NI 3-yr negative 35 ASM International  
2002 BE Semiconductor Industries NI 3-yr negative 35 Airspray   
2002 Qurius  NI 3-yr negative 50 Kendrion  
2002 Priority Telecom  NI 3-yr negative 48 NEW SKIES SATELLITES  
2002 Neways Electric International NI 3-yr negative 50 Eriks Group  
2002 Numico Negative EQ  20 CSM  
2002 Van heek-Tweka Bankrupt 23 McGregor Fashion Group  
2003 Vilenzo International  Suspension of payment 23 Ten cate 
2003 Exendis  NI 3-yr negative 36 Docdata  
2003 RT Company  Suspension of payment 73 Ctac   
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Appendix 9.II :Univariate analysis – matched pairs 
 
  Years prior to  financial distress n= 
Difference  
in mean t-statistic Sign   
Years prior to  
financial distress n= 
Difference 
in mean t-statistic Sign 
PVOL/TA -1 36 21.6% 0.944 ns TL/TA -1 37 18.9% 2.823 *** 
  -2 34 20.6% 0.761 ns   -2 37 0.8% 0.113 ns 
  -3 33 -5.6% -0.132 ns   -3 38 -0.3% -0.036 ns 
  -4 28 -73.8% -1.159 ns   -4 35 -1.3% -0.202 ns 
PVOL/TA-adj -1 36 19.9% 1.022 ns TL/TA-adj -1 36 17.5% 2.929 *** 
  -2 34 20.7% 0.929 ns   -2 34 4.9% 0.765 ns 
  -3 33 -12.3% -0.346 ns   -3 33 3.8% 0.584 ns 
  -4 28 -68.5% -1.367 ns   -4 28 -7.2% -1.084 ns 
PVOL/sales -1 36 47.0% 1.645 ns EBIT/TA -1 34 -148.4% -3.577 *** 
  -2 34 59.9% 2.058 *   -2 34 -2065.7% -1.983 * 
  -3 33 69.4% 1.751 ns   -3 34 -522.2% -1.425 ns 
  -4 28 -41.5% -0.799 ns   -4 32 -124.8% -0.712 ns 
CR -1 35 -49.9% -1.642 ns EBIT/TA-adj -1 33 -146.5% -3.34 *** 
  -2 35 6.8% 0.581 ns   -2 31 -524.3% -1.775 * 
  -3 35 21.1% 1.310 ns   -3 29 -408.6% -1.489 ns 
  -4 32 18.0% 1.254 ns   -4 26 -353.5% -1.023 ns 
CR-adj -1 21 -57.7% -1.333 ns NI/sales -1 37 11.9% 0.103 ns 
  -2 21 4.9% 0.305 ns   -2 38 -103.8% -2.195 ** 
  -3 20 21.2% 1.215 ns   -3 38 95.8% 0.733 ns 
  -4 15 26.1% 1.742 ns   -4 35 -23.3% -0.198 ns 
WC -1 35 -103.6% -1.925 ns CF/TL -1 37 -55.6% -0.431 ns 
  -2 35 5.9% 0.255 ns   -2 37 -346.6% -2.473 ** 
  -3 35 7.1% 0.311 ns   -3 38 -906.1% -2.064 ** 
  -4 32 11.0% 0.496 ns   -4 35 -3134.5% -0.956 ns 
WC-adj -1 33 -81.4% -1.611 ns CF/TL-adj -1 36 -64.4% -0.574 ns 
  -2 31 -6.9% -0.230 ns   -2 34 -487.3% -2.811 *** 
  -3 30 -0.9% -0.030 ns   -3 33 -696.0% -1.915 * 
  -4 25 31.0% 1.495 ns   -4 28 -567.5% -1.198 ns 
Sales/TA -1 37 -23.1% -2.383 ** CF/sales -1 37 26.7% 0.178 ns 
  -2 37 -19.1% -1.623 ns   -2 37 -137.1% -2.201 ** 
  -3 38 -37.1% -2.815 ***   -3 38 87.9% 0.743 ns 
  -4 35 -33.6% -2.648 **   -4 35 -21.3% -0.148 ns 
Sales/TA-adj -1 36 -29.2% -3.182 ** MVE/BVD -1 36 -147.4% -2.581 ** 
  -2 34 -18.2% -1.666 ns   -2 35 26.9% 1.025 ns 
  -3 33 -31.7% -2.621 **   -3 31 0.1% 0.005 ns 
  -4 28 -27.3% -2.506 **   -4 24 25.8% 0.722 ns 
EBIT/interest -1 33 -316.3% -3.366 *** MVE/BVD-adj -1 35 -107.1% -2.172 ** 
  -2 31 -80.8% -0.547 ns   -2 33 7.0% 0.279 ns 
  -3 32 3.4% 0.015 ns   -3 30 -3.9% -0.127 ns 
  -4 31 -267.4% -1.054 ns   -4 23 24.7% 0.623 ns 
EBIT/interest-adj -1 32 -215.9% -3.423 ***             
  -2 28 -1061.2% -2.209 **     
  -3 27 -133.6% -1.400 ns             
  -4 26 -385.6% -1.176 ns             
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CHAPTER 10 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
10.1 Introduction 
This study has explored whether the current lease-accounting standard provides 
useful information to the individual user of financial statements and what 
determines the choice of a company to choose operating leases. This study examined 
the operating-lease disclosures from two perspectives: the first investigates the 
operating-lease disclosures from the external user’s perspective, and the second 
investigates the operating-lease decision from the internal company’s management 
perspective. Both perspectives are useful investigations that may help standard 
setters decide whether the current lease-accounting standard should be revised. 
This is straightforward with regard to the usefulness of the lease-accounting 
standard, since this is an aim defined by the standard setters in their own 
framework. However, also the decision to use operating leases might be of interest 
for standard setters. As mentioned by Bowen (1999), ‘standard setters must 
understand the economic motives underlying accounting choices in order to 
determine how the flexibility allowed in financial reporting is being utilised’. While 
the management bankrupt or financially distressed companies might have 
additional motives in choosing operating leases, it was separately investigated 
whether these companies use relatively more operating leases than healthy 
companies. Therefore the study contained three main parts, addressing three 
research questions. The outline of the study was as follows; 
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The main research question was derived from the discussion between opponents 
and proponents of both the current lease-accounting standard as the proposed new 
lease-accounting standard. 
 
“While the on-balance treatment of operating leases has both many 
opponents as proponents, an intermediate solution might be acceptable 
for both sides: How can the current lease-accounting standard be 
improved? 
 
Whereas the intention of the introductorily part was to describe the setting and 
relevance of this study, the sub-research questions related to each of the parts II til’ 
IV were: 
1. Do the requirements of the current lease accounting standards regarding 
operating lease disclosures, result in useful information to individual users of 
the financial statements? 
 
2. What company characteristics determine whether a company has a high- or 
low- operating lease intensity? 
 
3. Do financial distressed companies have a higher operating-lease intensity 
than healthy companies? 
 
In this concluding chapter, the chapters 2 through 9 are summarised in section 
10.2. The conclusions will be described for each of research questions in section 
10.3.  concludes this study with recommendations for standards setters concerned 
with the lease-accounting standard. 
10.2 Summary  
Part I: Introduction 
Part I consisted of chapters 1 and 2, which described respectively the research 
proposal and the specific aspects of (operating) leases. Chapter 1 described the 
research proposal and the outline of the study. In addition, it placed this study in 
the accounting research spectrum.  Chapter 2 started with a general description of 
the history of leasing, the reasons why companies choose leasing and how 
(operating) leases relate to other corporate liabilities. This was followed by a 
description of the legal aspects of leasing as a financing source and a summary of 
the legal status of the accounting standards. Leasing is not explicitly mentioned in 
Dutch law, which only refer to rental-, hire purchase- or leasehold agreements as 
legally defined agreements. These were later included as the legal agreements that 
fall within the boundaries of the lease-accounting standard. Until 2005, the Dutch 
accounting standards were not legally binding guidelines, but merely authoritative 
opinions of an influential private group. This has changed for the Dutch listed 
companies, since they are from 2005 obliged to adapt IFRS. For non-listed 
companies, however, the guidelines are still not legally binding. The compliance 
with IFRS by listed companies will also be supervised in the near future, thanks to 
two new supervision laws that will become effective. 
 
Chapter 2 proceeded to show that although the intention of the current 
international accounting standards is the same, the harmonisation between the 
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standards is not yet complete. Three differences cannot be ignored. First is the 
difference between the disclosure requirements (annual payment) of SSAP21 in the 
UK and those required (total commitments) by the DASB in the Netherlands, by 
FASB in the US and by the IASB. The second difference has to do with the 
quantitative criteria of FAS13 and RJ292 versus the qualitative criteria of IAS17 
and SSAP21. Finally, the 90% rule applied by both RJ292 and FAS14 may lead to 
different outcomes between these two standards, since they use a different measure 
of the fair value of the leased asset.  
 
The differences between financial- and operating leases were also extensively 
described in chapter 2. The main difference, of course, has to do with the differences 
between the on-balance recognition for financial leases and the off-balance 
disclosure of operating leases. Whether this difference is a sensible distinction 
continues to be the subject of many discussions. The current lease-accounting 
standard has many opponents arguing that the classification is arbitrary. However, 
the difference between financial- and operating leases also has to do with the way 
the commitments are presented. While financial leases are recognised for their 
present value (excluding the interest part), for operating leases the full nominal 
commitments have to be disclosed (including the interest part).  
 
Although the first proposal to change the current lease-accounting standard dates 
from 1996, and was updated in 2000, in July 2006 the boards of both the IASB and 
the FASB voted to add (again) to their agendas the issue of lease accounting. 
However, the comments received on the 2000 reports of IASB and FASB suggest 
that although the risk/reward approach is often perceived as unsatisfactory, there is 
also no overwhelming support for the proposed asset/liability approach.  
 
Chapter 2 concluded with the description of leasing volume in the Netherlands and 
throughout the world. Leasing, it was shown, has grown enormously, and operating 
leases are by far the dominant leasing type for the Dutch listed companies. This is 
in line with the situation in the US and the UK. However, it also became clear that 
the amount of (operating) leases in the Netherlands is not easy to ascertain, and 
many leasing activities are executed beyond the sights of organised leasing 
associations.  
 
Part II: The usefulness of the lease-accounting standard regarding the operating-lease 
disclosures 
Part II consisted of chapters 3, 4 and 5, and investigated the decision usefulness of 
the operating leases disclosed in the financial statement. Chapter 3 described the 
qualitative criteria of information disclosed in the financial statement, as laid down 
in the conceptual framework of the accounting standard setters. These criteria, 
which should lead in the end to a true and fair view of the financial position and 
performance of a company, include understandability, relevance, reliability and 
comparability. It was shown that each of these criteria also relates to the disclosure 
of operating leases. However, due to the off-balance-sheet character of operating 
leases, these commitments are often neglected, and this affects the financial ratios 
utilised by the users of the financial statements. Since for the operating leases the 
total nominal commitments are disclosed, whereas the present value is recognised 
for financial leases, an on-balance equivalent has to be calculated for the operating 
leases. Therefore, chapter 4 compared seven lease-capitalisation approaches to each 
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other; six derived from previous studies and one improved approach developed in 
this study. The improvement of the approach used in this study is that the other 
approaches depreciate the leased asset using a depreciation schedule that does not 
follow the payment schedule of the lease commitments. This does not reflect best 
the difference between the lease liability and the leased asset, while the difference 
becomes bigger than reasonable. In this study, the depreciation pattern of the 
leased assets closely follows the repayment schedule of the lease commitments and 
this is a better reflection of the reality. 
 
Chapter 5 analysed the impact of the capitalisation of operating leases on key 
financial ratios, and tested the sensitivity of the capitalisation to the assumption of 
the interest rate used for discounting the remaining life and to the capitalisation 
approach used. The results showed some remarkable results. 
• Still in 2004, 36% of the companies that disclosed operating leases did not 
comply with the accounting standard; this harms the reliability and the 
comparability criteria of decision usefulness, since these financial statements 
are neither neutral nor consistent, nor can they be compared with those of 
other companies. Whether the commitments are relevant cannot be defined. 
• For at least 45% of the companies for which the lease commitments could be 
capitalised, these commitments were of a material amount— and this makes 
the information relevant. 
• Due to the sensitivity of the capitalisation to changes in the assumptions on 
the interest rate, remaining life and chosen capitalisation approach, the 
disclosed information on operating leases is not sufficiently complete, which 
threatens the reliability criterion of decision usefulness.  
• The comparability criterion of the disclosed operating-lease commitments is 
at stake, due not only to the statistically significant impact the capitalisation 
has on key financial ratios, but also to the sensitivity to the assumptions and 
the non-compliance with the accounting standard by many companies. 
 
Part III: The determinants of the operating-lease decision  
Part III consisted of chapters 6 and 7, and addressed the decision to use operating 
leases. This part investigated which company characteristics determine a 
company’s choice for operating leases instead of other financing forms. The choice 
for operating leases might be driven by an accounting reason to lease or by an 
economic reason to lease. The accounting reason to lease falls within the area of the 
accounting choice literature, which was described at the beginning of chapter 6. It 
was shown that accounting choices are closely linked to the positive accounting 
theory (investigating whether accounting does matter) and the financial contracting 
theory (investigating what the imperfections are in the financial markets that make 
the financial structure matter). Especially agency-related conflicts (internal 
conflicts such as bonus plans and external conflicts such as debt covenants) were 
described. The decision to use operating leases is not only limited to the accounting 
reasons, however, as was shown also in chapter 2. Avoiding risks attached to the 
economic ownership, flexibility and tax reasons are also important drivers of the 
lease decision. Several studies have investigated this issue, and these were 
described in chapter 6. Some remarks could be made on these studies: 
• Many studies ignored the difference between financial- and operating leases, 
and the focus was on financial leases. However, some of the determinants 
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related especially to operating leases (shifting tax shields or preserving debt 
capacity), and investigation of the relation with financial leases seems 
meaningless. 
• Most studies ignored the impact that the decision to use operating leases has 
on the determinants. This caused endogenous variables and conclusions to be 
opposite to what is true. This was illustrated with an example (Figure 6.1). 
 
Related to the literature review of previous studies investigating this subject, 
chapter 6 formulated hypotheses that were tested in chapter 7. Ten possible 
determinants were chosen and their relation with the operating-lease intensity was 
evaluated using both univariate analysis and regression models. Lease intensity 
was measured by both a relative measure (the ratio of capitalised operating leases 
to total assets) and a dichotomous lease dummy (one if a high-leasing company and 
zero if a low- or non-leasing company). The regression models were respectively 
linear regression models or logit regression models. In the univariate analysis also 
endogenous variables (before- and after the operating leases are capitalised) were 
tested to show the impact operating leases might have on this analysis. In the 
regression, an exogenous variable was chosen for each of the determinants 
(leverage, size, performance, growth, investment opportunity, capital intensity, tax, 
management compensation, ownership concentration, and industry). This was not 
possible for the determinants leverage and investment opportunity (market-to-book 
value of equity). Each regression was therefore tested with leverage and market-to-
book value of equity, once with the operating leases adjusted and once without. The 
results showed the following: 
• The determinants with a positive significant relationship with the operating-
lease intensity were leverage after lease-capitalisation, size, ownership 
concentration and ‘trade’ companies.  
• The determinants with a negative significant relationship were leverage 
before lease-capitalisation, performance (earnings per share), and labour 
intensity.  
• The results are consistent with the debt hypothesis that companies closer to 
breaching their debt covenants will lease more. The bonus-plan hypothesis 
and the political-cost hypothesis were rejected, although with respect to the 
bonus-plan hypothesis the univariate analysis was consistent with this 
hypothesis. Further research could be worthwhile. 
 
Part IV: Operating leases in financial-distress prediction models 
Part IV investigated whether including the operating-lease commitments in 
financial-distress prediction models would increase the classification accuracy of 
these models. The classification accuracy measures the percentages of correctly 
classified companies in either one of the two categories (healthy or financially 
distressed). This study is relevant for three reasons: first, no such study on this 
subject has been conducted since the early studies of Elam (1975) and of Lawrence 
and Bear in 1986; second, since these studies were conducted, statistical approaches 
(in methods and in sample selection) have been updated; third, the importance of 
operating leases and the frequency of their disclosure have been increasing (see 
chapter 2). The results of the previous chapters have indicated that operating leases 
might be a useful tool in financial-distress prediction. The impact of ignoring 
operating leases, shown in the comparison of companies in chapters 3, 4 and 5, is 
likely to be applicable also when comparing bankrupt- with healthy companies. 
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Also, the debt hypothesis, that companies choose operating leases when they are 
closer to breaching their covenants, was described in chapter 6 and confirmed in 
chapter 7.  
 
In chapter 8 two hypotheses were formulated: the first hypothesising that 
financially distressed companies use more operating leases than healthy companies 
do, and the second hypothesising that adding operating leases to a financial-distress 
prediction model increases the classification accuracy of the model. Sixteen models 
were constructed. Different models addressed the differences in sample selection, 
the differences between methods, and, of course, the differences between models 
with- or without the capitalised operating leases added to the model. A full healthy 
sample outperformed, in a statistically significantly way, the matched-pair sample. 
Logit analysis, although showing higher classification accuracy, did not show 
significantly better classification accuracy than the discriminant analysis.  
 
Based on the superiority of the full healthy sample, the results are consistent with 
the first hypothesis (that financially distressed companies use relatively more 
operating leases than healthy companies). The financially distressed companies 
used significantly (at least 5% significance) more operating leases than the healthy 
sample. However, since the classification accuracy did not improve when adding the 
capitalised operating leases to the model, the second hypothesis was rejected. 
Although the improvement of the classification accuracy did not significantly 
improve, the best-predicting model (93% correctly classified) was the logit model 
including the not-for-leases-adjusted variables but including the lease intensity 
PVOL/TA ratio (which was one out of four variables with significant explanatory 
power). This is in line with the univariate analysis of the difference between the 
financially distressed- and healthy companies. 
10.3 Conclusions and Recommendations 
Chapters 1 and 2’s (part I) particular aim was to demonstrate the relevance of the 
underlying study. The conclusions drawn from chapter 1 and 2 are: 
• No full harmonisation yet of the lease-accounting standard internationally; 
• Difference between financial- and operating leases not only in balance-sheet 
recognition but also in amount (present value of lease commitments as 
opposed to nominal commitments) to be disclosed; 
• A new lease-accounting standard to recognise all leases on the balance sheet 
is an ongoing debate, with no solution expected in the short term; 
• Leasing has become a major financing source throughout the world, which is 
mainly attributable to operating leases 
 
Therefore, the intention of the IASB and FASB to jointly proceed on the lease-
accounting project seems a sensible decision. The difference between operating- and 
financial lease may even seem bigger due to the differences between the disclosure 
requirements of both leasing types. The opponents to a new lease accounting 
approach to recognise all leases on the balance sheet are many, and not only the 
parties that will be most affected (lessees and the leasing industry). The importance 
of the operating leases as opposed to financial lease indicates a major impact on the 
leasing business. Also, as mentioned by several opponents of the proposed lease-
accounting standard, the recognition of all leases will place an undue requirement 
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on a lessee to recognise asset used, but not controlled, by the company. Therefore, 
maintaining the current lease-accounting standard, but improved, might me a 
welcome compromise between the opponents and the proponents of both 
alternatives. From the conclusions and recommendation following from the next 
parts, it may become clear whether this is achievable. 
 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 (Part II) investigated whether: ‘the requirements of the current 
lease accounting standards regarding operating lease disclosures, result in useful 
information to individual users of the financial statements. These chapters showed 
that the decision usefulness of the current lease-accounting standard is at stake, 
since the required disclosure is insufficiently complete and compliance with the 
accounting standard is often ignored and not (yet) supervised. The answer to the 
first research question is therefore negative. The conclusions of chapters 3, 4 and 5 
are: 
• Non-compliance harms the reliability criterion of useful information; 
compliance with the accounting standards must be enforced by law and 
carried out through supervisors. 
• Operating-lease information is relevant information, and financial 
statement users should consider this information when making decisions 
on individual companies. 
• The information disclosed is insufficiently complete. Capitalisation is 
sensitive to the choices and assumptions of an individual financial 
statement user, which renders the information disclosed unreliable. The 
disclosure of the present value of the operating-lease commitments would 
solve this capitalisation problem. This would also create harmony between 
financial and operating leases, since for financial leases the present value 
is disclosed.  
• The comparability between companies will be enhanced if all operating-
lease commitments are taken into account in the financial analysis of a 
company; the disclosure of the operating-lease information should for that 
purpose be neutral (compliance with the standard) and reliable (present-
value disclosure instead of nominal values). 
 
The requirement in the lease accounting standards to disclose the nominal 
operating lease commitments, with no additional information on implicit interest 
rate (or the alternative costs of debt), and no information on remaining and total 
lives, leaves the user of the financial statements with the trouble of making certain 
assumptions in order to estimate the capitalised operating-lease commitments. By 
not estimating the on-balance equivalent of the operating-leases the user of the 
financial statement would miss serious liabilities, while the operating-lease 
commitments are often of a material amount. From that perspective, the statement 
of former SEC-chairman Levitt (2003) that (operating-) lease financing distort the 
financial picture is correct (see the prologue of this thesis). Furthermore, he stated: 
‘markets and their participant will disciple themselves, but only if they have 
accurate information’. Part II also showed that the information is not accurate. Not 
only because the requirements of the lease-accounting standards are incomplete 
and capitalisation is sensitive to the assumptions made, but also because a great 
part of the financial statements do not comply with the requirements of the 
accounting standard and disclose even less information than required. 
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Therefore, the current lease-accounting standards which allow the off-balance sheet 
disclosure of operating leases can only be maintained if additional information is 
provided to the user of the financial statements. To my opinion, the information 
disclosed is only sufficiently complete, when the required disclosure of the 
operating-lease commitments disclosed are equal to the required recognition- and 
disclosure of the financial lease commitments. I recommend, therefore, that the 
accounting standard setters require the disclosure of the present value of the 
operating-lease commitments instead of the total nominal commitments.  
 
Furthermore, the information disclosed should be reliable, and here I see a task for 
different parties in the process of informing the individual user of the financial 
statements. First, each individual company should give priority to reliable financial 
statements and consider the importance of this information to the user of the 
financial statements. They should comply with the accounting standards in order to 
enhance the consistency of financial statements. Second, auditors should ascertain 
themselves that indeed the financial statements of these companies comply with the 
accounting standards. Third, as suggested by the results of this study the 
supervision on the compliance with the accounting standard is essential if the 
previous mentioned parties do not fulfil their task as recommended. Finally, I see a 
task for the intermediaries to users of the financial statements, such as financial 
databases and financial analysts publishing financial reports. If their intention is to 
provide their clients with a complete overview of the financial situation and 
performance of a company, they cannot ignore the impact operating-lease have on 
the financial ratios. Therefore, they should incorporate at least a leverage-ratio that 
is adjusted for operating-lease in order to facilitate the users who rely on their 
information. 
 
Chapters 6 and 7 (part III) investigated the second research question, ‘what 
company characteristics determine whether a company has a high- or low- 
operating lease intensity’. The answer to this question is that companies with the 
following characteristics have a higher operating-lease intensity: higher leverage, 
bigger in size, higher capital-intensity, (or lower labour-intensity), higher 
concentration of ownership, lower performance, and/or active in the trade-sector. As 
mentioned in chapter 1, the results of this chapter may facilitate standard setters to 
understand the economic or accounting motives to choose lease in order to 
determine how the flexibility of the lease accounting standard is being used. The 
determinants that relate to the off-balance treatment offered by the lease 
accounting standard are often considered to be the ‘accounting reasons’ to lease, the 
other determinants are then the ‘economic reasons’ to lease87.  However, the off-
balance treatment of operating leases is a result of the underlying question of who 
is the economic owner of the asset. As shown in Figure 2.1 one of the characteristics 
of operating lease as opposed to other corporate liabilities, but also to financial 
leases, is the separation of the economic-, from the legal-ownership of an asset.  The 
current lease accounting standards is based on this distinction, but is now 
considered to be arbitrary and misleading. One might argue that at the time leasing 
became an attractive financing form, the lease accounting standard provided for 
                                                          
87 Beware, this does not relate to the determinant (effective tax rate) relating to the fiscal operating-lease 
qualification: the purpose of shifting tax shields from lessee to lessor may result in a financial advantage and is 
considered to be an economic reason to lease. 
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regulation that both addressed the economic reasons to choose operating leases as 
the wish for useful information in the financial statements. The economic reasons to 
choose operating leases (in addition to economic reasons to choose leases that also 
relate to financial leases) related then to evading the risk of economic ownership 
and the wish for useful information required the disclosure of the total operating 
lease commitments.  
 
However, the off-balance treatment of operating leases as a result of the distinction 
between the legal and economic ownership of the asset, became a purpose in itself 
and probably contributed to the substantial growth of the leasing industry. The 
results of chapter 7 showed that this true; improving the leverage ratio is an 
significant determinant in the lease decision. This might be a reason for standard 
setters to decide that the current lease accounting standard misses its goals and 
should be adjusted. However, chapter 7 also showed that the economic reason to 
choose operating leases, using an asset but not controlling nor bearing the risk of 
ownership are still important reasons to choose operating leases. Avoiding the risk 
of obsolescence may be the reasons why closely held companies, trade companies, 
companies with many fixed assets, and companies that experience past growth 
choose more often operating leases than companies without these characteristics 
may.  
 
The elimination of the off-balance treatment of operating leases will not lead to the 
end of the leasing-industry; although chapter 2 showed that the majority of the 
leases are operating leases, chapter 7 showed that this is not only attributable to 
the off-balance treatment. Reasons to lease that can also be achieved by financial 
leases are for example flexibility, or tax reasons.  
 
The question that now remains is whether the separation between the economic and 
legal-ownership of the asset should still lead to a distinction between financial and 
operating-leases (i.e.on- or off-balance), or that the elimination of the accounting 
reason to choose operating leases, has a higher priority. In line with the arguments 
of the DASB, to my opinion assets that are used but not controlled by a company 
should not be recognised on the balance sheet. A greater emphasis should be on the 
notes to the financial statements, which are still an integral part of these financial 
statements. The information there disclosed should be reliable, and easy to 
interpret by the user of the financial statements. As soon as the disclosures of 
operating leases are really transparent, and it becomes common usage to indeed 
take these commitments into account when analysing a company, the current lease-
accounting standard may still reflect best the risk of ownership attached to the 
assets and the accounting reason to lease may become less interesting for 
companies taking advantage of the standard. 
 
Chapters 8 and 9 (Part IV) questioned ‘whether financial-distress prediction models 
improve when operating lease are included in these models’. The answer to this 
question is that financial-distress prediction models do not significantly improve. 
However, when comparing the operating lease-intensity of companies in financial 
distress to healthy companies, the financially distressed companies do use on 
average more operating leases. The last part of this study is more or less an 
extended study on the previous question of the distinguishing characteristics of 
companies that choose more often operating lease than other companies do. 
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Whereas the previous chapters 6 and 7 showed already that both the accounting- as 
the economic reasons determine the choice for operating leases, the underlying 
chapter 8 and 9 address a similar issue. When financial-distress prediction models 
improve when operating leases are added to the list of explanatory variables, this 
might confirm the idea of operating lease as a way of improving ratios or avoiding 
debt covenants, instead of operating leases as a sensible economic decisions. 
 
The results were in line with the results of chapter 6 and 7,  
• Financially distressed companies use relatively more operating leases, 
• Operating-lease commitments do not significantly improve financial-distress 
prediction models,  
• Differences between financial ratios between these two groups of companies 
are not significantly altered when operating leases are taken into account. 
 
This leads to the conclusion that in line with previous Part III operating leases have 
advantages for all kinds of companies, but also have specific features that make the 
financial contract interesting for financially distressed companies. Avoiding the risk 
attached to the ownership of an asset will also have additional advantages for 
financially distressed companies. Again the standard setters should ask themselves 
which lease-accounting best reflects the distinction between assets owned and 
assets used by a company, and whether elimination of the off-balance treatment is 
of greater importance than maintaining the distinction in risks attached to the 
financial contract. 
 
Some remarks on the results in an international context 
The major part of the conclusions and recommendations as formulated above are 
not exclusive to the Dutch situation but also apply internationally. As shown in 
chapter 2 the intentions and basic principles of the lease-accounting standards 
internationally dictated (FAS13, IAS17, SSAP21) are similar with some differences 
in the formulation.  Furthermore, chapter 2 showed that leases have become a 
major financing source worldwide, mainly attributable to operating leases. The 
difficulties in capitalising operating leases and the impact on financial ratios were 
also found in international studies in the USA, the UK, Canada, and New Zealand. 
From this perspective, users of the financial statements in the USA have somewhat 
more detailed information, whereas in the UK the information is even less 
transparent to be able to estimate the capitalised value of the operating leases. The 
requirement of the present value of the operating leases in the footnotes to the 
financial statements would therefore be an improvement for all lease-accounting 
standards worldwide. 
 
However, the Netherlands has some distinguishing features, which could have 
resulted in different results of the different parts if investigated in other countries. 
First, as described in chapter 2, in the Netherlands tax rules have little effect on 
financial accounting, which differs from other European countries but is in line with 
the USA and the UK (Nobes (2000)). This would presume that in counties were tax-
rules dominate the accounting rules it will even be more troublesome to change the 
current risk/reward-approach to the asset/liability-approach while consensus must 
be reached with the tax authorities. The recommended intermediate step in lease 
accounting to provide the present value of the operating leases in the footnotes 
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(increased transparency and reliability) might even be more appreciated in these 
countries. Also the result of chapter 7 that for the Dutch sample the effective tax-
rate does not determine the operating-lease choice, might be caused by the 
separation of the tax- and accounting-rules. As put forward by Nobes (2000, p.32), 
‘the treatment of taxation constitutes a major example of differences in financial 
reporting’. Furthermore, the results that a great part of Dutch listed companies did 
not comply with the accounting standard (chapter 5) are a consequence of the non-
legal binding of the Dutch accounting standard. Also the absence until recently of 
for example an institution as the SEC to supervise the compliance with the 
standard, indicate that these results are not expected in other countries as well.  
10.4 Final remarks  
This thesis addressed operating-lease disclosures. It investigated whether the 
information disclosed is useful to the users of the financial statements and if the off-
balance sheet character of the operating leases makes it a desirable financing form 
due to dubious, accounting, reasons. Although, the latter cannot be denied, several 
sensible, economic, reasons to lease are also apparent and although financially- 
distressed companies lease on average more than healthy companies, when taking 
other variables into account operating lease have no predictive power in predicting 
financial distress. Also, the information disclosed in the financial statements are 
maybe not optimal, but this can be fairly easy be recovered by requiring the present 
value to be disclosed. 
 
To my opinion, the user of the financial statement is best served with a transparent, 
reliable disclosure in the notes to the financial statements of the operating-lease 
commitments. This will enhance the comparability between companies but will also 
reflect the differences in the risks attached to the economic ownership that now 
distinguish financial- from operating leases. Indeed this leads to the maintenance of 
the often criticised arbitrary distinction between operating leases and financial 
leases, it still allows companies to structure a lease contract is such a way that it 
will be treated off-balance. However, the increased transparency by disclosing the 
present value of the operating lease commitments (in line with the requirement of 
financial leases recognised on the balance sheet) should result in less ‘abuse’ of the 
lease-accounting standard. Furthermore, often quoted by opponents of the 
recognition of operating leases on the balance sheet, the recognition of operating 
lease on the balance sheet will also lead to financial structures that avoid a too high 
burden on the balance sheet. The question is whether this provides more reliable 
and transparent information, and whether this forces companies to choose financial 
contracts that less optimal (for example by evading long-term commitments). 
 
Therefore, recalling the quotes of the former chairmen of both the SEC and the 
DASB in the prologue of this thesis and the questions they asked the answers are; 
yes, lease financing distort the financial picture, and no, market participants do not 
have sufficiently accurate information, but additional requirement will address 
(some of) the problems with the existing standard. The disclosure of the operating-
lease commitments in a transparent and consistent way will give the user of the 
financial statement a more reliable view of the financial position and performance 
of a company than the recognition on the balance sheet of assets the company does 
not own, nor control. 
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NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING (DUTCH SUMMARY) 
 
In dit proefschrift is de informatie betreffende operationele leases in de toelichting op 
de jaarrekening van ondernemingen onderzocht. De informatie over operationele 
leases in de toelichting op de jaarrekening wordt voorgeschreven door de lease-
accounting standaarden, zoals in Nederland de Richtlijn 292 van de Raad voor de 
Jaarverslaggeving (RJ292), Internationaal de International Accounting Standard No. 
17 (IAS17), en in de Verenigde Staten de Financial Accounting Standard No. 13 
(FAS13). De huidige lease accounting standaarden maken een onderscheid tussen 
financiële- en operationele lease op basis van wie (lessor of lessee) substantieel de 
risico’s en de opbrengsten samenhangend met het eigendom van een (geleasd) actief 
draagt; is dit de lessee (de gebruiker van het actief) dan is het een financiële lease en 
is het de lessor (de verhuurder van het actief) dan kwalificeert de lease zich als een 
operationele lease. Er wordt daarmee een onderscheid gemaakt tussen financiële en 
operationele lease op basis van het economisch eigendom van het actief; het juridisch 
eigendom ligt in beide gevallen bij de lessor. Als gevolg van dit onderscheid wordt een 
financiële lease als een actief respectievelijk een schuld op de balans van de lessee 
verantwoord en worden de onopzegbare toekomstige operationele leaseverplichtingen 
vermeld in de toelichting op de jaarrekening (‘off-balance’). De kwalificatie als 
financiële-, danwel operationele lease heeft derhalve consequenties voor onder 
andere de schuldverhouding en het balanstotaal van een onderneming. 
Tegenstanders van de scheiding tussen financiële- en operationele leases 
beargumenteren dat de scheiding arbitrair is en dat leaseovereenkomsten veelal 
gestructureerd worden om zo deze langlopende, onopzegbare, verplichtingen niet op 
te hoeven nemen op de balans. De International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) 
en de Amerikaanse Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) zijn daarom beide 
in 2000 met een voorstel gekomen om geen onderscheid meer te maken tussen 
financiële- en operationele leases, en alle leases op de balans te verantwoorden (IASB 
(2000) en Lennard en Nailor (2000)). Deze voorstellen hebben vooralsnog niet tot een 
veranderende regelgeving geleid; mogelijk gebeurt dit wel in de nabije toekomst 
aangezien in juli 2006 beide instanties het onderwerp opnieuw op de agenda hebben 
gezet, en daar ditmaal een hoge prioriteit aan hebben toegekend.  
 
Off-balance financiering heeft sinds het faillissement van Enron88 in 2001 een 
verhoogde interesse. Volgens de voormalig topman Arthur Levitt van de Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) dienen de SEC en beleggers zich sinds dit 
faillissement af te vragen ‘of het ondernemingen wel moet worden toegestaan om 
miljarden aan off-balance verplichtingen, zoals lease-verplichtingen, buiten de balans 
te houden. Hij betoogt dat deze off-balance verplichtingen het financiële plaatje 
verstoren en dat financiële markten en haar participanten dit wellicht kunnen 
doorzien maar slechts dan als ze voldoende informatie hebben’  (Levitt (2003)). Aan 
de andere kant betoogt de Nederlandse Raad voor de Jaarverslaggeving (RvJ) dat als 
alle leases op de balans vermeld zouden moeten worden, dit vereist dat lessees activa 
op de balans moeten vermelden die ze wel gebruiken maar die ze niet controleren. De 
RvJ suggereert vervolgens dat de huidige standaard wellicht in stand kan worden 
gehouden als het wordt aangepast met additionele vereisten89. 
                                                          
88 Enron ging in 2001 failliet door onder meer honderden special purpose entities (SPE’s) die onder US GAAP niet 
geconsolideerd hoefden te worden (dus ook off-balance) en waarvan achteraf gezegd werd dat deze SPE’s misleidend 
waren. 
89 Voorzitter van de RvJ, Johan van Helleman in een reactie van 3 augstus 2000 naar aanleiding van het voorstel van 
de IASB (2000) om alle lease op de balans te verantwoorden. Zie hiervoor ook paragraaf 2.5. 
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Bovenstaande meningen weerspiegelen de discussie tussen de voor- en tegenstanders 
van de huidige-, maar ook de voorgestelde-, lease accounting standaard. Dit 
proefschrift probeert een bijdrage te leveren aan deze discussie door met empirisch 
onderzoek de omvang-, het gebruik-, het doel- en de informatie- omtrent operationele 
leases te beschrijven.  De vragen die in dit proefschrift onderzocht worden zijn aan 
het bovenstaande ontleend: Verstoren de operationele leaseverplichtingen inderdaad 
de financiële analyse van een onderneming? Hebben de participanten op de 
financiële markten voldoende informatie om hiervoor te corrigeren? Kunnen de 
tekortkomingen opgelost worden door additionele eisen aan de informatie in de 
toelichting te stellen? En tenslotte, waarom kiezen ondernemingen voor operationele 
leases: is de accounting reden om te leasen hier doorslaggevend? 
 
De centrale probleemstelling van dit proefschrift is daarom afgeleid van de discussie 
tussen voor- en tegenstanders van het passiveren cq activeren van operationele 
leases, waaronder de hiervoor beschreven uitlatingen van de SEC en de RvJ, en 
luidt: 
“Aangezien het op de balans vermelden van operationele leases zowel vele 
voor- als tegenstanders kent, is wellicht een tussenoplossing acceptabel 
voor beide partijen: Hoe kan de huidige lease-accounting standaard 
worden verbeterd?   
 
Het onderzoek bestaat uit vijf delen (inclusief een inleidend en afsluitend deel), 
waarbij elke deel één onderzoeksvraag betreft.  
 
1. Resulteren de vereisten onder de huidige lease accounting standaarden 
met betrekking tot operationele leases in nuttige informatie voor de 
individuele gebruiker van de jaarrekening?  
2. Welke karakteristieken van ondernemingen bepalen of een onderneming 
een hoge- of een lage- operationele lease intensiteit heeft? 
3. Gebruiken ondernemingen met een naderend faillissement relatief meer 
operationele leases dan gezonde ondernemingen? 
Deze zijn weergegeven in onderstaande figuur. In het navolgende zal per deel een 
samenvatting van de uitkomsten worden gegeven. 
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Deel I 
Deel I van dit proefschrift is een inleidend deel met als doel de actualiteit en de 
relevantie van het onderzoek (hoofdstuk 1) en daarnaast de leasing in het algemeen 
(hoofdstuk 2) te beschrijven.  
 
Hoofdstuk 2 toont de bijzonderheden en verschillen van operationele lease ten 
opzichte van andere financieringvormen waaronder financiële leases, zowel vanuit 
juridisch, fiscaal en accounting perspectief, als in omvang. De bijzondere 
karakteristieken van operationele lease maken deze financieringsvorm interessant 
omwille van zowel economische redenen (belastingvoordeel, gemak, uitsluiten van 
vroegtijdige veroudering, flexibiliteit) als om accounting technische redenen (schuld 
buiten de balans houden en daarmee financiële ratios beïnvloeden). Hoofdstuk 2 laat 
zien dat civielrechtelijk een wettelijke definitie van leasing niet voorkomt in 
Nederland, maar dat het een verzamelnaam is van contracten met dezelfde 
karakteristieken. Deze karakteristieken zijn dat één partij (de lessor) aan een andere 
partij (de lessee) gedurende een bepaalde periode een actief ter beschikking stelt met 
als tegenprestatie een serie betalingen. De inhoud van het contract bepaalt de 
civielrechtelijke status van de lease, oftewel een huurovereenkomst (art.7:201 BW), 
een huurkoop (art.7A:1576h BW) of een pachtovereenkomst (art.1.1 Pachtwet). 
Vanuit juridisch perspectief is nog van belang dat de leaseregels tot 2005 niet 
wettelijke verankerd waren. Vanaf 1 januari 2005 is dit voor de Nederlandse 
beursfondsen gewijzigd en zijn zij wettelijk verplicht de International Financial 
Reporting Standards toe te passen90. 
 
In hoofdstuk 2 is vervolgens aangetoond dat de huidige lease accounting standaarden 
voorgeschreven in Nederland (RJ292 en IAS1791), in de Verenigde Staten (FAS13), en 
in het Verenigd Koninkrijk (SSAP21) in grote lijnen op hetzelfde neerkomen, maar er 
toch nog geen sprake is van volledig geharmoniseerde voorschriften. Zo wordt om te 
bepalen of het economische eigendom van het actief bij de lessor of de lessee ligt, 
kwantitatieve criteria gehanteerd door RJ292 (als indicatie) en FAS13 ( als ‘bright 
line-test’)92, terwijl IAS17 kwalitatieve criteria hanteert (termen als ‘substantieel’ en 
‘grootste gedeelte’). Verder vereist SSAP21 slechts de weergave van de 
leaseverplichting voor het komende jaar, terwijl RJ292, IAS17 en FAS13 de totale 
toekomstige leaseverplichtingen vereisen.  
 
Ook de fiscus maakt een onderscheid tussen financiële- en operationele lease, en net 
als in de RJ292 wordt het onderscheid bepaald door wie de economische eigenaar is 
van het actief. De economische eigenaar activeert het actief en schrijft hierover af, of 
is gerechtigd tot eventuele fiscale regelingen. Dit kan een motief zijn om een 
operationele lease aan te gaan om zo fiscale voordelen aan de lessor over te dragen 
(als economisch eigenaar) indien de lessee onvoldoende belastingcapaciteit heeft (zie 
ook Lückerath (1998)). Zo heeft in Nederland bijvoorbeeld de WIR-premie geleid tot 
een groei van operationele leases in de 70-er en 80-er jaren (Bruins Slot (1994)). De 
kwalificatie criteria volgens de RJ292 en de Leaseregeling 2000 wijken enigszins van 
elkaar af en volgens het Ministerie van Justitie is het ook geen doel op zichzelf om de 
                                                          
90 Tweede Kamer, 2002, publicatienummer 28 220, nr. 1,2. 
91 Standaard van de IASB en sinds 2005 in Nederland verplicht voor beursfondsen. 
92 Deze (indicatieve) kwantitatieve criteria zijn: een lease is een financiële lease als de looptijd van de lease langer is 
dan 75% van de economische levensduur van het actief, en als de contante waarde van de toekomstige leasebetalingen 
hoger is dan 90% van de reële waarde van het actief. 
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regelgeving op dit gebied te harmoniseren (Vereniging voor Belastingwetenschap 
(2001)). 
 
Zoals beschreven leidt het onderscheid tussen financiële- en operationele lease tot 
verplichtingen die ofwel als schuld gepassiveerd en als actief geactiveerd zijn op de 
balans (financiële lease) ofwel alleen vermeld staan in de toelichting op de 
jaarrekening (operationele lease). Daarnaast dient voor een financiële lease de 
periodieke leasebetalingen gesplitst te worden in een rente- en aflossingdeel, en 
wordt op de balans en in de toelichting de contante waarde van de financiële 
leaseverplichtingen opgenomen. In de winst- en verliesrekening van de lessee wordt 
vervolgens het rentedeel opgenomen en wordt een afschrijvingslast opgenomen. Dit 
in tegenstelling tot een operationele lease waarbij de gehele leasebetaling in de 
winst- en verliesrekening wordt verantwoord en geen onderscheid wordt gemaakt 
tussen rente- en aflossing. Dit heeft voor operationele leases bovendien tot gevolg dat 
in de toelichting de totale nominale toekomstige leaseverplichtingen vermeld dienen 
te worden, dus zonder onderscheid in aflossing- of rente-deel. De gevolgen hiervan 
worden in hoofdstuk 4 en 5 beschreven. Een analyse van de 27 ‘comment letters’ die 
de IASB ontving na hun voorstel uit 2000 om het onderscheid tussen financiële- en 
operationele leases op te heffen, laat zien dat deze voorgestelde methode ook door 
velen als een onbevredigend alternatief wordt gezien. 
 
Tenslotte toont hoofdstuk 2 aan dat wereldwijd leasing een belangrijke bron van 
financiering is geworden. Nadat in 1950 de eerste leasemaatschappij is opgericht (US 
Leasing Corp.) nam jaarlijks het volume in leasing toe, eerst vooral in de Verenigde 
Staten en vanaf de 80-er jaren groeit ook de omvang van leasing jaarlijks in Europa 
en Azië. Verschillende onderzoeken in de Verenigde Staten en in het Verenigd 
Koninkrijk hebben aangetoond dat operationele leases een veelvoud zijn van 
financiële leases. Ook voor de Nederlandse beursfondsen, die in deze studie zijn 
onderzocht, zijn de operationele leaseverplichtingen zes keer zo groot in omvang als 
de financiële leaseverplichtingen. Dit is vergelijkbaar met het Verenigd Koninkrijk 
(studie van Beattie et al (2006)), maar minder dan de Verenigde Staten waar een 
onderzoek van de SEC een veelvoud van veertien liet zien (SEC (2005)). In het 
“World Leasing Yearbook’ (Euromoney (2006)) levert Nederland een kleine bijdrage 
aan het totaal van Europa: 1,8% (11 miljard Euro) van de totale uitstaande bedragen. 
Echter deze gegevens worden aangeleverd via de nationale lease verenigingen (in 
Nederland de Nederlandse Vereniging van Leasemaatschappijen) en voor de 109 
beursfondsen onderzocht in deze studie, bedragen de nominale uitstaande 
operationele leaseverplichtingen al veel meer dan de genoemde 11 miljard Euro, 
namelijk ongeveer 30 miljard Euro. Duidelijk is dat een groot deel van de leases in 
Nederland zich buiten het gezichtsveld van de leasemaatschappijen afspeelt. Een 
verklaring voor het verschil kan verder zijn dat in Nederland de leasemaatschappijen 
zich gespecialiseerd hebben in roerende zaken (equipment leasing) terwijl in andere 
landen leasemaatschappijen meer betrokken zijn in onroerend goed en dat deze 
bedragen in omvang veel groter zijn. De relatieve omvang en belang van operationele 
leases bij de Nederlandse beursfondsen zal ook blijken uit de resultaten van 
hoofdstuk 5. 
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De conclusies van deel I zijn: 
• er is nog geen harmonisatie van de lease accounting standaarden wereldwijd; 
• het verschil tussen financiële- en operationele leases bestaat niet alleen uit 
verwerking op de balans of slechts in de toelichting, maar ook in het bedrag dat 
vermeld moet worden (contante waarde versus nominale waarde); 
• het voorstel om alle leases op de balans te kapitaliseren is een voortgaande 
discussie, met geen verwachte consensus op de korte termijn93; 
• leasing is wereldwijd een belangrijke vorm van financiering geworden waarbij 
operationele leases domineren. 
 
Deel II 
Deel II van dit proefschrift betreft de vraag of de informatie over operationele leases 
in de toelichting op de jaarrekening nuttige informatie voor gebruikers van de 
jaarrekening verschaft. Volgens de RJ en de IASB is het doel van de jaarrekening94 
om informatie te verstrekken over de financiële positie, resultaten en wijzigingen in 
de financiële positie van een onderneming, die voor een grote reeks van gebruikers 
nuttig is voor het nemen van economische beslissingen.  
 
Hoofdstuk 3 beschrijft vervolgens wat de kwalitatieve eisen zijn die gesteld worden 
aan nuttige informatie in de jaarrekening. Deze kwalitatieve criteria zijn ook 
neergelegd in het Stramien van de RJ (paragraaf 24 tot en met 42) en in het 
Framework van de IASB. De vier kwalitatieve criteria zijn: 
 
• Begrijpelijkheid; de informatie moet begrijpelijk zijn voor gebruikers met een 
redelijk kennisniveau; 
• Relevantie; de informatie is relevant indien het de economische beslissingen van 
een gebruiker kan beïnvloeden. De informatie kan relevant zijn door de aard van 
de informatie of doordat de informatie materieel is door haar omvang. 
Materialiteit verschaft daarmee een drempel of een kritische grens voor 
relevantie; boven deze grens is de informatie per definitie relevant. 
• Betrouwbaar; de informatie is betrouwbaar indien zij vrij is van onjuistheden of 
vooroordelen. Hiervoor dient de informatie een getrouw beeld te geven, gaat de 
economische realiteit boven de juridische vorm (‘substance over form’), is de 
informatie neutraal en voorzichtig opgesteld, en is de informatie volledig. 
• Vergelijkbaar; gebruikers van de jaarrekening moeten in staat gesteld worden de 
jaarrekeningen van één onderneming over verschillende jaren te kunnen 
vergelijken alsook verschillende ondernemingen onderling te kunnen  vergelijken. 
 
Niet al deze criteria zijn te toetsen aan de hand van de jaarrekening; bijvoorbeeld of 
de informatie vrij is van onjuistheden is niet te toetsen zonder te beschikken over 
informatie vanuit de onderneming, en of bijvoorbeeld de informatie begrijpelijk is 
kan alleen een enquête onder gebruikers uitwijzen. In hoofdstuk 3 zijn vijf 
onderzoekvragen geformuleerd, welke in hoofdstuk 5 empirisch getoetst worden.  
                                                          
93 Een nieuw voorstel van IASB en FASB wordt verwacht in 2008, en nieuwe regels worden niet verwacht voor 2009 
(IASB (2006)). 
94 Zoals neergelegd in paragraaf 12 van het Stramien voor de opstelling en vormgeving van jaarrekeningen. Het 
Stramien is een vertaling van het Framework for the preparation and presentation of financial statements van de IASB 
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Deze vragen luiden als volgt: 
1. Zijn de operationele leaseverplichtingen materieel (relevantie)? 
2. Wordt RJ292 door de ondernemingen nageleefd (betrouwbaar door naleving)? 
3. Is de informatie compleet om gebruikers in de gelegenheid te stellen de 
operationele leaseverplichtingen te kapitaliseren (betrouwbaar)? 
4. Worden financiële ratios significant beïnvloed door de kapitalisatie van 
operationele leases? (relevantie; vergelijkbaarheid) 
5. Verandert de positie van ondernemingen op basis van financiële ratios als de 
operationele leases gekapitaliseerd worden (vergelijkbaarheid)? 
 
Vanwege de overzichtelijkheid bij de beantwoording van deze vragen zijn de vragen 
gekoppeld aan één van de kwalitatieve criteria. Deze vragen zijn vaak ook te 
koppelen aan een ander criterium. Bijvoorbeeld of financiële ratios significant 
beïnvloed worden door de kapitalisatie van de operationele leaseverplichtingen 
(vraag 4) hangt ook samen met hoe materieel de verplichtingen zijn (relevantie). 
Toch is deze vraag ondergebracht onder het criterium ‘vergelijkbaarheid’ omdat 
onder andere getoetst wordt in hoeverre de vergelijking tussen ondernemingen 
wijzigt door de operationele leaseverplichtingen. Verder dient nog opgemerkt te 
worden dat de niet-naleving van de leaseaccounting standaard (vraag 2) niet zozeer 
een tekortkoming van de informatievereiste accounting standaard is, maar van het 
toezicht op de naleving van de standaard. Met vraag 2 wordt in deze studie toch een 
koppeling gemaakt met het betrouwbaarheidcriterium van de informatie in de 
jaarrekening. 
 
Om bovenstaande vragen te kunnen beantwoorden dienen de (off-balance) 
operationele leaseverplichtingen omgerekend te worden naar een on-balance 
equivalent. De gebruiker van de jaarrekening dient een kapitalisatiemethode toe te 
passen, dit wordt beschreven in hoofdstuk 4. Voorgaand onderzoek toont aan dat 
verschillende kapitalisatiemethoden voorhanden zijn, onder te verdelen in 
‘multipliermethoden’ en ‘contante-waarde methoden’. De multipliermethoden 
schatten de gekapitaliseerde waarde van de operationele leaseverplichtingen door de 
verplichting van het komende jaar te vermenigvuldigen met een vaste waarde, de 
multiplier. Deze multiplier kan een vaste waarde zijn (bijvoorbeeld zes of acht) of kan 
berekend worden aan de hand van een variërende rente en geschatte resterende 
levensduur van de lease portefeuille (zie onder andere UBSWarburg (2001)). De 
multipliermethoden worden vanwege hun eenvoud in de praktijk gebruikt95 maar 
negeren de leaseverplichtingen na het eerste jaar, waardoor ze minder betrouwbaar 
zijn dan de contante-waarde methoden. De contante waarde methoden berekenen de 
contante waarde van alle toekomstige leaseverplichtingen. Hiervoor dienen wel 
enkele aannames gemaakt te worden betreffende de rente waartegen contant 
gemaakt wordt, over de resterende looptijd van de leaseverplichtingen en over de 
verhouding tussen de nog resterende looptijd- en de oorspronkelijke totale looptijd 
van de leaseverplichtingen. De (geschatte) resterende looptijd bepaalt hoelang, en 
volgens welk schema de vermelde leaseverplichtingen vervallende-na-vijf-jaar nog 
doorlopen. De verhouding tussen de resterende looptijd en de originele totale looptijd 
                                                          
95 Zie bijvoorbeeld jaarrekening van Unilever 2004 waar de netto schuld wordt herberekend door vijf keer de 
leaseverplichting voor het komende jaar op te tellen bij de niet-aangepaste netto schuld. 
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van de leaseverplichtingen is van belang voor de relatie tussen de contante waarde 
van de leaseverplichtingen en de resterende waarde van geleasde activa96.  
 
Hoofdstuk 4 vergelijkt vervolgens zeven verschillende methoden op basis van de 
aannames en de calculaties. Van deze zeven verschillende methoden betreffen drie 
methoden een multipliermethode, en vier een contante-waarde methode. Van deze 
contante-waarde methoden komen er drie uit eerdere studies van Imhoff, Lipe en 
Wright (1991; 1997), van Beattie, Thomson en Goodacre (1998) en Ely (1995). De 
vierde methode is een verfijning op deze methoden aangebracht in dit proefschrift. 
De verfijnde methode stemt het afschrijvingschema van de geleasde activa af op het 
aflossingsschema van de operationele lease verplichting. Een onderneming met het 
merendeel korte termijn leases (bijvoorbeeld auto’s of computers) heeft een ander 
aflossingschema in de leaseverplichtingen dan een onderneming met overwegend 
lange termijn leases (bijvoorbeeld onroerend goed), terwijl ze beide een even lange 
resterende looptijd kunnen hebben97. De eerder genoemde studies houden hier geen 
of onvoldoende rekening mee en dit leidt vooral tot verschillen in de ratios waarbij de 
afschrijving van de activa een rol speelt (bijvoorbeeld bij de aanpassing van netto 
winst). Hoofdstuk 4 sluit af met een voorbeeld (aan de hand van de jaarrekening van 
KPN) dat illustreert waartoe de verschillen tussen de zeven kapitalisatiemethoden 
kunnen leiden. 
 
Hoofdstuk 5 toetst vervolgens de vijf vragen, zoals in hoofdstuk 3 geformuleerd, aan 
de hand van de informatie in de jaarrekening van 119 Nederlandse beursfondsen 
gedurende de periode 2000-2004. De jaarrekeningen van financiële instellingen zijn 
niet in het onderzoek opgenomen. De informatie over de operationele 
leaseverplichtingen zijn handmatig verzameld uit de toelichtingen, aangezien er geen 
financiële database bestaat waarin de verplichtingen compleet zijn opgenomen. Dit 
wordt mede veroorzaakt doordat veel ondernemingen de leaseaccounting standaard 
niet naleven, waardoor de verstrekte informatie moeilijk in een standaard 
vormgeving van een database past. In 2004 voldoet 36% van de ondernemingen in de 
dataset niet aan RJ292. Dit is een verbetering ten opzichte van 2000 waar 59% nog 
niet voldeed aan de regelgeving, maar betekent dat nog steeds 37 van de 103 
ondernemingen met operationele leases in de toelichting onvoldoende informatie 
verstrekt. Hoewel dit niet te wijten is aan de accounting standaard zelf, de standaard 
wordt niet nageleefd, is dit wel een bedreiging voor het betrouwbaarheidscriterium 
van nuttige informatie. De informatie is onvolledig, niet neutraal en geeft geen 
getrouw beeld van de financiële situatie van deze ondernemingen. Bovendien kan 
voor deze ondernemingen geen gekapitaliseerde waarde van de operationele leases 
berekend worden, zodat deze ondernemingen niet vergeleken kunnen worden met 
andere ondernemingen of  bepaald kan worden of de bedragen materieel zijn. 
 
Uiteindelijk kan voor 379 waarnemingen de contante waarde van de operationele 
lease berekend worden (hiervan hebben 77 waarnemingen geen operationele leases 
                                                          
96 Vanwege het verschil tussen de annuïtaire aflossing van de leaseverplichtingen en de lineaire afschrijving van de 
activa, gaat de afschrijving in eerste instantie harder dan de aflossing en zal bij kapitalisatie van de lease, het geleasde 
actief voor een lager bedrag op de balans geactiveerd worden dan de leaseverplichting. Zie hiervoor figuur 4.2. Dit 
verschil tussen geleasde activa en leaseverplichtingen heeft een effect op de aanpassing van de (netto- en operationele) 
winst en voor het eigen vermogen.  
97 Bijvoorbeeld als ze beide leaseverplichtingen hebben met een nog resterende looptijd van 20 jaar en dit betreft bij 
de ene onderneming 50% van de totale verplichtingen en bij de ander slechts 10%. De resterende looptijd is dan gelijk 
maar het aflossingsschema verschilt. 
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en is de contante waarde dus nul). Gemiddeld hebben deze 379 ondernemingen ruim 
14% aan operationele leaseverplichtingen ten opzichte van het balanstotaal (mediaan 
4,3%). Indien de ondernemingen zonder leases bij de berekening worden uitgesloten 
(deze ondernemingen verlagen uiteraard het gemiddelde) is het gemiddelde 17,8% 
(mediaan 6,3%). Gemiddeld neemt het totale vreemd vermogen, het lange termijn 
vreemd vermogen, het balanstotaal en de netto winst toe met respectievelijk 23%, 
26%, 5% en 1%. Deze toename is in alle gevallen significant (1%-niveau). De 
operationele leaseverplichtingen zijn materieel voor tenminste 45% van de 379 
ondernemingen waarbij als materialiteitsmaatstaf het percentage van de contante 
waarde van de operationele leaseverplichtingen ten opzichte van het balanstotaal 
(PVOLTA) is genomen, met een grenswaarde van 5%. Dit betekent dat voor 
minimaal 45% van de ondernemingen de operationele leaseverplichtingen relevant 
zijn en deze verplichtingen bij de financiële analyse meegenomen moeten worden. 
 
Vervolgens is berekend hoe gevoelig de berekening van de contante waarde van de 
operationele leases is voor aannames betreffende de rente, de resterende looptijd, de 
oorspronkelijke looptijd en de gebruikte kapitalisatiemethoden. De uitkomsten tonen 
aan dat vooral de kapitalisatiemethode en de rente de uitkomsten beïnvloeden, 
waarbij vooral de simplistische multiplier methode afwijkt van de overige methoden. 
Dit zou voorkomen kunnen worden door het vermelden van de contante waarde van 
de operationele leaseverplichtingen. Hierdoor hoeft de gebruiker van de jaarrekening 
zelf geen aannames te maken of kapitalisatieprocedures uit te voeren en neemt de 
gebruiksvriendelijkheid van de informatie toe. Bovendien zou dit ook leiden tot meer 
harmonisatie en een betere vergelijkbaarheid tussen de weergave van financiële 
leases en operationele leases. 
 
Tenslotte toont hoofdstuk 5 aan dat de vergelijkbaarheid van ondernemingen in het 
geding is als de operationele leases niet worden meegenomen bij de berekeningen 
van financiële ratios. De impact op de financiële ratios is het grootst bij ratios waar 
een schuldverhouding berekend wordt. Bijvoorbeeld vreemd vermogen ten opzichte 
van totaal vermogen neemt gemiddeld toe met 32% (mediaan 24%) of lang-vreemd-
vermogen ten opzichte van geïnvesteerd kapitaal neemt toe met gemiddeld 47% 
(mediaan 57%). Dit betekent dat hoewel een kleine meerderheid van de 
ondernemingen geen materiële leaseverplichtingen in de toelichting vermeldt, het 
ten behoeve van de vergelijkbaarheid tussen ondernemingen de operationele 
leaseverplichtingen van alle ondernemingen in de financiële analyse dienen te 
worden meegenomen. De vergelijking van weinig-leasende ondernemingen en veel-
leasende ondernemingen op basis van financiële ratios zal anders een verkeerd beeld 
geven. 
 
Naar aanleiding van bovenstaande resultaten zijn de belangrijkste conclusies en 
aanbevelingen voor deel II als volgt: 
• De niet-naleving van de lease-accounting standaard tast het 
betrouwbaarheidscriterium van nuttige informatie aan; 
• Voor veel ondernemingen is de informatie over operationele leaseverplichtingen 
relevant en gebruikers van de jaarrekening dienen deze informatie in acht te 
nemen bij de financiële analyse van de jaarrekening van een onderneming; 
• De vereiste informatie in de toelichting is onvoldoende compleet. De kapitalisatie 
van de operationele leaseverplichtingen is gevoelig voor de keuzes en aannames 
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van de individuele gebruiker en dit maakt de informatie onvoldoende 
betrouwbaar.  
 
Bovenstaande resultaten pleiten voor een wettelijke verplichting de accounting 
standaarden na te leven en een strenger toezicht op de naleving in Nederland98. 
Daarnaast is het wenselijk de accounting standaard te wijzigen zodat in plaats van 
de nominale waarde, de contante waarde van de operationele leases wordt vermeld in 
de toelichting. Dit vergroot de transparantie en de betrouwbaarheid van de 
informatie; de kapitalisatie door de gebruikers is niet meer gevoelig voor aannames 
en kan efficiënter plaatsvinden; en de informatie zal naar alle waarschijnlijkheid 
eenvoudiger beschikbaar komen door financiële databanken. Het opnemen van de 
contante waarde leidt bovendien tot een harmonisatie van de wijze van vermelden 
tussen financiële- en operationele leases. 
 
Deel III 
Deel III van dit proefschrift onderzoekt de vraag welke karakteristieken van een 
onderneming mede bepalen of een onderneming relatief veel- of weinig operationele 
leaseverplichtingen heeft (’lease-intensiteit’). Het antwoord op deze vraag geeft 
inzicht in de keuze van een onderneming om operationele leases te kiezen als 
financieringsvorm. In hoofdstuk 2 is beschreven dat deze keuze zowel op grond van 
financieel/economische redenen (bijvoorbeeld belastingvoordelen, gemak) gemaakt 
kan worden als omwille van accounting specifieke redenen (schuld buiten de balans 
houden). De resultaten van dit deel II kunnen bijdragen in de discussie of alle leases 
op de balans geactiveerd dienen te worden en de accounting reden om leases te 
kiezen daarmee vervalt. 
 
Hoofdstuk 6 beschrijft het theoretische kader en het voorgaande onderzoek op het 
gebied van de determinanten voor de leasebeslissing. Paragraaf 6.2 beschrijft de 
relatie tussen de positieve accounting theorie, de literatuur over accounting keuzes 
en de financiële contracten theorie. De positieve accounting theorie beschrijft het 
(mogelijke) opportunistische gedrag van het management van ondernemingen en de 
relatie met accounting variabelen. Financiële contracten hebben vaak tot doel 
agentschapkosten99 te verminderen, waarbij de accounting keuze literatuur dit 
splitst in interne agentschapkosten (managementbeloning, ‘bonusplan hypothesis’) 
en externe agentschapkosten (maximale schuldverhouding in leenovereenkomsten; 
‘debt-covenant hypothesis’). In paragraaf 6.3 worden vervolgens negen verschillende 
studies beschreven waarin eerder onderzoek naar de determinanten van de 
leasebeslissing is gedaan. Deze onderzoeken worden vergeleken op basis van de 
afhankelijke variabele in het onderzoek (een bepaalde lease-intensiteit maatstaf) en 
de verklarende variabelen. Er zijn slechts drie studies die als afhankelijke variabele 
operationele leases gebruiken. De overige studies onderzoeken, ofwel alleen de 
financiële leases, ofwel de financiële- plus operationele leases gezamenlijk. Dit is 
verwonderlijk aangezien de meeste studies specifiek aandacht schenken aan het off-
                                                          
98 Sinds 1 januari 2005 zijn beursgenoteerde ondernemingen in Nederland wettelijk verplicht de IFRS na te leven 
(Tweede Kamer, 2002, nr. 28 220). Het toezicht op de naleving is per 31 december 2006 wettelijk geregeld bij het 
inwerking treden van de Wet toezicht financiële verslaggeving (Staatsblad 2006, nrs. 569, 570, 571). 
99 Agentschapskosten vloeien voort uit contracten waarmee één partij (de principaal) een andere partij (de agent) 
werft, en beslissingsbevoegdheid geeft, om in zijn naam een bepaalde taak uit te voeren. Hoewel in deze 
agentschapsrelatie in eerste instantie de relatie tussen aandeelhouder (principaal) en manager (agent) werd bedoeld 
(Jensen and Meckling (1976)), is ze ook algemener te definiëren en dekt ze meerdere relaties tussen twee partijen 
waarbij de situatie van de één, afhangt van de actie van de ander. 
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balance karakter van operationele leases en de gevolgen hiervan voor de 
schuldverhouding. Dit kan bovendien tegengestelde uitkomsten van empirisch 
onderzoek tot gevolg hebben, wat door middel van een voorbeeld (figuur 6.1) is 
aangetoond.  
 
Op basis van de determinanten van voorgaande studies zijn tien verschillende 
determinanten en/of karakteristieken van ondernemingen beschreven, waarna voor 
elke determinant één of meerdere hypotheses zijn geformuleerd. Deze determinanten 
zijn; de schuldverhouding, de omvang van de onderneming, de financiële prestaties, 
de groei in het verleden, toekomstige investeringsmogelijkheden, de kapitaal- en 
arbeidsintensiteit, de effectieve belastingdruk, managementbeloning, de 
eigendomsconcentratie en de sector waarin de onderneming actief is. Voor enkele van 
deze hypotheses is een verschil gemaakt tussen de verwachte relatie met-, en zonder- 
de operationele leases te kapitaliseren. Dit, vanwege de mogelijke invloed van de 
operationele leases op de betreffende determinant. Zoals eerder beschreven geldt dit 
bijvoorbeeld voor de schuldverhouding. 
 
In hoofdstuk 7 worden de hypotheses vervolgens empirisch getest. De invloed van de 
kapitalisatie van de operationele leases op zowel de afhankelijke-, als de 
verklarende-variabelen wordt hier getoetst door sommige tests tweemaal uit te 
voeren als de operationele leases hier invloed op kunnen hebben. Eenmaal zonder de 
operationele lease te kapitaliseren en eenmaal door de operationele leases wel te 
kapitaliseren. Verder is de relatie met de lease-intensiteit zowel getest voor elke 
determinant afzonderlijk (univariate analyse), als gezamenlijk in een model 
(regressie analyse). Tenslotte is de afhankelijke variabele (lease-intensiteit) in deze 
analyses op twee manieren berekend; ten eerste als een relatieve maatstaf (contante 
waarde operationele leases ten opzichte van balanstotaal; PVOLTA) en ten tweede 
als een absolute maatstaf, een lease-intensiteit dummy (1 voor veel-leasende 
ondernemingen, 0 als weinig-leasende ondernemingen). Deze indeling is gemaakt op 
basis van de materialiteitstoetsen uit hoofdstuk 5.  
 
Vervolgens is voor elk van de determinanten een univariate analyse uitgevoerd 
waarbij steeds twee statistische tests zijn uitgevoerd. De eerste univariate test 
betreft de correlatie100 tussen de relatieve omvang van de operationele leases 
(PVOLTA) en de betreffende determinant. Uiteraard betreft dit alleen die 
ondernemingen in de dataset waarvoor de contante waarde van de operationele 
leaseverplichtingen berekend kon worden. De tweede univariate test betreft de 
verschillenanalyse tussen de twee groepen, te weten de veel- en weinig-leasende 
ondernemingen, aan de hand van het gemiddelde en de mediaan van de 
determinanten. Vervolgens is de relatie tussen de verschillende determinanten en de 
lease-intensiteit ook in een regressie getest. Vanwege de twee vormen waarin de 
lease-intensiteit is gemeten, de relatieve maatstaf en de dummy variabele, zijn er ook 
twee regressie methoden gebruikt: een lineaire regressie voor de relatieve lease-
intensiteit en de logit-regressie voor de lease-intensiteit dummy (1 of 0).  
 
                                                          
100 Spearman rank correlatie: correlatie tussen de medianen. 
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Naar aanleiding van de resultaten van hoofdstuk 7 zijn de voornaamste conclusies 
van deel III als volgt: 
• de schuldverhouding, berekend met inachtneming van de operationele leases, 
is een belangrijke determinant bij de beslissing om voor operationele leases te 
kiezen (bevestiging van de debt-covenant hypothesis); 
• indien de schuldverhouding niet wordt aangepast voor de operationele leases, 
wordt een tegengestelde relatie gevonden, wat aangeeft dat de onderneming er 
in slaagt schuldverhouding te verlagen door operationele leases; 
• naast de schuldverhouding hebben ondernemingen met een grotere omvang, 
een geconcentreerde eigendomstructuur (% aandeelbelang bij één partij) en 
ondernemingen in de sector ‘handel’ significant meer operationele leases dan 
ondernemingen zonder deze karakteristieken; 
• een significante negatieve relatie met de operationele lease intensiteit werd 
gevonden voor ondernemingen met een betere financiële prestatie en voor 
arbeidsintensievere ondernemingen; 
• voor de overige determinanten werd in de modellen geen significante relatie 
gevonden. 
 
Bovenstaande resultaten tonen aan dat de ondernemingen operationele leases kiezen 
zowel vanwege het off-balance karakter (accounting reden) als om economische 
redenen (zoals het vermijden van risico’s verbonden aan economische eigendom of 
vanwege flexibiliteit).  
 
Deel IV 
Deel IV onderzoekt of het meenemen van de operationele leaseverplichtingen in 
faillissementvoorspelmodellen de nauwkeurigheid verbetert van de classificatie als 
gezonde- danwel ondernemingen in financiële problemen (‘probleemondernemingen’). 
Deze nauwkeurigheid wordt berekend aan de hand van correct geclassificeerde 
ondernemingen. Vergelijkbare studies zijn uitgevoerd door Elam (1975) en Lawrence 
en Bear (1986). De resultaten van de voorgaande hoofdstukken hebben echter laten 
zien dat een hernieuwd onderzoek op zijn plaats is. Ten eerste is het gebruik van 
operationele leases de afgelopen decennia toegenomen en is er meer en betere 
informatie beschikbaar gekomen (hoofdstuk 2 en 5). Ten tweede hebben de 
operationele leases een significante impact op sommige financiële ratios waaronder 
de schuldverhouding (hoofdstuk 5), welke ratios bovendien vaak voorspellende 
waarde hebben bij het voorspellen van faillissement. Ten derde kan het ontwijken 
van een te hoge schuldverhouding, een reden zijn om voor operationele leases te 
kiezen (hoofdstuk 7). Dit zou vooral op ondernemingen in financiële problemen van 
toepassing kunnen zijn. Tenslotte is er sinds voornoemde studies veel veranderd in 
zowel de statistische methoden, als in het gebruik van de datasets, bij het 
voorspellen van financiële problemen. De impact van operationele leases op de 
onderlinge vergelijking van ondernemingen is aangetoond in hoofdstuk 5, en deze 
impact kan wellicht ook een invloed hebben bij het vergelijken van gezonde 
ondernemingen met ondernemingen in financiële problemen.  
 
In hoofdstuk 8 wordt voorgaand onderzoek naar het voorspellen van faillissementen 
beschreven. Aangetoond wordt dat in veel studies financiële ratios gebruikt worden 
om faillissement te voorspellen. Vooral financiële ratios met betrekking tot 
performance, schuldverhouding en kasstromen blijken voorspellende waarde te 
hebben bij het voorspellen van faillissement. In het gebruik van de financiële ratios 
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in de voorspelmodellen zit weinig variatie en de keuze wordt veelal niet bepaald door 
onderliggende theoretische argumentatie maar door resultaten van voorgaande 
studies. In de afgelopen decennia zijn echter wel de statistische technieken 
veranderd, waarbij een verschuiving heeft plaatsgevonden van het gebruik van 
multiple discriminant analyse (MDA) naar logit analyse. Deze verschuiving heeft 
vooral te maken met de statistische vereisten voor de dataset waar bij MDA vaak 
niet aan voldaan werd. Toch hebben verschillende onderzoeken aangetoond dat de 
voorspellende kracht van logit-analyse niet groter is dan die van MDA (zie 
bijvoorbeeld Altman et al. (1994) en Pompe and Bilderbeek (2000)). 
 
In hoofdstuk 8 worden vervolgens de drie studies beschreven die operationele leases 
meenemen in hun model: Elam (1975), Lawrence en Bear (1986) en Altman et al. 
(1977). Alleen de eerste twee doen een uitspraak over de toegevoegde waarde van 
operationele leases in hun modellen. Elam concludeert dat de toevoeging van 
operationele leases niet de voorspellende kracht van financiële ratios in faillissement 
voorspelmodellen vergroot. Deze conclusie wordt in 1986 gedeeld door Lawrence en 
Bear. Alledrie deze studies gebruiken multiple discriminant analyse en een dataset 
waarbij elke failliete onderneming gekoppeld wordt aan een gezond bedrijf op basis 
van industrie sector en omvang van de onderneming (‘matched pairs’). Bovendien 
zaten in Elam’s dataset alleen ondernemingen met operationele leases. Het matchen 
van ondernemingen wordt vaak bekritiseerd omdat de variabelen waarmee 
gematched wordt, beter als verklarende variabele in het model kunnen worden 
gebruikt dan als matching variabele (zie Ohlson (1980)). Een alternatief is de failliete 
bedrijven af te zetten tegen een zo groot mogelijke dataset van gezonde bedrijven 
(‘full sample’).  
 
Het empirisch onderzoek in hoofdstuk 9 wordt op verschillende manieren uitgevoerd 
om zowel een vergelijking te kunnen maken met voorgaand onderzoek, alsook de 
verbeterde inzichten omtrent methoden en dataverzameling toe te kunnen passen. 
Daarom wordt allereerst als statistische methode zowel discriminantanalyse, als 
logit-analyse toegepast. Ten tweede wordt elke test uitgevoerd met zowel een 
matched pairs (36 gezonde- en 36 probleemondernemingen) dataset als met een full 
dataset (61 gezonde- en 36 probleemondernemingen). De classificaties van de 
verschillende modellen worden vergeleken, en aan de hand van de kritische z-waarde 
wordt een uitspraak gedaan over de statistische significantie van de verschillen.  
 
De univariate resultaten laten zien dat in het jaar voor de financiële problemen de 
volgende ratios significant verschillen tussen gezonde- en probleemondernemingen: 
operationele winst (EBIT) en vreemd vermogen (beide ten opzichte van het 
balanstotaal), en de rentedekking. Het maakt voor deze resultaten niet uit of de 
operationele lease wel of niet in de ratios zijn meegenomen. Wat betreft de lease-
intensiteit laten de resultaten zien dat de lease-intensiteit ratios (operationele lease 
ten opzichte van balanstotaal of ten opzichte van omzet) het hoogst zijn bij de 
bedrijven in financiële problemen (gemiddeld respectievelijk 14% en 18%) waarbij dit 
voor complete set gezonde ondernemingen significant lager is (respectievelijk 7% en 
6% voor de full dataset). Voor de matched set gezonde ondernemingen (n=36) zijn de 
lease-intensiteit ratios ook lager maar niet statistisch significant verschillend met de 
ondernemingen in problemen. 
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In de regressie analyses zijn zestien verschillende regressies uitgevoerd. Er zijn 
steeds vier modellen getest: model 1 zonder inachtneming operationele leases, model 
2 waarbij de ratios zijn aangepast voor operationele lease, model 3 is als model 2 plus 
de lease-intensiteit als extra variabele erbij, en model 4 zijn de onaangepaste ratios 
met de lease-intensiteit als extra variabele erbij. Aangezien elk model getest is met 
discriminant- en logit-analyse, en met matched- versus complete-set gezonde 
bedrijven, zijn er voor zestien regressies resultaten. Alle zestien modellen voorspellen 
significant (1%-niveau) beter dan een randommodel. De regressie modellen laten zien 
dat de beste voorspelling wordt behaald door de logit-regressies met gebruik van de 
complete set gezonde ondernemingen. In het beste model (model 4, logit, complete 
set) wordt een classificatie van 93% correcte voorspellingen behaald. In het slechtste 
model (model 1, discriminant, matched pairs) wordt een classificatie score van 72% 
behaald. De verschillen tussen de methoden is niet significant, het gebruik van de 
complete set gezonde ondernemingen ten opzichte van de matched pairs wel. In het 
beste model (93% correct) is de relatie tussen operationele lease-intensiteit en 
financiële moeilijkheden positief significant (5%), maar wordt het voorspelmodel niet 
significant beter ten opzichte van het model waar de operationele-leases niet in 
zitten (90% correct). 
 
Op basis van voorgaande resultaten wordt de hypothese, dat ondernemingen in 
financiële problemen relatief meer operationele leaseverplichtingen hebben, 
bevestigd maar wordt de hypothese, dat de operationele leaseverplichtingen de 
accuratesse van de voorspelmodellen vergroot, verworpen. 
 
Deel V 
In deel V wordt een samenvatting van elk deel gegeven en worden conclusies 
getrokken en aanbevelingen gedaan. De belangrijkste conclusies zijn: 
• dat operationele leases wereldwijd een omvangrijke vorm van financiering 
zijn; 
• dat zowel de activering op de balans (voorstel IASB/FASB), als de verwerking 
in de toelichting (huidige standaarden), voor- en tegenstanders heeft; 
• dat de huidige internationale lease-accounting standaarden te weinig 
informatie vereisen, zodat de gebruiker van de jaarrekening niet goed in staat 
is om de leaseverplichtingen betrouwbaar en consistent te kapitaliseren; 
• dat de leaseverplichtingen voor sommige ondernemingen dusdanig materieel 
zijn, dat het negeren van deze verplichtingen een financiële analyse 
onbetrouwbaar zou maken; 
• dat in Nederland in ieder geval tot 2004 de lease accounting standaard 
bovendien slecht werd nageleefd en dat de wettelijke verplichting de 
standaard na te leven wenselijk is; 
• dat de keuze om voor operationele lease te kiezen mede bepaald wordt door de 
mogelijkheid verplichtingen off-balance te brengen (accounting motieven) 
maar dat ook economische motieven een belangrijke rol spelen; 
• dat failissements-voorspelmodellen niet significant verbeteren door de 
inachtneming van operationele leases, hoewel ondernemingen in financiële 
problemen gemiddeld wel relatief meer operationele leases hebben dan 
gezonde ondernemingen. 
 
Het doel van dit proefschrift was een bijdrage te leveren aan de discussie of alle 
leases op de balans gepassiveerd/geactiveerd-, danwel in de toelichting vermeld 
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dienen te worden. Op basis van de resultaten uit deel II kom ik tot de conclusie dat 
de huidige lease accounting standaard niet voldoet en de gebruiker van de 
jaarrekening voorziet van onvoldoende informatie over de operationele 
leaseverplichtingen. Mijn aanbeveling is dan ook dat de contante waarde van de 
operationele leaseverplichtingen vereist moet worden. Dit vergroot de transparantie 
van de informatie, is efficiënter voor de gebruiker van de jaarrekening die de 
verplichtingen voor zijn analyse wil kapitaliseren, voorkomt daarmee verkeerde 
schattingen en is bovendien meer in lijn met de informatie-vereisten van financiële 
lease waarbij ook de contante waarde vermeld dient te worden. Daarbij maakt het 
niet-naleven van de accounting standaard bij de Nederlandse ondernemingen de 
informatie nog minder betrouwbaar en transparant voor de gebruiker van de 
jaarrekening. De wettelijke verplichting de accounting standaarden te volgen (per 1 
januari 2005) en wettelijk toezicht (per 31 december 2006) hierop is daarom 
noodzakelijk.  
 
De resultaten van deel III en IV tonen aan dat het gebruik van operationele lease 
mede bepaald wordt door het off-balance kunnen brengen van verplichtingen, wat 
veelal als een dubieuze reden wordt aangedragen. Echter, ook de economische 
redenen voortvloeiende uit de aard van de transactie (geen juridisch en economisch 
eigendom) hebben een positieve relatie met de mate waarin een onderneming voor 
(operationele) leases kiest. En ondanks het feit dat de operationele leases vaak 
gekozen worden vanwege de verbetering van financiële ratios, zijn meer operationele 
leases geen voorbode van financiële problemen bij een onderneming.  
 
Nu de IASB en de FASB zich in de nabije toekomst zullen buigen over een nieuwe 
opzet van de accounting standaard betreffende leasing, hoop ik met dit proefschrift 
een eerste aanzet te hebben gegeven voor een alternatief tussen twee uitersten. De 
discussie of rechten en verplichtingen uit langlopende overeenkomsten wel of niet op 
de balans opgenomen dienen te worden strekt zich namelijk veel verder uit dan 
alleen leasecontracten101 (denk aan contracten waarbij een verplichting is aangegaan 
maar de prestaties nog niet geleverd zijn, zgn executory contracts) en zal daarom 
eerst gevoerd moeten worden. In de tussentijd is een aanpassing van de huidige 
standaard gewenst als het gaat om de betrouwbaarheid en transparantie van de 
informatie. Dit zal bovendien het negatieve imago van operationele lease als puur 
accounting instrument verbeteren. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
101 De IASB (2000) maakt een onderscheid tussen lease-contracten en ‘executory contracts’s welke laatste zij wil 
uitsluiten van de nieuwe accounting standaard. Het gaat hier bijvoorbeeld om contracten waarbij de verplichting al 
wel is aangegaan maar de tegenprestatie nog niet is geleverd, of om service contracten. Reacties hierop zijn onder 
andere dat de IASB het ene arbitraire onderscheid (financiële versus operationele leases) inruilt voor een andere 
(leases versus executory contracts), British Bankers Association (2000) en Mullen (2000), beide reacties op het IASB-
voorstel. 
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